

SOME ACCOUNT
OF
THE PUBLIC LIFE,
AND
A SELECTION
FROM THE UNPUBLISHED WRITINGS,
OF
THE EARL OF MACARTNEY.

THE LATTER CONSISTING OF
EXTRACTS FROM AN ACCOUNT OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE: A SKETCH OF THE
POLITICAL HISTORY OF IRELAND: AND A JOURNAL OF AN EMBASSY FROM
THE KING OF GREAT BRITAIN TO THE EMPEROR OF CHINA:

WITH AN APPENDIX TO EACH VOLUME.

By JOHN BARROW, F.R.S.

AUTHOR OF "TRAVELS IN CHINA" AND "SOUTHERN AFRICA,"
AND OF "A VOYAGE TO COCHINCHINA."

Erin nos genuit, vidit nos Africa, Gangem
Hausimus, Europæque plagas fere visimus omnes;
Nec latuit regio primum patefacta Columbo;
Sinarum licuit dextram tetigisse tyranni,
Tartaricos montes, magnum et transcendere murum,
Turbidaque impavidi tentavimus alta Pe-che-læ,
Hactenus Europæ nullis sulcata carinis:
Casibus et variis acti, terræque marique,
Sistimus hic tandem, atque Lares veneramur Avorum. — MACARTNEY.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR T. CADELL AND W. DAVIES IN THE STRAND.

1807.

SOME ACCOUNT


OF

THE PUBLIC LIFE

AND

A SELECTION

FROM THE UNPUBLISHED WRITINGS



THE EARL OF CARLISLE

THE EARL OF CARLISLE, IN ACCOUNT OF THE PUBLIC LIFE AND A SELECTION FROM THE UNPUBLISHED WRITINGS OF THE EARL OF CARLISLE, BY THE REV. JOHN GIBSON, D.D., F.R.S., &c.

WITH AN APPENDIX TO THE VOLUME

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P R E F A C E.

IF, in conformity with common usage, I am led to say a few words, by way of preface, concerning the work which is now submitted to the public, it will be merely for the purpose of explaining the motives which urged me to the undertaking, and the limits within which I thought proper to confine myself in the execution of it.

In the first place then, the design originated in a hint that was conveyed to me of the great probability, amounting indeed nearly to a certainty, that the history of a life employed on such various and extraordinary occasions, as that had been of Lord Macartney, might be expected, in these times of general reading, to find its way into print in some shape or other, however imperfect; for that even in his life time application had been made to him for materials for this purpose, and that the pursuit of such materials after his death was not likely to be abandoned. On this suggestion I became naturally desirous not to be anticipated in a work of this nature; and thus deprived of the opportunity of fulfilling what I considered to be a duty to the memory of a great and distinguished public character, particularly due from one who for so many years had enjoyed his friendship and been honored with his patronage. It appeared to me, indeed, on every consideration which I could give to the subject, that a

faithful sketch of the public conduct of a man who had filled various and eminent situations in the four quarters of the globe, of one who, with the eye of a statesman and a philosopher, had surveyed mankind in every region and climate of the earth, and who, after a long and laborious life spent in the service of his country with an unblemished reputation, resigned it at last full of years and crowned with honor, in the midst of his friends and in the bosom of his family—it appeared, I say, that a sketch of such a life would afford an illustrious example for imitation not unworthy of being handed down to posterity; and in this opinion I had the satisfaction to be confirmed by the concurrence of many of those friends, who were most dear to him when living, and in whose memory he will long survive. Such were the motives and the origin of the undertaking.

The execution, if confined to a plain narrative of facts, could not be difficult. On the perusal of the documents however, from which the account was to be drawn up, an impression was left on my mind strongly in favor of extending the narrative, so as to comprize a concise history of the principal events, transactions, and politics of the times and places which were comprehended within the sphere of Lord Macartney's public functions; and of which his respective employments might be supposed to have enabled him to obtain the most correct information; but I soon perceived that such a plan, however it may be sanctioned by the practice of modern biography, would have led me into details not perhaps strictly consistent with the nature of the work, and must, at all events, have swelled it to an immoderate size. I determined therefore to confine myself rigidly to those events and transactions in which the subject of the narrative bore a conspicuous part; following him through all the various situations of his public life, without once losing sight of him, or quitting his company in any of those intricate paths which he frequently had to tread. Being thus furnished with the means

of giving a tolerable account of the many difficulties he had to encounter, the firmness with which he always met them, and the wisdom by which he overcame them, I flattered myself with the hope of being able to exhibit an illustrious example of extraordinary self-denial and disinterestedness, of inflexible integrity, unabating zeal, and unrelaxing energy in the public service. It has likewise been my endeavor, in this attempt, to introduce his own sentiments in his own language on all occasions, whenever the one or the other, or both, could be adopted without interruption to the narrative; and I have throughout most scrupulously adhered to such documents as were either of a public and official nature, or such as I had unquestionable proof to be of good authority, without hazarding any conjectures of my own, or indeed scarcely venturing to offer a single reflection. Had I indulged an inclination to launch into a strain of general and indiscriminate panegyric, I might well have been pardoned where so much was owing, and might probably have obtained credit; but I felt that it would be more satisfactory to the public, and not less just to the memory of my patron, rather to relate his actions than to recite his praise.

In every situation in which he was engaged in the public service, the great and leading features of Lord Macartney's character appear to have been of the same cast; but in narrating the history of his life I have deemed it expedient to dwell at greater length on his Government in India, where the powers of his mind had greater scope for action than elsewhere. Here, indeed, his virtues shone forth with transcendent lustre; here, surrounded with intrigue and corruption, his integrity exposed him to every kind of calumny, his zeal to a hostile opposition, and every measure he took for the detection and reformation of abuse, was pregnant with difficulty, and attended with danger. If, in taking a survey of his public conduct in this quarter of the globe, I have been compelled, from a regard to truth and justice, to state some facts which may seem to bear

somewhat hard upon certain individuals, (and to have suppressed them would be little less than treason to the subject of this memoir), I hope, at least, to be believed when I assert that I entered upon my task free from all prejudice and partiality; that I was in a great degree ignorant of Indian politics, and wholly unacquainted with any of the parties connected with them, except Lord Macartney; that I had no malice to sway me, no angry passion to gratify. I felt indeed that it did not belong to me, in my present undertaking, to expose individual corruption, or to drag delinquents to the face of day; that it was not my business to wander from the direct path for the sake of picking up a public offender, though, at the same time, I do not hesitate to say, that I should not have felt the least reluctance in exhibiting any character of this description that might have fallen directly in my way. Public characters are public property; and to connive at their abuses is little short of treason to the State. My object however was to shew rather that Lord Macartney acted right than that others acted wrong; and if, in establishing the rectitude of his conduct, I have unavoidably attached blame to that of others, I hope to be acquitted, at least, of any malevolent intention. I have been careful to state nothing but what is already on record in India and in Leadenhall-Street, and what I conceive there can be no impropriety in making the public acquainted with. Had I on this subject entertained the smallest degree of doubt or hesitation, it would effectually have been removed by a conviction that Lord Macartney was never averse from publicity being given to every act of his life. In his reply to an application for materials to compose a history of his Government in India, by a writer who would have executed the task in a much more able manner than I can pretend to do, he observes, after referring him to the records of the India House, "There is no transaction of my Government, even of the minutest nature whatsoever, which I can have an interest or a wish to conceal from the public eye, but it might not be becoming in me to be the channel of communication."

The second Volume of the Work, which is now laid before the public, consists entirely of a selection from the writings of Lord Macartney, of which it will be unnecessary to say much in this place, especially as I shall have occasion to give some account of them in the course of the narrative; it may therefore be sufficient, at present, to observe, that the selection now printed was made as partaking more of a public and official than of a private nature; the first two articles being extracted from two complete treatises, one on the Russian Empire, and the other on Ireland, drawn up from materials collected at the time when he held public situations in those countries, and printed at a private press, to enable him to distribute a few copies among some of the Cabinet Ministers and others of his particular friends. The third article is his Lordship's own Journal of his Embassy from the King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China; a copy of which he transmitted to Mr. Dundas, then Secretary of State, as the public account of his proceedings on this new and extraordinary mission.

I am perfectly aware that among the numerous papers of Lord Macartney, a selection of a more entertaining nature might have been made than that which is now published; but professing, as I do, to give only some account of his *public* life, I thought it right, carefully to avoid all private anecdote and private correspondence, and forbore therefore to ask for any papers which might properly be considered to fall under this description. What those may be I do not pretend to know; but I fully concur in the opinion of such as may think that matters of this kind, generally speaking, ought more properly to be left to the discretion of the families on whom they devolve, than brought, perhaps prematurely, before the public by others less interested in what they contain. I have no doubt that, at some future day, the two complete treatises, from which I have only given short extracts, together with a very varied and voluminous correspondence, and many curious and interesting papers on different subjects,

will be found worthy of being communicated to the world. Their interest, whatever it may be, has neither been anticipated nor impaired by that part of them, which is now submitted to the eye of the public.

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SOME ACCOUNT

OF THE

PUBLIC LIFE

OF THE

EARL OF MACARTNEY.

GEORGE EARL OF MACARTNEY was the only remaining son of George Macartney, and the only male descendant of his great-grandfather George Macartney who, removing into Ireland in the year 1649, settled near Belfast in the county of Antrim, where he acquired a large estate. This ancestor of the Earl was a captain of horse, surveyor general of the province of Ulster and, in the year 1678, served the office of high sheriff of the county of Antrim. At the Revolution in 1688 he, at the head of his troop, proclaimed king William and queen Mary at Belfast, for which he was soon after obliged to fly into England, and was attainted in

king James's parliament, held at Dublin in 1689; but being restored, on the settlement of Ireland, he returned to Belfast, where he soon after died. By his will, bearing date April 22, 1691, after making ample provision for his younger children, he constituted his wife executrix and guardian of his sons Chichester and George, from the latter of which was descended the late earl of Macartney.

George Macartney, the subject of the present memoir, was born the 14th May, 1737, at the family mansion of Lissanoure. As the juvenile years of most individuals in the same class of society are passed pretty nearly in the same manner, and afford but little that can be considered as worthy of record, unless where some peculiarity in the plan of their education shall appear to have given a peculiar bias to future opinions and conduct, it may be sufficient to observe, with regard to young Macartney, that at an early period of life he was placed under the tuition of a clergyman*, whose library, consisting chiefly of works in theology, was but scantily supplied with books of such a description as are usually most captivating to youthful minds. It seems however that he had a curious collection of tracts on heraldry, genealogy, and chronology, subjects that are but little calculated to engage the attention of a boy; but Macartney's fondness for books

* Doctor Johnson having pronounced it a kind of literary fraud in biography not to mention the name of the tutor of any person of distinguished talents, it may be observed that the name of lord Macartney's tutor was Dennis; that he was a clever and ingenious clergyman, for whom his lordship always preserved a sincere attachment, and obtained for him two good livings in the church, namely Clane and Dunmore.

led him imperceptibly, from want of others, to the study of such as were to be had; and to the early exercise of his memory on those subjects, he used to attribute, in a great degree, the peculiar retentive faculty for which through every part of his future life he was distinguished. At the age of thirteen he was admitted a fellow commoner of Trinity College, in the university of Dublin, and proceeded master of arts there in 1759. From Dublin he came to London, and was entered of the society of the Middle Temple, where he formed an intimacy with Mr. Burke, Mr. Dodwell, Mr. Bacon, and many other characters then rising into eminence; but, having no intention to study the law with a view to practice in that profession, he remained there but a short period before he had completed his arrangements for making the tour of Europe, on which he was resolved to pass a few years of his early life, in order to collect, by his own observations and the reports of others on the spot, whatever information was to be procured as to the physical strength and the resources of the several states of that continent, and the character and politics of their respective courts. This knowledge, added to that of the principles of the British constitution, he considered as the essential preparatives for the career of a public life which he already had in view, and which it was his intention to commence by endeavouring to procure a seat in the British House of Commons. In the course of his travels he made the acquaintance of several young noblemen of distinguished families and, among others, of Mr. Stephen Fox (the eldest son of the first, and father of the present Lord Holland) whom he had an opportunity of serv-

ing in a manner so essential to himself and his connections, that he was ever afterwards honored with the esteem and confidence of the old Lord and Lady Holland, and with the friendship of all the younger part of the family.

The romantic country of Switzerland, and the happy and contented lot of its inhabitants at that time, were so congenial with the feelings of Mr. Macartney, who to his other accomplishments added a taste for poetry and music, that he determined to remain there for some time. At Geneva he was introduced to the acquaintance of the philosopher of Ferney, who invited him to his house, in which he passed several days greatly delighted with the society of this extraordinary man, with whom on his return to Europe he is supposed to have kept up a correspondence; this indeed appears from a letter of Captain Robert Jephson to Sir George Macartney in the year 1775, requesting him to send a copy of his tragedy of Braganza to M. Voltaire, "whom," he observes, "you have cultivated more than any of our countrymen since his retirement;" and he further adds, "I cannot so entirely suppress the partiality of an author as not to wish you may add a word or two of undue influence to your old acquaintance of Ferney, to recommend the play to his perusal."

On his return to England he became an inmate of the Holland family, by whom he was introduced to the acquaintance of Lord Sandwich, then secretary of state for the northern department; and an arrangement was speedily concluded by these two friends to bring him into parliament for the borough

of Midhurst, afterwards represented by Mr. Charles Fox. About this time the affairs of Russia had assumed a very interesting aspect for all Europe. The success of an unexpected revolution which had placed a woman not less extraordinary for talent than ambition on the throne, more perhaps through accident than design *, gave fresh energy to a nation, which had hitherto been scarcely considered to hold a place among civilized states, and caused her, as Mr. Macartney observes, "no longer to be gazed at as a distant
"glimmering star, but as a great planet that had obtruded
"itself into our system, whose place was yet undetermined,
"but whose motions must powerfully affect those of every
"other orb." To England, in particular, an alliance with Russia was desirable on many considerations, and especially in a commercial point of view. In fact, a treaty of commerce had for some years before engaged the attention of the British government; but neither the ministerial talents of Sir Charles Hanbury Williams, under the reign of the empress Elizabeth, nor the diplomatic skill and good humor of Mr. Keith, though a convivial favorite of the unfortunate Peter, nor the weight and splendor of the earl of Buckinghamshire at the court of Catharine, had been able to succeed in making the least progress towards a treaty either of commerce or alliance

* The intention of count Panin and the other conspirators was to declare the grand duke Paul emperor, and to constitute Catharine empress regent; but Gregory Orloff, who had secretly dispatched his brother Alexey to fetch Catharine from Peterhoff, while himself and the young princess Dashkoff, who though only eighteen years of age was the most active instrument in bringing about this extraordinary revolution, used their endeavors with, and at length prevailed on, a small number of the guards, not more than thirty in the first instance, to shout "long live the empress";—and empress she was crowned a few hours afterwards.

with the Russian cabinet. The old treaty of commerce of 1734 had long expired by its own limitation, yet the empress Elizabeth, though unwilling to renew it, had acquiesced in a continuation of the regulations thereby established; but Catharine at a very early period of her reign manifested a disposition less favorable to British commerce. Scarcely indeed was she seated on the throne till a flat refusal was given to Lord Buckingham, on the ground that it was not intended to enter into any exclusive engagement with any particular power.

Under these circumstances it occurred to Lord Holland, who immediately suggested the idea to Lord Sandwich, that the various acquirements of Mr. Macartney might be employed to more advantage to the public and, perhaps, with all the success that was wished, at the court of St. Petersburg, than by a seat in parliament*. His knowledge of European politics alone fitted him for the undertaking; but a graceful person, with great suavity of manners, a conciliating disposition and winning address were considered as no slight recommendations at a female court, where such accomplishments, it was fair to conclude, might work their way, when great but un-

* Extract of a letter from Lord HOLLAND to Mr. MACARTNEY, dated 22d May, 1764.

DEAR MACARTNEY,

Lord Buckingham leaves Russia; there is business there which will not be transacted with success by his lordship, but which it is hoped may be by his successor. Your character will be that of envoy extraordinary, and I can answer for every thing in lord Sandwich's power to make your station agreeable and useful to you. Lady Caroline bids me put you in mind that the empress is about the age you like, not a slim woman, and, I add, growing older every day, and when she passes the turn of perfection you will be coming away.

accommodating talents alone would prove ineffectual. Accordingly, on the 22d August, 1764, Mr. Macartney was appointed envoy extraordinary to the empress of Russia; and having furnished his mind from the public records with all that had been done, attempted and failed, since the first intercourse between Great Britain and that country, he took leave in the month of October, and on this occasion received from his Majesty the honor of knighthood. Early in November he set out upon his mission, arrived at Petersbourg in December, and on the 11th January, 1765, had his first audience of the empress.

From the Earl of Buckinghamshire he received the most polite attentions, and was lodged in his house during the short time his Lordship remained in St. Petersbourg. This gave him an opportunity of making himself acquainted with the leading plans and politics of the court, and the weight and character of the principal persons with whom he would have to negotiate. The chancellor and vice-chancellor were represented by Lord Bucks as men wholly incapable of directing the affairs of so great a nation; that the former had no real friendship for England, and that if any point could be obtained from him favorable to its interests, it would not be determined by his inclination, but in consequence of his sovereign's orders; that Mr. Panin, governor of the grand duke and minister for foreign affairs, seemed better qualified than most of the Russian ministers to hold the first place, and that he shared the confidence of the empress; but that Catharine herself, from all the observations he could make,

and from all the lights he could obtain, was, in point of talent, information, and application to business, greatly superior to every body in that country ; that however her life was a mixture of trifling amusements and intense application to the concerns of her government, which, from difficulties industriously thrown in her way as well as from the variety of schemes all set in motion at once, had, as yet, produced little or no effect ; that her plans were numerous and extensive, but greatly inadequate to her means. By one scheme she proposed to raise a sufficient quantity of tobacco to supply the French market ; another was to open a commerce with Spain, Portugal, and Italy, by Russian merchant ships ; her navy was to be increased ; manufactures of silk, cloth, lace, linen, and porcelaine to be brought all at once to the highest possible perfection ; the government, the laws, the manners, and the very disposition of the nation were to be changed : these and many others were all to be undertaken at once, in a country where every innovation was unpopular, by means of ignorant, indigent, and corrupt counsellors, an indolent people, averse from all manufacture, and more averse from the sea, a mutinous army, and an exhausted treasury ; the sovereign hampered likewise by the obligations she had recently received, to which, in fact, she owed her throne, unable to get rid of many of those about her, whose characters and mean abilities she could not but despise, subject to plots and continual murmurs from the distinguished favors she lavished on count Gregory Orloff, who was so much considered as an upstart that all but his own family hated him, and none more inveterately than those en-

gaged with him in the late revolution, whose plans were ruined by his mismanagement or treachery; thus situated, Catharine had hitherto scarcely ventured to act for herself.

In this posture of affairs no sanguine hope could be entertained of drawing the attention of Russia from so many grand projects to a commercial treaty with England, which was the principal object of Sir George Macartney's mission. It required however but little consideration from one of his sagacity in what quarter he should begin his plan of operations. He waited on Mr. Panin who received him with great civility, and appointed the third day after for his first public audience. On this occasion he addressed her Imperial Majesty in a speech of some length, in which, after declaring, in the name of the king his master, the sincerest assurances of his inviolable attachment to her person, and constant zeal for her interests, he adds, "and forgive me, " madam, if here I express my own particular satisfaction " in having been chosen for so pleasing, so important an employment. By this means I shall have the happiness of " more nearly contemplating those extraordinary accomplishments, those heroic virtues, which make you the " delight of that half of the globe over which you reign, and " which render you the admiration of the other*." To this speech her Imperial Majesty condescended to deliver personally, and not as usual through her chancellor, an extemporary reply, in a manner so gracious that it was not suffered to

* The late Mr. Charles Fox, in a letter to Sir George Macartney, observes, " I think your speech to the czarina is one of the neatest things of the kind I ever saw; and I can assure you Edmund Burke admires it prodigiously."

pass unnoticed by her courtiers and the rest of his diplomatic brethren. On the same day the Earl of Buckinghamshire had his audience of leave.

Sir George lost no occasion of cultivating the friendship of Mr. Panin, whom he soon discovered to be not only minister for foreign affairs, but, in fact, sole minister of the Russian empire, and high in the favor and confidence of Catharine; that his political notions coincided exactly with her own; that he firmly supported all her opinions and her projects against every opposition; that his character for honesty and integrity was unimpeachable; that he was proof against corruption, but immeasurably obstinate, and inflexibly attached to his own and his mistress's opinions; that his genius, though not of the most brilliant cast, was admirably adapted for the mechanical man of business, in which, if he proceeded slowly, he, at least, moved steadily; but that, when once put out of the track he had worn for himself, or worn for him by others, he was infinitely embarrassed and unable to proceed; that he had therefore adopted certain fixed notions, and formed a system for his conduct which, on most occasions, he adhered to with almost invincible obstinacy. "Of a suspicious nature dreading a surprise, he takes up arms," says Sir George "on the slightest noise, and makes a parade of exercise to show he is prepared*".

* By making allowances for inferiority of talent, Mr. Panin may be considered as the Mr. Pitt of Russia. They both were distinguished by an unsullied integrity and a disinterestedness of conduct which are rarely found in a first minister, and each had to support in a great measure, the weight of an empire on his shoulders. The one however had able assistance during the greater part of his administration

To conciliate the friendship and to rivet the good opinion of this wary statesman, Sir George Macartney took care to employ all his address ; and he had the satisfaction to perceive that his endeavors had not been exerted in vain. An intimacy sprang up between them, such as is not often the fruit of a ministerial intercourse ; for, during the whole of his long, arduous, and painful negotiations with the court of Russia, he was at all times distinguished by Mr. Panin with unequivocal marks of his high esteem and particular regard. This gentleman used frequently to speak in terms of admiration of the various acquirements and extensive knowledge in so young a man as Sir George then was ; to acknowledge freely the advantage he had derived from his information respecting the several courts of Europe, and even on points regarding Russia, particularly on that of its commerce with Great Britain, a general view of which it seems Sir George had drawn up and put into his hands for his own private use.

Thus having laid the solid foundation of a good understanding with the Russian minister, he ventured to open the grand objects of his mission, namely, the concluding a treaty

which the other had not. Panin was a real patriot. Unworthily treated as he had been through the intrigues of favorites, he is said to have sent for the grand duke Paul when on his death bed, when he conjured him, by every thing he held dear and sacred, never to harbor an idea of dethroning his mother. "Russia, says he, has already suffered enough by revolutions ; if they are not now checked there is no saying where they may end." The advice of the dying tutor was not neglected by the grand duke ; for when it was hinted to him, some time afterwards, that he ought to make an immediate demand of the crown which properly belonged to him, "I will never," says he, "give my son an excuse to dethrone me."

of alliance and commerce between the king of Great Britain and the empress of Russia. Mr. Panin heard what he had to say with great attention, and in return disclosed to him the projects he had conceived for the aggrandizement of his country, to the accomplishment of which he added his whole life should be devoted. His first and great object, he observed, was to effectuate a confederacy of the northern powers, of which Russia was to be the heart and centre; that one great step towards this end was the plan of making a common cause with England and Denmark for the total annihilation of the French interest in Sweden; that for this purpose it would be necessary to gain a majority in the diet of Stockholm, and preserve it by a subsidiary treaty; that money would be necessary, and that if England came into his plans she must either pay liberally or not pay at all. That Russia had just concluded a new treaty of alliance with Denmark, by one article of which a war with Turkey was made a *casus fæderis*. That when that event should happen Denmark bound herself to pay to Russia a subsidy of five hundred thousand roubles a year by quarterly payments; and, by a most secret article she promised to disengage herself, as soon as possible, from all French connections; and to enter into all the views of Russia in the kingdom of Sweden, in the constitution of which however it was not intended to make any alteration; that, on the contrary, the royal authority was to remain the same, and the privileges of the people preserved without violation. He dwelt on the ardent desire the empress had expressed for a treaty of alliance with Great Britain, as the surest means of disappointing the views of the courts of Vienna and Versailles, against which she was irri-

tated with uncommon resentment; but that this alliance could only be brought to a happy conclusion by England's first assenting to his Swedish project, which he took care to hint would require considerable expense; and that she would also agree, by a secret article, to pay a subsidy in case of a Turkish war, as Denmark had done. If on these grounds England consented to enter into a treaty of alliance, he observed that the treaty of commerce would grow with it *passibus æquis*.

From this conversation Sir George was sufficiently aware of the difficulties he should have to encounter in the progress of his negociation, as it would embrace other points which did not depend on him. In fact, every subsequent conference opened with Sweden, was closed with Sweden. Mr. Panin declared that he had already spent two hundred thousand roubles in his Swedish projects, for which, in other respects, he had spared, as much as possible, the imperial treasure, knowing that economy was most agreeable to his mistress, avarice, as Sir George observes, being perhaps the second passion of her soul. The next point was the Turkish clause. He complained bitterly of the conduct of England, who had taken no notice of a *projèt* for a treaty of alliance which had been sent to London in the time of Lord Buckinghamshire, and could not forbear observing, that if England was sincere in her professions she would hardly have deviated from the common rules of politeness established between courts; that Russia having offered a scheme could not, when reflecting on the behaviour of England, be any longer amused with new assurances without wounding her own dignity. To this Sir

George observed, that his predecessor had proposed certain alterations which had been rejected by Russia, and that the inflexibility of the court of St. Petersbourg in insisting on what she knew to be inadmissible, left them little cause to complain of a want of good breeding; that he would furnish him in a day or two with a counter-projet, provided he would abandon the Turkish clause, which he knew England would never agree to insert in any treaty. But he saw that every effort was in vain; in vain did he urge the unreasonableness of expecting any subsidy in time of peace; and that an alliance on an equal footing would be more safe as well as more honorable for both nations. But Panin swore by every thing sacred, that while he was minister, Russia should never make a treaty of defensive alliance with any power upon earth by which a war with Turkey was excluded from being a *casus fœderis*. In short, it was sufficiently obvious, that the Turkish clause, inserted either in the body of the treaty, or in a secret article, would be a *sine quâ non* in every negotiation he might have to open with the court of Russia. This point indeed was established by the discovery he made of a treaty which had actually been concluded with Prussia, in which Frederic had agreed to the Turkish clause on condition that Russia should make no alliance with any other power but on the same terms, and count de Solms, the Prussian envoy, had orders to remonstrate, in the strongest manner, against any treaty that should be concluded contrary to this condition.

The project of buying a majority in the diet of Sweden for the purpose of annihilating the French interest, appeared

to Sir George Macartney to be less objectionable than the Turkish clause, though he felt the impolicy of England squandering money in that country; "that by augmenting their treasury we should make money cheap and goods dear; that as we sold little and bought much from the Swedes, the price of their commodities would be raised; and thus the political measure of granting a subsidy would become highly and perpetually detrimental to our commerce." The consideration however of destroying the influence of the French with the Northern Powers was an object in which Sir George had less difficulty to promise the co-operation of his government; and, in this respect, his private feelings kept pace with his public duty. He had seen enough of Frenchmen, in his travels through Europe, to impress on his mind no very favorable opinion either of their moral or political character, and it does not appear that he ever found reason to alter that opinion.

Well assured therefore that, by urging his court to accede to the latter of the two obstacles to the success of his negotiations for a treaty of commerce, he should greatly facilitate the conclusion of this desirable object, several sums of money were, at his recommendation, supplied for the purpose, though not to the extent of Mr. Panin's wishes, who frequently and severely took occasion to reflect on the parsimony of England. Still however the progress made in the treaty of commerce was very slow, and he saw, from the mode of conducting business at the court of Russia, that impatience and perseverance were the politician's only weapons.

In fact, the delay and procrastination of the college of commerce, arising not merely from the want of method and gross ignorance, but from the ill dispositions and intentions of some of the commissioners, determined him, if possible, to get it out of their hands, that the arrangement might finally be settled between Mr. Panin and himself. This gentleman, out of pure friendship, assented with great good nature to the proposal, provided there should be no objection on the part of the empress, although he could not forbear complaining that he had the whole weight of foreign affairs on his shoulders, and no person of capacity to assist him, in whom he could trust. Catharine, who was well aware of the incapability of the members of the commercial college, to transact a business of this nature, wishing to oblige the English minister, yet willing to save appearances, suggested a middle path; she proposed that count Panin should settle the points with the British minister, and that the commissioners should be invested with full powers to sign the treaty. The commissioners however were exasperated at the affront which they conceived was thus put upon them; angry at their own insignificance, and angry at Sir George for having discovered it, they soon began to manifest all that kind of malice which little minds delight in. Their resentment broke out on a particular occasion in the conduct of the vice-chancellor, to whom the empress had given orders to invite all the foreign ministers to dine with her on the anniversary of her accession to the throne. The court was at this time at the camp, and the entertainment was given there. The vice-chancellor taking advantage of the distance and the confusion

that might possibly be supposed to result from that circumstance, contrived to leave Sir George Macartney out of the invitation, who, being thus pointedly neglected, conceived it would be most consistent with his official character not to go to court that day. His absence was taken very particular notice of by the empress, but to prevent its making a wrong impression he contrived to let her know the reason of it. Having taken this step, on the Sunday following he went to court, where he enjoyed a complete triumph in witnessing the mortification of those who had put in practice their little arts of revenge. The empress singled him out and distinguished him in a very extraordinary manner both in the morning and the evening; all the foreign ministers were present, but he was the only one she did the honor of addressing on that day.

After a close negociation of four months the treaty of commerce was brought to a conclusion, on such equal and impartial terms as neither party, it was hoped, would afterwards find reason to repent of; and in this confidence the duration of the treaty was extended to twenty years. The terms obtained on the part of England were, in fact, more advantageous than his majesty's ministers had ventured to hope he would be able to procure*, and such as the mer-

* Extract of a letter from Lord Sandwich, dated 15th March, 1765.

“ By an article of the old treaty the British merchant is put upon the same
“ footing with a subject of Russia in all duties of export, a renewal of which you
“ are to endeavor to obtain; though it is much to be apprehended that, after thirty
“ years advancement in commerce, since the conclusion of that treaty, this bene-

chants concerned in the trade expressed themselves perfectly satisfied with. Reflecting therefore on the difficulties he had experienced, and on the uncertainty of a convulsory government, he was anxious to seize the advantage which the moment offered, and which, if once lost, might not easily be recovered, and signed the treaty; not doubting the approbation of his majesty's ministers for having done more than they expected, and accomplished that which three former ministers at this court had not been able to effect. He did, in fact, receive a letter, dated the 17th September, written by direction of the Duke of Grafton, then secretary of state for the northern department, acknowledging the receipt of the treaty which, it was stated, was very agreeable to his grace, as well as to the rest of his majesty's ministers; no objection was then taken at his having signed it: but in a subsequent letter, dated the 27th of the same month, he is informed by the duke's same secretary, that he is extremely concerned not to be able to send him a confirmation of those hopes, which his former letter had given, that his treaty and his conduct would meet with *general approbation*; for that, upon a thorough examination of it, a very material objection had appeared. Two days afterwards the duke himself informs him that his majesty's ministers were highly dissatisfied, that he should have taken upon himself, contrary to his instructions, to sign a treaty of

" ficial concession is more to be wished for than expected from the court of
" Russia."

This concession, however, was obtained by Sir George Macartney in its fullest extent.

commerce before he had sent it over for his majesty's approbation.

The objection which his majesty's ministers were pleased to make to the treaty appears principally to have lain against the following expression, which makes part of a clause in the fourth article, "*En reciprocité de l'acte de navigation de la Grande Bretagne**. These words it seems, they considered not only as a reservation in favor of Russia, but as an infringement on the act of navigation, to the very name of which the Duke tells him this country is enthusiast, and the mention of it therefore is carefully avoided in all treaties†. Sir George acknowledges that he was perfectly aware of the objection that might probably be made; but, when he considered that, by admitting the reservation in favor of Russia (of which he knew she could make no use) he had obtained an equality of duties upon exports (which neither his majesty's ministers nor the merchants had hoped for); knowing, as he did, that our trade with Russia being a trade of necessity on our part, she would grant no other terms; having already been threatened that if the treaty was not signed an *ukase* would be issued, by which the English factory would be deprived of their privileges, and put upon the same foot-

* The whole of the clause stood thus: "*Mais alors on se reserve de la part de la Russie, en reciprocité de l'acte de navigation de la Grande Bretagne, la liberté de faire dans l'intérieur, tel arrangement particulier qu'il sera trouvé bon, pour encourager et étendre la navigation Russe.*"

† The Duke of Grafton sent him a copy of the Navigation Act, on which Sir George, after thanking him for his kind intentions, assures his grace he needed not to have given himself so much trouble, for that he had the Navigation Act by heart many years ago.

ing as other traders; knowing also that the favorite and the minister were on the worst terms, and that if Orloff got the better of Panin there was an end to the treaty for ever; having moreover ascertained, that the merchants who are always the first to complain, were highly satisfied with the terms he had procured; feeling likewise, as well as the Duke of Grafton, that those merchants were enthusiasts to the very name of the navigation act, yet made no objection to the wording of the fourth article; and seeing the absolute necessity of bringing the treaty to an immediate conclusion, armed as he was with full powers, he ventured to judge of that necessity. On these grounds, and in the temper of the court, at that time highly dissatisfied with the parsimony of England in regard to Sweden, and trembling for the fatal consequences of a delay, he thought it most expedient on every consideration to sign the treaty, "preferring, as he observes, "the public service to his own private security, "and daring a fault which he thought success might convert "into a virtue."

Among other motives which weighed with Sir George Macartney to bring his treaty to as speedy a conclusion as possible, were the intrigues of the French. From the moment of the arrival of Beausset as minister from the Court of Versailles, this gentleman had taken uncommon pains to make the court of St. Petersbourg relish a treaty of commerce with France: and although Sir George had received the strongest assurances from Mr. Panin that, so long as he was minister, Russia should contract no other commercial engagements than those with England, yet he was too well acquainted with the

intriguing character of the French to trust to such an assurance. He knew that the court of Versailles was anxious for a treaty of commerce with Russia; that the Spanish envoy had proposed one, and that a Dutch *projèt* had lain on the ministerial table for the last twenty years. The French, it is true, by that levity and absurdity which one would almost be led to conclude were ingrafted in their nature, had taken uncommon pains to defeat their own projects at the court of St. Petersbourg. The king of France having, in his minister's credentials, thought proper to give to Catharine the title of *Majesté* only without the addition of *Imperiale*, the court of Russia was so highly offended at the incivility as to refuse an audience to Monsieur Beausset; stating, as a ground for such refusal, that, as this title had already been granted, the objection to it could now be construed in no other way than as a personal affront to the empress. The French minister alleged that if his court had granted it before it must have been owing rather to an oversight in the office than to an avowal on their part; for that it was contrary to the idiom of their language, and therefore impossible; that in writing they never say, *votre majesté imperiale* even to the emperor of Germany. This explanation, however satisfactory it might appear to the vanity of a Frenchman, was by no means so to the Russian court. Its ambassador at Paris, Prince Galitzin, was instructed to complain of the indignity that was thus offered to the person of his sovereign; but all the satisfaction he could obtain was an avowal from the *Duc de Choiseul*, that although the court of Versailles had no objection to allow the imperial title to the crown of Russia, they

could not possibly in writing use the expression *majesté impériale* without wilfully consenting to corrupt the purity of their language; on which important consideration he hoped the court of St. Petersbourg would no longer insist upon it. The Duc de Choiseul is said to have pushed his pleasantry on this occasion still farther by declaring, when speaking on this subject a few days after, "*Qu'il ne pouvoit pas introduire dans la langue Françoise un barbarisme en faveur de la Russie.*" The effect may readily be imagined which such a sarcasm produced on a court of the complexion of Russia, whose sensibility was generally less hurt by a real injury than by the slightest insult on its pride. Sir George was too good a patriot not to take every due advantage of this hostile disposition against France. He succeeded so far as to prevail on the Russian minister to discourage as much as possible the predilection of his countrymen for French customs, and the fashion of wearing French silks and velvets; and, in the present temper of the court, the empress was easily prevailed upon to set the example. Still, however, there was a general sort of attachment in St. Petersbourg for every thing that was French, and from the representations of the ambassadors of this nation, it was strongly suspected that the court of Versailles would abate of its obstinacy, and condescend even to sacrifice the purity of the French language, in order to carry an important point with Russia.

But independent of all these circumstances, Sir George Macartney had seen enough of Russia to be convinced that all its efforts to encourage the commerce of its own subjects

would prove abortive; he knew, from the temper of the inhabitants, from the state of her navy, her dock-yards, her officers and seamen, that there was not the least apprehension, for many years to come, of her assuming either a naval or a commercial aspect that could possibly give to England the slightest umbrage or jealousy. The genius of Catharine had scarcely yet begun to operate on the national character, which she found, as it were, in a state of inaction. At that time it might fairly have been doubted, whether a single subject in the Russian empire had ever even seen our Navigation Act, or had any more acquaintance with it than the mere name. "An act," says Sir George, "which, like the bow of Ulysses, bends only to the hands of its master, may well defy the exertion of every Muscovite effort."

The Duke of Grafton, who was in reality very much his friend, and not a little mortified at the disapprobation which some of his majesty's ministers had thought fit to express at the treaty, thought it would be right to refer the clause in the fourth article for the opinion of the Russia company, who, having already been informed of the objections against it, very laconically and without assigning any grounds for their opinion, declare "that it may essentially affect and prejudice the trade and navigation of Great Britain, and render the whole treaty ineffectual*." On the receipt of

* That it may not be considered unfair to give an extract only of the very concise condemnation pronounced by the Russia company on the point which was so particularly referred to them, and to obviate any appearance of this kind the whole of their letter is subjoined, which, according to the advice of a great law officer, never to give a reason for a decision, must certainly be esteemed as a very sagacious epistle.

which Sir George observes, "I must beg leave to make one
 " observation relative to the Russia company. Not a third
 " of those who compose their court of assistants have ever
 " been in Russia, or carry on any trade with it; and the
 " greater part of the rest, who were formerly in this country,
 " have either totally forgot it, or at the least (considering the
 " revolutions it has undergone since their time) are now very
 " incompetent judges of it. Your grace knows that any per-
 " son whatever, on paying five pounds, may become free of
 " the Russia company." His grace, however, having thought
 fit to take the opinion of a body of men, who, it seems, were
 very ill qualified to give a solid one on the subject, Sir George
 conceived it would be right in him to obtain the sentiments of
 the British factory in Russia, in order to transmit them to the
 Duke in return, a body of men who were not only capable of
 giving a substantial opinion, but were also most deeply in-
 terested in every sentence of the treaty of commerce between
 Great Britain and that country. For this purpose he desired
 the consul to assemble the merchants, to read the treaty, and
 to inquire whether there appeared to them any material ob-
 jections to the whole or any part of it, hinting to him at the

" MY LORD,

London, 24th September, 1765.

" We the governor, consuls, and court of assistants of the Russia company have taken the letter which your grace did us the honor to write to us, together with the fourth article of the treaty of commerce with Russia, into our consideration, and are of opinion that the paragraph referred to, as it now stands, may essentially affect and prejudice the trade and navigation of Great Britain, and render the whole treaty ineffectual. We are, &c.

(Signed) by order of the governor, consuls, and court
 of assistants of the Russia company,

" M. SIERRA, SECRETARY."

same time, to mention to them in particular that clause of the fourth article, which had been disapproved. In reply to the requisition made by the consul, the merchants resident in Russia drew up and unanimously agreed to sign the following letter :

“ We the underwritten members of the British factory
“ humbly beg leave to return your Excellency our thanks for
“ having so obligingly condescended to communicate to us
“ the new treaty of commerce with the Russian court previous
“ to its final ratification.

“ Sensible as we are how great must be the satisfaction
“ resulting to a mind like yours from the consciousness of
“ having accomplished in so full and perfect a manner his
“ majesty’s gracious views and intentions for the good of his
“ trading subjects in this important negociation ; we humbly
“ presume it may afford some additional pleasure to your
“ excellency to receive a public acknowledgment of the
“ *entire and unreserved approbation of every article in this*
“ *treaty* from us who are so immediately and so nearly con-
“ cerned in its consequences.

“ Though the whole is in every point as advantageous to
“ the trade and navigation of Great Britain as could reason-
“ ably be expected, yet we think ourselves more particularly
“ obliged to your excellency for that part of the fourth article,
“ by which an equality of duty on exports between the
“ British and Russian merchants is established, and for the

“ very favorable explanation obtained by your excellency of
“ the succeeding clause.

“ It is in this light we desire your excellency will take
“ this letter, and do us the favor to believe us every one in
“ particular, and all in a body, with the greatest truth and
“ respect,” &c. &c.

(Signed by all the British merchants residing
in St. Petersbourg.)

The favorable explanation, alluded to in the above letter, was a declaration signed by Mr. Panin respecting the clause which had given so much alarm to the British cabinet. This document, favorable as it was and highly satisfactory to those who professed themselves “ so nearly concerned in its “ consequences,” did not however satisfy his majesty’s new ministers. They not only required that this declaration should be signed by the four plenipotentiaries who had signed the treaty, but that new powers should be granted by the Russian court authorizing them to do so. Upon the mention of this to Mr. Panin he flew into a violent rage, saying “ he would have Sir George Macartney to know, and “ he wished to inform the duke of Grafton, that he himself “ was the minister, and he alone; that a distrust in a letter “ written by him, at the empress’s command as therein expressed, was a kind of affront he could not be insensible of, “ and that if his majesty’s ministers thought him or his court “ capable of breaking their word, or departing from engagements in that form, it was very unlikely that any de-

"claration would bind them were it ever so solemnly made
"or unequivocally worded;" and he concluded by saying,
that he would advise the empress, who was long since tired
with importunities on this subject, to do no more; that all
Russia exclaimed against him for having done so much; and
that her interests had been shamefully sacrificed: that if
Great Britain therefore did not like the treaty with his ex-
planatory letter she might take her own measures; but that
if the signatures were once annulled, he declared most so-
lemnly that the English factory should immediately be put
upon the same footing as the merchants of other nations.

From this time Sir George seems to have labored with un-
ceasing diligence and unexampled assiduity to carry the
point, which his superiors at home appeared to have so much
at heart. But every application was fruitless, every en-
deavor vain, to induce Mr. Panin to alter his sentiments.
He ventured even to speak to the empress herself at the mas-
querade upon the subject, and almost went on his knees to
persuade her into compliance, but he found her, to use his
own expression "inflexible even beyond a woman's obsti-
nacy;" and he had the mortification to perceive that it
would be no less difficult to draw from them such a declaration
as was required than "to count the billows of the Baltic or
"number the trees in the forest of Onega." Still however
he persevered till he discovered that Mr. Panin had actually
received orders to cancel the signatures, and to put an end
for ever to the treaty; a step that was immediately to be
followed by a revocation of the declaration given by the em-
press Elizabeth in favor of the British factory; and it re-

quired all his powers of persuasion to prevail on Mr. Panin to delay the execution of this violent and precipitate measure.

He now proposed that the objectionable reservation in favor of Russia should be left out, and the treaty newly written and signed afresh. As the omission of the words "*En reciprocité de l'acte de navigation de la Grande Bretagne*" made no alteration in the terms, and left Russia free to make what laws she might think fit respecting her own commerce and navigation, Mr. Panin thought there could be no objection on the part of the empress, and as his majesty's ministers had taken the alarm only on the introduction of the Navigation Act by name, it was not probable they could start any objection to the total omission of it. Sir George therefore caused the treaty to be written out afresh with the omission and sent to England. But the cabinet of St. James's acted on this occasion with more than Russian obstinacy; it required that not only the objectionable words but the whole clause should be left out. Thus three times did they refuse to ratify the treaty, and three times send back fresh proposals*.

* Sir George Macartney was completely at a loss to account for this strange conduct of the British cabinet towards him from the time that lord Sandwich had been removed from the northern department, till the following passage in a letter from one of his friends then in office threw some light on the subject. "It is not quite fair" says this friend "to charge any man where one is not quite positive of the fact; but though I may be mistaken I am much inclined to think that lord ——— has from the beginning been your enemy; not that I know or suppose he had any personal enmity to you, but in the game of his politics you were the card to throw out. From the outset of the marquis of Rockingham's administration, ——— saw they could not stand, and con-

The court of St. Petersburg began now to consider the conduct of England so trifling on the subject of the treaty of commerce, and so repugnant to her more cherished schemes, that Catharine determined to break off all negociation for the future, and with this view gave directions for an *ukase* to be prepared, revoking the declaration of the empress Elizabeth in favor of British merchants, to be published as soon as the first British ship should arrive at Cronstadt. In vain did Sir George endeavor to impress on the minds of the empress and her minister, the advantages which Russia would derive from a close alliance with England. But vain of her past successes, giddy with her present prosperity, blind and incredulous to the possibility of a reverse, both the empress and her minister seemed every day to be more intoxicated with pride, more contemptuous toward other powers, more elated with their own. "No art," says Sir George, "has been left untried, no argument unenforced, and no effort unexerted. All that my own ingenuity could inspire, the nature of the subject furnish, or the circumstances of the times suggest to me, I have employed,

"sequently determined to keep aloof, and entertain no intimate connection with them; the Russian negociation was among the first objects of consultation; he knew that a new administration might be scrupulous in the conduct of the then people, and he hated and despised them for omitting to seize the palpable support that proffered itself; so that he was cautious, perverse, and troublesome in all the meetings concerning the declaration; his situation as chancellor made his opinion decisive, while but the iota of a punctilio was wanting in the forms. And his interests, his malice, his resentments, and his habitual ill-nature found one common qualification in condemning your conduct; but their treatment will not disgrace you with your country and the public, whose esteem alone is at all worth esteem."

“ with most unshaken attention, the most unceasing diligence
“ and unremitted assiduity. But this court has listened to me
“ with the most provoking phlegm, and the most stoical in-
“ difference.” So painful was the task now become that in
one of his public letters he observes, “ Nothing on this side
“ of heaven could bribe me to pass the last six months over
“ again : mortified and dejected as I am, I have long since
“ disclaimed the least hopes of applause for any ministerial
“ endeavors, however judiciously conducted, or fortunately
“ concluded ; persuaded that nothing is more dangerous than
“ to do more than is commanded, and that he alone is secure
“ and happy who entrenches himself within the bounds of his
“ duty, unambitious of the renown which arises from enter-
“ prising boldness or successful temerity.” Such however
was the strength of his zeal, and such his eagerness to execute
his majesty’s commands, that his ardor neither appears to
have cooled by repeated denials, nor slackened by ill suc-
cess ; though often repulsed he still returned to the charge.
At a conference with Mr. Panin it occurred to him that the
same inveterate objection might not lay against the new
modelling of the clause as against its total omission ; and with
this idea he took up a sheet of paper and folding it in two
columns he drew on the first the clause as it originally stood,
and in the opposite one as he now proposed it to stand. To
his great astonishment Mr. Panin thought the alteration
admissible, but could not undertake to say any thing posi-
tively until he had seen the empress. After keeping it six
weeks he at length returned it with a proposal to have it
altered in the following manner :

Clause as proposed by Great Britain.

Mais alors on se reserve de la part des deux hautes parties contractantes la liberté de faire dans l'interieur tel arrangement particulier qu'il sera trouvé bon pour encourager et etendre leur navigation respective.

Clause as proposed by Russia.

Mais alors chaque haute partie contractante se reserve pour elle la liberté de faire dans l'interieur de ses etats, tel arrangement particulier qu'elle trouvera bon pour encourager et etendre sa propre navigation.

In this as in other instances the pride of Russia sustained itself to the end. Mr. Panin remained obstinate and inflexible, and Sir George found it expedient to submit to the vanity and obstinacy which suggested the alteration in the words, especially as there was none in the sense. He then demanded new full powers to be given to the plenipotentiaries, but was answered that they continued to act under their former powers. It was useless to contend, knowing that it would be as easy for him, to use his own expression, "to heave Pelion upon Ossa as to persuade them to grant a new power to the commissioners." Considering therefore the ill consequences of delay he once more, as he observes, "put his own safety on the cast for the public service, and signed the treaty a second time."

The management of the northern department had now devolved upon Mr. Conway, from whom he at length received his majesty's ratification of the treaty, and at the same time a notification of Mr. Stanley's appointment as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the court of St. Petersbourg, without however the least intimation whether he was to continue as minister until Mr. Stanley's arrival, remain in that capacity after his arrival, or what was intended

with regard to his future destination. He thought it right however particularly to request that Mr. Stanley might be furnished with very pointed instructions, to inform himself of his conduct. "Conscious," says he, "of having acted in all things entrusted to my care, with the utmost integrity, vigilance, and activity, having exerted every talent which nature and education have given me for the service of my sovereign and the interest of the public, ambitious only of honest fame, I present myself to every scrutiny, convinced of being able to prove, that no man in my situation could have obtained what I have done, convinced that you, Sir, and every branch of administration will in the end see the strongest reasons for approving every particular of my conduct."—*Letter from Sir George Macartney to Mr. Secretary Conway, dated August 26, 1766.*

From this period till the month of March 1767, he remained in complete ignorance as to the time of Mr. Stanley's setting out and of his own destination. The disappointments and vexations he had long suffered had a severe effect on his health, and he had the additional mortification of observing, that although the personal attentions both of the empress and Mr. Panin continued the same, he had now lost all the ministerial confidence of the latter. He entreated his court to relieve him from so embarrassing a situation, by sending his letters of recall, that he might take advantage of the shipping season to return to England. He represented the state of his health as every day getting worse, that the court was preparing to depart for Mosco, where all the foreign ministers were to attend it; that after its departure he could be

of no use in St. Petersburg, where he would be left in the most disagreeable and, for a public minister, in a most ridiculous situation, as the whole court, the senate, and all the principal chanceries and offices were to be removed to Mosco. Notwithstanding these statements he received directions from his court to remain at St. Petersburg. What his feelings and sentiments were on this occasion will best appear from his own letters which are inserted in the Appendix *.

As there was not the slightest hope of negotiating a treaty of alliance without admitting the Turkish clause, and for many other reasons given by Sir George in his letter to Mr. Secretary Conway †; and as his majesty's ministers were at length convinced that his remaining at St. Petersburg, while an ambassador was expected, could answer no good purpose, they gave him permission to return to England for the benefit of his health; but without any letter of recall, or any intimation that Mr. Stanley was about to proceed. Having sent his secretary Mr. Shirley, as *chargé d'affaires* to Mosco, he left Petersburg about the end of May, and proceeding by the way of Stockholm and Gottenburgh took his passage at the latter for England.

There was an idle story propagated in St. Petersburg by persons who could not explain the circumstance of his remaining behind, when the court and foreign ministers pro-

* Letter from Sir George Macartney to William Burke, Esq. No. 1.—To the Right Hon. Hans Stanley, No. 2.—To the Right Hon. Henry Seymour Conway, No. 3.

† Letter to Mr. Secretary Conway, dated St. Petersburg, Jan. 26; Feb. 6, 1767. Appendix, No. 4.

ceeded to Mosco, that Catharine had instructed her ambassador in London to request he might be recalled, and had forbid his appearance at court. Such an absurdity scarcely requires a serious refutation; but if any proof were wanting of the continuance of that distinguished attention with which he was honored to the last moment of his stay in Russia, the following letter from Mr. Panin, written by command of the empress at Mosco, is alone sufficient for that purpose: “ Dans le moment ou je lui (l’imperatrice) ai présenté vos hommages en vous congédiant de sa cour, j’ai reçu, pour vous, Monsieur, les assurances les plus positives de sa bienveillance, et je vous les transmets avec un contentement qu’il vous sera facile de vous représenter. Sa majesté imperiale ne veut point que vous partiez sans en emporter une marque distinguée. La maniere dont vous vous congédiez sans produire de lettres de rappel, nous engageant à vous considerer toujours comme ministre actuel auprès de notre cour, vous n’êtes pas encore dans le cas de recevoir le present d’étiquette que nous faisons aux ministres, et nous le renvoyons au tems ou il doit avoir lieu. Mais indépendamment de ce present, sa majesté m’a ordonné de vous envoyer la boîte que j’ai l’honneur de joindre ici, comme un temoignage de son approbation et de l’estime qu’elle a jugé que vous meritez. Trouvez bon, Monsieur, que mes sentiments particuliers s’expriment tous dans la satisfaction avec laquelle je vois ceux de ma souveraine. Je vous demande avec empressement la continuation de votre amitié, et vous prie de croire que l’attachement que je vous ai voué est aussi sincere qu’inviolable.” The mark of distinguished regard, mentioned in Mr. Panin’s letter, was a

present from the empress of a very magnificent gold snuff-box enriched with diamonds, in value about six hundred pounds. As to their wishing his recall it is contradicted in the declaration of Mr. Panin in the above extract, that they must still consider him as the actual minister at the court of Russia, and more strongly by his subsequent appointment in England as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to that court.

During his residence at St. Petersbourg he had many opportunities of rendering very signal services to Stanislaus the unfortunate king of Poland, by forwarding his views and assisting his minister count Rzewuski to discover and counteract the mean and unjust artifices of the king of Prussia towards that nation. As an acknowledgment of those services Stanislaus sent him, in 1766, the ensigns of the order of the White Eagle which his majesty was graciously pleased to permit him to accept. At the same time they were accompanied by a very handsome letter from the king of Poland.*

* The King of Poland to Sir George Macartney.

“ MONSIEUR DE MACARTNEY,

“ IL m'est bien agreable et bien flatteur de retrouver d'une façon si efficace dans un homme de votre merite et de votre distinction les mêmes sentimens de bonne volonté, dont j'ai le plaisir de recevoir les preuves de tant de vos compatriotes. Ma reconnoissance et mon affection particuliere pour votre nation est connue ; je souhaite que la mienne pour vous personnellement le soit tout autant. C'est ce que me determine a vous conferer, Monsieur, l'ordre de l'Aigle Blanc, dont le compte Rzewuski, mon envoye extraordinaire et plenipotentiaire à la cour imperiale de Russie, est chargé de vous remettre les marques. Je vous prie d'y reconnoitre l'estime parfaite et l'amitié sincere dans laquelle je suis veritablement,

“ Monsieur de MACARTNEY, votre très affectionne,

(Signed)

“ STANISLAS AUGUSTE Roy.

“ Varsovie, ce 31 May 1766.”

Whether before his return to England the cabinet of St. James's had begun to reflect on the impolicy of removing a minister who had concluded a "just and satisfactory treaty of commerce *," and who stood so high in the estimation of the court with which he had to treat, or whether Mr. Stanley, on contemplating the difficulties which, in all probability, he would have to encounter as every English minister before him had encountered, does not appear; but shortly after his arrival in London Mr. Stanley gave in his resignation, and Sir George Macartney was immediately appointed to succeed him as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the court of Russia. Some particular circumstances however occurred, and were followed by other engagements, which were likely to prevent him from proceeding on his embassy, at least in any reasonable length of time. He conceived therefore, that it would be most expedient for himself and the public service to give up the situation at once than continue to hold it while any uncertainty remained of his ever being able to fulfil the duties of it. On this occasion he acted with a liberality which is not usually met with among public men. Notwithstanding the large sums of money he had expended out of his own pocket in the public service, by which he contracted a debt of near 6000*l.* in order to support his ministerial character, he voluntarily and without any requisition returned the warrants for a service of plate, usually granted to ambassadors, the equipage money and every other emolument, receiving no advantage of any kind from his appointment except their majesty's pictures, which he particularly desired he

* His majesty's speech from the throne at the opening of the session of 1766,
1767.

might be allowed to keep, setting thus an example of disinterestedness, perhaps the only one of the kind in the diplomatic history of this country.

ON the 1st of February 1768, Sir George Macartney was married to the Right Honorable Lady Jane Stuart, second daughter of John Earl of Bute; and in the month of April following he was chosen one of the representatives of the borough of Cockermouth, in the parliament of Great Britain. Conceiving however that he might be able to serve his country more effectually in the Irish than the British parliament, he was elected in the month of July of the same year to represent, in the former, the borough of Armagh. It was at this time in contemplation to make a considerable change in the system of government, which had hitherto been practised with regard to Ireland. It had long been the custom for the lord-lieutenant to go over once only in two years, and to give himself little concern about public matters while he was there: he convened a parliament which lasted a few months, lived in a state of splendid magnificence, provided for his dependents, received, as Sir George observes, "freedoms, gold boxes, and complimentary addresses, and then hurried back to England with the utmost precipitation," leaving the government, at his departure, vested in a commission usually composed of the two principal members of the church and the law, together with the speaker of the House of Commons. These gentlemen were generally ap-

pointed lords justices, but in Ireland were better known by the name of undertakers. The power, the patronage, and consequently the influence derived from their situation, gave them in fact an unlimited control over the interior government in Ireland, and they considered themselves so important and so necessary to the crown, in transacting what was called the king's business, that they generally were able to dictate their own terms to the administration of England. But on the great change of the English ministry in 1766, one of the first measures settled in the cabinet was, that Ireland should no longer be left to the discretion of the undertakers; but that the lord-lieutenant should for the future constantly reside in that country, and hold the reins of government in his own hands. The Earl of Bristol was fixed upon as the first resident chief governor, but resigning the situation without having once taken possession of his government, Lord Townshend was nominated to succeed him, who immediately went over; and on the 1st January 1769, Sir George Macartney was appointed chief secretary of Ireland, and sworn of his majesty's privy council there on the 30th March following.

This change of system, as might naturally be expected, made very strong and opposite impressions on the different political parties in Ireland. "The Irish people," observes Sir George *, "ever fond of novelty, were rejoiced beyond measure at the happy tidings; individuals were no less delighted: those who had long been in leading-strings, but had never been led to what they looked for, felt new hopes rise in

* In his *Account of Ireland* which will be more particularly noticed hereafter.

“ their bosoms, and flattered themselves that the day of enfranchisement was come; golden visions of profit and of honor opened on the eyes of every patriot*; he who had disdained the thralldom of an undertaker, was ready to wear the livery of a resident viceroy; and the most inveterate republican became a convert to the new theory of government: all was rapture and reformation; the return of Astrea was hourly expected, and the kingdom of Saturn was supposed to be at hand.

“ The undertakers, against whose usurpation this scheme of residence was levelled, immediately took the alarm and strenuously used all their endeavors to defeat it. They knew indeed that opposition, if steadily resisted, must soon moulder into insignificance, but they flattered themselves that no lord-lieutenant would long persevere in the new plan. If he should they were resolved to omit nothing on their part to make his situation as uneasy and as unpleasant to him as possible.”

In this state of the public mind Lord Townshend arrived at his new government, and was immediately beset, as all former lord-lieutenants had been, by the undertakers on one

* A name particularly affected by those in Ireland who set up a systematic opposition to the measures of government. All the undertakers and their adherents when they lost their power became patriots. “ A friend of mine,” says Sir George, in one of his speeches “ seriously told me that he could not support government for, that if ever he quitted his present connexion, which was a private one, he would become a patriot—like General Kirke, who told king James, when asked to turn Papist, that he was engaged in honor to the emperor of Morocco that if ever he changed his religion he would become a Mahometan.”

hand and the patriots on the other, both proposing such measures and plans as, however opposite in their nature, both assured him were calculated to make his government easy and himself popular; but most of which, in fact, if adopted, must either have turned him into ridicule, or been some innovation on the established constitution, or some encroachment on the revenue. Schemes of the wildest and most absurd nature were daily offered at the castle. In some places roads were proposed to be made to facilitate commercial intercourse where no commerce could exist; in others means of conveyance where there was nothing to convey; here a navigation was to be encouraged where the sea was unnavigable, and there harbors to be constructed which presented shipwreck instead of safety. Collieries were proposed to be wrought where turf was the common fuel of the colliers, even in the very coal-pits themselves; and a proposal, among others, was seriously made that a *land-carriage* bounty should be allowed for all corn and flour brought to Dublin *by the new canal*. However ludicrous such projects may appear, Sir George assures us this representation of them is not exaggerated; and that so artfully were some of their schemes conceived, that they met, or at least seemed to meet, with encouragement at the castle. It happens indeed not infrequently and, from the noblest and best of motives, in the eagerness and ardor of improvement, without inquiring whether improvement be practicable, or if practicable whether expedient or necessary, that a minister is prevailed upon to lend his assent to the schemes of an artful impostor or an unprincipled jobber; or, as Sir George Macartney observes, "A lord-lieutenant new in his government, perhaps

“ new in business of any kind, unacquainted with the people
 “ and constitution of Ireland, and desirous of carrying on his
 “ administration with popularity and good humor, probably
 “ at first did not apprehend any danger or inconveniency
 “ from adopting these schemes : he perhaps seemed to ap-
 “ prove them, and his seeming approbation was immediately
 “ sworn into a positive promise, the performance of which
 “ he was afterwards either soothed or frightened into, ac-
 “ cording to the features of his character and the circum-
 “ stances of the times*.”

* One great object of the undertakers was to keep up the charges of government beyond its revenue ; as it then became necessary for the crown to ask them for a supply ; they granted it and thus recovered their own importance ; but to preserve that importance they granted the supply for two years only. The revenues however, in spite of extravagance, became at length more than equal to pay all the charges of government. “ This circumstance,” observes Sir George Macartney, “ alarmed the Irish undertakers : a flourishing revenue would strip them of their consequence, and render them less necessary to government. Their first care “ was to impoverish government as fast as possible, by squandering away the “ redundancy arising in the treasury. Unfortunately, they were permitted to “ do so.

“ By these means, in a space of four or five years, the kingdom, from a most “ prosperous and affluent condition, from having a revenue far greater than its ex- “ pense, and from possessing a treasure of near half a million sterling, *unap- “ plied*, and ready to answer any public emergency, was reduced to a state of the “ utmost distress, was obliged in 1759 to borrow 350,000*l.* at so high an interest “ as 5 *l.* per cent., and to revive the loan duties for the payment of it.

“ Thus the undertakers accomplished what they wished. By this manage- “ ment they plunged the nation in debt, had the art to throw the odium of their “ own prodigality on government, and then claimed rewards from that govern- “ ment for supplying the wants which they themselves had created. It was no “ longer the petition of modest merit for reward and encouragement ; it was “ the confident demand of powerful connection, a compact among individuals to “ support each other’s pretensions, and to vote for each other’s jobs, or an inde- “ cent scramble for the public spoil.” *Account of Ireland.*

With regard to Lord Townshend he soon discovered that by conceding a few points, he was every day harassed with greater and more extravagant demands, and he therefore determined to act in future upon his own suggestions and observation, and to get rid at once both of patriots and undertakers. The demands of the latter were particularly and obviously confined to selfish views. One wanted peerages for his friends, another some great reversion for himself; some expected pensions, and others an addition to those they already had. Thus, as Lord Townshend observes, “by distressing one lord-lieutenant and compromising with another, they are always gaining something for themselves, and paring away the authority and reputation of the English government, until it hath scarcely any ground left to stand upon.” And Sir George remarks, that instead of being grateful “for past favors, they were enraged at the refusal of new ones; turned the power of the crown entrusted to their hands, against the crown itself, and endeavored to extort, by faction and opposition, what was meant to be the reward of loyalty and service.”

It was therefore the first and great object of Lord Townshend's administration to crush this growing aristocracy of Ireland, and rid the country of an evil equally injurious to the people and to the crown*. Their ingratitude to the lat-

* Some idea may be collected of the influence of the undertakers in Ireland from the following extract of a letter from a friend then in government to Sir George Macartney, dated 12th May 1769.

“Your friends have long had reason to be vain of you, and in endeavoring to emancipate government and rid this country from the name of undertakers, you

ter proved the means of hastening the destruction of their power. Among the bills framed in the council of Ireland and transmitted to England in the accustomed manner, was in conformity with constant usage a money bill. This money bill, returned under the great seal of England, was read in the House of Commons on the 21st of November 1769, and rejected by a majority of 94 to 71. On this occasion all the strength of the undertakers, the Duke of Leinster, Lord Shannon, then master of the ordnance, and Mr. Ponsonby the speaker, was mustered against government. The lord-lieutenant entered his protest against the vote of the House of Commons, and put an end to the session by a sudden prorogation. Lord Shannon and Mr. Ponsonby who had shown in the course of this strange proceeding, that they acted, not from principle, but with the sole view of distressing government, were immediately dismissed from their employments. After this it became a matter of course for these gentlemen, together with the Duke of Leinster and his party, to unite with the patriots, and to determine to oppose and harass government to the utmost possible extent of their power. Every kind of spiteful resolution was proposed in the House of Commons that disappointed resentment could suggest. The press of Dublin teemed with indecent and

“ will do the first and most essential service to Ireland—a service in my opinion
“ so essential that it ought to be considered in the political system of Ireland
“ like charity in the religious. And as, in the religious, nothing, it is said, can
“ avail without charity, so in the political, nothing ought to avail without a faith-
“ ful discharge of this principal and most essential duty, the emancipation of
“ government.”

scurrilous libels *. The lord-lieutenant was represented as a man who must necessarily be the greatest enemy to the true interests of Ireland, because he was an Englishman, and by parity of reasoning it followed of course that his secretary could not be a friend, because he was an Irishman; and though the latter had a considerable estate in the country, and therefore most likely to be interested in its prosperity, yet as he had passed so much of his life in foreign parts it was hinted that he might perhaps have become a papist. No suggestion, however wild, is too absurd to be advanced when some party purpose is meant to be answered. In the House of Commons they endeavored to give every opposition and embarrassment to the measures of government. "For four months," says Sir George, "the turbulence of the faction kept the House of Commons sitting every night till ten o'clock, and very frequently several hours after midnight." To their sallies of violent invective and their intemperate speeches the secretary opposed calm and argumentative replies, spirited remonstrance against their absurd propositions, and preserved a firm and steady conduct throughout the whole session, and an uncommon share of temper and good humor upon every occasion †.

* Some of the best productions of this kind, though in general very coarse, and very severe against Lord Townshend, have been collected into a volume and published under the name of *Baratariana*. Those which are signed *Sindercome* are ascribed to Mr. Flood. The defenders of Lord Townshend replied to them in a periodical work called the *Batchelor*.

† Lord Townshend was much pleased with Sir George Macartney's conduct in the House of Commons. In a letter to Lord North he observes, "The session of Parliament being now ended, I think it incumbent on me, in justice to Sir

The undertakers however had soon the mortification to find that with their places they had lost a considerable part of their influence ; and that in the same proportion the British government regained its authority. The consequence of this change was, that several wise and salutary measures were now carried through the house, in which not individual interest but the real welfare and prosperity of Ireland only were consulted ; and the finances of this kingdom, by resolution and perseverance, were retrieved and placed upon a proper footing. The lord-lieutenant and his secretary now became more popular, though constantly residing on the spot, than most of their predecessors, who had made only their occasional visits and conferred favors. Sir George indeed remained upwards of three years constantly employed in the laborious office of chief secretary with unremitting exertion, without once returning to London according to the usual practice of other secretaries ; generally residing in Dublin at a great expense, and distributing among his countrymen the whole of his salary annexed to his official situation, and

“ George Macartney, to represent to your lordship that the happy conclusion to
“ which it is brought is, in a great measure, to be ascribed to his attention and
“ abilities. I have had the satisfaction of hearing from all the king’s servants,
“ who were his fellow laborers, that during the whole sessions he acquitted him-
“ self with great credit in the different speeches which he made, and that in
“ every other respect his conduct and behavior were such as proved him to be
“ a very judicious knowing man, and perfectly the man of business. He has now
“ been seven years in his majesty’s service without having received any favor, ex-
“ cept the temporary one which he at present holds under me ; and I think he has
“ the fairest and justest claim to be distinguished with some particular mark of
“ his majesty’s approbation.”

the income derived from his paternal estate. He conducted, in the course of this period, three difficult sessions of parliament, seconding, with complete success, the spirited measures of his principal, by which, for the first time, was broken to pieces the formidable aristocracy in that kingdom, which we have already observed had so long dictated its own terms to the government of this. In this turbulent and arduous employment he acquitted himself not only with distinguished political abilities very much as we have seen to the satisfaction of the lord-lieutenant, but with a temper that contributed not a little to allay the violence of party, and break the obstinacy of opposition. Lord Townshend was firmly persuaded of his zeal and fidelity, and often lamented that there was no reward within his reach, that he could consider to be adequate to his distinguished merit. With regard to himself and his friends he acted with his usual disinterestedness, having waved the acceptance of a place of 2000*l.* a year, to accommodate the government, and secured no advantages of any kind, except a small provision for a faithful servant in the revenue, and a commission in the army for a near relation, whom he felt himself bound to serve.

In the early part of the government of Lord Townshend, Sir George had occasion to fight many hard battles for his principal in the Irish House of Commons; and he was among the few members in that house who, by his manly and spirited retorts, could temper the impetuous eloquence of Mr. Flood, or silence the wild and democratic effusions of Dr. Lucas, a notorious republican declaimer of the day, whose patriotism,

however, his party, it seems, found it necessary to keep alive by the help of a subscription*. Sir George had recently checked the latter for some flippant remark he had thought fit to apply to him as the ministerial instrument in the Irish House of Commons; and Mr. Flood taking occasion shortly afterwards to repeat the observation, at the same time made some allusion to the badge of the Order of the White Eagle, under the name of the Northern Star, and the *blueish* ribband, which drew from the secretary this spirited reply. "I gave notice some days ago to the most learned and
" ancient professor of patriotism in this political university
" that I would not permit him nor any other to address me as
" a minister. I find notwithstanding that although he has not
" thought fit to repeat it himself, yet he has prompted others;
" but I am not deceived; I see the quiver from which the
" shaft is drawn; I recognize the poison which envenoms its
" point. For my own part I wish to avoid all personal alter-
" cation. I have always endeavored to observe a language
" void of offence, and a conduct of openness and candor in
" every transaction of my life, both as a public and a private
" man. Whether I have demerited of my country or not,
" my country must judge; but wherever I have been I have
" at least endeavored to deserve well of it. Its honor never
" suffered in my hands, and the Irish name has not, I trust,
" been sullied in mine. Unassisted by blood or alliance I

* Not many years before, this virtuous character had been driven out of the city of Dublin by his fellow citizens, and took refuge in London. So great was the annoyance he gave to the House of Commons, that a writer, in the "Batchelor," compares him with a fly which is most troublesome at the latter end of the season when it grows weak and blind.

“made myself considered in a neighbouring kingdom; I
“obtained the notice of my sovereign, and, by his favor,
“my youth has been employed in business of the highest con-
“cern, in negotiations of the most important nature. Suc-
“cess was attendant on my labors, and the distinguished ap-
“probation of the British parliament has sanctified those
“labors. Thus, Sir, was I employed at a very early-age
“whilst some of my opponents were engaged in the weighing
“of syllables, the measurement of words, the composition of
“new epithets, and the construction of new phrases. If in
“my embassies I have received testimonies never before
“granted but to my superiors; if my person is adorned with
“extraordinary proofs of distinction, let me tell these gentle-
“men that they are badges of honor, not of shame and dis-
“grace. Let me tell them that, if from my public situation,
“my name should ever pass to posterity, it will be trans-
“mitted as a testimony of my service and integrity, not as a
“record of infamy and crimes.”

He contended, in fact, that no secretary ought to be con-
sidered as a minister, on account of the public situation he
held in that capacity. “Mine,” says he, “is an office of
“private trust not public responsibility; to conciliate not to
“conduct; to explain not to dictate; to concur not to control.
“Are there,” he asks, “any marks of my being a minister?
“Are there any tokens of my possessing either the power or
“of adopting the practice of a minister? Is there a single
“instance of any of my friends, relations, or dependents be-
“ing advanced or promoted by me? Have I received either
“place, pension, or reversion?—None. My situation then

“ is simply this. I have the honor of being chief secretary to
“ the lord-lieutenant, which to me is an employment merely
“ official, and by no means ministerial; and if any stronger
“ proof be wanting of my not being a minister, it is this—
“ there is not a man in this house, or out of this house, to
“ whom I am under any promise whatsoever.”

And upon the whole, while fulfilling the duties of this arduous situation, Sir George Macartney was greatly esteemed by the Irish in general, both in his public and private character; he attended indeed to all their concerns and representations with willingness, candor, and punctuality; and though he was frequently obliged to disappoint their expectations, yet he generally contrived to dismiss them in good humor. On his part, he took every occasion to express and to demonstrate the sincere regard he felt for the country which gave him birth, and in which he received his education; and towards the close of his labors, as chief secretary of that kingdom, he observes, in one of his speeches, “ If I have merited the approbation of
“ my countrymen I shall rejoice not only as a servant of
“ government, not as a secretary to a lord-lieutenant, but as
“ an Irishman, as a man who thinks it an honor to have been
“ born among you, who esteems it a peculiar happiness to
“ possess his property in this kingdom, and who has a heart
“ that feels warmly for the interests and liberties of his
“ country. May she be happy! When the tumult of con-
“ tending parties shall cease, when the heads of those parties
“ shall rest from their labors, whatever may become of lord-
“ lieutenants and secretaries, may she be happy! But to be
“ happy she must listen to the voice of moderation, and

“ take wisdom for her guide ; and the paths of wisdom are
“ the paths of peace.”

It had always been usual to make liberal provision for a chief secretary of Ireland on or before his resigning the office, sometimes even when he never entered on his office ; but it so happened that no appointment fell within the gift of Lord Townshend that was worthy the acceptance of his secretary, except that of muster-master general which, as before observed, Sir George generously gave up to accommodate the lord-lieutenant. His services however were not unnoticed nor unacknowledged at home *. His Majesty, in June 1772, was graciously pleased to nominate him a Knight Companion of the most Honorable Military Order of the Bath, and he was installed at Westminster by proxy, on the 15th of the same month ; and some time afterwards, in the year 1774, as a further reward for his services in Ireland, he was appointed governor and constable of the castle and fortress of Toome, with a nominal salary of 1,300 *l.* a year, but which, beside being ill paid, produced only in London 1,036 *l.* 5 *s.* a year. Yet an ungracious attempt was made in the Irish House of Commons to render the appointment objectionable, as not being vested in the crown, but the property of a private individual. The attempt however answered no other purpose than that of proving to Sir George Macartney the great number of firm friends which he had among the most exalted

* Extract of a letter from Lord North to Lord Townshend, dated April 1772.

“ The conduct of Sir George Macartney is very meritorious ; I am sure it must
“ appear so to the king. He will never want an advocate there, whilst your hum-
“ ble servant is able to bear to his merit the testimony which is due to it.”

characters for worth and integrity in that kingdom, all ready to stand forth in his behalf. The motion which had been made by Mr. Barry, for an inquiry into the state of the garrison of the castle of Toome was therefore withdrawn, or, more properly speaking, wholly abandoned*. It was but indeed, at best, a scanty reward, when compared with what other secretaries had received before him, after a four years service in an office whose duties were uninterrupted, and, from the new order of things introduced into Ireland, unusually severe.

HOWEVER desirous Sir George Macartney might have been, after quitting Ireland, to obtain a little relaxation and retirement from the bustle of public life, it is not probable that a person of his talent for business and active turn of mind would long remain satisfied without participating in public concerns. In the course of the year 1773, he appears to have been employed in drawing up his treatise on the subject of Ireland, of which we shall have occasion to speak

* Extract of a letter from Sir Robert Waller to Sir George Macartney, dated 11th November 1775.

“ There is not a respectable character in the House of Commons who could
“ at this moment be prevailed upon to take up the paltry, ungenerous, and im-
“ politic question of Toome Castle; it is now this day disclaimed and abandoned
“ by all. For you there is the greatest cause of exultation in the proof you have
“ thus received of the high estimation in which you are held by the respectable and
“ influencing characters in this country. In every situation, and in every climate,
“ I hope you will meet with equal instances of justice and gratitude.”

hereafter. In the month of October 1774, he was chosen member of the British parliament for the boroughs of Air, Irwin, Rothsay, Cambletown, and Inverary; and in December 1775, was appointed captain-general and governor in chief of the southern Caribbee islands of Grenada, the Grenadines, and Tobago. On the 10th June 1776, his majesty (by privy seal at St. James's, and by patent at Dublin, the 19th July following) was pleased to advance him to the peerage of Ireland, by the title of Lord Macartney, Baron of Lissanoure, in the county of Antrim. On his arrival at Grenada, the principal seat of his government, he found that island distracted by party feuds, which, in a great degree, had destroyed its credit, diminished its resources, and impeded its general welfare; there was the Scotch party and the French party. The former was inveterate against the latter, because they were Papists, and these bore no less hatred to the others, because they were considered as intruders. Of the two the *odium theologicum* of the Scotch was the most violent and the most difficult to conciliate. Their zeal had driven them so far as to threaten the demolition of all the French churches on the island; and so violent was the spirit of enthusiasm, which operated in the cause of the church of Scotland, and so rancorous the hatred against the Catholic religion, that this pious intention would, in all probability, have been carried into execution long before the arrival of his lordship, had not Mr., afterwards Sir George Staunton, an advocate and member of the council, whose benevolent mind was always ready to afford an active assistance to the oppressed, stepped forward to interpose his good offices between the contending parties, and to prevent at least their

proceeding to this last shameful extremity. When Lord Macartney had obtained an accurate statement of these party feuds, which, from the time of the annexation of those islands to the crown of Great Britain, had been equally productive of injury to the colonists, and of inconvenience and perplexity to his majesty's ministers at home, he lost not a moment in setting about the means of composing and adjusting those pernicious dissensions. His first object was to restore harmony in the colonial legislature, where, in fact, the root of the evil was grounded, and to make provision for their public debt. His measures gave general satisfaction, the colony flourished, and the prosperity of individuals kept pace with the public welfare.

The government of those colonies united to that situation the office of chancellor; and in this latter capacity Lord Macartney had a new field for the display of his judgment, his ability, and his impartiality. The rectitude of his conduct in the execution of the duties of this important office, the attention he bestowed on all matters that were brought before him, and his just and impartial decisions were applauded with warmth and gratitude by all parties. By address and management, but perhaps more by the confidence his conduct had inspired, he contrived, for the first time, to establish a respectable militia in the island of Grenada, composed of those very parties who, previous to his arrival, had been endeavoring to tear each other in pieces. The invidious distinction of English, Scotch, and French was no longer kept up, but was happily buried in the general desire for

the protection and preservation of the island under so just and happy a government; and part of this militia, though composed of such heterogeneous materials, contributed not a little to the gallant resolution with which the garrison shortly afterwards stood upon its defence, when attacked by a very superior force under the command of count d'Estaing in July 1779.

Of this intended attack Lord Macartney had received very accurate information not only from Martinique but also by a variety of small vessels which he employed as avisos to gain intelligence and to watch the enemy's motions. He knew the great value which the French attached to the Grenadines, and the easy conquest by which they calculated that the islands must fall to the great superiority of their land and sea forces. For nearly twelve months before the event happened he had done every thing that depended upon himself to put the island of Grenada into the best possible state of defence. He was on all occasions, and on every alarm, the most active man on the island, and for many nights together at different times he refused to lie down on his bed, and very frequently used to get up at all hours of the night and visit in person the works and the different posts. He caused batteries to be erected at the several landing places and on the heights, and by his example of zeal and attention for the preservation of the colonists and their property he contrived to animate all ranks of men with a spirit of emulation and with a determined resolution to defend themselves nobly whenever an occasion should call for their exertion.

Aware however of the weak state of the garrison with the addition of all the militia and volunteers that could be collected, he had frequently endeavored to impress on the minds of the admirals Young, Barrington, and Byron the value and importance of those islands to Great Britain, and the necessity of their being reinforced, as both the ships and troops stationed for their protection were wholly inadequate to that object. In one of his letters to vice-admiral Young he observes "I beg leave to repeat my request that you will order some of your cruizers to pay a little more attention to these islands than they have hitherto done. Grenada is in point of consequence the second of our West India islands, being in produce next to Jamaica. The value of the exported produce of Grenada and the Grenadines alone is 700,000 *l.* a year, and the value of the exported produce of Tobago is equal to 200,000 *l.* a year, and every day increasing, so that the whole is little short of a million sterling. Being in a great measure, new islands their importance is as yet not so well known; and on that account only do I imagine that they have been so much neglected by the fleet."

Having at length received intelligence, on which he could rely, that the French fleet was preparing to sail for Grenada, he sent off an express to General Grant, then commanding in chief, at the neighboring island of St. Lucie, and another to Admiral Byron who commanded the fleet. By the former he was told that he could not possibly think of dividing his force, nor spare him a single man: and the admiral thought fit to depend rather on the strength of his own intelligence and his own conjecture, with regard to the intentions of the

enemy, and returned for answer, that he was proceeding to the island of St. Vincent's; but that if Grenada should actually be attacked, and Lord Macartney would let him know it, he would, in that case, come down to his assistance without loss of time. The admiral by this message meant no disrespect to Lord Macartney, nor want of inclination to meet the enemy; but his obstinacy and want of judgment were not the less prejudicial to the public service. When therefore his lordship perceived that he had to rely wholly on his own little garrison and those auxiliaries which he himself had trained to arms, he lost no time in making such a disposition of his force, as he conceived to be most effectual for the defence of the island.

On mustering his forces the whole strength of the garrison of St. George, the capital of the island, when they expected the attack to be made, was as follows:

One hundred and one regulars, of the 48th regiment.

Twenty-four artillery.

Sixty-six volunteers.

Three hundred and seventy militia.

Of the regulars eighty-four only were fit for duty; and the militia, which his lordship had raised, were only of four months standing, and certainly but little to be depended on, as most of them were utter strangers to discipline and obedience, and one third of them at least Frenchmen, equally averse from English manners, religion, and government, and but very recently exempted from a shameful persecution

which, as we have seen, had religion for its plea. Those however who remained faithful performed their duty like veteran soldiers.

Early on the 2d July 1799, Count d'Estaing appeared before the island with twenty-five sail of ships of the line and twelve frigates, having on board near seven thousand land troops; and in the evening of the same day the enemy effected a landing of thirteen hundred men, under the orders of Count Dillon.

As the fort was utterly incapable of holding out resistance for any length of time, Lord Macartney, at the head of his small force, thought it most prudent to retire to the Hospital-hill, as being the strongest ground, commanding at once the town, the fort, and the harbor. On this spot he determined to make his stand, and to maintain his post to the last extremity. About two in the morning a party of the enemy attempted to penetrate his left along the river, but they were soon repulsed, thrown into disorder, and lost several men. An hour after this Mons. d'Estaing sent a flag by one of his aides-de-camp, with a peremptory summons to surrender, accompanied by menaces of mischief in case of further resistance; but without any terms of capitulation in the event of compliance. The message was contained in the following words, "Humanity requires it, and the personal consideration which the Count d'Estaing has for Lord Macartney induces him, in the most solemn and pressing manner, to summon his lordship to surrender. Lord Macartney

“ should know the superiority of force with which he is at-
“ tacked, and against which he presumes to resist. If
“ therefore he does not surrender he must be personally
“ responsible for all the ill consequences which his obsti-
“ nacy may occasion. He is also informed that such
“ of the inhabitants and merchants as are taken in arms
“ shall irrecoverably lose their estates and properties, and
“ the free colored people be reduced to slavery.

(Signed) “ D’ESTAING.”

To this gasconade Lord Macartney returned a short but
emphatic reply. “ Lord Macartney is ignorant of the
“ Count d’Estaing’s force ; he knows his own and will defend
“ the island to the utmost of his power.”

(Signed) “ MACARTNEY.”

Lord Macartney had, in fact, determined in his own mind
never to surrender himself a prisoner to the French, even if
reduced to the last extremity ; it was not likely therefore
that, independent of his personal feelings, he would adopt a
conduct so dishonorable as to give up a valuable colony un-
conditionally, when there was at least a possibility that relief
might speedily arrive ; and to the honor of the inhabitants
who served under him, neither did their interest nor their
sense of danger induce a single man to propose such advice.

Before the evening of the 3d, the enemy had landed in
sufficient force to extend themselves so widely in the rear
as to cut off from the British all communication with the

interior of the island, and all their motions indicated a speedy assault, for which Lord Macartney prepared himself as well as his little force would admit, by a judicious distribution of it. Between two and three o'clock in the morning of the 4th, the enemy began their operations by a seventy-four gun ship cannonading the town and fort; at the same time a body of five hundred men attacked the north-west end of the Hospital-hill, whilst three other columns of five hundred men each, with an advance guard of two hundred men, pushed forward to the lines near the east battery. Their onset was sustained with great steadiness and resolution for more than an hour and a half, notwithstanding the smallness of the English force which, in the course of the night, had suffered a considerable diminution by the desertion of almost all the colored people, and the greater part of the new subjects; insomuch that at the time of the attack Lord Macartney could not muster in the whole, of every description, three hundred men to oppose to very nearly as many thousands brought against him. After a brave and obstinate defence, and the loss of two lieutenants, two non-commissioned officers, and several privates, who were killed in the trenches, and a considerable number of wounded, the hill was taken by storm, not however before the loss on the part of the enemy, in killed and wounded, was equal, if not superior, to the whole force which had so gallantly defended it*. But although thus overborne by numbers, and compelled to quit

* The loss of the enemy in this affair was one major, one captain, one lieutenant, one hundred and eleven privates killed; one captain, three lieutenants, one aid-de-camp, one hundred and ninety-five privates wounded.—Total three hundred and fourteen.

their ground, the British, still resolving not to surrender, retreated into the fort. The enemy however poured in with such impetuosity and in such multitudes, having now landed the whole of their troops, that there was not even time for spiking up the cannon. Having now also got possession of all the heights, with the mortars and heavy artillery, and thus enabled to bury the few English under the ruins of the fort in a few hours, they lost no time in opening their cannonade upon it. A council of war was called by Lord Macartney; all the officers declared that the place was absolutely untenable, and that nothing could justify a further waste of lives, as it must fall at all events in less than an hour; he felt it therefore his duty to endeavour to obtain from the enemy such a capitulation as might be honorable to his majesty's troops, and advantageous to the inhabitants of the island. To such a capitulation he was warranted by all the rules of war, after so gallant a defence, to consider himself entitled. But the man he had to treat with possessed none of those generous feelings which usually distinguish the military character, nor indeed did he seem to be overburdened with those which are generally met with in common life. He peremptorily refused to enter into any treaty, rejected every proposal, but sent back a string of propositions that had evidently been ready manufactured before his appearance off the island, so unprecedented and humiliating, so ensnaring and uncertain in their nature, extent, and aim, that it required no deliberation in the mind of such a man as Lord Macartney to declare, that he never would degrade himself so far as to put his hand to such base conditions; and all the principal proprietors on the island there assembled,

and to whom they were communicated, unanimously preferred to surrender at discretion rather than to subscribe to terms which might at any time supply pretexts for taking away the lives and fortunes of the capitulants. If Lord Macartney was worthy of the highest praise and admiration for the gallant manner in which, at the head of his little force, he sustained the assault of an army, his conduct, if less brilliant, was not the less meritorious nor less advantageous to the public, in rejecting the offers of an artful and insidious capitulation presented under the cover of a species of neutrality which, had it been accepted, would have enabled D'Estaing to proceed with undiminished strength to attack his majesty's other possessions in the western hemisphere. Determined therefore never to consent to the terms offered, yet unable to obtain better, without the means of resistance or the possibility of relief, he was compelled to the hard necessity of delivering up the island to the enemy unconditionally *; and when he found that his being made a prisoner of war was inevitable, he tore the star of the Order of the Bath from his breast, observing, that although his person could not escape falling into the hands of the enemy, he would take care that the ensigns of his sovereign's favor should not grace the trophies of a Frenchman's victory. He knew the enemy he had to deal with, and the use he was likely to make of his inglorious conquest.

Nothing indeed could exceed in baseness the whole conduct of Count d'Estaing in this affair. With a force ten

* For a more detailed account of this gallant resistance made by a handful of men against a very superior force, see Lord Macartney's letter to Lord George Germaine, dated 5th July 1779, Appendix, No. 5.

times superior to that he had to contend with, he was induced, either through a paltry resentment, or because he thought it necessary, to animate his troops to the attack by promising them the pillage of the British quarters; a promise which he suffered them to carry into execution to the utmost extent of their licentious desires. A whole service of plate belonging to Lord Macartney, all his furniture, clothes, and other effects, even his papers, both public and private, were taken from him, without his ever being able to recover a single article. So void of decency was the French commander in chief, and so totally lost to all sense of honor or shame, that he allowed the plate, with Lord Macartney's arms upon it, his other effects, and even his wearing apparel, to be publicly sold in the market-place of Grenada for the benefit of the French soldiery. And after having thus shamefully encouraged this act of systematic plunder, he refused to give permission to Lord Macartney to proceed on his parole to any of the British settlements in the West Indies; but sent him a close prisoner to France.

But the ill conduct of the French commander in chief towards Lord Macartney, and the misfortunes he suffered in consequence of it, had no effect in disturbing the serenity of his mind, or casting the least cloud upon his temper. Conscious of having done his duty to the utmost extent of his means, he met his own and the public loss with dignified composure and tranquillity; and when d'Estaing, the day after the storm of the hill, sent him an invitation to dinner, instead of betraying any resentment or ill humor at his unworthy treatment, he returned for answer that he willingly accepted his invitation, but hoped he would overlook the

style of his dress, as the French soldiers had made a little free with his wardrobe. They had not in fact left him a second coat.

The injury which Lord Macartney thus suffered in his private fortune by the capture of Grenada, and for which he never received any compensation or allowance whatsoever, was still further increased by the irreparable loss of all his papers. From his first setting out in life he had made it a rule to commit to paper whatever observations occurred in the course of his reading, which he deemed worthy of recollection, and all such new matter of information as he considered to proceed from good authority. A person who was thus in the constant habit of noting down whatever appeared to be interesting from its novelty, or its value, could not fail to have collected a mass of materials in travelling through the different states of Europe, which, in point of fact, was the case with regard to Lord Macartney. All these materials, with many other papers and accounts, fell into the hands of the French, and could never be recovered. And as misfortunes are observed seldom to come single, it happened in this instance that the duplicates of many of these papers, which he had taken the precaution to make, were also irrecoverably lost. For having seen the probability of an attack many months before that event actually took place, he had procured a passage to England, in the Supply storeship, for Lady Macartney, and had sent those duplicates and other papers in her ladyship's charge. The ship stopped at St. Kitt's to collect the convoy there, and, in the mean time,

the passengers went on shore. Lady Macartney debated for some time in her own mind, whether it might be more safe to leave the box of papers, which was to her a subject of anxious solicitude, on board the ship, or carry them with her on shore, and she at length concluded to leave them on board as less liable to accident. On the third morning after their arrival, just as they were going to reembark, they were alarmed at the appearance of fire in the fleet. Lady Macartney however got into the boat, and was proceeding towards her ship when they were hailed by the captain of a vessel in the fleet, and informed that it was the Supply storeship which was in flames. It was in vain to proceed; every thing within the ship was speedily consumed; and Lady Macartney lost not only the papers, but all her clothes and every article of value which was on board, having saved nothing but a few changes of linen which she had taken with her on shore. Had not Lord Macartney caused a few copies to be printed of his *Account of Russia and of Ireland*, they too, in all probability, would have followed the fate of the rest of his papers.

By the destruction of this ship, and by the capture of Grenada, Lord Macartney suffered in his private fortune a very considerable loss, which at this time was the more inconvenient as, previous to his leaving England, he had sold his pension or annual salary annexed to the constablenesship of the castle of Toome, to pay the debt he had been under the necessity of contracting for the public service while in Russia, no part of which on account of the expense attending a constant residence in Ireland, during three sessions of parliament, had he yet been

able to liquidate. He may therefore justly be said to have returned from every public appointment he had hitherto held, in worse circumstances than when he entered upon it.

In the midst of the calamities of Grenada, both public and private, Lord Macartney however had the satisfaction of experiencing a testimony of gratitude which could not be insincere. It was from the inhabitants of Grenada, given to him at a time when he was no longer their governor, but a prisoner in the hands of him who was now their governor. Notwithstanding this change of circumstance, such of the principal inhabitants as were then in the town of St. George waited upon his lordship in a body, and presented him with the following address :

“ July 5, 1779.

“ THE testimonies which all orders of men, within your
“ excellency's late government, have given of their sense of
“ the wisdom and justice of your conduct, while you presided
“ over them, as well as of your constant, zealous, and well-
“ directed attention to their security and welfare, are too well
“ founded to require a proof of their sincerity by a repetition
“ of them, after your administration has ceased by the fate of
“ war. We shall therefore, in this pressing moment of your
“ excellency's departure, confine ourselves to express that
“ gratitude which we justly feel towards your excellency, to
“ join our voices to the acknowledgment of the conquerors of
“ this island, of the well-planned and spirited defence which
“ you have made with such inferior force ; and to add, what
“ we had an opportunity of observing, that the example
“ which you gave of intrepidity and coolness, during the

“several attacks, must have influenced all persons under
“your command to the full exertion of their duty to their
“sovereign and country; and that your excellency hath, to
“the last moment of your command and negotiations with
“the conquerors, allied your duty to your sovereign to a true
“regard to the people who had been committed to your
“care.

“We wish your excellency a safe passage to Europe, and
“all happiness in future.”

(Signed)

By the principal Inhabitants of St. George Grenada.

The high sense entertained by his countrymen at home of the gallant defence of the island against so superior a force, could not have been less gratifying to the feelings of Lord Macartney than the tribute of those who had an opportunity of witnessing his conduct upon the spot. By an act of the British legislature the extraordinary indulgence was granted to the island of Grenada, of allowing an importation of its sugars and other produce into Great Britain, notwithstanding its being in the possession of a foreign and hostile power; and the ground of this act, as declared in both houses of parliament, was the gallant resistance made by Lord Macartney at the head of his little force, most of which was composed of the inhabitants of the island.

His Lordship remained but a short time as a prisoner of war at Limoges before he obtained, through Mons. Sartines, the permission of the king of France to return to England,

where he was immediately exchanged. Just at this time the affairs of Ireland, under the administration of Lord Buckinghamshire, were likely to give much trouble and embarrassment to his majesty's ministers. Lord North therefore prevailed on Lord Macartney to undertake a secret and confidential mission to that kingdom, which he accomplished equally to the satisfaction of his majesty's ministers and the lord-lieutenant; the advice and assistance he had it in his power to afford to the latter, on several very delicate and important questions then in agitation, were of infinite service, and were received and acknowledged by Lord Buckingham with expressions of gratitude. On his return from Ireland he offered himself a candidate for the borough of Beeralstone in Devonshire, and was chosen to represent that place in the British parliament in September 1780.

ABOUT this time the court of directors of the East India Company had under their consideration the appointment of a suitable person to fill the vacant chair of the presidency of Madras. The enormous abuses in the administration of that government which, for a great number of years, had been committed under a repeated succession, with few exceptions, of weak or wicked governors, who had risen in the routine of service to that station, loudly demanded a change of men as well as of measures. The disgraceful scenes which were exhibited in opposition to the administration of Lord

Pigot, who terminated his life in confinement, a victim of party violence, the corrupt practices that were known to prevail in almost every department under that of Sir Thomas Rumbold, and the same system of corruption accompanied with an extraordinary imbecility and inactivity, which distinguished the short career of Mr. Whitehill, had involved the government of Fort St. George in such confusion and disgrace, that to restore to reputation and to order the distracted affairs of the Carnatic, required the choice of a man of no ordinary capacity, experience, and integrity. The difficulties against which a new governor would most assuredly have to struggle, did not however deter a multitude of candidates from aspiring to the vacant chair with pretensions no less various than their numbers. Generals, directors, civilians, commissaries, and engineers, all of them at one time or other in the employ of the East India Company, and most of them degraded by dismissal or suspension from that service, burned with the bright ambition of succeeding Sir Thomas Rumbold. There happened very fortunately at this time to be several members in the direction, who felt it no less their inclination than it was their duty, to search for qualities in their new governor different from those which any of the candidates that had yet offered themselves, appeared to possess; who conceived that it would be for the honor of the nation, as well as the prosperity of the company, to send out a person of rank and reputation to fill the vacant chair; and that his never having been in the service of the Company, instead of being an objection, ought to be considered in the present state of their affairs, as one of the first recommendations, as he would thus be disengaged from all party squabbles; that, on this ac-

count, it would now be policy, as it always had been among the ancients, to send out new men to their distant settlements; and that it was not the knowledge in detail of local customs which was so much required on the present occasion as a man of general experience, liberal education, comprehensive mind, free from prejudice, and accustomed to business.

Sentiments of such a cast, when known to proceed from high authority, could not fail to create an alarm in the minds of those who were more liable to be actuated by motives of private interest than public benefit. This alarm discovered itself openly on the 9th November, 1780, when, at a meeting of the proprietary, Mr. Lushington made a motion, "That it be recommended to the court of directors to appoint forthwith a governor of Madras, and that it be earnestly recommended to them to appoint one of their own servants to fill that vacancy." The court however adjourned without proceeding to a ballot, but not before it appeared to be the sense of a very respectable body of proprietors, that no particular set of men, but the very fittest man wherever found, ought to be the object of their choice; that "integrity unshaken by the example of plunder and corruption, a character to lose and consequently one to save by shunning the faults of former governors, were to be considered as the fittest qualifications in their new governor or Madras."

From this novel complexion of affairs in Leadenhall Street, it occurred to some of the friends of Lord Macartney

that, from the proofs he had already given of talent, address and integrity, he was eminently qualified to fill the chair of that presidency ; and as his lordship had laid it down as a rule never to refuse employment where he was likely to be of use to the public, he was easily prevailed upon to offer himself as a candidate for the vacant situation. His principal opponents were now reduced to Mr. Russel, formerly a store-keeper and commissary, and Colonel Call, a surveyor and engineer, men who had both acquired considerable wealth in the Company's service. To the first it might have been objected that, as the son-in-law of the late Lord Pigot, and, in a great measure, the cause, though perhaps innocently, of the dissensions at Madras, it would be utterly improper to place him in this situation, where he would have so many personal enemies to contend with ; the objections to the second were equally strong ; he was one of the principal creditors of the nabob of Arcot. It was contended, on the part of those who favored Lord Macartney's pretensions, that if (other qualities being equal, and experience accounted of any use) a man will execute the same office a second time better than he did the first, and that office better than any other, it would fairly follow that if stores should be reserved for a commissary, and forts for an engineer, a government could not be better conducted than by him who had already proved himself a good governor ; that experience of profession was a better plea than experience of locality ; they admitted that if a man who negociated a good treaty of commerce in Russia was therefore, from his long residence, to fancy to himself that he was capable of taking an accurate survey and ad-measurement of that extensive empire ; or that he could be

expert in supplying its armies with provisions, his absurdity must be readily acknowledged; and they contended that the notion was equally ridiculous, which sets up the experience of a surveyor or a storekeeper, as the path which leads to the knowledge of a statesman. Against the local information, and the lesser and confined acquirements of his Lordship's opponents were set up the great and essential qualifications of a liberal education, political experience, enlightened understanding, and eminence of character; that on all these principles there could not be the least ground for contesting the manifest superiority of Lord Macartney in all these several respects; that it was absurd to suppose a man must be ignorant of India, because he had never been there; and that it was not necessary for a governor of that country to be a chuser of muslins or a river pilot.

At a court of proprietors, held on the 23d of November, a letter from Sir Thomas Rumbold was read, wherein he declared his intention to resign his government, and notice was then given that on the 14th of December, it was intended to proceed to the nomination of a successor. On this occasion General Smith addressed the court, and having expatiated at great length on the merits of the old servants of the Company, and the necessity of local knowledge to any governor in India, he concluded with a motion to this effect, "That it be
" recommended by the proprietors to the Court of Directors
" to appoint forthwith a governor of Madras; and as experi-
" ence and local knowledge are necessary in such a station,
" that it be recommended to the directors to appoint to that
" trust some person who is, or has been, in the Company's

“service.” It may be observed, that the court of proprietors was not, at this time, exactly composed of the same description of men which constitute its majority on great questions at the present day, when every tradesman and ship-chandler on the borders of the Thames, from Wapping to Blackwall, must hold in his name as much India stock as will give him a vote in Leadenhall-street before he can hope to sell to those concerned in the shipping interest, a pound of nails or a ball of pack-thread. At that time the court of proprietors recommended their governors to the court of directors, and some of the leading men in the kingdom did not disdain to take part in their debates. On the present occasion Mr. Edmund Burke rose to propose an amendment to General Smith’s motion, previously to which, in his usual strain of eloquence, he laid open the rapacious, disobedient, and usurious conduct of the servants of the Company in India; he observed that at Madras those servants had formed a consolidated fund of nearly two millions and a half lent, or said to be lent, to the nabob of Arcot, for which they received an exorbitant interest, infinitely greater than the dividend received by the body of the proprietors from their commercial concerns; that subsequent to the reception of the orders of the Company at Madras for the restoration of Tanjore to the Raja, the same set of servants had the audacity to take a mortgage from the nabob of Arcot of that very kingdom of Tanjore; that the nabob was only a phantom raised by those servants, that he acted by their direction, though on him they throw the odium of the unjust, rapacious, and inhuman act of which they have been guilty; that they lend him money to carry war into the dominion of his neighbours, for the

avowed purpose of plundering enough to enable him to pay the interest of that consolidated fund said to be due to them ; that such wars lead to new debts, and new debts to new wars ; that they have even threatened to divert a river from its natural course, and from the fertility which it gives to lands that nourish five millions of innocent natives, unless their rapacious demands be satisfied by a people whom they had already exhausted ; that, in short, the sun would traverse from the meridian of London to that of Madras before he could complete the history of the extortions and the injustice of the Company's servants, or of their tyranny to the natives, and their contempt of the orders and authority of their employers at home ; that if all the servants of the Company were of the nature he described, as most of them were, he would not only prefer the noble Lord, who was a candidate for the government of Madras, and whose abilities and virtues he respected highly, but would prefer any common person to such men ; but if there were exceptions, if there were obedient and honest servants, he thought it would be right to reward that obedience and that integrity ; and therefore he would move almost in the words of a letter, the dying legacy of Lord Pigot, in addition to General Smith, that "such servant should have proved himself worthy of their recompence by his obedience and integrity."

Governor Johnstone perfectly agreed with the picture which had been so ably and so truly given of the enormous misconduct of the Company's servants, and inferred, from that very picture, the strongest necessity of not confining the choice of governors to a class of men so justly reprobated.

He contended that, from the very arduous and difficult office which that of the governor of Madras is allowed to be on all hands, as from him must flow the remedy of those gross and fatal abuses, the utmost latitude of choice should be allowed ; that if it had formerly been narrowed, it should now be enlarged ; that in excluding all persons from eminent employments in their service, except persons bred in India, the proprietors would exclude themselves from the care of their own concerns, and that he, for one, should never consent to be the suicide of his own natural rights.

The name of Lord Macartney being often mentioned or alluded to in the debate, at length called up his lordship. He observed, that several persons of character and worth, conversant in the Company's affairs and interested in its welfare, had often expressed to him their concern at the distracted situation of Madras, and declared it as their opinion, that in order to heal the wounds given to that settlement, and to restore to it tranquillity and order, it would be necessary to appoint to the government of it some person new in the service, new to its abuses, but warranted and proved by the stricter trials of other services ; a person who, not having yet been in India, was above the suspicion of local passions or prepossessions, and totally unconnected with the contending factions or interests of any part of Hindostan. This opinion, he assured the court, was formed long before they had thought of him, or sounded his disposition to accept that employment ; but as they had often observed, that India was a favorite subject of his attention, and that beside the general information which a British statesman should possess, con-

cerning all the dependencies of the empire, he had endeavored to acquire a particular knowledge of the concerns of the India Company, concerns rising daily in magnitude and importance, they imagined that, having been employed in remote situations, he was not likely to be startled by distance or difficulty, and that he might be rendered a happy instrument of that good which the real friends of the Company were anxious to effect; they were pleased, he said, to judge from his conduct in the various stations he had filled in Russia, in Ireland, and in the West Indies, that he was not likely to acquit himself in Asia with less satisfaction or benefit to his employers; the character and reputation which they supposed him to have gained in public life, they considered as a pledge that he would not sully by any impropriety of future conduct; they were therefore so good as to recommend, nay almost to solicit him to offer his services on the present occasion; that he had been thus induced by them to think that a fair field now opened for a man of honest ambition, though bred in what is called the service of the Crown and not of the Company, to exert his abilities for the honor and the advantage both of the Company and the Crown. He was aware, he said, of the popular and interested objection of his want of local knowledge; a knowledge upon which he never knew any man value himself, who could value himself upon any other. He did not perceive in Russia that his want of local knowledge then retarded his success, in procuring the treaty of commerce with that power, from which are derived whatever advantages of trade we continue to enjoy in that country; he did not find that the want of local knowledge, or his being new in the West Indies, prevented him from

reconciling the different parties and jarring interests which had distracted the colony of Grenada, from its conquest to his arrival there. He found that prudence and integrity, temper and perseverance seldom failed to surmount the difficulties of public stations, and those difficulties for which they are established; that local knowledge, which is necessary to men in eminent offices, is indeed either quickly acquired or easily supplied by inferior persons on the spot; not the report of an individual, but compared and collected from many. Any one man's local knowledge must be so corrected, or it will be found both lame and blind. The public man becomes the impartial judge, who gathers from the witnesses of the fact, the truth of the evidence. His Lordship proceeded to remind the proprietors that he offered himself to their consideration, without any display of his pretensions, or the disqualification of the other candidates, conceiving it far more honorable to leave a perfect and unbiassed freedom in the minds and judgment of all the proprietary between the tender of his new and humble services, and the more confident claims of his competitors; that he was ready to abide by the usual mode of a previous nomination by the Court of Directors, or submit his claim at once to the judgment of the proprietors by a general ballot; that if he should have the good fortune to be the object of their choice, he should, by the utmost exertion of his abilities, by the same disinterestedness which had prevented any increase from his several employments, of his paternal fortune, by a punctual and faithful execution of their commands, and a strict adherence to their instructions, endeavor to deserve, and he hoped he should obtain, their approbation of his services and conduct.

His lordship was heard with great attention and much satisfaction ; his modest pretensions, and the unaffected manner in which he delivered them, seemed to have made a very general impression in his favor. Even Mr. Burke, who was exerting all his influence for a very different person, could not forbear acknowledging that Lord Macartney had, on a former occasion, composed the distractions of a settlement where he was also a new man ; a settlement which he conducted wisely, defended gallantly, and even since his return served amicably ; that his general and political knowledge, his experience and ability, and his being wholly free from the danger of party connections or corrupt and vicious habits in the country ; that having a character to stake more eminent, and a reputation more extensive than all the other candidates ; that his dignity and rank would not only give credit to the appointment, but serve as pledges for his conduct, and procure respect for his commission ; that his conciliatory disposition was well suited to compose the dissensions that of late had disgraced the government of Madras, as it had the good effect of doing those of Grenada.

An amendment was then moved for the purpose of leaving out such part of the original motion as excluded new men from the service which, after being ably supported by Governor Johnstone, Mr. Dallas, Mr. Hussey, Mr. Moore, and others, and as warmly opposed by Mr. Burke and General Smith, was carried on a division by a majority of 79 to 60, thus leaving it in the breast of the court of directors to name the person most proper in their opinion for promoting the tranquillity of the settlement of Madras, and the pro-

sperity of their affairs on the coast of Coromandel *. The court did not long hesitate as to the object of their choice ; and on the 14th December Lord Macartney was nominated governor and president of Fort St. George ; the nomination of the directors had the concurrence of the proprietors, and he was sworn in the next day without even the ceremony of a ballot.

It was supposed that Lord Macartney obtained this appointment to India through ministerial influence, which does not however appear to have been the case. The general sense of the court of proprietors of his fitness for the situation, and the same opinion prevailing in a majority of the court of directors, seem to have wholly decided the question in his favor. No court candidate, it is true, was set up against him, and he might, in some measure, have been countenanced by his majesty's ministers ; but if he had their sanction for offering himself, it does not appear that he had much of their support. Lord North indeed had been heard to say it would be idle to give themselves any trouble about Macartney, as it was utterly impossible he should ever succeed to an Indian appointment. Lord North perhaps would not have been sorry to keep Lord Macartney in England, as at that time he had it in his power to be of great service to administration in the management of the affairs of Ireland. It is true, in addressing the court of proprietors a second time upon his appointment, Lord Macartney observes, that he is honored with the countenance of his majesty's ministers ; but that he had the

* India Debates, Nov. 23, 1780.

consolation at the same time of reckoning among his warmest friends some of the most eminent characters in opposition. "Describing myself to be," he said, "what I have the happiness of being, possessed of the friendship and good opinion of all parties, but resolutely fixed on continuing unconnected with any party, it will be but justice to reject any insinuation that I have adopted the system, or am to forward the views of particular men. The system of the Company's welfare shall be mine; it may be the business of this court to consider, it will be the business of the court of directors to determine on instructions calculated to produce that salutary end; my province will be to pursue, and I pledge myself to pursue, such instructions." In the same address he observes, "It may be proper to take notice of what is no doubt to myself a disadvantage. My fortune, it is true, is now impaired; it has been impaired by public services; it has suffered in public calamities. The consolation however of losing in such a manner approaches to the advantage of gaining in any other. Nor do I wish to alter that disinterested disposition which has preserved me from accumulation. You do not, I hope, suppose that enormous wealth alone can warrant independence. That happy spirit proceeds from a disposition of the mind, which is not governed by the accidents of life; and, I hope, I have what is the surest pledge of honorable independence, the independence of honest and moderate desires. My aim will ever be so to conduct myself, on all occasions, as to be able to appear before you in this court, on my return from India, with as little necessity of apology for any part of my proceedings there in your employ,

“ as I have ever had in those other stations with which I
“ have had elsewhere the honor to be entrusted.”

About the same time that his appointment took place, a declaration of war against the Dutch made it advisable that not a moment should be lost in sending out intelligence to India, and that Lord Macartney should carry it out with him. Being asked by the chairman to name a time when he thought he should be ready to set out, he replied that the instant he should receive his instructions he would be ready to proceed; and accordingly he left London the very day they were delivered to him, and embarked in the *Swallow* packet for India.

On the 21st June 1781, after a passage of four months, he arrived before Pondicherry, where he found Vice Admiral Sir Edward Hughes at anchor with his squadron, and having delivered to him his dispatches, he submitted for the admiral's consideration the principal objects which the king and the company had in view. From Sir Edward he first learned intelligence of the war with Hyder Ali, (of which no apprehensions had been entertained in England,) the invasion of the Carnatic by this intrepid adventurer, the ill success of our arms, and the general gloomy appearance of our prospects in every part of India.

The following day he landed at Madras, opened his commission, and took possession of his government. He found the situation of affairs on the coast in a more deplorable state than he could well have imagined, but his arrival was hailed

with joy by all descriptions of men. In the state of despondency to which men's minds had been for some time inclining, a change of government became, at least, a momentary relief. From the instant of the invasion reciprocal blame and general confusion in the settlement had followed the disappointments in the field; and the progress of the enemy was not a little facilitated by the want of union and exertion in the councils of Madras. The successes of Hyder Ali had enabled him to spread his numerous horse over all the Carnatic. Parties approached daily to the very gates of Madras. The neighboring country was abandoned both by Europeans and natives. The nabob of Arcot and his family were obliged to take refuge in the town. The failure of every supply of provisions, except by sea, was accompanied with an increased demand to feed the multitudes that flocked within the walls; and even that supply was rendered precarious by interruptions from the enemy's privateers.

Hyder Ali, having penetrated into the midst of the Carnatic before any body of troops had been assembled to oppose him, not only possessed himself of several strong holds, besieged and took several garrisons, but desolated the whole country in such a manner as to prevent any army from following his movements, unless it could be accompanied by sufficient subsistence for the whole route. Hyder was on this occasion as vindictive and merciless as he was active and powerful. Thousands of unresisting and innocent natives were murdered in cold blood. All the indignation he felt against the English, all the hatred with which he was inspired against the nabob of Arcot was vented upon the inoffensive peasantry of the

Carnatic ; every town and village were laid waste with fire and sword. An army of one hundred thousand cavalry was scattered over the province for the purpose of sweeping before them men, women, and children, seizing their cattle, burning their habitations, and of spreading devastation, far and wide, even to the bound hedge of Madras. All traces of population and agriculture speedily disappeared. The tanks, or those reservoirs of water by which the fertility of the soil is sustained, were all destroyed. Yet although the unhappy natives who escaped the sword were daily rushing in thousands to Madras, such was the indifference, the supineness, and the affected contempt of Hyder shown on the part of that government, that no preparations were commenced, no exertions were made to meet the approaching storm, till an alarm was given, in the month of July 1780, that the cavalry of Hyder Ali were actually at the moment only a few miles distant from Madras. And though the meditated invasion of the Carnatic was well known to all the powers of India more than twelve months before it actually took place, no collection had been made on our part of provisions equal to a long march or a regular siege ; nor were any means yet furnished for carrying the provisions they had, or for drawing artillery. From the want of these essential preparations the British army was confined to the neighborhood of the sea, by which alone the scanty supplies it received were sent ; while the enemy was ranging through all the territories of the Company on the coast of Coromandel, as well as through those of its dependent allies, the nabob of Arcot and the raja of Tanjore, whose disaffected subjects were ready to transfer their loyalty to any new sovereign. In fact, four regiments of cavalry belonging to the nabob had been so

ill paid and neglected, that they took the first occasion of deserting in a body to the enemy, even before he entered the Carnatic; and most of the forts were given up without resistance. This disaffection in the people, the army and the native killadars, or commanders of garrisons, rendered it an easy task for Hyder Ali to possess himself of Arcot, the capital of the nabob's dominions, as well as of almost all the strong posts in the country.

But the British army was not only unable to advance towards the enemy for want of cattle to draw the artillery, the stores and provisions, and compelled to remain on the defensive near Cuddalore, where it was supplied entirely from Madras with almost every article of subsistence; it had also shown a very serious disposition to mutiny, on account of the arrears of pay that were due to it. In such a temper it would not have been considered safe to employ the troops, if practicable, in any important enterprise. The different demands, which required to be satisfied without delay, amounted to several lacks of pagodas, and there was not a single lack in the treasury. Every pecuniary resource likewise had failed. The nabob of Arcot had not furnished a single pagoda since the commencement of the war, and the raja of Tanjore had barely satisfied the demands of his feeble garrisons; all payments were necessarily discontinued; and even the bills which had been drawn on the government of Madras for money advanced to the army, remained undischarged. The public offices were in large advance to the Company, and there remained little hope, from the gloomy

aspect of affairs, of any further assistance by loans either from Europeans or natives ; and had it not been for the extraordinary aids, both in provisions and specie, which were supplied from Bengal, the army must have been disbanded, and the ruin of the Carnatic inevitable.

In addition to the want of means for moving the army, Sir Eyre Coote, to whom the whole conduct of the war had been entrusted by the late government of Madras, declared as his opinion that, in the defensive war, in opposition to multitudes of cavalry, the best provided infantry, without the assistance of an adequate body of horse, could act with little permanent or extensive effect. On an army thus considered to be constituted as to be inefficacious, so unprovided as to be obliged to remain almost inactive, so ill supplied and paid as to be ready to mutiny, little dependence could be placed for retrieving the calamitous posture of affairs, notwithstanding the acknowledged bravery of the troops, and the abilities and experience of the general. No hope of resources could be entertained from any of the princes of India. Their disposition towards the English was avowedly hostile. A general alarm seemed to prevail on account of our supposed ambition, and a suspicion entertained of our ill faith ; as well as disrespect arising from the fluctuation of our councils, and the inconsistency of our proceedings. So far from any appearance of inclination to assist us, there were but too strong grounds for supposing that a general confederacy was projecting for our expulsion. That such were their views is sufficiently obvious from a letter of the Nizam to Fazel Beg

Khan which fell into lord Macartney's hands *. The invasion, in fact, of Hyder Ali was in consequence of this projected confederacy which, as Mr. Burke observed, "by a sort of miracle united the most discordant powers for our destruction, as a nation, in which no other could put any trust, and which was the declared enemy of the whole human species."

The government of Bengal, aware of the danger to which the Carnatic was exposed, had sent a considerable detachment under Colonel Pearse to reinforce the army under Sir Eyre Coote; but this detachment, being as essentially deficient in cavalry as the main army, was not likely to be of much use, while, by its excessive expense, equal or nearly equal to that of the remainder of the army, it increased enormously the calls for money and provisions, without the certainty of any return of important service. To add to their embarrassment the presidency of Madras was informed by the supreme council of Bengal, that however disposed to continue their assistance, a period might arrive when such supplies would cease, or when the resources from which they were drawn would fail. They were themselves in fact at this time engaged in the midst of an inauspicious war with the Mahrattas, in which they derived very little assistance from the army of Bombay; the war on that side of the peninsula having, as on the opposite coast, become merely defensive on the part of the Bombay presidency.

* Letter from the Nabob Nizam-ad-Dowlah to Fazel-Beg-Cawn, Appendix, No. 6.

A French fleet superior to the force under Sir Edward Hughes was momentarily expected on the coast, and all the Dutch settlements were apprized, by a French frigate sent out for the purpose, of hostilities having commenced between Great Britain and the United Provinces, and were accordingly prepared for the event. All these untoward circumstances were aggravated by the consideration that the people were become devoid of all confidence in the government, and averse from assisting it; and the public cause had assumed at last so hopeless an aspect that individuals almost ceased to take any interest in its fate.

At this crisis of complicated distress, at this almost hopeless juncture, the affairs of the government of the Carnatic were committed to the direction of Lord Macartney.

A mind less firm than he possessed, and less fertile in expedients, would have been apt to partake of the general despondency; but whatever impression the calamitous situation of affairs might have made on his mind, he felt it became his duty to meet the danger boldly, to aim immediately at inspiring the company's servants, its subjects, and its allies with confidence in their manifold resources, to impress their enemies with a just sense of the substantial power of Great Britain; but at the same time of her desire to employ that power to the sole purposes of procuring and preserving peace on terms of equity, and without extension of territory; and to direct, with fidelity and activity, to the public relief, what-

ever means or resources were still remaining within the reach of the administration of the presidency.

Conformably with these principles the troops were encouraged to their duty by an immediate distribution among them, towards satisfying their arrears, of the greater part of the small quantity of specie he found in the treasury. Vessels were taken up on credit, without a moment's loss of time, and dispatched, some to the northward for grain, and others to proceed with provisions for the army. To defray these extraordinary and urgent expenses, and to satisfy the further demands of the army, as well as other calls of a pressing nature, his Lordship perceived the necessity of having recourse to individuals for present assistance on the credit of the future revenues; and although the apprehension of misfortunes, together with the facility of getting and the impunity for taking enormous interest from the natives, precluded the expectation of raising any considerable sum by that means, yet this appeared to be the only expedient which remained to be tried; and his Lordship had the satisfaction to find that it more than answered the expectations under which it was adopted. But beside the immediate benefit resulting from the advances thus made by individuals, they implied that confidence of reviving prosperity from the conduct of his administration, which not only the ill success of the war, but the weakness of the former government, the unsteadiness of their councils and deficiency of system, independently of every criminal imputation, had rendered almost hopeless.

Lord Macartney was too good a statesman not to know that a confidence so recovered was to be cherished and supported by judicious measures and vigorous exertions. The Dutch settlements, as above observed, had received intelligence of hostilities between Great Britain and Holland, which gave them sufficient notice to put themselves in a posture of defence; and it could not be doubted that they would avail themselves of the opportunity of purchasing the amity of Hyder Ali by assisting effectually to annoy the English. The two Dutch forts of Sadras and Pulicat to the northward and southward of Fort St. George, formerly of little strength comparatively with our power, were now able to interrupt the communication not only with our territories and factories situated beyond them, but also with our main army on the one side, and with Colonel Pearse's detachment on its march from Bengal on the other. And as Hyder had no ports on the coast of Coromandel, those of the Dutch might become of essential consequence to him as inlets of supplies by sea. These considerations were with Lord Macartney additional motives for yielding to the desire he felt of carrying into execution, as far as it was possible, the instructions he had received to seize every Dutch ship and settlement within his reach. Within the first week of his arrival Sadras was accordingly summoned, and immediately surrendered without opposition; and as a sufficient garrison could not be spared to remain there, the fortifications were ordered to be demolished. The seizure of Pulicat was of still greater importance, but was an undertaking of more difficulty, as no force was stationed near it capable of attack-

ing it with the probability of success. Beside the Dutch soldiery stationed in this garrison, Hyder Ali had a considerable corps of horse and foot in the neighborhood, which it was necessary in the first place to overawe or to overcome. A detachment for this service could be taken only out of the garrison of Fort St. George which, weakened as it already was, could not even for a short interval be further reduced without urgent motives. But the capture of Pulicat, beside the advantages attending it already mentioned, promised to open a source of provisions that were already so much wanted by the garrison and the settlement. This want alone might have warranted the hazard, but to render it less considerable, Lord Macartney determined to put himself at the head of the militia; and, encouraged by his example, the numbers and the ardor of this corps were so much augmented as to promise a respectable addition to the defence of the garrison. The possession of Pulicat was quickly accomplished; it surrendered to the Madras detachment on condition of securing private property.

These successes acquired an additional value from the appearance of enterprise which they gave to the proceedings of the new government, and the impression of British power still remaining which they could not fail to make upon the natives. The zeal and activity of government animated the efforts of the people. The troops in camp and garrison acquired fresh spirits from the immediate marks of attention given to their demands, as well as from the small but seasonable supply of money furnished for their relief. They immediately afterwards gave the strongest proofs of bravery, dis-

cipline, and attachment in a battle won by them on the 1st of July near Porto Novo, under the command of Sir Eyre Coote. After an unsuccessful attack, on the 18th of June, of the fort of Chillumbrum by storm, and sustaining a severe conflict, in which he was repulsed with considerable loss, the general encamped at Porto Novo on his return to Cuddalore, and remained there till the 30th, preparing for a general action, an event which, from the motions of the enemy, he had reason to expect. Accordingly, on the following day, the 1st July, the enemy advanced to the attack, with a force consisting of twenty-five battalions of infantry, four hundred Europeans, forty-five thousand horse, and one hundred thousand matchlock men, peons, and polygars, and with forty-seven pieces of cannon, which were all brought into action. The engagement lasted from eight in the morning till three in the afternoon, when the front line of the English advanced, upon which the enemy drew off his guns and left the British troops masters of the field. The loss on the part of Hyder was computed at three thousand men, beside a number of horses. Meer Saheb, one of his principal generals, with several officers of distinction, fell in the battle. The number of killed and wounded on our side did not exceed three hundred and twenty men. As Sir Eyre Coote had no cavalry it was impossible to prevent the enemy from carrying off his guns. Never perhaps were the British interests in the Carnatic brought to a more serious crisis than at this day, and never were they more ably and intrepidly supported. That they could not pursue the advantages they had gained, that they could not convert the defeat of Hyder into a total rout, or prevent his army from assembling again and opposing

them immediately, could only be ascribed to the want of cavalry, and of the means of conveying stores and provisions. But the victory that was gained so far disconcerted the enemy as to deter him from leading his troops into action a second time, and preventing a junction with the Bengal detachment under Colonel Pearse, which was happily accomplished on the 2d August near Pulicat, without the smallest opposition.

In the letters written to the several princes of the peninsula, according to custom, on the arrival of a new governor, Lord Macartney, to the impression endeavored to be conveyed of the victory of Porto Novo, added the expectations justly formed of the future achievements of the British arms as soon as the reinforcement of the ships and men expected from England should arrive. And conceiving that, in this moment of apparent superiority, an assurance of the pacific intentions of the British government would come with greater dignity and effect, as well as with a stronger impression of its being indicative of the genuine sentiments of the nation, he did not fail, on this occasion, to endeavor to convince them that the East India Company had no aim of extending its possessions, and that pacific maxims had the preference in all its councils. He perceived indeed the necessity of trying every means, consistent with the honor and the security of the government, to carry those principles into effect. His opinion on this point was seconded by the admiral and the general, who declared they saw no probability that any successes, which our forces could obtain, would be adequate to the end of procuring a favorable issue to the contest in the

Carnatic ; that it was perfectly at the disposition of Hyder Ali to avoid or terminate an action whenever he pleased ; that although we might frequently gain the field of battle, we should not be able to make any lasting impression on his army ; that our resources which had hitherto been precarious and inadequate were likely to diminish, whilst the demands would necessarily increase. On these considerations it was strongly recommended on the part of Sir Eyre Coote, with the assent of the admiral, to aim at the accommodation of differences with Hyder Ali. To this recommendation Lord Macartney the more readily inclined, as the East India Company had, in their letters of the preceding year to the presidency of Madras, given express and positive directions to maintain a strict connection with this enterprising chief, and even in certain points to bestow, if necessary, pecuniary gratifications on his ministers. An address to that prince was therefore inclosed in a letter to Sir Eyre Coote, to whom his Lordship submitted to forward or suppress it ; but expressing, at the same time, his determination that no consequence which might result personally to himself, from any displeasure of the Bengal government *, should prevent him from undertaking or persevering in any measure conducive to the honor and interest of the Company, or from hazarding his responsibility in any step of such a tendency for which the admiral and general were likewise willing to become responsible. Sir Eyre Coote did not hesitate to dispatch the proposal to Hyder's camp, accompanied by a letter from himself,

* The Bengal government was alone empowered to conclude treaties, and make peace and war with the country powers.

and another from the admiral to the same effect. The answer of Hyder on this occasion furnished a most unfortunate instance of the dissatisfaction and distrust to which former transactions in the Company's governments had given rise. "The governors and sirdars," he observes, "who enter into treaties, after one or two years return to Europe, and their acts and deeds become of no effect; and fresh governors and sirdars introduce new conversations. Prior to your coming, when the governor and council of Madras had departed from their treaty of alliance and friendship, I sent my vakeel (agent) to confer with them, and to ask the reason for such breach of faith; the answer given was, that they who made these conditions were gone to Europe. You write that you have come with the sanction of the King and Company to settle all matters; which gives me great happiness. You, Sir, are a man of wisdom and comprehend all things. Whatever you may judge most proper and best, that you will do. You mention that troops have arrived and are daily arriving from Europe; of this I have not a doubt: I depend upon the favor of God for my succors."

This apparently evasive answer was not however considered, by persons conversant in the intricacies of Indian policy, as preclusive of an inclination on his part to come into terms with the Company. At all events, the endeavor to bring about a reconciliation with all the country powers in India was so strongly expressed in the desire and directions of the Company, in order to leave our arms free to act against our European enemies, that Lord Macartney felt it his

duty to make every effort for terminating differences not only with Hyder Ali, but with any other country power with whom we happened to be at war. The critical state of the affairs of India fully justified such efforts without the previous and regular approbation of the Bengal government in any preparatory step for enabling it to attain a cessation of hostilities. Not a moment was therefore to be lost in taking advantage of the favorable disposition of the Mahrattas towards an accommodation, of which strong assurances were received by Lord Macartney from the nabob of the Carnatic; assurances however which were accompanied with the mistrust conceived at all the Indian courts of the fidelity of the English to their public engagements. The infraction of former treaties had weakened their dependence on any renewed proposals from the same party. Suspicion now governed the conduct of every Indian Prince towards the English, of which melancholy truth an unfortunate and alarming instance, just at this moment, reached Madras. Mr. Hastings had determined upon an excursion to the upper provinces of Benares and Oude. Cheyt Sing the tributary Raja of Benares, a man of much reputed wealth, immediately supposed that his treasure was an object of the governor-general's views, and under this idea lost no time in preparing privately for resisting any attempt that might be made against him. Mr. Hastings arrived at Benares the 14th August. The Raja is said to have waited on him with the appearance of profound respect and unreserved confidence. Whatever were the subjects of their verbal conferences, the governor-general's letter to him contains no new application for money, but upbraids him for having failed in giving the assistance which had already been de-

manded from him. Cheyt Sing particularizes in his answer the sums by which he had fulfilled that engagement. The governor-general did not indeed controvert the fact, but he observes in the stile and manner of the Raja a tone of disrespect towards him, offering less a vindication of himself than a recrimination upon the governor-general; he observed too, he thought, a spirit of independence, for all which he found it necessary to order the Raja to be put under arrest in his own palace. The English resident, with his usual guard, followed by two companies of sepoy, proceeded towards the palace with the act of power by which he was armed. The captive Chief seemed to comply in terms of the utmost humility; and he appeared so totally overwhelmed by his misfortune, in having incurred the displeasure of the governor-general, that the humanity of the latter was excited to send him a favorable message, which was received with strong expressions of gratitude and of perfect reliance on the protection of Mr. Hastings. This gratitude and this reliance were, in a few moments, manifested by a dreadful slaughter of all the officers and most of the two companies of sepoy. The result of this unfortunate affair is too well known to require a repetition of it in this place.

With the fate of Cheyt Sing, fresh in their recollection, it was not assuredly the most auspicious moment for endeavoring, by pacific declarations, to strengthen the confidence of the Mahratta powers. Proceeding however from a new and separate government such assurances might serve, at least, as declaratory of the views of that government. A letter was therefore drawn up and signed by Lord Macart-

ney, by Sir Edward Hughes as commander of his majesty's ships in the Indian Seas, by Sir Eyre Coote as commander in chief of the King's as well as the Company's land forces and a member of the supreme council, and by Mr. Macpherson another member of the same council, in which they not only declare an earnest desire, on the part of the Company, to conclude a peace with the Mahratta state, but become, in the name of their sovereign and their employers, as well as personally, guarantees for the strict and constant performance of any treaty which may be made for that purpose by the governor-general and council of Bengal. And as the points, on which the peace was known to rest with the ministry of Poonah, were, the restoration of the province of Guzzarat on account of its value, and of the islands of Basseen or Salsette from religious attachment; as a compliance with those conditions was not dishonorable; and as it would redound to the national advantage to comply with them, they did not hesitate to declare their readiness to accede to their wishes on these points. This proposition, thus made under most unfavorable circumstances, but warranted by the emergency of the occasion, produced such an effect at the court of Poonah, that no hostilities were afterwards committed by the Mahrattas against the English; and it paved the way for the Bengal government to conclude a peace with them shortly after through the mediation of Scindea.

This event was the more desirable on account of the improbability, which soon appeared, of procuring peace with Hyder Ali, who preferred to enter into close connection with the French and Dutch, in the hope that their united arms

would be able to exterminate the British power in India. The readiness, however, expressed on the part of the government of Madras, to put an end to the war with Hyder, operated, no doubt, in inclining the Poonah ministry to accede to the proposals made to them. For there was so much rooted enmity, from former wars and mutual ill treatment, between the Mahrattas and Hyder Ali, that nothing but indiscretion on our part could have caused a temporary connection between them, which was almost certain of yielding to the dread of a junction between us and one of them, to the disadvantage of the other. From this disposition of the two powers, Lord Macartney perceived that “ policy thus fairly “ exerted might attain what our strength alone was not likely “ to effectuate. For the frequent struggles which have hap- “ pened between European forces and the forces of the natives “ have, at length, removed much of the inequality in their “ respective discipline and intrepidity. The Indians have less “ terror of our arms ; we less contempt for their opposition. “ Our future advantages therefore are not to be calculated “ by past exploits. Troops in the hardiness and ardor of “ first adventures, and during the first impression of their “ prowess, are capable of achievements which their num- “ bers afterwards encreased may not be able to continue. “ Their discipline and valor may be the same ; but the in- “ fluence of the climate, the contagion of example, the very “ rewards of success introduce a luxury which may retard, “ and in some instances fatally obstruct the operations of “ an army. The followers of our camp, as I am told, bear “ no less a proportion to the fighting men than that of four to “ one. The servants of a general officer are reckoned by the

“ hundred. The expenditure of money and provisions for
“ multitudes, of which so many must be useless, drains our
“ treasury and our magazines. If supplies proportionably
“ augmented were plentiful and even costless, the trouble
“ and difficulty of carrying them on must render an army un-
“ wieldy, and its progress slow and ineffective *.”

These considerations applied but too closely to the main army remaining in a state of inactivity near Cuddalore, which, as before observed, had no other supply of provisions than what were sent from Madras by sea, where all the horrors of an approaching famine were staring them in the face. The enemy's privateers knowing the distressed situation of the presidency were indefatigable in their exertions, to cut off and destroy the grain ships proceeding to and from Madras. Lord Macartney ordered two Indiamen to be fitted out and dispatched to Coringa to beat off one of these privateers whose object was to destroy a large stock of rice that had been collected there, the loss of which would have been irreparable to the settlement. The privateer disappeared, and the fort of Jaggernaikpore surrendered without resistance, the public property was taken on board the Indiamen, and being landed at Masulipatam the ships returned with grain which proved a most seasonable supply.

It was now resolved to make every effort for recovering Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic, from the hands of the enemy; but with the utmost exertions means could only be

* Letter from Lord Macartney to the Committee of Secrecy of the Court of Directors, dated ———

procured for carrying three days provisions for the army. Dependence however was placed in finding a large supply of grain which it was reported the enemy had laid up at Tripassore. The batteries were opened against it, and in three days the breach was reported practicable. On the morning of the fourth day a flag of truce came out to propose terms. The general sent back word that he would only agree to spare their lives on their surrendering themselves prisoners of war, and that an answer must be returned in a quarter of an hour. At that instant a very large body of the enemy appeared in sight. The general perceiving their numbers were formidable sent orders to storm immediately; the party were just advancing when the flag of truce was returned accepting his terms. As the army was now reduced to the last day's rice, the gaining of the fort at that moment was a most fortunate event. The force which made its appearance proved to be the advance of Hyder's army, which had marched the same morning with a view to relieve the garrison.

The grain found in Tripassore was only sufficient for a few days, which cut off all hope of proceeding against Arcot. The general however was determined, if possible, to bring Hyder to a second engagement, which seemed not impracticable, as at that time he lay encamped within a few miles. On the 26th of August the army moved in this hope towards the enemy, upon which Hyder struck his encampment, and took the road to Conjeveram. At nine o'clock in the morning of the 27th, the general came up with Hyder's whole army, which was advantageously posted on the very spot

where Colonel Baillie's detachment had been cut to pieces the preceding year. The engagement lasted from nine o'clock till near sun-set when the enemy gave way on all sides. Our army encamped on their ground that night, but for want of provisions was obliged to return to Tripassore the next day. The loss on our side was six officers and one hundred and thirty-three privates killed, and one officer and two hundred and sixty-two privates wounded. Among the former were Lieutenant-colonel Brown and Captain Hislop, and among the latter Brigadier-general Stuart.

The two victories of Porto Novo and Conjeveram, although reflecting the highest honor on the bravery and discipline of the troops, were attended with little advantage to the general state of affairs; and so far were they from enabling the general to regain the places that had been lost, he was still without the means of supporting those which remained in our possession. The fort of Vellore, which had been maintained for a long time by Colonel Lang with unwearied zeal and great good management, was now reduced to imminent distress; a part of the garrison had been set at liberty to seek its own subsistence, and there were only sufficient provisions for the remainder until the 25th October. The relief of Vellore became therefore an object of Lord Macartney's most anxious attention, well knowing that the fall of that fortress to the enemy would establish him in complete possession of the greater part of the Carnatic. But the army was unable to move for want of provisions and about to return to the neighborhood of Madras, whose situation was truly alarming, the wretched inhabitants being at that moment agitated by

every afflicting symptom of an inevitable famine. It was considered however by Sir Eyre Coote as absolutely necessary for the safety of the army, should it keep the field, to be supplied with twelve days' rice; to effect this was a task of infinite difficulty; but great difficulties are only to be overcome by great exertions; and Lord Macartney was resolved that no exertion should be wanting, no effort remain untried to avert the fatal consequences which must inevitably follow the loss of Vellore. Coolies to the amount of six thousand were pressed into the service by military force, to carry from Madras to Poonamalée the quantity of rice required. The extreme necessity of the case could alone justify the risk incurred to the settlement by these exertions, for at the time the army was again put in motion for the relief Vellore on the 19th September, there was not actually at Madras a grain of rice left in store; they trusted solely to three thousand bags on board different vessels in the road, and to future supplies for their support. These supplies were also of a doubtful nature, being mostly external; for were the enemy even to withdraw from the neighborhood of Madras, so effectually had all traces of cultivation disappeared, so destroyed were the villages, so ruined and dispersed the individuals who were employed in tillage, that the inhabitants, during part of the following year as well as the remaining part of that year, could only be preserved from famine by external resources.

In his march towards Vellore, the general received intelligence that Hyder's whole army lay encamped about ten miles off between Cavery Pauk and Shulaugar; he determined therefore to march directly towards him in the hope of bring-

ing him to a general engagement, conceiving that a successful issue afforded the best prospect of opening resources for subsisting the army, without which he would be under the dreadful alternative of returning to Madras, the inevitable consequences of which he was well aware would be the loss of Vellore and famine to the settlement. The loss of Vellore was, in fact, the loss of the Carnatic. Fortunately on the 27th September the general fell in with Hyder's whole army, which he engaged and put to flight with great slaughter and with very inconsiderable loss on his side. The good effects experienced from this third victory were, the desertion of two rajas from Hyder a few hours after the action, the means of subsisting the army, and, above all, the relief of Vellore in which the garrison under Colonel Lang had been shut up sixteen months. In the course of this expedition for the relief of Vellore an instance of the bravery and discipline of the British troops occurred, which has rarely been equalled and perhaps never exceeded. Colonel Owen with a detachment, consisting of about two thousand men, had been sent to intercept a convoy of grain proceeding to the enemy. On the 23d October Sir Eyre Coote receiving intelligence of the probability of Colonel Owen's being attacked marched to his support. After proceeding a few miles he was met by some Mogul horse who had fled from the field of battle, and who informed him that Colonel Owen's detachment was cut to pieces. The general however continued his route, and was soon met by an officer with a note from Colonel Owen saying that, after a severe day with the whole force of Hyder Ali, they had lost their baggage, and had several officers and men killed and wounded, but that their guns, the detach-

ment, and their honor were safe. The general observed that the undaunted bravery and the deliberate courage displayed by this little detachment exceeded every commendation that could be passed upon it. A jemidar of Hyder reported that, in this action, his master lost three hundred of his chosen horse, being part of four thousand which he always kept about his own person, and on whom he could depend for performing any desperate service. It appeared indeed that the repulse they had met with, and the disappointment which Hyder himself suffered in the sanguine expectation he had formed of cutting off this detachment, which he looked upon as a thing certain, was felt by him as one of the severest checks he had received in the whole course of the war, as the failure with his whole army against so small a number of British troops but too clearly convinced him of his inability to cope with the main body. Towards the end of November the army returned to the neighborhood of Madras, and were quartered for the monsoon at the mount St. Thomé and on Choultry plain.

The whole of the Dutch settlements had now fallen into our hands, except Negapatam and Tutucorin. So far back as July Lord Macartney had formed a plan for the reduction of the former, but Sir Eyre Coote was of opinion that the army would be better employed in the capture of Arcot, and afterwards to march to the southward to the attack of Negapatam. As he was not able however to accomplish the former, no attempt had yet been made against the latter. Independent of the express directions of the Company for endeavoring to get possession of all the Dutch settlements on

the coast, the fortress of Negapatam was of the utmost importance to Hyder Ali. All his forces that were scattered in the Tanjore country drew their chief resources from Negapatam, and depended on its fate. It furnished money, clothing, and ammunition; and was the vent for all their plunder. The Dutch had been on this occasion no less active than vigilant. They had formed an offensive alliance with Hyder, and had received from him a reinforcement of between three and four thousand men; and they were as successful as politic in securing an interest with the principal polygars in the Tinevelly country for the protection of their settlement of Tutucorin. Lord Macartney, to whom these circumstances were well known, considered that he would not be justifiable in desisting any longer from an enterprize when he had the Admiral's promise of the hearty co-operation of the fleet and marines, which, after their departure from the coast, would be not only hazardous but impracticable. He considered it as less necessary to wait for the season when Sir Eyre Coote might perhaps find it convenient to go against Negapatam in person; that the general had no need of either the addition of fame or fortune, which the surrender of that place might procure to him who took it. The general indeed seemed to wish that all the troops should be employed in the grand army, which he commanded, in the most desolate provinces of the Carnatic, where there was nothing valuable to gain or defend; and so extremely anxious was he to disclaim all responsibility of an attempt against Negapatam, that he took the earliest occasion of expressing his sentiments to Lord Macartney on the subject. "I am not sorry," says he, "in being relieved from so great a part of my bur-

“den, and, as I conceive myself exonerated from all re-
“sponsibility in that quarter, and indeed in some degree
“from what would otherwise have been my share here, I
“shall not attempt to send away further orders to the south-
“ward. I wish most sincerely those you have sent may be
“attended with success equal to your most sanguine wishes;
“but I will venture to foretell that if the attack of Negapa-
“tam is commenced, leaving an enemy in the rear equal to
“cope with our besieging army, and they move towards its
“relief, we shall be disgraced; and if we are not more fortu-
“nate than we have a right to expect, it will terminate in the
“loss of Tanjore, Trichinopoly, and all the southern coun-
“tries; as well as bring on the ruin of this army *.”

Notwithstanding this opinion of Sir Eyre Coote and the tardy movements and innumerable difficulties started by Colonel Brathwaite, who had been directed to proceed from Tanjore to the attack of Negapatam, leaving a sufficient garrison behind him to guard against surprise, Lord Macartney was so much convinced of the importance of the object, and the certainty of success with the assistance of the fleet, that he determined at once and at all hazards to take the sole responsibility upon himself, which, in a case less urgent and less clear, he would have been cautious of doing. He was likewise determined not to employ a single officer or a single man from the main army since he had ascertained the sentiments of the general on this undertaking. In answer to

* Letter from Sir Eyre Coote to Lord Macartney, dated camp near Palapet, October 31, 1781.

the anxiety expressed by Sir Eyre Coote, in his letter above recited, his Lordship observed, "Though with an exact
" knowledge of facts, I combined the observations of several
" capable persons, I was very cautious in forming my own
" judgment; but after taking these precautions, it appears to
" me a laudable exertion of duty to become responsible in
" following the dictates of such a judgment. Personal pru-
" dence may be sometimes prejudicial to the public cause,
" and caution beyond the danger is a weakness which may be
" as fatal as the rashness of enterprise beyond the means of
" success. In return for the confidence placed in me by the
" Company and by the committee, in justice to you and to
" Colonel Brathwaite, I ought not to shrink from the respon-
" sibility of the present measure; most cheerfully I take it
" upon myself alone, trusting to be justified by the motive of
" doing essential service, and by my efforts to pursue the
" fittest methods of accomplishing it. In the midst of the
" efforts I made for giving success to this expedition, I was
" mindful of that attention towards you which was due to
" your station, and which my sincere esteem for you will
" naturally suggest. No officer who could be supposed to
" belong to the army under your command was called upon
" to serve on this occasion. Those who offered, I referred,
" as you know, to you; though I wished much for the ser-
" vices of Lord Macleod and others of them; the recovered
" men of his regiment I sent to you in lieu of sending them to
" Negapatam *."

* Extract of a letter from Lord Macartney to Sir Eyre Coote, dated Fort St. George, Nov. 6, 1781.

A very serious difficulty however occurred in the choice of an officer to command the expedition. Major-general Sir Hector Munro, who was, in a great degree, recovered from an indisposition which had prevented his accompanying the army to take the command in the Tanjore country, was judged to be the fittest person for the occasion, but an unfortunate dislike he had taken against Mr. Sadlier, one of the members of the select committee, had induced him to declare that he never would serve under any orders or instructions, in which this gentleman had a concern. The committee therefore, in order to obviate this difficulty, very liberally empowered the president to issue such orders and adopt such measures, in conjunction with Sir Edward Hughes, as were most likely, in his opinion, to promise success against the Dutch settlements. Sir Hector Munro now cheerfully consented to undertake the siege, and set off without delay with a reinforcement from Madras for that purpose. On the 21st October he arrived on the coast, when the admiral immediately landed about one thousand seamen and marines. On the 30th the lines and redoubts were attacked and carried; and on the 12th November the town and fort of Negapatam surrendered. The resistance it made, and the force found within it were greater than had been supposed, but the advantage of the conquest was the more conspicuous. The besieged made two vigorous sallies. They had a French engineer and several German officers of infantry. The number of troops under arms, who surrendered prisoners of war, was six thousand five hundred and fifty-one, being considerably more than the whole of the besieging army. Beside a great quantity of warlike stores and ammunition there was found a

double investment of goods, no ships having come from Holland for that of the preceding year. Among the archives was discovered the original treaty with Hyder Ali, the tenor of which sufficiently showed how much the English interests might have suffered from the longer continuance of that port in the hands of an enemy, and consequently how much was gained by its passing into our own. Its capture not only effectually destroyed the Dutch power on the coast of Coromandel but, as had already been foreseen, the Mysorean enemy, immediately after the surrender of the place, began to abandon all the forts he had possessed himself of in the Tanjore country. In fact, the fall of Negapatam restored that country to a degree of security which it had not known since the commencement of the war, at the same time that it cut off the French from the least chance of landing their forces on that part of the coast with any degree of success.

After making his arrangements for the security of Tanjore, and sparing Sir Edward Hughes five hundred men to assist in the meditated attack of the harbor of Trincomalée, which Lord Macartney had for some time before strongly urged, and sent an ambassador to the king of Candy as preparatory thereto, Sir Hector Munro, still in a very indifferent state of health, returned to the presidency, where he took his passage for Europe, after closing his services in India with the important conquest of Negapatam. The zeal and alacrity with which he undertook that enterprise, and the ability with which he accomplished it, were highly honorable to his character as a good and active officer.

The difficulty of keeping the army supplied with provisions was by no means the only one, which the government of Madras had to encounter. Every pecuniary resource dependent on the Carnatic had long since wholly failed, and any further assistance of this nature from Bengal was now become absolutely hopeless. The governor-general was himself distressed for want of money, and shut up in the fort of Chunar-Ghur, where he was invested by the troops of Cheyt Sing, amounting to ten thousand men, beside the peasants of the country, who had also taken up arms. Every effort had been used by Lord Macartney to prevail on the nabob of Arcot to contribute towards the expenses of the war but without success. He had indeed assigned over to the late government for the use of the Company, during the war, the countries of Trichinopoly and Tinevelly; but this wily Mahomedan contrived to defeat entirely the use they might have been of, by insisting that his own creatures should have the sole management of the revenues. By these rapacious agents the peaceable and patient Hindoos suffered nearly as much as from the ravages of the enemy. The ryots or husbandmen were harassed and oppressed by the arbitrary and indefinite claims of the head renters on the produce of their labor, extorted by military force and corporal punishment in case of resistance. So venal and corrupt a system as that which prevailed under the nabob's administration throughout the whole Carnatic, is not to be paralleled in any government. Beside the rent of the districts to be paid to the nabob, he sold the appointments of every description held in these districts, and the whole host of inferior agents were obliged to purchase their public situations from their superiors; com-

plaint at the Durbar or palace of the nabob was unavailing as to redress; but the punishment of such presumption was not infrequently that of death; and the sum total of this chain of extortion and avarice was taken out of the crop of the ryot or laborer.

Under this state of wretched mismanagement and extortion had he granted the unavailing assignment of two districts, while under cover of which he strenuously withheld those supplies for carrying on the war which, in fact, he was squandering with a lavish profusion on a set of worthless and unprincipled Europeans, who were kept about his person for no other purpose than that of pampering his vices and feeding his vanity, or perhaps, according to his own calculation, that of securing their attachment. In vain did Lord Macartney set before his view the great and pressing necessities of the public service, the impropriety of the conduct he was pursuing, and the fatal consequences it must inevitably produce, both to himself and to the Company; but no expostulations were sufficient to rouse him to a just sense of the common danger; they produced only a reply full of asperity and recrimination, and a refusal to afford the least assistance beyond what he had already given, which was literally nothing, to defray the expenses of the war. The governor-general and council, in answer to the representations made from Madras on this head, expressed themselves in terms of great surprise and indignation at the conduct of the nabob, in withholding assistance for the prosecution of a war, in which his interests were more immediately concerned than those even of the Company; they declared that, in their opinion, the nabob

could no longer be looked upon as the proprietor of the Carnatic, while every part of it, not immediately protected or wrested from the enemy by our troops, was in the hands of a foreign power, and all his hopes of recovering it depended entirely on our arms; that a case like this would justify their demanding the immediate transfer of his whole country in exclusive assignment for the expenses of the war; that such a measure was, in their opinion, by the necessity of imposing it, an indispensable obligation; that they earnestly advised it, and that, had they the authority to command, they should peremptorily command it.

Such was the opinion of the Bengal government. Lord Macartney however had resolved not to proceed to extremities, but to try every persuasive effort with the Nabob, to induce him to assist in the present emergency, making use of every argument that so naturally and obviously arose, to show him how much it was for his real interest to contribute even to the last pagoda, rather than suffer his possessions to fall a prey to the enemy*. The nabob never precisely denied his ability to give assistance; many of his friends acknowledged that he could have given it. At length however when very strongly pressed on the subject, he coolly observed that he had concluded a treaty with Mr. Hastings which provided for all the supplies he was required to furnish. This declaration was very soon discovered to be founded in truth; for in a little time afterwards, Mr. Richard Joseph Sullivan

* Lord Macartney's private note of application to his highness the Nabob of the Carnatic, July 4, 1781. Appendix, No. 7.

and Assam Cawn, the nabob's dewan or treasurer, arrived from Bengal with a sort of treaty concluded by them on the part of the nabob with that government. As one article of this strange convention opened a door of arrangement for the cession of the nabob's revenues to the Company, retaining a proper allowance to himself and family, Lord Macartney, without either accepting or disavowing the treaty, made use of this disposition expressed by the nabob and acceded to by the Bengal government of giving his assistance to the Company. After a long and frequent correspondence and conversation on the subject, the nabob signified his consent to assign over all the revenues of his countries to the Company during the war, reserving one-sixth part for the private expenses of himself and his family. These revenues were to be managed by a committee; and as success depends as well on the choice of instruments as on the propriety of measures, his Lordship took care to appoint only such persons to the commission of assigned revenue, as were conversant in the finances of the Carnatic, and such as, at the same time, were perfectly agreeable to the nabob. He thought it but fair to consult his own choice in the persons who were to conduct a business so closely connected with his government. The plan which was proposed, as well as the persons to carry it into execution, met with the nabob's entire concurrence. But it soon appeared that the authority, which the committee found it necessary to demand, in order to give efficacy to their proceedings, excited an alarm in the breast of the nabob, who began to consider the exertion of powers by Europeans over his affairs as subversive of his dignity and government. To the great surprise of Lord Macartney, he expressed the

highest dissatisfaction and distrust of his old friend Mr. Benfield, who, on the sole account of the relation in which he stood at the Durbar, had been appointed president of the committee of assigned revenue; and he concluded by preferring to give to his Lordship, on behalf of the Company, an exclusive power to nominate natives to those offices on which the collections chiefly depended. He considered it as less derogatory to his station, to invest the representative of the sovereign of England and the East India Company with a considerable portion of his authority, than to divide a lesser portion with several persons of inferior rank. The nabob was, in fact, averse from any delegation, notwithstanding the perfect confidence he seemed to place in a person whose uniform disinterestedness was as great a novelty to him as it was a security against any concealed designs.

Some arrangement however was become absolutely necessary, not only for the purpose of pecuniary aid, but likewise for securing such an influence throughout the country as would facilitate the endeavors of the commander in chief to send those other supplies and secure that friendly assistance, the want of which he loudly complained of through the whole course of the campaign. In one of his letters to Lord Macartney Sir Eyre Coote observes, "I had better give up the
"burdensome task, and spare our arms the shame and disgrace, and our interests from the total ruin in which they
"may be involved by these hidden and double transactions in
"the nabob's government." It became therefore indispensable, in every respect, to have such a share in the appointment of his highness' officers throughout the country as would

oblige them to consult the welfare and interest of the Company. The entire management of the finances appeared to be as necessary as it was delicate to demand and difficult to obtain. But by the perseverance and temper, the known integrity and disinterestedness of Lord Macartney, all these points were gradually accomplished. Of his integrity the nabob had already received the most convincing proof in his rejection of the highest bribe that was probably ever before offered to a governor of Madras in one sum*.

The deed which established this new and important alteration in the government of the Carnatic, so desireable for the Company and so necessary for the preservation of the nabob and the people, bore date 2d December 1781, and was to continue in force at least for five years†. By this deed the authority of the Company hitherto, through the collusion of its servants, totally distinct from, and generally clashing with, that of the nabob, occasioning a double and divided government, now became simplified and efficient. But as every change of system calculated to operate effectually, though gradually, must be productive of some inconveniences, the present transfer was not expected to be without them, and the protraction of the difficulties the government was then laboring under was not the least of them. Coercion indeed might have operated an earlier change, and the exercise of force, as recommended by the Bengal government, might have been justified by the necessities of the times; but while there remained a hope of success though the means of per-

* Two lacks of pagodas, or 80,000/.

† The Nabob's assignment. Appendix, No. 8.

suasion, Lord Macartney felt that no momentary advantage could compensate for the discredit of resorting to violence against a prince standing in the relation he did with the Company, however unworthy he had in many respects proved himself of their patronage and protection.

Thus, at the termination of the year 1781, the prospects of the East India Company on the coast of Coromandel were considerably brightened, and a ray of hope once more beamed upon the desponding subjects of the Carnatic. In the first six months of Lord Macartney's administration the main army, assisted effectually by the exertions of the presidency, without which it could not possibly have kept the field from the total want of provisions in every quarter and want of pay, was enabled to bring the enemy to two decisive actions, and to gain two brilliant victories. By well-planned enterprises and by detachments from the garrison of Madras were effected the destruction and capture of the Dutch settlements of Sadras, Pulicat, Madepollam, Policat, Jaggernautporam, Bimlipatam, and Negapatam, thereby dissolving the connection that had been formed between this power and Hyder, and annihilating its influence on the coast of Coromandel, and compelling the enemy to abandon all his positions in the Tanjore country; and finally these successes were crowned by the assignment of the revenues of the Carnatic, for the use of the Company, by the nabob of Arcot to Lord Macartney; a measure that contributed to the exultation, the security, tranquillity, and happiness of all the inhabitants of the Carnatic, except those few rapacious Mahomedan agents of the nabob, who had hitherto subsisted

by the plunder and oppression of the harmless Hindoo natives.

Not less auspicious was the commencement of the year 1782, when information was received at the presidency of the important harbor of Trincomalée and Fort Ostenberg having surrendered to our arms; the latter of which was now garrisoned by the detachment of five hundred men, which had been embarked on the fleet after the reduction of Negapatnam. These bright and cheering prospects were but however of short duration. The army had scarcely gone into cantonments for the monsoon when the disagreeable intelligence reached Madras of the loss of Chittoor, with its garrison, consisting of a complete battalion of sepoys; and that the important fortress of Vellore would not be able to hold out longer than the 11th January. To enable Sir Eyre Coote to march to the relief of this important garrison, Lord Macartney gave orders that the treasury should be drained to the last pagoda to pay the arrears of the army. Still however the means of conveying provisions were inadequate to the demands of this service. The estimate of the quarter-master general for carrying provisions for thirty-five days was no less a number than thirty-five thousand bullocks for twelve or fourteen thousand fighting men. The difficulty of providing so great a number was an insurmountable obstacle, and the expense, if they could have been found, was too enormous for the exhausted finances of the presidency to bear. Nor was it easy to conceive what means could be adopted for protecting a line of march of so many miles of road as must be covered by five and thirty thousand bullocks, against the

numerous horse of the enemy. The number already in store was eight thousand, and with these and three thousand coolies pressed into the service, it appeared to Lord Macartney that, by marching light, leaving behind the heavy artillery and baggage, and taking only what was indispensably necessary, they might perhaps be able to accomplish this important object; and he ventured to suggest it to Sir Eyre Coote, who seemed to be sensible of the necessity of using the most strenuous exertions for that purpose. On this trying occasion extreme indisposition could not prevent the general from again taking the field and hazarding, as the event proved, the sacrifice of his life to his zeal for the service. He joined the army on the 2d of January, and on the 5th was seized with a violent apoplectic fit. This attack did not however prevent his proceeding with the army, and on the 11th, by means of the eight thousand bullocks and three thousand coolies, he threw into Vellore provisions and stores for three months, besides taking with them twenty-one days' provisions for the fighting men. It is impossible to do ample justice to the army which, on this pressing occasion, marched again to the field with the utmost cheerfulness under every difficulty and disadvantage, without any rest after a long and arduous campaign. In their return to Madras they were opposed by the whole army of Hyder, which they drove from its ground with very inconsiderable loss.

Sir Eyre Coote now declared his intention of going to Bengal for the benefit of his health. Such a resolution was considered as particularly unfortunate at this period when,

on every consideration it was adviseable to follow up the late successes with the most active and vigorous measures. For though the British army had hitherto, in every engagement, possessed the field of battle, and had a fair title to the laurels due to victory, yet Hyder had suffered few of the disadvantages of a defeat. There was no consternation on his part, no trophies on ours. The decided superiority of the British arms in Hindostan had been most honorably maintained, but the solid purpose of the war, that of expelling the enemy from the Carnatic, remained to be effected. All the bravery and discipline of the troops, and all the general's experience and abilities were still required to counteract the manifold difficulties with which this side of India was still threatened. Every argument was therefore urged on the part of government, to keep him at the head of the army to which, as his health recovered, he seemed not to object, at least he silently acquiesced.

In the month of January information was received of an enemy's fleet of twelve sail of the line and five frigates, under the command of Monsieur Suffren, having appeared on the coast; and that they had taken and destroyed several vessels bound for Madras with grain. The English squadron under Sir Edward Hughes, consisting of seven sail of the line, was at anchor in the road of Madras, where, on the 12th February, it was fortunately reinforced by three sail of the line under Commodore Alms. The following day Suffren made his appearance before the roads with his whole fleet, and anchored to windward. On the 14th the French

fleet weighed anchor and passed to the southward in line of battle. Sir Edward also weighed and stood after them. On the 15th the two fleets passed each other and exchanged a few shot before the night set in. The next morning the English admiral perceiving himself between the enemy's line of battle ships to the eastward, and a convoy of frigates and transports to the westward, standing towards Pondicherry, made a signal for chasing the latter, the rear of which they soon came up with, and captured five or six English merchant ships that had been taken by the French, and a large transport laden with stores and ammunition, having also on board a number of officers and about three hundred men. Suffren perceiving what was going on gave chase to the English admiral. Early on the morning of the 17th, the French fleet bore down upon the English. After a great deal of manœuvring, in which Suffren still preserved the weather-gage, the action commenced partially about four o'clock. Eight of the enemy's ships were engaged against five of ours; towards six the remaining four with the advantage of a squall were brought into action; but night coming on the two fleets separated; the French stood away to windward, and Sir Edward Hughes bore up for Trincomalée. In this action Captain Reynolds of the Exeter was killed, and Captain Stevens of the Superb died of his wounds.

Immediately after this engagement the French landed two thousand troops at Porto Novo, where they were joined by a considerable part of Hyder's army, under the command of his son Tippoo Saheb, with a view of attacking Cuddalore, which surrendered to their united force on the 3d April.

Shortly after this event information was also received from the Tanjore country, that Colonel Brathwaite, with one hundred Europeans, one thousand five hundred sepoy, and three hundred cavalry, had been attacked and totally defeated by Tippoo Saheb; and that Colonel Brathwaite was wounded and taken prisoner with nineteen other officers.

Another serious misfortune occurred about the same time in the loss of three thousand bullocks, which were cut off by the enemy in returning from Chingleput, where they had been sent with rice. As this loss appeared to have been occasioned entirely through the neglect of Major Byrn, he was tried by a general court martial and cashiered.

These misfortunes however were amply compensated by the success of the British arms both by land and sea. The battle of Arnée fought with the whole army of Hyder, like all former actions, terminated to the honor of the British arms, and to the disgrace of those of the enemy, who retreated with precipitation almost immediately as our line advanced. The English general pursued several miles, and took a gun and some carts of ammunition; but was not able to reap further advantages, for as he advanced Hyder retreated. On returning to Madras the grand guard, as Sir Eyre Coote called it, was unfortunately surrounded by the enemy, and the whole either cut to pieces or taken prisoners.

On the 12th April Sir Edward Hughes had a second and most obstinate engagement with the fleet of Suffren; on which occasion the honor of the British flag was nobly main-

tained against a superior force. The French admiral was obliged to shift his flag during the action. Sir Edward Hughes had fifty-nine killed and ninety-six wounded on board his own ship, and in the whole one hundred and thirty-seven killed and four hundred and thirty wounded. After the action the French repaired to Batecola, a port belonging to the Dutch on the island of Ceylon, twenty leagues to the southward of Trincomalée, where they landed one thousand four hundred sick and wounded, and are said to have buried seven hundred men. On the 2d of June they again put to sea.

On the 6th July Sir Edward Hughes once more fell in with and engaged the French fleet off Tranquebar, over which he gained a decided superiority; and had not the wind shifted and thrown his majesty's squadron out of action at the very moment when some of the enemy's ships had broken their line and were running away, and others of them greatly disabled, the admiral was of opinion the action would have ended in the capture of several of the French ships of the line. The object of the enemy was, in conjunction with their land forces, and a considerable body of Hyder's troops assembled near the river Coleroon, to proceed to the southward to the attack of Negapatam; but their meeting with the British fleet, and the engagement which ensued, entirely frustrated this enterprise, by obliging them to return to Cuddalore to repair their damages. In the mean time the admiral, at the urgent request of Lord Macartney, threw into Trincomalée a reinforcement of two hundred of his majesty's troops.

Notwithstanding the superiority which was unquestionably gained over the French fleet on the 6th July, and the great damages which most of their ships received on that day, particularly the *Brilliant* and *Sevère*, both of which struck during the action, but hoisted their colors again on Suffren's firing into them, and the former lost her mainmast, intelligence was received by Lord Macartney, on which he could depend, that about the end of July the French were nearly refitted; and he had information on the 5th August, that the whole or a considerable part of their fleet had actually put to sea on the 1st of that month, when they steered to the southward; that their first division of reinforcements, expected from Europe, was arrived at Point de Galle, and that Monsieur Bussy with the second division might be looked for daily. His Lordship communicated this intelligence to the admiral, who said he would be ready to put to sea in pursuit of the enemy on the 11th. Reflecting on the infinite importance of the moment, and that the delay of a single day might involve the safety of the Company's possessions on the coast of Coromandel, the committee considered it their indispensable duty to address the admiral on this occasion. They stated the strong grounds they had for giving credit to the intelligence received by the president, however extraordinary it might appear, that a fleet, over which a decided superiority had certainly been gained, and some of its ships greatly damaged, should, under every disadvantage, be already able to refit in such a miserable and unprovided port as Cuddalore, and proceed to sea; that the public safety never more required, than at the present moment, that every effort should be made to pursue the enemy's squadron before it should have time to make any

successful attack on Trincomalée or Negapatam, and before their junction with any of those reinforcements from France, which already were arrived or hourly expected in these seas. This representation, it seems, gave great offence to the admiral. In his answer he termed it an extraordinary letter, and said that he was the judge when to sail, being himself only accountable for his conduct, and that too not to the governor and council of Madras; and he concluded an intemperate letter by observing that he should proceed to sea with his majesty's squadron under his command so soon as it was in a condition fit for service.

When it is considered how many advantages the British ships possessed over those of the enemy, independently of the one being a victorious and the other a vanquished fleet, it is scarcely credible that the latter should have been able completely to refit and put to sea twenty days before the former was ready to proceed, or in little more than half the time required by Sir Edward Hughes, which, however, is strictly the fact. The French fleet sailed on the 1st August from Cuddalore, and the English on the 20th of the same month from Madras. Sir Edward arrived on the 3d September off Trincomalée, and found this important harbor and the forts in the possession of the enemy, whose fleet had been reinforced with two additional ships of the line and one of fifty guns. Had Sir Edward Hughes to his skill and bravery added the activity and energy which distinguished his antagonist, it was the opinion of many able men, and among others of some of his own officers, that opportunities were not

wanting to have completed the destruction of the French fleet. Suffren was an active and indefatigable officer, who neither slept nor suffered those under him to sleep when any thing was to be done that required dispatch; who would on great emergencies work whole days in his shirt like a carpenter's mate. On the present occasion he went himself about the houses and buildings of Cuddalore, examined all the beams, had such of them taken out as suited his purpose, and converted them into masts and yards. To some of the captains who complained to him of the bad state of their ships, and urged the necessity of returning to the Isle of France to refit, he replied that the value of their ships was trifling in comparison of the object for which they had been ordered to India; that he was resolved to keep the sea with them as long as they would swim, and that until he could get possession of a place to refit them, the ocean should be his harbor. Suffren as an officer possessed many good qualities, but they were tarnished by still greater faults as a man. His want of humanity in sending to Hyder a number of English whom he had taken prisoners was universally reprobated even by his own people. Lord Macartney on the 26th April received a letter from Mr. De Chemin, stating that he, in conjunction with Monsieur Suffren, had before addressed a letter to his Lordship, proposing an exchange of prisoners, and requesting, at the same time, that some medical gentlemen might be released, which was consistent with the rules of war adopted by civilized nations. This letter had never been received; but long before the receipt of the second, Lord Macartney, of his own accord, had given directions

to the commanding officer at Negapatam to release the French surgeons. As Sir Eyre Coote at this time was invested by the governor-general and council with a full and unparticipated power in all military concerns and operations, his Lordship referred to him the proposal for a cartel. The general, in his reply to the letter, required that the cartel should include the prisoners taken by Hyder Ali in the action with colonel Baillie, and that no separate cartel could be entered into between the English and the French while they acted in concert against us. Suffren probably availing himself of this pretext, that the general had refused to agree to an exchange of prisoners, delivered the greater part to Hyder Ali at Chillumbrum chained two and two, from whence they were marched in the same way to Bangalore and other forts in the Mysore country. Several of the French officers at Cuddalore used their utmost endeavors to dissuade the French Admiral from an act so repugnant to humanity and to the principles upon which war is conducted between civilized nations, but without effect.

On the English fleet appearing before Trincomalée on the 3d September, Suffren immediately stood out of the bay to meet it. Another action ensued in which Sir Edward Hughes gained another victory. The French Admiral's ship was left a wreck without a mast standing, and two others were in little better condition; several of them were greatly damaged in their masts and rigging. In seamen and marines the English suffered less than in any of the former engagements; but in officers their loss was very considerable: Captain

Lumley of the *Isis* was killed in the action, and Captains Watt and Wood of the *Sultaun* and *Worcester* died shortly after of their wounds at Madras. Suffren broke no less than six of his captains, and sent them away to the Isle of France. He told some of the English prisoners at Trincomalée, that he had given up many of his ships as lost, and that, deserted by his captains in the action, he dreaded the sight of the English fleet the following day. Sir Edward however left him unmolested, and, finding his ammunition to run short, proceeded to Madras. Thus the victories of the admiral, like those of the general, evincing, as they strongly did, the gallantry and superiority of the British arms, were of little real advantage to the state of affairs in the Carnatic.

The intelligence of the loss of Trincomalée was accompanied with that of the admiral's intention to proceed to Bombay. Such a determination, at so critical a moment, gave the most serious alarm to the government. To leave an enemy's fleet in the possession of a secure harbor, without a single ship to oppose them on the whole coast of Coromandel, amounted to an almost certain sacrifice of the Company's remaining possessions on that coast. Equally certain was it, in such a situation, that the supplies expected from Bengal would be intercepted by the enemy; and grain was already become so scarce at the presidency that famine had commenced among the lower orders of people. The Bengal government had for a long time been most earnestly pressed to forward supplies, without which they were told the presidency foresaw it must be reduced to the hard necessity of

compelling a great part of the inhabitants of the Black Town to seek for subsistence elsewhere; and these supplies were daily expected.

These considerations, joined to certain intelligence of the near approach of Sir Richard Bickerton with five sail of the line, induced the president to prevail on the admiral to assist the deliberations of the committee with his opinion and advice as to their future proceedings. They represented to him, in the most forcible terms, the great importance of his passing the monsoon on the eastern side of the peninsula, and the danger to which Madras and the rest of the Company's possessions on the coast of Coromandel would be exposed by his proceeding with the squadron to Bombay. They reminded him of his having remained on their side of the peninsula the preceding year, without accident or the appearance of danger; they suggested the practicability of trying some of the ports, said to be in the bay of Bengal, or that in one of the Nicobars, or at Acheen head; they stated, as their opinion, that how great soever the risk to which the ships of his majesty, whose interest is inseparable from that of the Company, might be exposed, it must be still inferior in its consequence to that of the disasters which might follow the departure of the fleet to the other side of the peninsula. The admiral said, in reply, that his ships had been so much shaken in the four actions with the enemy, that his going to Bombay was absolutely necessary and unavoidable. But as five or six weeks had yet to elapse before the setting in of the monsoon, he added, that if Sir Richard Bickerton should arrive within a few days, he was resolved, with the co-opera-

tion of the Madras government, to attempt the recapture of Trincomalée. And on being asked if he could detach ships to Cuddalore, to protect the operations of the army for its reduction, he replied, that he certainly could detach a sufficient number to protect them against any force that Suffren could send to oppose them. It was therefore resolved to invest Cuddalore; but information was soon afterwards received that Sir Eyre Coote had been taken ill, and that in consequence thereof the army was on its return to Madras, under the command of General Stuart. The intended attack on Cuddalore was therefore necessarily postponed for the moment.

In this very critical posture of affairs, Lord Macartney wished most anxiously that Sir Eyre Coote should attend the committee, or if his indisposition made that inconvenient, that they should hold their meeting at his quarters on Choultry plain; but the general thought fit to decline both the one and the other, and desired that General Stuart might attend in his place. To their surprise and concern the admiral, who two days before had readily and chearfully assented to co-operate, now gave a sudden and decisive refusal to any requisition of the kind, notwithstanding that, himself excepted, it was the unanimous opinion of the committee still to pursue the enterprise. Without his assistance however it was impossible to proceed with any hope of success, and the project of investing Cuddalore was consequently abandoned.

Lord Macartney being well aware that the French would immediately attempt the reduction of Negapatam, as soon as

they should hear that the English admiral had proceeded to the other side of India, and probably without waiting for that event, had prevailed on Sir Eyre Coote to send a detachment to that garrison of three hundred men under the command of Colonel Fullarton. This reinforcement, joined to the force already there, might, he conceived, give a favorable turn to affairs in the Trichenopoly country, where, for some time past, they had worn but a deplorable aspect, the garrisons and the inhabitants being equally distressed for provisions, and our force too weak to show itself in the field against Tippoo Saheb; the troops were likewise greatly in arrear of pay; and at Tanjore there was an immediate prospect of famine. On the 3d October intelligence was received from Colonel Fullarton, of the intention of the enemy to attack Negapatam. A council was immediately summoned, at which the admiral assisted. It was now proposed and unanimously agreed that, if the information should prove to be correct, the squadron should proceed to its relief. Sir Edward however thought fit to doubt the truth of the intelligence, and observed, that he could hardly be ready for sea before the 15th of the month, and that then it would be his duty to proceed round Ceylon without attempting the relief of Negapatam, even if it should be attacked. The following morning Lord Macartney received a letter from Mr. Sullivan, dated the 3d October at Negapatam, advising that seventeen sail of the enemy's ships were then in sight. A gentleman likewise landed at Madras from Tranquebar, which he left on the 3d, who informed Lord Macartney that Negapatam was actually attacked; that after he was embarked he had received a letter from the shore, in which it was stated, that

seventeen sail of ships were in the road, and had been firing at the fort for three hours. The committee upon this lost no time in making a requisition to the admiral to proceed immediately to the relief of Negapatam; but Sir Edward Hughes declined to comply with it, and let them know that he adhered to his former determination to proceed direct to Bombay.

The government of Madras had now before it an awful and humiliating prospect. The British admiral retiring to the other side of the peninsula, and abandoning to their fate the whole of the Company's possessions on the coast of Coromandel, at a moment too when threatened with famine; leaving behind him an active enemy in possession of a secure harbor, and a fleet which, though four times conquered, was actually engaged in attacking the most important of the Company's garrisons; a fleet which had assuredly suffered greater damage than the English in every engagement, which, since the last action, had lost one of its best ships (the *L'Orient*) on a rock going into the harbor of Trincomalée, and which came out of that port so ill refitted, that another of its line of battle ships was run ashore at Cuddalore to prevent her from sinking. Convinced, as every reasonable man in the settlement was, of the fatal consequences of the admiral's determination, but not convinced of its necessity, Lord Macartney felt it his duty to urge every argument which, in his opinion, ought to have weight with him against carrying into execution a measure which threatened such dreadful consequences to the Company's interests; but Sir Edward Hughes still persisted in his determination.

Information was now received by the president from Mr. Sullivan the resident at Tanjore, that Sir Richard Bickerton had arrived at Bombay and sailed again for Madras. The admiral observed, that he also had received similar information from the same quarter, but it was so vague that he did not believe it to be true, and that he could not detain the fleet on such authority. On the 12th a letter was received express from Bengal, stating that Mr. Ritchie the marine surveyor would undertake to conduct his majesty's ships in safety to a proper anchoring place in the entrance of the Bengal river. This letter conveyed pretty clearly the sentiments of the Bengal government, as to the necessity of the British squadron remaining on the east side of the peninsula. It was immediately communicated to the admiral, who, at the same time, was told, "That as the safety of the settlement, and with it immediately that of the whole coast of Coromandel, was a matter of the highest concern, nothing should prevent the committee from fulfilling their public duty in acquainting him with the state of their supplies on which that safety must depend; that the rice then at the presidency did not exceed thirty thousand bags; the quantity afloat in the roads amounted only to thirty thousand bags; the monthly consumption was, at the least, equal to fifty thousand bags; that their sole dependence for the preservation of the settlement was on the supplies expected by sea, and then supposed to be on their way; that the number of boats for the daily service of his squadron had, in a great measure, deprived them of the means of landing the grain from the vessels already in the road; those vessels, and the others which might arrive in future,

“ would be exposed to the utmost hazard from the enemy if
“ they should be left to the inadequate protection of frigates
“ only ; that the fate impending, in such case, over the most
“ important possessions to the Company and to the state
“ could neither be doubtful nor distant ; that it might there-
“ fore be worthy of his consideration, whether the squadron
“ should not remain in a proper station, at least, during a
“ time sufficient for the landing under its protection the pro-
“ visions already in the road, and those on their way from the
“ northward ; and it was added that, at all events, if the
“ whole quantity were already landed it would still be very
“ inadequate to their wants.”

The morning of the 15th October threatened an approaching storm, upon which the squadron put to sea and disappeared. The settlement was now doomed to experience a new and most severe misfortune. The gale speedily commenced and continued to blow with increasing violence till midnight. Several large vessels, and among them the Hertford Indiaman, were driven ashore, others foundered at their anchors, and all the small craft, amounting to nearly one hundred in number, were either sunk or stranded in the course of the night. The following morning presented a most melancholy spectacle ; the shore was covered with wreck and dead bodies ; and the whole of the rice, amounting to thirty thousand bags, was irretrievably lost. This dreadful blow seemed to be decisive of the fate of the presidency. Even the firm mind of Lord Macartney was shaken, and despondency seized on every soul. This however was not a time for inaction. Not a moment was suffered to be lost without de-

liberating what measures should be taken for averting the desperate necessity of surrendering or abandoning Fort St. George to the enemy. But whatever measures might be resolved upon, the government had the melancholy truth before it, that no human effort could prevent the fate, which the certain and immediate prospect of famine presented to the miserable inhabitants of the settlement. In consequence of the dreadful ravages committed by Hyder's army, the black town had, for some time before, been crowded with people, who had fled thither for refuge from all parts of the country. Their lands overrun, their habitations burnt, their cattle carried off, deprived of all means of cultivation, dreading the return of that enemy from whom they fled, they had directed their steps to the capital of the province, in the hope of protection, and the chance of subsistence. Some of these unhappy creatures had again left the town and reached those parts of the country which had escaped the devastation of the enemy, when positive orders were sent by government to feed and protect them; but these bore only a small proportion to the vast multitudes which remained in the town, and of which hundreds now began daily to perish. To the horrors of a famine was superadded the dread of a pestilence, which was only prevented by the activity and vigilance of government, in causing to be collected and piled in carts such of the dead bodies of the wretched sufferers as had fallen and expired in the streets, or carried thither out of the houses, to be conveyed to the place of interment. The number thus collected and borne out of the town to be buried in large trenches made for the purpose, is said to have been not less for several weeks than from twelve to fifteen hundred a week.

The calm resignation approaching to apathy with which the patient Hindoos submitted to this most dreadful of human calamities, and the firmness with which they pertinaciously refused, under every circumstance of distress, to taste of animal food while languishing and dying for want of sustenance, rather than violate one of the leading principles of their faith, exhibited an instance of self-denial which, how much soever we may be disposed to condemn, we cannot well refuse to admire; it formed a striking contrast with the conduct of the Mahomedan natives who, clinging tenaciously to life, were frequently seen, as an intelligent officer* has observed, "digging in the entrails of a dead carrion" to prolong for a few days, perhaps only a few hours, their miserable existence †.

The disaster that had happened to the ships in the road rendered it necessary, in the first instance, to cause a notice to be given in the most public manner, and in all the languages spoken by the various classes and nations in Madras, that no grain could for the future be issued for the consumption of the inhabitants from the public stock, as had hitherto been done; and to warn all persons not provided with a sufficiency of grain for themselves and families, until supplies might be expected to arrive the following year from the northward, to leave Madras immediately. At the same time it

* Colonel Fullarton.

† It would be difficult to form any estimate that could be relied on as accurate of the depopulation of the Carnatic, in consequence of Hyder's invasion, by sickness, by famine, and by the sword. Mr. Greville, on the authority of an eyewitness of the miseries of that unfortunate country, states it, (in his *British India analyzed*) at 540,000 souls, a number that, in all probability, is not exaggerated.

was signified that all such, as availed themselves of this summons, would be furnished with a certain quantity of rice, and conducted under an escort towards the northern provinces which had suffered least from the devastation of the enemy, and where directions would be sent to provide for their subsistence. The army was immediately reduced to a very small allowance, calculated to such a quantity every day as would enable the whole to last till the probable arrival of new supplies. Upwards of twenty thousand rations of grain were provided for the daily consumption of the troops and followers, and a sufficiency for all other persons actually employed, or necessary to be retained, in the service of the garrison of Fort St. George in the event of a siege. Lord Macartney set the example of sending away all the superfluous servants about the government house, his horses, palankeen bearers, and every person who was not absolutely necessary to be kept; and the humanity of government and of individuals was constantly exercised in devising means for mitigating, as much as possible, the dreadful calamity that had befallen the city; in consequence of which nourishment was distributed daily to several thousands under the walls of Madras.

It afforded but little consolation to Lord Macartney, after having in vain opposed the admiral's resolution of going to Bombay, to find by a letter from him, dated the 17th of November, that he now began to feel so far the incautionness of the step he had taken as to regret that winds and currents had rendered it impossible for him to return. This after-thought of the admiral could avail but little now; had

he been of the same opinion on the 16th October, the day after the gale, when in his letter of that date, written off Sadras, he still declares his intention of proceeding to Bombay to refit, without the least mention of any inclination to return to Madras, the presence of a superior and victorious fleet might have prevented many of the melancholy consequences which were the result of the coast of Coromandel being left wholly unprotected. Had he then returned, he would have been joined by Sir Richard Bickerton who, four days after his departure, arrived at Madras; but who, after speaking the Juno from the admiral's fleet, immediately again put to sea.

To add to the accumulation of distress and difficulty, the whole army was now encamped in the neighborhood of Madras, their pay six months in arrear, Sir Eyre Coote incapable of continuing in the command, and actually embarked for Bengal, and General Stuart at the head of the forces. Independent of every other misfortune, Lord Macartney had long seen with pain the danger to which the Company's possessions were exposed, while those entrusted with the care of them had no control over the forces sent for their protection. It was of little avail to gain victories while an Indian enemy ravaged the Carnatic, and an European foe triumphed on the seas. He conceived that something more than a mere defensive war was necessary to be waged, in order to secure a safe and honorable peace; but to all his proposals and plans innumerable difficulties were raised and obstacles thrown in the way. From the moment of his arrival in India he began to experience those evils which might

naturally be expected to arise out of the unparticipated authority vested in the commander in chief of the forces; and he took the earliest occasion of stating his opinion both to the Bengal government who had conferred it, and to the Court of Directors, of the fatal consequences which might be apprehended from such a delegation of power. He had even suggested a remedy for the inconveniences that were felt from this divided authority. "Let the commanders in chief," says he, "of his majesty's land and naval forces have each a seat and voice in the select committees of the different presidencies, and let them be equally bound with any other member to execute the resolutions of the majority." The navy indeed has always been considered to act distinctly and independently of the civil government in the colonies, but the army has invariably been placed under the civil power wherever such power existed. A different system, however, or, more correctly speaking, a total want of system with regard to the military, prevailed in India.

As a great part of the difficulties, against which Lord Macartney had to struggle, were occasioned by the unwarrantable powers partly assumed by and partly granted to the king's officers serving in India, it will be necessary to take a more particular, though a summary, view of the situation and the conduct of the commander in chief of the forces, and the influence they had upon his immediate successor, without which it will be impossible to form a just estimation of those difficulties.

The late governor and committee of Madras, who had made no provision for the war until Hyder Ali had penetrated to the very centre of the Carnatic, terrified at the storm that was ready to burst upon them, were glad to transfer to Sir Eyre Coote, who had been sent from Bengal, the whole conduct of the war, and thus get rid, as they imagined, of a considerable share of the responsibility. Lord Macartney finding on his arrival matters thus circumstanced, concluded, that it did not remain for him to consider whether, on general grounds, it was justifiable or safe to enlarge the powers vested by the court of directors in the commander of their forces; but whether from the use that was made, in the present instance, of such a delegation, the interest of the Company was most likely to be affected by the continuance or the revocation of it. He clearly perceived the grand evil of such a system; he saw there could be no immediate nor effectual check on the consumption and expenses of the army which, by speedily exhausting its resources, was soon arrested in its progress. The licensed followers of an army of about ten thousand men are stated to have been more than thirty thousand; these necessarily took from the fund of food, of pay, of carriage, from the fighting men. The bullocks with the army for train and draught, were seldom fewer than one for every soldier, yet were declared by the commander in chief not to be half sufficient for conveying its provisions and ammunition; yet they consisted sometimes of as many thousands as there were hundreds accompanying those British troops which, little encumbered with baggage or attendants, fixed our dominion in Hindostan. His Lordship gave Sir

Eyre Coote the credit to suppose, that his zeal for the service was abundantly strong to incline him to the correction of those abuses; but he could not at the same time avoid perceiving that, from the indulgence of his nature towards the companions of his labours, from a fondness of military popularity, and perhaps also from that decline in the vigor of his mind, which sometimes follows ill health, those evils were still likely to continue. He was aware that the utmost tenderness was to be used on the part of the civil government in attempting to restore that system of simplicity and economy, which the state of their resources so imperiously demanded; and though the unwarrantable delegation of power was revocable at pleasure; yet out of respect for the experience and abilities of Sir Eyre Coote and his long services in India, he was unwilling to propose rescinding any resolution of the former government, by which a confidence was implied or a compliment conveyed. He conceived moreover that it would be for the good of the service to continue to the commander in chief the same uncontrolled latitude, in which his temper had been indulged, both as to the plan and conduct, as well as the execution of all the military operations of the main army, rather than incur the hazard of any temporary inconvenience that might be occasioned through ill humor or disgust by pursuing a contrary line of conduct. And so scrupulously did he adhere to this principle that when it became expedient, conformably with his instructions, to take possession of Negapatam, and Sir Eyre Coote thought fit to oppose the measure, his Lordship, in order to avoid the possibility of giving offence, did not allow a single man to be

taken from the main army for this purpose. It could not be supposed however that a person of Sir Eyre Coote's hasty temper would readily forgive the success of an expedition, of which he had reprobated the plan, pronounced the failure, and disclaimed the responsibility. In fact, from that moment he appears to have let no opportunity slip of teasing the committee with complaints, or casting animadversions on their proceedings. Still however Lord Macartney was resolved to make no alteration in the powers that had been entrusted to him, nor in any respect to withdraw the confidence his predecessors had placed in him; and he exerted every nerve to anticipate his wishes by supplying the army with money, provisions, and draught cattle. Indeed, it evidently appears through their whole correspondence, that Lord Macartney was strongly disposed to show this veteran officer every possible mark of regard and respect. His momentary sallies of ill humor he was willing to attribute to a natural hastiness of temper, disappointments, and ill health, convinced that in his cooler and fixed sentiments he would be ready to do him that justice to which he was entitled. "I never retort," says his Lordship, "any sharp expression which may occur in his letters. In fact, I court him like a mistress, and humor him like a child; but with all this I have a most sincere regard for him, and honor him highly. But I am truly grieved at heart to see a man of his military reputation, at his time of life, made miserable by those who ought to make him happy, and from a great public character worked into the little instrument of private malignity and disappointed avarice. All however," he observes,

“has been and shall be good humor and good breeding on my part *.” But it appears that every attempt to conciliate him was fruitless so long as his ill advisers remained by his side. He was determined to be dissatisfied, refused to attend the consultations, and found fault with every measure that was proposed. On some occasion where it does not appear that he had any thing specific to allege, he complained in general terms to the governor and council of Bengal of interference in his authority, and threatened to lay down the command unless he should be invested with full and absolute power to act in all cases without consulting the committee.

In consequence of this complaint, the governor-general and council, who had already manifested a kind of jealousy towards the new Madras government, for reasons which will be noticed hereafter, thought fit to direct, or as they artfully express it, earnestly to recommend, that an unparticipated command over all the forces in the Carnatic should be allowed to Sir Eyre Coote to the utmost possible extent of his wishes. In this letter to the government of Madras they remark, that they perceive the great difficulties they (the select committee) had to struggle with in supporting the army in its operations in the Carnatic; and observe, with concern, that notwithstanding their great exertions, aided by the unwearied zeal and unexampled perseverance of General Sir Eyre Coote, and the established superiority of the forces under his command, scarcely any substantial advantage had been gained over the enemy; that in offering their advice

* Extract of a letter to Mr. Macpherson, dated Fort St. George.

they should use all the tenderness and delicacy which became them upon a subject of which they profess to have no adequate materials to found a certain judgment; yet, they add, that for the sake of expressing their sentiments more fully they would suppose every case alluded to, to exist in its extreme as the grounds of their conclusion upon them. They then proceed to observe, that the general had complained to them of an interference in his command which, if not removed, and all the military operations in the Carnatic left to his sole and exclusive conduct and control, he had threatened to relinquish his situation. "We do not," say they, "pretend to inquire into the grounds of this complaint, indeed we are better pleased that we are destitute of the evidence requisite to form a judgment, whether it is well or ill founded, than solicitous to obtain it. We see but one single instance, in which the great importance of its object and its complete success will justify the greatest irregularity, admitting that any was committed in the mode in which it was executed; we allude to the siege and capture of Negapatam. Whether there are any other causes for Sir Eyre Coote's dissatisfaction, besides the above, we know not, but we shall offer our opinion upon the general question, and beg you will receive it in good part. We think that so much is due to the unexampled zeal and exertions of the present commander in chief, and to the confidence which we are assured the army reposes in his command; and so much depends, in all operations of war, on uniformity of system and authority, that we do most earnestly recommend to you that Sir Eyre Coote's wishes in this point may be gratified to their fullest possible extent; and that you

“ will allow him an unparticipated command over all the
“ forces acting under your authority in the Carnatic *.”
They further observe, that they are sensible every government must possess an ultimate and overruling authority, and that the right of exercising such authority must also be invariable and perpetual; that cases may happen in which the instant interposition of that authority may be necessary for the safety of the state without a participation or even a communication with the person entrusted with the military command; that it will depend on the judgment of the Madras government to determine, when cases of weight and urgency demand their sole and separate interposition; that however, in some cases, the power of conducting military operations might be even extended to the commander in chief; such, for instance, as in the conciliation of the dependent chiefs of the Carnatic; the acceptance of terms offered by those of the enemy, and, in general, such other acts as do not fall within the express line of military command, but which may contribute to the success of its operations, either by adding strength to our arms, or weakening those which may be opposed to them; that in all such cases the officer who is charged with the conduct of the war, especially if he has shown himself deserving of that confidence in an eminent degree, ought to be entrusted with an implicit discretion. And after expressing their hope, that the advice is sufficiently guarded which they have taken on themselves to offer, professing their total ignorance of any cause which could have excited the general’s displeasure,

* Extract of a letter from the governor-general and council of Bengal to the president and select committee of Fort St. George, dated 11th March, 1782.

excepting one which reflected great credit on the Madras government, they proceed to observe, " Were we to adopt
" the ostensible and artificial language of that prudence
" which dictates to the minds of men the sole preservation
" of their own personal characters, by acting under the
" cover of prescribed forms, without regard to public consequences, we might avail ourselves of the powers with
" which the court of directors have lately invested us over the
" other presidencies, to take the lead in all their military and
" political operations, and of the peremptory orders given by
" them to the other presidencies, to pay an implicit obedience to our injunctions ; but the exercise of such a privilege might prove as ungrateful to you as it would be painful to ourselves, and we know it to be unnecessary. We
" do not command : we only recommend ; and this degree of
" interference is assumed by us more with a view to lessen
" the weight of your responsibility, by taking on ourselves a
" considerable portion of it in so hazardous a service, and in
" circumstances requiring perhaps some deviation from the
" rules of ordinary practice or general opinion, than for the
" purpose of influencing your measures, or of opposing the
" judgment on which you had formed them*."

On ordinary occasions, a letter of this description, artfully as it seems designed to embarrass the Madras government, might have been considered to require only an ordinary answer from the latter signifying its obedience to their commands ; but as a great deal more was meant by it than meets

* Extract of a letter from the governor-general and council of Bengal to the president and select committee of Fort St. George, dated 11th March, 1782.

the eye, and as it was written at the very moment when Lord Macartney's private secretary, Mr. Staunton, was living in Mr. Hastings's house, and receiving the fullest assurances of his determination to co-operate with and support all his Lordship's measures, and to act with cordiality, friendship, and affection towards him, it was deemed proper to take such notice of it as the embarrassing situation into which it threw the Company's Government at Madras seemed to demand. Previously however to any public answer being returned, it may be observed, that on some orders being received at Madras, which followed close on the heels of this letter, respecting the necessity of sending a detachment of troops to Bombay, the Madras government expressed, in reply, its entire approbation of the wisdom of the plan, and its earnest wishes to promote it; but they observed that as all the military powers and some others that were not military had been vested by the letter from Bengal of the 11th March in the commander in chief, *the ancient and constitutional system, by whose undivided energy government was formerly enabled to act, subsisted no longer*; and that the Madras government was thereby deprived of the means of enforcing their wishes. The gentlemen of the supreme council, alarmed at this early proof of the ill consequences of their undue interference thus operating to their own disadvantage, and ashamed probably at their rash and unguarded decision, made by their own avowal without examination, now thought fit to retract* the powers they had given to Sir Eyre Coote, or, at least, to absolve the

* By a letter from the governor-general and council to the president and select committee of Fort St. George, dated July 4, 1782.

Madras government from obeying the orders contained in their former letter ; endeavoring however, at the same time, with their usual ambiguity of argument and expression, to qualify their former opinions, and make them convey a different sense from what they could bear. In reply to these two contradictory letters of the 11th March and 4th July, the select committee felt it their duty to enter into a long and minute investigation of their own and Sir Eyre Coote's conduct from the time of Lord Macartney's arrival at Madras. They point out, from the general's own letters, how ready he was, on every occasion, to do justice to the committee and especially to the president, " whose zeal and exertions," he observes, " for the support of a distressed cause had far exceeded their merited success." On their part, they add, they were not only willing to satisfy him by their exertions when he wished for assistance, but by their forbearance as much as possible in others where he wished to act without controul or interference. " We had much reliance," they said, " on the good effects of his experience, abilities, and reputation. We were sensible of the value of that confidence which the sepoys placed in his bravery and good fortune. His presence was thought necessary to inspire them with confidence also in themselves, which was supposed to have been shaken by the disaster that had happened to Colonel Bailie's detachment. The general's influence might be essential to keep troops together and in good order, to whom arrears had been due several months. His age and infirmities might, we knew, afford him too many opportunities of desiring to quit the command on the first dissatis-

“faction he might feel from government. Those infirmities
“and that age; the irritability occasioned by former contests
“with the civil power; the warmth and extreme sensibility
“of his temper, which he indeed acknowledges and laments,
“warned us of the danger, and cautioned us against the oc-
“casion of giving him any dissatisfaction. We therefore not
“only furnished to his demands, with the zeal and exertion
“which he mentions, but we allowed the general order in
“his favor to remain in full force; satisfied with apologizing
“to our employers in general terms, as well as we were able,
“for this forbearance from the exercise of part of the duty
“we had undertaken to discharge; with a promise however
“of ceasing such forbearance whenever we should perceive
“that it would be for their essential interest we should do
“so. This determination to court and humor a veteran and
“valuable commander, we soon experienced, was not to be
“maintained without many sacrifices. We were neither con-
“sulted nor made acquainted with the general’s designs. The
“management and expenditure of the army were points that
“approached too closely to his new prerogative to be exa-
“mined or controlled by us without risking to provoke him.
“It was even with the utmost tenderness that we expressed
“our anxious wish for his presence and assistance at our
“board, of which he was a member; and even when we saw
“the possibility of a famine amongst us, it was in vain that
“we requested he would communicate so much of his pro-
“spects and intentions, in relation to the army under his
“command, as might be proper for our guidance in the mea-
“sures to be pursued for the safety and subsistence of the
“settlement.”

They then proceed to state that even when they undertook the expedition against Negapatam, Sir Eyre Coote expressed his happiness that Sir Hector Munro's health would allow of his undertaking the command, as he was sure he could not fail of success; that however when the siege was begun the general, on receiving a letter from Colonel Braithwaite, then for the first time declared to Lord Macartney, that it was not consonant with his ideas to attack Negapatam, and that he was not sorry in being relieved from so great a part of his burden by the orders sent from the committee to the southward; and that he conceived himself exonerated from all responsibility in that quarter; that he took care however, on finding that the enterprize was likely to succeed, to appoint agents, on the part of the army, for the captures, though he had not furnished a single man from the main army for the purpose. And that when the success was made known of an expedition, undertaken by the civil government, without the assistance but with the knowledge and, at first, the apparent concurrence, of the military commander in chief (though he latterly announced its danger and impolicy, and disclaimed its responsibility) and of which the private benefit was likely to be distributed contrary to his wishes, he gave them notice that his bad state of health required a change of air and a relaxation from business, and that he meant to proceed immediately to Bengal. After taking a complete view of every transaction connected with military affairs, and proving most satisfactorily that, except in the instance of the Dutch settlements, no interference whatever had been used on the part of the committee with the command of Sir Eyre Coote, they proceed to state, "As by

“ a letter from the court of directors you are to take the
“ lead in all military operations, we thought ourselves bound
“ to account with you for our silence or our defects on such
“ subjects : but we were conscious of our own authority, had
“ we thought it expedient to exert it, over Sir Eyre Coote ;
“ and therefore had no occasion to make, in relation to him,
“ any reference to your board. You acknowledge, in your let-
“ ter of the 11th March, the receipt of our proceedings. You
“ are pleased to tell us you have read them with attention ;
“ that attention must have discovered to you in them the na-
“ ture and tendency of our conduct ; you must there have
“ observed our forbearance from military control, and our
“ confidence in Sir Eyre Coote. He assures us that his re-
“ monstrances to you spoke only to points publickly written
“ on to this committee, enclosing his letters and our answers
“ on the different heads, all which are among those proceed-
“ ings which you have attentively read. You tell us posi-
“ tively you see but one instance of interference, on the part
“ of our government, in his general command, which inter-
“ ference you think the importance of its object and its com-
“ plete success would, even if it had been irregular, have
“ rendered justifiable ; and which reflects a credit on our ad-
“ ministration. In all other instances he appears to have
“ acted without control ; yet you tell us that he has com-
“ plained in strong terms of our interference. His com-
“ plaint must therefore, and is indeed acknowledged to re-
“ late to that act alone which you consider as justifiable. As
“ we were guilty of it by the exertion of that overruling au-
“ thority inherent in every government when, in our judg-
“ ment as in yours, it was proper to have exerted it, the

“ source of such complaint could not be removed, and Sir
“ Eyre Coote’s wishes in this point gratified to their fullest
“ possible extent, according to your desire, unless we forbore
“ from exercising that authority even when, in our judgment,
“ we were called upon to exercise it.

“ The reserve which you are pleased to make of our inter-
“ position in cases of weight and urgency must be therefore
“ merely speculative, not only as likely to militate with the
“ possible wishes of Sir Eyre Coote, most earnestly recom-
“ mended by your board to be gratified to their fullest extent,
“ but actually militating with his actual wishes, communi-
“ cated by you to us, for a sole and exclusive conduct and
“ control, without any exception or reserve whatsoever; nor
“ is it perfectly clear to us that while you suffered your letter
“ of the 11th March to remain in its full force, a com-
“ mander in chief, at the head of his army, with the influ-
“ ence and under the sanction which that letter gave him,
“ and who had insisted upon the sole and exclusive control as
“ the condition of his command, would have been very ready
“ to agree with us on the propriety of our interposition in that
“ control, or to carry into execution any of our directions.
“ We acknowledge that we saw these consequences from a
“ compliance with your desires. We felt, at the same time,
“ as we ought to have done, all the delicacy and attention
“ towards us with which they were conveyed to us under the
“ name of most earnest recommendations; but they were
“ unattended with the communication of any fact or obser-
“ vation that could be new to us, or to which we had been
“ insensible, and we therefore concluded they must have

“ been intended to operate, not upon our understanding but
“ our obedience. We knew that, in the common intercourse
“ of business, a compliance is expected, without having used
“ the harsh expression of command. It was not difficult to
“ foresee that any delay in that obedience might be con-
“ strued into a jealousy of the power which required it, and
“ into a consequent reluctance of yielding to it. We find too
“ that any objection, which we might have urged against it,
“ was liable to be attributed to passions, under the impulse of
“ which you, who are a collective body as numerous as we
“ are, candidly observe, that collective bodies sometimes act
“ without being sensible of doing so.

“ It would at any rate have been an unhandsome return
“ for your tenderness in the exercise of your authority, and a
“ flagrant abuse of your literal expressions, if we had pre-
“ tended to reject what you consider yourselves, and in the
“ same letter acquaint us that you were empowered to com-
“ mand, merely because you had been pleased to deliver
“ it in the form of recommendation or advice: but to guard
“ us against the possibility of such a misconduct, you take
“ the trouble of reminding us, in giving us this advice, of the
“ peremptory orders transmitted to us by the court of direc-
“ tors to pay an implicit obedience to your requisitions; the
“ reason you give, beside the painfulness of it to yourselves,
“ for not exercising, in this instance, the powers so granted
“ to you, that you knew it to be unnecessary, sufficiently
“ forewarned us of its exercise when it should cease to be
“ unnecessary. We could not therefore, on the attentive
“ consideration which it became us to give to your letter,

“ mistake its real meaning of strict obedience, notwithstand-
“ ing the apparent latitude left to us in some parts of it ; and,
“ at any rate, we were thus reduced by it to the alternative
“ of yielding up at once, and, in all instances, the exercise
“ and operation of our own judgment in the direction of the
“ forces intended for our protection, and placed by our em-
“ ployers under our authority, as well as of political measures
“ necessary for our safety and welfare ; or of preparing for the
“ reception of orders peremptorily expressed from you to do
“ so. In complying therefore with the transfer of such a
“ general and comprehensive authority to the commander of
“ our forces, who was before but an individual member of
“ our board, we plainly saw that, though we should conti-
“ nue to be in office, we should no longer be in government.”

After commenting at length, in a very able manner, on the ill consequences that had already resulted, and must necessarily continue to result from the impolitic transfer of all authority to the commander of the forces, they proceed to observe, “ It was, no doubt, the idea of benefit to the service
“ which induced you to pronounce immediately upon the
“ partial application of Sir Eyre Coote, though you profess
“ not to have inquired into the grounds of his complaints,
“ to have no adequate materials for pronouncing a judgment
“ on the occasion, and are destitute of the evidence requisite
“ to form it. We who have been too much influenced by
“ the dread of that officer’s quitting the command of the
“ army on this coast, must make indeed a large allowance
“ for your endeavor to retain him in it. His loud and re-
“ corded complaints of some acts of your board, during his

“ absence from Bengal, might have indeed been some argu-
“ ment of his disposition to complaint, but from thence we
“ cannot be surprised if you should not be anxious for his
“ return to his seat in that presidency. We still are willing to
“ flatter ourselves that a sense of the public danger, and a
“ regard to private honor will be sufficient to prevent a sol-
“ dier from deserting the service of his country ; and that he
“ will be satisfied with the conditions on which he had en-
“ gaged, and the further indulgencies he has experienced in
“ it, without insisting upon the gratification of a sole and
“ exclusive, and, as it calls for an unusual term in our lan-
“ guage, an imperatorial control, extended, in fact, as you
“ have found to be the necessary consequence, to all or
“ the most essential branches of the government.

“ In yielding to this new control we thought it an inoffen-
“ sive and, at any rate, an indispensable act of duty in us to
“ warn, on his accession, the possessor of it with whatever
“ wisdom, discretion, and moderation he might be supposed
“ to be endued, of that responsibility which must ever ac-
“ company the exercise of delegated authority ; and from
“ which, as from that exercise, we were in the same moment
“ and in the same proportion, absolutely discharged. But
“ we fear you have given us more credit for caution than we
“ deserve in the selection you suppose we had made of the
“ terms used by us to Sir Eyre Coote, with a view to conceal
“ our consideration of your recommendation as commands ;
“ for we must have plainly enough betrayed our construction
“ of them, by acknowledging that our compliance with them
“ arose from our sense of duty to our employers ; and our

“ express mention of the responsibilities necessarily implied
“ in the powers that were the object of your letter, and
“ which must be both equally exclusive, was no indication of
“ our having voluntarily acceded to it. For, in telling us,
“ whether as an advice, recommendation, or command, that,
“ for the good of the state, the general is to act without our
“ concurrence ; but that we are to concur in answering for
“ those acts ; that he is to have an unparticipated command,
“ but a participated responsibility—you advance a doctrine
“ so extraordinary, so unjust and inadmissible, that we can
“ scarcely give credit to those senses which inform us, that it
“ proceeds from your board.

“ A circumstance more alarming in its immediate tendency,
“ even than the alteration in the system of this government,
“ soon diverted our attention from that object. Your most
“ secret letter of the 25th March announced a mutiny among
“ the sepoys in Bengal ; and every other letter from thence
“ was full of the most direful apprehensions. You acquainted
“ us with the very small number in your presidency of Euro-
“ pean soldiers, on the superiority of whom over the native
“ corps you depended for your essential security against the
“ fatal consequences, to which the interests and property of
“ the Company were exposed. Here also, without recurring
“ to the unusual, ungracious, and unnecessary expression of
“ command, you, on this most critical occasion, only request
“ us immediately to return to you all the Europeans here be-
“ longing to your establishment with an addition from our own.
“ No peremptory order could be more operative upon our sub-
“ mission. We were bound to it by our duty ; we were impelled

“ to it by our sense of your repeated and liberal attention to
“ our situation. We placed our pride perhaps in proving that
“ we were not the less cordial and zealous in our co-operations
“ with you, wherever we were able, though we could not give
“ our approbation to all of your opinions. We instantly deter-
“ mined on sending to you by the earliest opportunity all the
“ Company’s recruits destined for your presidency, who were
“ then in the garrison of Fort St. George, having no authority
“ over the remainder. We deplored in our own minds, but we
“ avoided, as you were then liable to be circumstanced, to ob-
“ serve to you that the very first effect of the restriction of our
“ authority might be to your own disadvantage ; but we ad-
“ dressed a copy of your letter to the general, in hopes he might
“ be induced to assist in your relief. We accounted to you
“ for not then being able to transmit his answer to you, by
“ telling you that, not having heard from him since the army
“ marched, we knew not at that time where he was. This
“ simple assertion of a fact not needlessly and separately, or
“ singly introduced, but connected with the whole subject of
“ the letter, and necessary for your information and satisfac-
“ tion, and without the smallest insinuation of any kind to
“ the general’s or your prejudice ; you have thought proper
“ to ascribe to some spirits which you do not precisely de-
“ fine, but too plainly not to that spirit of serving and satis-
“ fying you which did alone, in fact, animate us on the oc-
“ casion. But to prove that it was an improper spirit, you
“ assert that the general could not, at that time, have been
“ more than ten miles from the Mount, which short distance,
“ if it were true, would not warrant the inference ; because
“ as he had marched four days before, and had not been

“ heard of, he might, at a moderate computation, have been
“ at sixty miles distance from Fort St. George, where we were
“ to account for him ; nor did we know whether he was gone
“ north or south, or west, or in some intermediate direction
“ between those points : we find indeed now, by recurring to
“ his letters, that he was, at the time we wrote, at Vadeca-
“ pettah, south-west of Fort St. George, thirty-two miles dis-
“ tant from that Fort ; and three and twenty from St. Tho-
“ mas’s Mount. We wish to draw no inference or derive ad-
“ vantage from this inaccuracy in your assertion of the dis-
“ tance, which is not material, for though you should have
“ calculated right, we should not have been culpable ; but
“ what is most material, and what we have the most solid
“ reasons in a public as well as private sense truly to lament
“ is, that this unguarded and unmerited imputation discovers,
“ among other circumstances, too manifestly and to our great
“ disappointment, a disposition in you to view our conduct
“ in an unfavorable light ; a disposition very different from
“ the sentiments which, in other parts of your letter, you
“ profess to entertain, and which we yet hope your convic-
“ tion of our good intentions will induce you to realize.

“ Of Sir Eyre Coote’s disposition, even from the time of
“ novelty and good humor, to impart his instructions or his
“ views, or to communicate with us, or to commit his mili-
“ tary judgment and sagacity, you may form some opinion
“ from the event of our application to him in September last,
“ upon the apprehension of a famine, when we anxiously re-
“ quested to know how long, and to what extent we were
“ likely to be still called upon to furnish the army ; taking

“ care to add to this request, that we were very certain it
“ was his most earnest wish to take immediately the forces
“ where they might find subsistence, as well as have new
“ opportunities of vanquishing the enemy; but that what
“ was desirable was not always practicable. To this appli-
“ cation, however urgent the occasion, he contented himself
“ with returning to us our own words, that what was desir-
“ able was not always practicable; that were there magazines
“ in the country to which he could have recourse when in
“ want of provisions, he could then speak with some degree
“ of certainty and precision, both as to his intentions and
“ prospects, and sufficiently testified his dissatisfaction at our
“ inquiry by throwing out, for the first time, a hint about
“ quitting the command.

“ A late plan of Mr. Sullivan’s depended much as to its
“ eligibility on a knowledge of Hyder’s disposition to refuse
“ or accede to the Mahratta treaty, concluded on the 17th
“ May. At that knowledge we endeavored to arrive by re-
“ questing Sir Eyre Coote to be so obliging as to let us know
“ whether from any late events, he had been able to judge
“ of the present disposition of that chief towards peace, or
“ whether he had received any kind of information from or
“ concerning him, by which we might form an opinion of his
“ intentions to reject or abide by the treaty in which he was
“ included by his allies. But the general, justly enough
“ deeming that the only matters now remaining necessary for
“ our consideration, were such as immediately related to the
“ supply of aids for enabling the army to act, and professing,

“ with some degree of humor, his wish to furnish us with
“ every information, keeps back the information we desire on
“ the ground of having communicated whatever occurrences
“ had happened of that nature to your board, as the only
“ persons who could decide on points of that kind, and in
“ all of which he had acted in a manner strictly conform-
“ able to the directions he had received from you.”

Having gone through a variety of instances, in which their forbearance with the humor and caprice of the commander in chief was carried perhaps beyond the bounds of prudence, they proceed to state : “ Had these sacrifices to quiet been
“ known to your board, you would probably have thought it
“ superfluous to observe, how little flattering it can be to
“ persons seriously occupied in public concerns, to gain an
“ advantage in expression, which is a true position, or in ar-
“ gument which, in relation to conduct is not so, unless it be
“ plausible only, and not founded on truth and reason which
“ it ought to be. In this age of general education the talent
“ of writing, as far as can be of use in business, is so univer-
“ sally diffused through all the middling ranks of life, that it
“ ceases even to have the merit of distinction ; and were we
“ of an age and disposition to be infected with this juvenile
“ and exploded vanity, we should have been sufficiently
“ brought back to the recollection of our folly by a very re-
“ spectable correspondent, who plainly observes to us of one
“ of our letters, that it is a *very poor performance*. Close
“ reasoning, as far as it is just, is preferable, no doubt, to
“ diffuse reasoning, which is apt to lead astray the reader,

“ and to throw upon the writer the imputation of obscurity
“ or duplicity. But well turned periods, except for the pur-
“ pose of persuasion, which you so eminently possess, and
“ except in works of composition, whose end is answered by
“ the pleasure they confer, are not always to be coveted, as
“ being capable of sharing that attention, the whole of which
“ might be requisite to the discussion of intricate and import-
“ ant subjects. At any rate there is little occasion for the
“ apology you offer for the general in this respect; whether
“ he finds that leisure which you thought his active pursuits
“ might have denied him, or that he has most ready an in-
“ genious assistance, certain it is that, with all our opportu-
“ nities, we have scarcely been able to keep pace with his
“ correspondence. We have been obliged to answer several
“ of his letters in one, and have often returned a few pages
“ for many with which he has honored us.”

This very able letter, part only of which is here quoted, concludes by declaring their firmest conviction of the sincere desire of the Bengal government for the relief and prosperity of the Carnatic, as well as its full intention to continue its best exertions for these purposes; “ if,” they observe, “ we
“ are apprehensive that there is any sentiment existing in
“ your mind, which we should wish to have removed from it,
“ it is that of personal indisposition towards us, which indivi-
“ dually we deplore as a severe and unexpected misfortune;
“ but it is not a public consideration as not affecting your
“ public measures*.”

* Letter from the president and select committee of Madras to the supreme council, dated August 30, 1782.

If the Bengal government really considered the presence of Sir Eyre Coote, at the head of the Carnatic army, to be necessary, or if they wished for his absence from their presidency, they could not possibly have taken a more effectual step to defeat both these objects than by first delegating to him extraordinary powers, and immediately afterwards revoking those powers, and restoring them, where they ought to rest, to the civil government. They might easily have anticipated the effect that would be produced on him who had to surrender these powers, whatever degree of circumspection and delicacy was employed by the Madras government in the resumption of them; they ought also to have reflected that a shifted authority could not easily establish its confidence; or suddenly recover its influence. The greatest delicacy was observed on the occasion by Lord Macartney; he determined to conceal most carefully from Sir Eyre Coote, who was then absent with the army, the contents of the second letter till his arrival at the presidency a fortnight afterwards. And when, on his return to it, he refused to attend the committee then held for the purpose of communicating the subject, he directed the original dispatch from Bengal to be transmitted to him, with a letter from himself and the select committee, conveying those favorable sentiments, which they really held of his merits, in the most handsome and unequivocal manner. But notwithstanding this delicate attention, on the part of Lord Macartney, it was not difficult to perceive what line of conduct the general would adopt; he seized, in fact, the first occasion to inform the committee, that the state of his health required a sea voyage and change of air, and that he had therefore taken the resolu-

tion of proceeding to Bengal on the Medea frigate, which Sir Edward Hughes had lent him for that purpose. He accordingly embarked, and on the 28th September the Medea sailed for Bengal.

Whatever reasons Lord Macartney might have had to induce him to observe, towards Sir Eyre Coote, an extraordinary degree of delicacy in the resumption of that imperial authority with which he had been invested, the same reasons could not apply to his immediate successor General Stuart. He considered, in fact, that an impediment was now removed, which had hitherto delayed the carrying into execution one material point of his instructions, the correction of abuses in the army department. The first object that engaged his attention was the placing of proper checks on the enormous and extravagant expenditure in every branch connected with the military service, and especially that of the Bengal detachment, the accounts of which had not before this period even gone through the ceremony of being examined; and his next consideration was that of making such a disposition of the forces as would prepare them to meet the enemy in those quarters which were most exposed to his attacks. A reinforcement of four hundred of his majesty's troops was sent to the Malabar coast to assist the operations of the Bombay army which was intended to carry the war into Hyder's country; three hundred to Masulipatam for the protection of the northern Circars, against which the French were supposed to have formed a design; and five hundred to reinforce the garrison of Negapatam, all of which had the good fortune to arrive at their several destinations in safety.

It was equally fortunate for the presidency of Madras, and indeed for all the Company's possessions on the coast of Coromandel, that the French were, in a great measure, ignorant of the calamitous situation to which they were reduced, and of the settlement of Fort St. George being abandoned by the fleet. Had Suffren known their real state, and stationed two ships of the line, north and south of Madras roads, they would have been able most effectually to cut off those supplies, on the safe arrival of which the preservation of the settlement entirely depended; but he had heard of the arrival of the squadron under Sir Richard Bickerton, and knew not that the admiral had left orders for this reinforcement also to proceed to Bombay. To this circumstance alone they were indebted for that undisturbed repose from the enemy's fleet, whose visit must have been a conquest; whereas by its absence they were enabled to receive, from time to time, very considerable supplies of grain from Bengal and the northern Circars, which, though sufficient to preserve the army and the settlement from absolute famine, could scarcely however be said to have relieved that most afflicting calamity from the poorer and the most numerous class of the inhabitants of the black town of Madras.

An event of the utmost moment to the British interests in India closed the year 1782. This was the death of Hyder Ali, who expired at Chittoor between the 4th and the 8th of December. It was natural to expect that such an event would be attended with all those important consequences which usually follow the death of an usurper, whose power had been acquired by violence and preserved by terror. It

took place likewise, at an inauspicious moment, when his eldest son Tippoo Saheb was absent on the Malabar coast with the best troops of his army, opposing Colonel Humberstone, who had advanced to attack Paliacacherry; but was necessarily compelled to retreat to Paniané, where the command devolved on Colonel Macleod, who had been sent from Madras with a detachment of the 42d regiment. Here the latter was attacked by Tippoo Saheb's whole force, led on in four columns, in one of which was a body of Europeans. They were received by the British at the point of the bayonet, and repulsed with great slaughter; two hundred of the enemy were killed on the spot, and about one thousand wounded. On our side seven officers were wounded, and only eighty-eight Europeans and sepoy killed and wounded. Tippoo Saheb was supposed to be meditating a second attack, when he received the intelligence of his father's death, upon which he immediately returned with a few horse to the Carnatic, leaving orders for his army to follow him. Having first repaired to Colar and performed the usual ceremonies over his father's grave, he continued his march and joined the main army between Arnée and Vellore about the end of December.

The ministers and sirdars of Hyder Ali had managed affairs with so much prudence and address that no tumult nor disorder happened in the camp; and through their good conduct Tippoo Saheb succeeded to the command of the Mysorean army and to all the authority of his father without the least opposition. He had the good sense and precaution to adopt, without any delay, such measures as could not

fail to ingratiate himself with the army. With his father's accumulated treasures he paid off their arrears ; he abolished the duties on provisions sold in the camp, and, in short, laid down a system of indulgencies for the troops, opposite, in every respect, to the severe and unjust policy of his father. Thus the youthful and spirited heir of Hyder, without the odium of his father's vices or his tyranny, by some popular and well-timed acts, and the hopes which a new reign usually inspires, as well as by the adoption of European discipline in his army, seemed likely to become a more formidable opponent to the British power than ever Hyder Ali was.

Hyder Ali Khan, a few days before his death, is said to have sent for his two principal dewans, and dictated to them a letter which they were to deliver to Tippoo Saheb on his arrival, and of which the following is a translation. " I
" marched out of my country to attack and drive the
" English out of their possessions in the Carnatic, in which
" attempt I have expended a vast treasure. I invited the
" French, but since their arrival have never received any as-
" sistance from them ; however, should I recover, I think I
" should be able to finish what I have begun. I have raised
" myself to the nabobship of Seringapatam, established a
" great name, and conquered many countries ; I therefore
" desire you will not bring disgrace upon my name. You
" will make peace with the English and return with your
" army to Seringapatam, and establish yourself in the govern-
" ment. I think there is no reliance to be put upon any as-
" sistance from the French ; but should their ships arrive in
" a month or forty-five days, you may join them, but weigh

“ all matters well ; do nothing rashly, and consider whether
“ or not you can effect my plans. When you make peace
“ give large bribes to the English officers, and procure the
“ fort and district of Poodicotah belonging to the Tricheno-
“ poly country and the hill and district of Halipady belong-
“ ing to the Vellore country. You must have it stipulated
“ in the treaty with the English, that they are to grant you
“ assistance whenever you require it. You will also take
“ possession of the forts of Mahée and deliver them over to
“ the French.” Scarcely however had Tippoo sufficient time
to consider what line of conduct to adopt, when, towards
the end of December, he was joined by a French force from
Cuddalore, consisting of nine hundred Europeans, two hun-
dred and fifty coffries and topasses, and two thousand sepoy
with twenty-two pieces of cannon. At this time the whole
effective strength of the British force in the Carnatic, ready
to take the field, amounted only to two thousand nine hun-
dred and forty-five Europeans and eleven thousand five hun-
dred and forty-five natives.

Whatever line of policy Tippoo Saheb, from the circum-
stance of his father's death and the conclusion of a peace
with the Mahrattas, might be inclined to pursue, it became
the duty of the Madras government to be equally prepared
for peace or war. Indeed long before the former event, the
president had submitted several arrangements to the com-
mittee, which were approved by all the members except Ge-
neral Stuart, who appears to have considered it as a part of
his duty as commander in chief to object to every military
measure proposed by Lord Macartney. From the moment

this officer had succeeded to the command and to a seat in council, he seems to have been engaged perpetually in discussions about his rank and privileges, his pay and emoluments; the records of the presidency were loaded with long memorials and minutes relating more to himself individually than to the public service. One day he disputed the meaning of the Company's orders, another he contended for his right to be consulted, and to have a voice not only in military matters but also in the management of commerce, revenue, and all the Company's concerns. It was as difficult to be comprehended as it was seriously to be lamented, why General Stuart should feel such extreme solicitude for a voice in council on matters so foreign to the duties of his profession, which must unavoidably have broken in upon that time and attention so necessary to be devoted solely to the care and discipline of the army. On finding that the select committee consulted with him only on military matters, he thought fit to complain to Sir Eyre Coote, who, in consequence thereof, submitted the question to the supreme council, "Whether
" any act of the select committee of Fort St. George, from
" which one of its efficient members is excluded from a voice,
" can be deemed valid?" After much ingenious casuistry delivered in a long minute of the governor-general and his council, they, at length, arrive at this very logical conclusion:
" Therefore to wind up the argument; since the select committee is only competent by its constitution to take consideration of military affairs or negotiations with any country
" power of India, and the court of directors having given to
" every eventual commander in chief *a seat and voice in the*
" *council, and select committee only when military affairs or*

“ *negociations with any of the country powers in India shall be*
“ *under consideration, they have given to such officer a com-*
“ *petent and effective seat in the select committee without*
“ *any distinction, exception, or reservation, the word only be-*
“ *ing applicable to the council, but not to the committee:*
“ *and it is further our opinion that, such being the constitu-*
“ *tion of the select committee, and by such constitution the*
“ *commander in chief being an efficient member thereof,*
“ *his exclusion from it on any occasion, or under any pre-*
“ *tence whatsoever, is both in itself illegal, and renders*
“ *every act illegal which shall be passed by the select com-*
“ *mittee in every instance in which he is excluded*.*” After
an opinion thus logically deduced by such high authority,
the line of conduct subsequently adopted by General Stuart
will appear the less surprizing.

The turn, which these discussions gave to the opinions
and conduct of the officers in the king's service, was pro-
ductive of serious detriment to the Company's affairs, and
occasioned no little concern and embarrassment to Lord Ma-
cartney. Among those who showed themselves most dissa-
tisfied under the civil control was Sir John Burgoyne, who
commanded the 23d regiment of cavalry; his regiment about
this time had been ordered to be mounted, and Sir John was
extremely urgent that a preference should be given to his men
in point of accommodation and every other respect above all
other corps of his majesty's or Company's troops; and appear-
ing to make no allowance for the calamities of the times and the

* Minute of the governor-general and council, Jan. 13, 1783.

exigencies of their situation, was loud and frequent in his complaints; and every endeavor of Lord Macartney to show attention to himself and to his regiment fell far short of the sense he seemed to entertain of the claims of both.

In fact, the king's officers appear to have conceived an erroneous and most dangerous idea, which they were at no pains to conceal, and therefore became general in the army, that the civil government had no authority over the king's troops; and the commander in chief ventured so far, without the knowledge of the council, as to act upon such an opinion. A detachment had been sent for the protection of the northern Circars, in which were included near three hundred of the king's troops. The chief and council of Masulipatam were directed to employ them as circumstances might require. Many reasons pointed out Ellore to be the station most conducive for the public service; but Colonel Jones, who commanded the detachment, informed the civil servants there, that it was impossible he could move from Masulipatam until he had received General Stuart's orders for so doing. Aware of the evils to be apprehended from a doctrine of such dangerous tendency being suffered to gain ground, Lord Macartney lost not a moment in delivering his sentiments on the occasion for the better information of General Stuart and the army. "His majesty," he observed, "has been graciously pleased to send out troops to the assistance of the Company; he has expressly declared them to be for their service, and they are actually in their pay. The king has formed regulations for their interior discipline, and has

“ reserved to himself to fill up the vacancies which may hap-
“ pen in them, but how they are to be employed, and when
“ and where their services are to be performed, must depend
“ on those whom they are sent to serve. The authority to
“ conduct all military operations lodged in the Company’s re-
“ presentatives cannot be separated from the authority over
“ the troops which are to execute them.

“ The king gives therefore to officers coming to India, and
“ the secretary of state afterwards transmits to them, no in-
“ structions as to military operations. They are not officially
“ told from home what war they are to wage, what country
“ to attack, or what expedition to undertake. They are
“ simply informed, that they are sent to the assistance of the
“ India Company, to whom the obedience of the officers
“ as well as troops is, by this very act, transferred while they
“ remain in India. The mutiny laws, which do not say that
“ the king’s troops in India are to obey the Company and its
“ representatives, do not say, that the king’s troops in
“ England are to obey the king and his commands, signified
“ by his secretaries of state or of war; but both are equally
“ understood. The senior officer of the king’s troops in India
“ is vested with no unlimited power; he must receive orders
“ before he is empowered to act; he has no orders from the
“ crown; he must therefore necessarily take them from the
“ authority commanding where he is sent.

“ Before the India Company had any extensive posses-
“ sions; when the war that was to be waged in India was
“ chiefly intended against an European and a national

“ enemy, yet the instructions of the commanding officer of
“ the reinforcements, sent by the crown, expressly directed
“ him to follow the determinations of the Company’s repre-
“ sentatives ; nor was a failure considered justifiable on his
“ part, unless a council of officers, particularly named in the
“ instructions, should deem the plan proposed to be im-
“ practicable *.”

Agreeably with these principles General Stuart was directed by the committee to send immediate orders to Colonel Jones to march to Ellore with the king’s troops under his command, if the chief and council of Musulipatam should continue to think that measure necessary for the public service ; a requisition which the general, after reading the president’s minute, thought fit to comply with. But a few days afterwards he delivered to the committee what he called an answer to the minute of the president above quoted, in which, after declaring that he acts under Sir Eyre Coote, he observes, “ I am likewise of opinion that there are cases
“ where the requisition of government, concerning the em-
“ ployment of his majesty’s troops, may be refused by the
“ officer commanding, who thereby makes himself answer-
“ able for such refusal, but not to this government †.”

These dangerous doctrines still asserted and maintained by the commander in chief ; an independent authority assumed, in a separate capacity, over the king’s troops, which then

* Extract from president’s minute in select committee, December 10, 1782.

† Extract from General Stuart’s minute in select committee, December 16, 1782.

constituted the principal strength of the Carnatic army; an avowal of obedience to another authority superior to that which he owed to his employers; all these considerations determined Lord Macartney to put an end at once to the discussion, by moving in the committee that General Stuart should be positively required in future to send no orders nor instructions whatever to any of the king's or company's officers employed at a distance from the presidency, excepting on matter of detail or the discipline of the troops, without previously communicating such orders or instructions to the select committee for their approbation. It was indeed not difficult to perceive that there was but a slight transition from a refusal to employ the king's troops upon a requisition from the civil government to the employing of them without a requisition; it was impossible to foresee to what uses such an authority might be applied, and where the consequences might end; and it was of little avail towards the retrieval of those consequences that the character, property, and life of a commander in chief became answerable; the forfeiture of any or all of which would be a poor compensation for the mischiefs occasioned by his wickedness or folly.

It is not necessary to multiply instances of the counter-acting spirit manifested by the new commander in chief. In fact, from the moment of his succeeding to the command in September till the event of Hyder's death, the greater part of his time appears to have been occupied in writing voluminous minutes to be laid before the committee, and entered on the records, many of them not less extraordinary in their composition than dangerous in their principles. He had

repeatedly been urged by Lord Macartney to have the army in readiness to take the field upon any emergency. When therefore no doubt could be entertained of the demise of Hyder Ali, his Lordship, in sending the intelligence in circulation among the members of the committee, took occasion to observe that this important event was a fresh motive for action. But the general, in his usual spirit of opposition, replied, that he did not believe the fact; but that if it were true, the army would be ready for action in the proper time.

It was a cruel mortification for one so anxious as Lord Macartney was to seize every circumstance and moment that could be converted to the public welfare, to be thus baffled in all his plans for that end, by a spirit of contention and contradiction. Every man of common sense in the settlement was of opinion, that the death of Hyder Ali was an event which held out such great advantages as to have justified any risk, and so attainable that they required only a hand to seize them; yet they were not seized nor even attempted. His Lordship appears to have left no argument untried, no assistance unoffered to accomplish the immediate movement of the army, or even a part of it towards the enemy. The advantages of instant exertion, and the disadvantages of inaction and delay were urged with equal force. The committee resolved that the army should immediately hold itself in readiness to take the field, and the general was desired to issue orders for that purpose, and to cause every exertion to be made, as far as depended on him, that the army might be encamped with as little delay as possible. Four days after this the general delivered a minute in answer to the presi-

dent's observations, and the resolution of the committee, in which he affected still to disbelieve the death of Hyder, and considered any immediate movement of the army as impracticable. With regard to the latter point he observed, "What-
" ever the president urged, near a month ago, has been taken
" notice of on my part nearly about the same time; but it
" really astonishes me there should be so little reflection as to
" think that when the whole face of the country was covered
" with water, and no tents for cover in the most inclement
" monsoon known in this country, and with half allowance of
" rice from the necessities of the times, any person can talk
" of undertakings against the enemy, or of any immediate
" movements of the army at this time *."

The general had indeed, as appears by his minutes, taken notice of what the president had urged near a month before, and that notice was, "that as soon as it was practicable and
" proper, and that the object did deserve it, the army should
" be put in motion:" and further, "that upon any real
" emergency the army may and must move even were it
" without their guns;" and it was resolved in committee where the general attended, that the army, on its present establishment, ought to be at all times ready to move; he had also said very recently, that if the news of Hyder's death were true "*the army would be ready for action in proper time.*" The object which now presented itself deserved of all others the most attention, yet the army *was not put in motion*; a real emergency now actually existed, and the army neither

* Extract from General Stuart's minute in select committee, Dec. 16, 1782.

moved *without its guns*, nor did General Stuart prepare himself or listen to the president's proposal, that a part of it should move *with them*; and, lastly, the news of Hyder's death was true, and *the proper time for action*, yet it was allowed to pass away without improvement.

Intelligence now came in from all quarters confirming the event of Hyder's death, and representing the advantages that might be derived from a movement of the main army. General Stuart had himself a variety of letters, both from English officers and native amuldars, strongly recommending that the army should show itself on the frontiers, in which case all the forts at the foot of the passes would without opposition fall into our hands. The commanding officer at Tripassore observed, that nothing but the hourly expectation of Tippoo Saheb kept the army together, that the whole camp was in the greatest consternation, fearing they would be attacked before this chief would join with his forces; that numbers had deserted, and that it was the opinion of all those deserters, that if the English were to march suddenly towards them before Tippoo Saheb's arrival, the whole army would disband and fly into their own country without firing a shot. Such were the opinions expressed in several letters addressed to General Stuart.

At length, on the 4th January, the president received a paper from the general, informing him that the army had taken the field; reporting its situation and its wants, and the measures necessary for supplying them; all of which were adopted agreeably to his recommendation. Lord Macartney

then delivered in a plan of operations, as the general had presented none; and, at the same time, he observed, that other ideas might be proposed, that those he had suggested were only for the present moment, that he offered them with reluctance and with the diffidence which became him, as well as with the regret of observing, that there did not appear to be really then any adequate, grand, or solid object attainable for the army in the Carnatic, though there might be elsewhere, as it would be here, in the present prospect of things, little more than an army of observation and defence.

On the 5th February the army marched; on the 8th arrived at Vandiwash, and on the 9th in the morning, the enemy's camp was seen from a hill. On the 13th the general marched and offered battle to the enemy, who moved off towards the river in great confusion. The next morning the army returned to Vandiwash and demolished the works. From hence it proceeded to Corongoly and, having withdrawn the garrison and stores, blew up the fortifications. The former could not have held out longer than two or three days against the united force of Tippoo Saheb and the French, who had now joined him, and there was no possibility of defending Corongoly which would easily have been breached. When the army arrived at Vellore, the general learnt that Tippoo was retreating from the Carnatic and that he had ordered two sides of the fort of Arcot to be destroyed, and the place evacuated. On the 20th February the army encamped within three miles of the Mount.

During the absence of the commander in chief on this short expedition, letters were received from General Matthews advising of the surrender of the important fortress of Bidenour or Hydernagur to the army under his command ; adding that Mangalore would be his next object ; but that his attention was called off by a report, that a large party were coming against him from Tippoo Saheb's army of ten thousand horse and twenty thousand foot ; that he hoped the exertions of the presidency of Madras would prevent so great a force from advancing so far, and that the southern army would be ordered to advance towards Seringapatam. This intelligence sufficiently explained Tippoo's abandonment of the Carnatic. Orders were immediately sent to Colonel Lang, who commanded the southern army, to march to the westward ; and it was submitted to General Stuart, whether it was not possible, and indeed very practicable, to march with a considerable part of the army towards the territories of Tippoo in the neighborhood of Vellore, as the enemy had evacuated Arcot without marking his retreat by the desolation of the country or destruction of its resources ; authorizing him however at the same time to use his own discretion in any movement or operations of the army, which might appear expedient to him, at that time, to be pursued for attaining the object the committee had in view of supporting the superiority lately acquired, and preventing any misfortune to the army commanded by General Matthews. The general, however, stated, in his answer, that it was absolutely impossible to move the army under his command in that or any other direction ; that in his opinion the best di-

version, after supplying themselves as fully as possible, where they were, would be to proceed to Cuddalore, and if the French should be found to have abandoned it, he would, in that case, if he could not come up with them, proceed to destroy every possible means of their countrymen by sea or land finding future shelter on this coast, beginning first with Cuddalore and next proceed to Pondicherry. And as Tippoo Saheb had now evacuated the Carnatic, the general very justly observed, that it might be proper to embrace the first opportunity of intimating to that chief that, whatever might be the reciprocal interest and inclination of himself and the Company to terminate the war, so desirable an event could not take place, if he should yield to any solicitations on the part of the French, for ceding to them any of the forts, territories, or places now in his possession, or binding himself, contrary to the prudent precaution of his father, to make a common cause or engage in a permanent connection with a nation which had no solid footing now remaining in the country.

Nothing could be more congenial with the sentiments of Lord Macartney than such a proposal. There happened then to be at Madras a vakeel or agent for the rajah of Tanjore who, being a bramin, was about to proceed to the pagoda of Conjeveram for the purpose of performing devotional exercises. As this person would have an opportunity of conferring with his friends from Tippoo's camp in that neighborhood, the president was of opinion that the occasion should not be lost of attempting to open a communication with the chief of Mysore, if it was only for the purpose of requesting the exertion of his humanity towards our prisoners,

though, at the same time, his inclinations might be sounded with respect to a pacification without the embarrassment of sending a deputation directly from government. The committee unanimously concurred in the sentiments of the president expressed in his minute, and authorized him to give such instruction to the vakeel as he might deem to be necessary.

On the 25th February the vakeel returned to Madras. He had met at Conjeveram a bramin and another person, both confidential servants of Tippoo Saheb, who gave him assurances that attention should be paid to the English prisoners, and that if the English would agree to reasonable terms of peace with the Mysorean, the latter would break off all connection with the French, though he would not consent to deliver them into the hands of their enemies, or behave otherwise dishonorably towards them. The vakeel of the rajah had been prevailed upon by those persons to visit Tippoo Saheb, who not only confirmed their assurances, but, as a mark of his desire to make peace, sent one of his principal men with the vakeel to Madras to confer on the terms of it with Lord Macartney. But although, by Tippoo's declaration in the presence of the vakeel, this person had the directions of his master to treat accordingly, yet as he brought no written credentials from that chief his Lordship thought it most becoming in him not to see him until he should be furnished with such; but he had no objection to his remaining in the vakeel's garden to give an opportunity to his master to send him the necessary powers for his being regularly acknowledged. Tippoo however thought proper to start a dif-

difficulty on a point of etiquette. In his letter to his agent he observes, "There is no enmity or dissension subsisting between the English and me, therefore the governor, conformable with the custom of the world, ought to have sent a letter of condolence on the death of my father; but since he did not favor me with it, I think it is not customary in the world that I should write him first; as he is a wise man I have no occasion to write more on this subject."

In the mean time, Monsieur de Bussy arrived with a reinforcement at Cuddalore, while the British army remained inactive in the neighborhood of Madras. On the receipt of this intelligence, Lord Macartney was extremely anxious that the army should march without delay to invest Cuddalore before the works could be strengthened, and before Tippoo's forces, or the French who had joined him in Mysore, should return to the Carnatic; but the attention of General Stuart still seems mostly to have been occupied in composing long minutes, some filled with statements of difficulties, many of them apparently created to sanction delay, and others abounding in personal invective against the president, whom he accuses of *playing the general, occupying the field of Mars*, and of having probably some personal views in the destruction of the enemy. About fourteen days however after the time fixed upon by himself, that is to say, on the 21st April, he was peremptorily commanded to march the army towards Cuddalore. He did indeed put the troops in motion, but a number of fresh difficulties were started on the march, among which the want of money to pay the troops was considered as the most urgent and alarming. The treasury was ex-

hausted for the purpose of satisfying their demands, and every pagoda that it was possible to procure was sent to the general; and so anxious was Lord Macartney to contribute all that was in his power to keep the troops in good humor, that he actually raised, upon his own private notes, a very considerable amount in small sums of fifteen hundred, two, three and four thousand pagodas*. Ten lacks of rupees had been sent from Bengal, but the persons into whose charge they were given, refused to deliver them to the council, as their orders were to put them into the hands of Sir Eyre Coote, and not to the civil government. Sir Eyre Coote however had before their arrival resigned his command with his life on the 26th April at Madras, three days after his landing there from the ship, which had brought him from Bengal. This ship was chased several days by some of the French cruizers, and was sometimes in hourly danger of being taken. The state of prolonged anxiety, occasioned by this circumstance, is supposed to have operated so strongly on the mind of this veteran officer as to have brought on a third fit of apoplexy which terminated his life.

Before General Stuart's departure from the presidency, at a consultation, held on the 17th April, he had earnestly re-

* His endeavors were warmly seconded by a gentleman whose public spirit deserves to be publicly noticed. In a letter to a gentleman of the supreme council, his Lordship observes, "I must beg leave to recommend to your attention Captain Mercer, who carries this dispatch. He is a character but one very much to my mind. He is public spirited, which is some merit in a man of twenty-five years' standing in India. He brought down your treasure to us without charging freight; and a few days since, on hearing we were distressed for money to make the army march, he raised a large sum on his own credit, and lent it us without any conditions. But he shall be no loser by that."

commended the committee to empower him, should he find it necessary, to order Colonel Lang to join him with the main army from the southward. Lord Macartney reminded him of the important service, on which Colonel Lang's army was then employed in attacking the enemy's possessions in the Coimbatore country, encouraging the disaffected there, and creating a diversion in favor of General Matthews, who, without such diversion, might not be able to make head against the force opposed to him. However as the speedy possession of Cuddalore, and with it the newly arrived French force, was a most important object, and as the general assured the committee he would, at all hazards, leave a sufficient force to the southward, to maintain their footing there, to give protection and encouragement to those who might declare in our favor, and even to act offensively and assist General Matthews; and as at a committee held on the 19th, the general expressed his hope, that they would place that confidence in him to believe, that he would not call Colonel Lang with a part of the southern army to join him, but on the fullest conviction of the absolute necessity of the measure, in order to effect the great object of getting possession of Cuddalore and the French force there; and that he would do his utmost to let the committee be judges of that necessity before he determined on the measure—the committee, conceiving it right to give to the commander in chief a certain latitude for the exercise of discretionary power, resolved accordingly to authorize him to order Colonel Lang to join the main army with a part of the southern troops, in case that measure should be found to be indispensably necessary. Yet this commander in chief, as it afterwards appeared, on the

preceding day, the 18th of April, and before he left the presidency, had written to Colonel Lang, without saying one word to the committee on the subject, ordering him to join the main army himself with the greater part of the force under his command. As soon as the intelligence of this hidden transaction first reached the committee, which was not till the middle of May, when a copy of the order was obtained from the general, but not till repeated applications had been made to him, and a declaration that unless it was communicated his discretionary authority would be withdrawn, they found it right to make a strong remonstrance on such improper conduct; and shortly after, on the receipt of unfavorable intelligence from the Malabar coast, it was considered expedient to give him positive orders to stop any troops that might be on their march to join him from the southward; observing to him, at the same time, that "since his marching from Madras they had made an addition to his army of upwards of one thousand Europeans, and a battalion of sepoy; a force alone greater than that with which General Lawrence drove the French from India. You desired," they add, "and obtained, before this considerable increase, a power from us of calling for assistance from the southward, in the case only of its becoming indispensably necessary to your success; and of which necessity you were to do your utmost to make us be judges. The use you have made of the confidence we placed in you, forces us to caution in the continuance of it. We desire therefore that you will communicate to us without delay copies of all the orders you have sent to Colonel Fullarton and Major Bruce, with your reasons for them, and that you will

“enclose to us, and to us only, all such orders as you shall
“in future think expedient to be issued to the southward,
“with your reasons for them, which, if we approve, we shall
“forward and direct the execution of them; and, in the
“mean time, that you will countermand the execution of
“those already sent by you until they shall be confirmed by
“us. These are precautions, which your deviation from your
“own declarations has suggested to us, and which the pre-
“sent state of affairs to the westward has rendered indis-
“pensable *.” In the same letter he was also warned of the
fatal consequences which might be expected from the unac-
countable delay that had already taken place on an expedi-
tion which, on every consideration, demanded dispatch; he
was told, that he had not marched at the rate of three miles
a day, and that the admiral, who had proceeded to co-
operate with the army, declared he could not remain before
Cuddalore till the end of June for want of water and provi-
sions. It seems indeed from what appears on the records
utterly impossible to account for the general’s procrastination.
He marched from the Mount on the 21st April. He did not
meet, he was not apprehensive of meeting, any resistance
on the road. He did not arrive at Cuddalore till June.
The distance is little more than one hundred miles. The
march at the common rate, and allowing for accidents,
is not more than twelve days; the carriage of provisions
actually with the army was avowedly for double the
number of those days. On his route there was provided

* Extract of a letter from the president and select committee of Fort St. George
to Major-general Stuart, dated May —, 1783.

a large magazine of provisions. A swift sailing ship was taken up to land him provisions at Pondicherry within about a day's march of the bound hedge of Cuddalore. Every effort appears to have been made to prevent his wants, to ensure his success, to satisfy his wishes. But this march of twelve days he made a march of forty days, which was not equal to the average of three miles a day. The ship intended to land provisions for him at Pondicherry, nearer to Cuddalore, he chose should land them at Conjemeer, farther from Cuddalore; he halted near such station, under the idea of waiting for the whole cargo to be landed there, until he expended nearly as much provisions as she brought to him. He reported his carriage cattle to be diminished beyond any former reduction, although they suffered no fatigue, and none were taken, destroyed, or dispersed by the enemy.

But admitting that some obstruction might have occurred on the march, no obstruction could have occurred after the march was over, and the army opposite the enemy, which delay would not strengthen. Yet after his arrival the enemy was suffered to have time to recover from its surprize, to gain confidence from the tardiness of its opponents, and to increase its means of resistance. The consequence of tardy measures must no doubt be tardy success. General Stuart declares to the Admiral that it will require seven weeks to ensure the capture of Cuddalore, and that too with the presence of his majesty's fleet before it. "To verify such a declaration" Lord Macartney observes "would seem to require a settled determination to remain inactive six out of those seven weeks. It is possible indeed that the general

“ might have been sincere in the declaration he thus had
“ made, if it be true, what is mentioned in the most intelli-
“ gent advices from camp, that the procrastination of his
“ operations had enabled the enemy to erect very formidable
“ works, that the further protraction of such delay might
“ even endanger the success of the whole expedition, and that
“ the murmurs of the army were what at length produced
“ that attack of the enemy’s works on the 13th June, which
“ was difficult to effect, uncertain in the event, and occasioned
“ much slaughter of the king’s and company’s troops, from
“ no other cause than that of time being given even after the
“ arrival of the army by land, and of the reinforcements from
“ Madras by sea, to erect such works ; and which, if allowed
“ to be strengthened by the labor of a few days more, would
“ be still more costly of men’s lives and more difficult to
“ carry. Such however is the inferiority and comparative
“ weakness of the French troops, evinced in the loss of their
“ strong entrenchments and redoubts, and acknowledged in
“ their seeking for retreat and shelter behind the feeble walls
“ of Cuddalore, that it is scarcely possible to desire to take
“ it without succeeding in that desire *.”

By this attack of the 13th June above alluded to, in spite of the mismanagement with which it is said to have been conducted, the enemy’s strong post on the Vandypollam hills and their second works, together with several pieces of cannon, fell into our hands ; but about sixty British officers and near one thousand men were lost to the service. The plan, it

* Extract from president’s minute in committee, June 25, 1783.

seems, had been settled for storming the works in three separate points at the same instant of time, and with this view it is said the general gave orders that on a signal being made of three field pieces fired from a hill, the grand attack should commence. It is scarcely credible that, in the midst of incessant firing, a signal should be adopted which, from its nature, could not possibly be distinguished; but whatever the arrangement was for the intended simultaneous attack, the result was three separate attacks made at three different periods of time. The British troops were repulsed and thrown into confusion; the enemy quitted their works in pursuit, and the battle was decided on the field. The English, it is true, got possession of the works that had been quitted, and the French retired behind the walls of Cuddalore; but had they made a sally and attacked our troops in the night, it was thought by many that our whole army must have been captured or cut in pieces.

The day after the battle Sir Edward Hughes brought his fleet to anchor near Cuddalore. On the 16th about noon Suffren was observed bearing down under easy sail in line of battle, upon which the English ships got under weigh and formed the line, manœuvred a considerable time in order to get to windward, and the next morning Suffren was at anchor with his fleet on the very spot which Sir Edward Hughes had occupied the day before, took on board a reinforcement of men from the shore, stood again out to sea, and the very same day got to windward of Sir Edward Hughes, who made a signal to the fleet that it was not his intention to engage the enemy that day, but to endeavor to

gain the wind of him. On the following day the French however were still to windward. On the 19th the two fleets were within three miles of each other but did not engage. On the 20th in the morning the French were still in sight on the lee bow. Sir Edward Hughes made the signal for forming the line a-head. The wind shifted in favor of Suffren, who, about half past four in the afternoon bore down upon the English, when an action commenced and continued till about half past seven. Suffren on this occasion manœuvred his ships so well that, although he had but sixteen and Sir Edward eighteen, he contrived in several instances to place two of his ships upon one of the English, five of which indeed were very little engaged. The French ships were so leaky that most of them were obliged to be pumped during the action. Suffren having hauled his wind stood away from Sir Edward, and the next day was out of sight; but on the morning of the 22d they were discovered at anchor in the road of Porto Novo. In this situation Sir Edward Hughes did not find it expedient to attack them, but contenting himself with offering them battle, bore up and made sail for Madras for a supply of water. Some officers in the British fleet, perhaps from motives of faction or disappointment, were ill natured enough to assert that Suffren weighed and stood after him, but this does not officially appear to have been the case; that he immediately weighed there can be little doubt, for he reached Cuddalore on the 23d where he relanded the men he had taken on board when on the 17th he occupied the anchorage of Sir Edward Hughes.

On the 25th, the enemy made a sally on our troops before Cuddalore, but were driven back with considerable loss, on which occasion Colonel Cathcart, at the head of his grenadiers, particularly distinguished himself. Suffren perceiving that he was now master of the sea, landed all the men he could spare from the fleet; and it was determined between him and Monsieur de Bussy, that a vigorous sally should be made on the besiegers on the 4th July, which could scarcely fail of ensuring the capture of the British army, reduced as it was, by the first attack, by sickness and fatigue.

The failure in the grand object of the expedition against Cuddalore, and the return of Sir Edward Hughes to Madras, leaving Suffren at full liberty to assist the operations of the French in that fortress, conveyed to the government of Madras as gloomy a prospect as had presented itself since the commencement of the war, when an unexpected event occurred by which and the promptitude of Lord Macartney, in availing himself of the means it offered, the British army was preserved from the destruction that threatened it. This was the intelligence just then received from a variety of quarters, of preliminaries of peace having been signed in Europe. By the terms of the treaty it appeared that hostilities were to cease between his Britannic Majesty and his Most Christian Majesty, their kingdoms, states, and subjects, by sea and land, in all parts of the world. His Lordship immediately observed to the committee, "that after a thorough
"conviction of the truth of the fact, it would be a wanton,
"useless, and criminal disregard of the feelings of humanity

“ to continue, or even to risk the effusion of human blood
“ under the pretence that official notice of such fact had not
“ arrived. It is probable it will soon arrive; but accidents
“ might retard its arrival for a considerable time. In that
“ interval, whether long or short, the continuance of the con-
“ test here could not alter the terms of the treaty; and the
“ loss of one man’s life would be more than this government
“ could justify, if the French government or governor be
“ willing to accede to an immediate cessation of arms*.”
He therefore proposed that a flag of truce should immediately
be sent to Monsieur de Bussy, commander in chief of the
French forces and representative of that nation in India,
communicating to him that event with a copy of the treaty,
and proposing an immediate cessation of hostilities on shore
as well as by sea, with the consent of the Admiral Sir Ed-
ward Hughes. He further proposed several necessary mea-
sures and precautions, and concluded by observing, “ that
“ for reasons which he had already assigned, with regard to
“ the conduct of General Stuart, he could not rely on the
“ obedience of that officer, and therefore reminded the
“ committee of that conduct as grounding the necessity of
“ calling him to the presidency, in order that the committee
“ might hear from him at length whatever he should have to
“ advance in justification of his conduct. The death of the
“ commander in chief of the king’s forces, putting an end to
“ the delegation from him to General Stuart, puts an end to
“ every apology for continuing the latter at the head of the
“ troops in the field . . . Major-general Bruce, who, at Cud-

* Extract of president’s minute in committee, June 25, 1783,

“ dalore, has verified his reputation as a good and gallant
“ officer, is recommended to assume the command of the
“ Carnatic army while in the field, and to be aided on ac-
“ count of his late arrival in the country, with a council of
“ war of such of the principal officers as are best acquainted
“ with it. And the order for the return of Major-general
“ Stuart to the presidency and the assumption of the com-
“ mand by General Bruce to be delivered to them by an
“ officer dispatched from home for the purpose of securing
“ the conveyance and delivery of such orders, and the due
“ obedience to them *.”

Mr. Sadlier the second member of the select committee, and Mr. Staunton his Lordship's secretary, embarked on board the *Medea* frigate, being jointly entrusted with the execution of the orders for the two Generals Stuart and Bruce, and with instructions for submitting the propositions of the president to Monsieur de Bussy. They arrived at Cudalore on the 3d of July, the very day before the grand sortie was intended to be made on the part of the French. The Marquis de Bussy, at this critical moment, was considerably staggered what line of conduct he should adopt; but after consulting Suffren, and hearing the persuasive arguments of Mr. Staunton, and the clear and impressive reasoning in which he enforced them, these two officers at length consented, though not without a good deal of apparent reluctance, to a suspension of hostilities. The concurrence of Suffren was not easily obtained. He had no objection once

* Extract of president's minute in committee, June 25, 1783.

more to measure the strength of his crazy fleet with the superior force under the command of Sir Edward Hughes. He had several objections to start against the impolicy of the measure, and when these were removed many proposals to offer in favor of their Mahomedan ally, but Mr. Staunton, by his firmness and the strength of his arguments, succeeded in carrying his point without yielding to one of them. He even prevailed on Mons. de Bussy to invite Tippoo Saheb to accede to the pacification made in Europe, and to send positive orders to the commander of the French troops then acting as auxiliaries with this chief, to withdraw immediately from his service. This handsome conduct of the Marquis determined Lord Macartney to propose to the committee, to give to this officer in return the satisfaction of declaring that the main army, which had been employed before Cuddalore, should not be sent out of the Carnatic, or commence any offensive operations against the possessions of the ancient ally of France, during the month of July, in order that Tippoo Saheb might have time to announce his determination to cease hostilities, or to persist in the continuance of them. At the same time it was resolved to send a very considerable force to the southward, to be ready to act as occasion might require.

General Stuart, it seems, thought fit, in the first instance, to disobey the orders of the presidency. At length, however, he left the army and returned to Fort St. George, where, instead of offering any justification of his conduct, he renewed his former practice of opposing the measures of the select committee, and seizing every occasion to fill his long minutes

with offensive language directed against the president, under a pretext that the president was personally hostile to him, notwithstanding the frequent declarations of Lord Macartney, that he was entirely under a mistake; that he disdained personalities; that it was a painful part of his public duty to express censure; that when it became his task to do so, he trusted that it was done in a liberal and gentlemanlike manner, and that such censure never proceeded from wantonness or passion, but was the necessary deduction from indisputable facts and unprejudiced observation. Such however was the unfortunate turn of the general's mind for contention and discussion, as appears from his own minutes, that Lord Macartney was, at length, compelled to consider him as wholly disqualified from assisting the public service, either in the field or the cabinet, and consequently to take the last and decisive step of dismissing him from the Company's employ. His reasons for adopting this strong, but, as he conceived, necessary measure, are set forth in the following minute which his Lordship, on this occasion, presented to the select committee on the 17th September 1783.

“ The president has the honor to observe to the committee
“ that, in a former minute, after mentioning some of the in-
“ stances of the misconduct and disobedience of Major-gene-
“ ral Stuart, which made it necessary to recal him immedi-
“ ately from the command of the army, the president added,
“ that upon the general's return he would have an opportu-
“ nity of adducing his reasons, if any, that could tend to his
“ justification. Since his return he has referred to his former
“ correspondence, and he asserts that he is fit for the com-

“mand; but he has adduced no reasons either to justify his
“misconduct or to mitigate the punishment due to it. His
“conduct indeed appears to have been that of a premedi-
“tated, wilful, repeated, and systematic disobedience; and
“that disobedience has been not only prejudicial, by its ex-
“ample, to the Company’s regular government, and has a
“direct tendency to bring about the same subversion of such
“government as that, of which the general has been, in a
“former instance *, a principal and active instrument; but
“such disobedience has been actually productive of material
“and lasting injury to the Company; in the instance of his
“not following the directions and intentions of the select
“committee, and his consequent promise to have the army
“ready to march on all emergencies which immediately
“upon the death of Hyder Ali, and the absence of Tippoo
“his successor from his army in the Carnatic, and the con-
“fusion in that army, might have long since terminated the
“war and desolation of the Carnatic by that prince; in
“the instance of his abusing the discretion lodged in him
“for calling a detachment of the southern army, then essen-
“tially employed, in case of indispensable necessity, instead
“of which he immediately, without any such or even any
“pretence of such necessity, and, exerting *instantly* the
“power to be exerted at any rate only *in future*, ordered the
“main body of that southern army to join him in the Carna-
“tic, declaring that such was the order of the committee;
“by which means the operations of the southern army were

* In the instance of the disgraceful proceedings carried on against Lord Pigot, who, by the active assistance of General, then Colonel, Stuart, was carried to a prison from whence he never escaped.

“ impeded, and Tippoo left at liberty to pursue with success
“ his attacks against the Company’s inferior army, and their
“ exposed possessions on the other side of the peninsula, and
“ for the obvious purpose of waiting for the junction of the
“ southern army, as he could have no pretence for it if he
“ marched quickly and succeeded without it, which he ac-
“ knowledged the force already with him was fully equal
“ to ; and by such junction, of having the command of the
“ whole, he procrastinated a march to Cuddalore that might
“ be effected in twelve days to upwards of forty days ; so that
“ the opportunity was lost of attacking and most probably
“ defeating and taking the French troops in that neighbor-
“ hood, when, according to the intercepted letters of their
“ commander the Marquis de Bussy, they were in want of
“ provisions and even of ammunition ; and consequently if
“ even invested, would have been under the necessity of sur-
“ rendering themselves prisoners of war ; instead of which, by
“ such a wilful procrastination the enemy had an opportu-
“ nity of receiving provisions from the country, and ammu-
“ nition by sea, and the enemy’s squadron had time to ar-
“ rive to the assistance of the land forces which, after the
“ retreat to Madras of his Majesty’s fleet, and the com-
“ munication by sea entirely cut off with the Company’s
“ army before Cuddalore, might have been productive of
“ fatal consequences, if this government had not availed itself
“ of the private accounts of the preliminaries of peace to
“ announce the same in form to the enemy, and to establish
“ a cessation of hostilities. By this fatal misconduct of
“ Major-general Stuart, the French are now in such force in
“ India as may prove of much present embarrassment and

“ future evil to the Company. General Stuart in this mis-
“ conduct disobeyed the directions, and counteracted the
“ intentions of the government; he declared he would send
“ no positive orders for the junction of the southern army
“ without the concurrent sentiments of the select committee;
“ but he did not only send such orders without such concur-
“ rence, but he sent them in direct contradiction to such
“ sentiments; he expressly disobeyed the government in not
“ countermanding such orders; he disobeyed government in
“ not instantly giving up the command of the troops before
“ Cuddalore; he acted as commander in chief after the
“ orders for his not doing so were actually published through-
“ out the army. He did not immediately repair to the presi-
“ dency in obedience to the orders he received, but stayed
“ with the army, sat at a council of war, misinformed and
“ misled that council of war, and gave a new example of
“ disobedience in retaining the detachment ordered to be sent
“ to the southward. His assumption of independent com-
“ mand in the fatal instances already quoted has pervaded
“ the whole system of his conduct, as in the case of orders to
“ the northward, which might have lost the Circars which
“ were indeed afterwards menaced by Monsieur Suffren—
“ in the case of the expenditure of the public money contrary
“ to the express directions of the select committee—in the
“ case of the appointment of a judge advocate general which
“ was made by the select committee, under the express au-
“ thority of instructions from the Court of Directors—in the
“ case of employing to act as adjutant-general, a person
“ different from him who has been appointed by government,
“ in order to have undue influence over the army, or a con-

“siderable part of them, and be able to communicate orders
“to them without the knowledge of the committee—in the in-
“stance of publishing orders to the army, without a previous
“communication to the governor as directed by the instructions
“of 1774—and in various other cases of which the committee
“has too strong a remembrance to render the detail neces-
“sary to them. This assumption of independent command,
“and this deliberate and repeated guilt leave no alternative
“to the committee, but by preventing the continuance of
“them, or by becoming responsible for all the evils to the
“Company, and all the distractions in this government with
“which it is at present threatened, and of which a continu-
“ance of his command might be productive. The president
“therefore moves, in virtue of the powers given to the go-
“vernment, in case of the disobedience of any of its military
“officers, that Major-general Stuart be immediately dis-
“missed from the service: and as his rank in the king’s
“service can operate only, when on service by the king’s
“command, not being so employed, and being only on half
“pay from the bounty of the crown, and not employed by
“the Company, Major-general Burgoyne the senior officer
“in the king’s service upon the coast is consequently to
“command the king’s forces*.”

This minute of Lord Macartney was read and voted in Gen. Stuart’s presence by all the other members of the committee, and there formally announced to him, and immediately published in general orders; notwithstanding which he still per-

* President’s minute in select committee, September 17, 1783.

sisted in assuming a military authority, and announced his intention of retaining the command of the king's troops. So illegal an attempt, if successful, seemed to indicate the illegal use he must have meant to make of such a power. The committee, however, not apprehending the practicability of putting his intentions, whatever they might be, in execution, suffered him to depart at liberty. Sir John Burgoyne was now in command of the whole forces in the Carnatic; he was considered and saluted as commander in chief. But after having been with Major-general Stuart he went to the committee and declared that Major-general Stuart insisted upon retaining the command of the king's troops; that he would issue orders that very evening, and that he, General Burgoyne, would obey such orders. Such an assumption of illegal authority, thus intended to be facilitated in its execution, by the willing obedience of him, who possessed real authority, seemed to point out too clearly to be mistaken the ends to which such means were likely to be applied; and it also pointed out to the committee the immediate steps which the public safety required from them. The known disposition and the past actions of General Stuart were quite sufficient, as they thought, to warrant them to take the strongest measures for the security of the government. An order was therefore instantly issued to seize his person, before his orders to the king's troops, whatever they were, should have time to reach them; and Mr. Gomond the town adjutant, accompanied by Mr. Staunton and a party of sepoy, proceeded to the General's garden-house, and brought him under close arrest to Fort St. George. Here he remained a few days

within the fort till a ship about to sail for Europe was ready to receive him on board, when he embarked and was sent to England as a prisoner. It has been thought proper to enter thus particularly into the conduct of General Stuart, as the consequences of it did not end here, but had nearly been fatal to Lord Macartney on his return to England, as there will hereafter be occasion to notice.

As Major-general Burgoyne had not only declined accepting the command; but had declared to the select committee that he would obey such orders as General Stuart might issue to the troops, the governor had no alternative but to promote Colonel Lang, the senior infantry officer in the service of the Company, to the rank of lieutenant-general, in order to preserve the command of the troops (agreeably to the instructions of the court of directors) in their own officers. Yet, notwithstanding the authority of the mutiny act for the East Indies, which includes the king's forces serving there, and notwithstanding the express orders to make such promotion as gave the command of the whole to the Company's officer, Major-general Burgoyne and the other king's officers suffered themselves to be led away by the resentment of what they considered an indignity, in being superseded by an officer junior to them in the king's service *. Sir John Bur-

* The following extract from the general letter of the Court of Directors, dated March 13, 1761, will shew how tenacious the East India Company were, at that time, of their rights, and jealous of the interference of the king's officers. "We are greatly astonished that his majesty's officers should ever interfere in the promotion of our officers, or meddle in any shape with your management of our

goyne did not however chuse to risk the actual disobedience of the king's troops, in refusing to move, according to the orders of General Lang, but thought proper to withdraw in the night from the army, and to apply to the Admiral for protection on board the fleet; but, on failure of success in this quarter, he wrote the next day to Lord Macartney, signifying that he was ready to surrender his person to avoid the insult of an armed force. His Lordship reminded him that the conduct of government towards him, on the dismissal of Major-general Stuart, implied a marked attention personally to him, as well as to the other officers in his majesty's service; but that his own declaration left the committee no alternative, but to make the appointment authorized by law, and directed by the Company's instructions; that it never was the intention of government to force obedience from the king's officers by any exertion of coercive authority, when the public necessity did not absolutely require it; and that there was not the least design of calling upon him to give any account of his conduct there, or to lay any restraint upon his person, unless some future act committed by him should force them to adopt so painful a measure.

The month of July having now elapsed, without receiving any notification from Tippoo Saheb of his intention to abide

" affairs; it is entirely out of their province, and we will never suffer you to allow, for the rights we derive from our charter shall ever sacredly be preserved, and which the legislature alone can control; if an attempt of this kind should be again made, instead of submitting to show your authority, call upon them to produce theirs, which you will find to be, that they must aid and assist the service in such manner as the governor and council may desire."

by the general pacification to which, in compliance with the treaty between the court of London and Versailles, he had been invited, Lord Macartney determined that such a reinforcement should immediately be sent to the southern army, to the command of which Colonel Fullarton had now succeeded, as would enable him to carry his arms into the heart of the Mysore country, and such as this officer, on whose judgment and prudence as well as exertions the committee had every reason to rely, had declared as his opinion would enable him to effect the conquest of Seringapatam. He also gave directions for strengthening the northern army under Colonel Jones. The reinforcements recently arrived from Europe enabled his Lordship to accomplish these measures, and leave, at the same time, a sufficient army in the Carnatic which had there, in fact, no enemy to contend with. In short, it was resolved to carry the war vigorously into the enemy's country, and to assail him on every side.

The answer from Tippoo however soon after arrived at Madras, offering certain conditions, and among others expressing a desire to send two ambassadors to treat of peace, a point that was readily acceded to by the committee, who, at the same time, observe, "that no measure can be considered as a proof of a cordial disposition to peace until, at least, the English officers shall be released on parole; which is the more necessary as there is reason to believe the hardships suffered by the prisoners taken by his father or him have already been fatal to many of them; and that many of those, who have survived, are detained contrary to the express words of the capitulations upon which they had surrendered."

Two vakeels or agents accordingly arrived at Madras, from whom it appeared there would be little difficulty in coming to an arrangement of terms on the part of their master, on the footing of a mutual surrender of places taken by both parties during the war, agreeably to the instructions from Europe; though some objectionable points were started, with regard to the restoration of the prisoners respectively taken on both sides. The principal and the most pressing object which Lord Macartney had in view, in accelerating a peace with Tippoo Saheb, was the saving of the lives and the speedy recovery of the liberty of the numerous English prisoners in the hands of the enemy. For the better accomplishing this humane purpose, and at the request of the vakeels in behalf of their master, but chiefly with a view to hasten the termination of the treaty by a direct intercourse with the sultaun of Mysore, his Lordship appointed two commissioners to proceed in company with the two vakeels to Seringapatam to settle, in the presence of Tippoo, the terms of the treaty. To give the more weight and respect to such a mission, at the head of it was placed the second member of the council, Mr. Sadlier; and Mr. Staunton, whose abilities and address had so recently and so happily been employed in the arrangement made with Monsieur de Bussy at Cuddalore, was appointed his colleague. Scarcely had these gentlemen entered the Mysore country, when the ministers of Tippoo Saheb demanded from them the unconditional delivery of Mangalore to their master, which Mr. Staunton resisted with that firmness inspired by a just sense of public duty, for which he was no less distinguished than his principal. But his colleague Mr. Sadlier, more intent upon his own

safety than on the release of some hundreds of his suffering countrymen, was ready, on the first proposal, to yield the point, and thus give up the only security they had for the speedy delivery of the prisoners. From the petulance of this gentleman, and to prevent delay in future in case of any difference in opinion, Lord Macartney, at the request of Mr. Staunton to be recalled or to have a third person added to the commission, sent after them the military secretary Mr. Huddleston, in order that any contested point might be settled by a majority of voices.

The commissioners on approaching Seringapatam were told by the vakeels, that their directions were to conduct them to Mangalore. They accordingly quitted the great road leading towards the capital, and were conducted over a tedious and nearly impassable country, so difficult and dangerous that some of their people and cattle actually perished. They passed at a short distance from Bangalore without being able to obtain permission to see any of the prisoners, or to send them the necessaries which had been provided for them by government. In the same manner they were designedly precluded from seeing or relieving the English prisoners in every fortress where they were confined, and near to which they passed on their route. They dispatched letters to Tippoo complaining in strong terms of such wanton treatment; but all the satisfaction they could get was a declaration from him, that all the prisoners had been ordered from Seringapatam and Bangalore to other places, for the express purpose of being delivered up to the commissioners. They discovered also that their letters to and from the presidency of

Madras had for some time been stopped and detained. The commissioners at this time were ignorant that Tippoo Sultaun, in the true spirit of oriental treachery, had violated the agreement he made with Major Campbell, when the cessation of arms took place on the 2d of August before Mangalore, by which agreement it was stipulated, "that he (Major Campbell) should be at liberty to take into the fort of Mangalore ten or twelve days provisions of every kind; but not to lay in a greater quantity at a time;" they were unacquainted with the circumstance of this garrison having not only been reduced to the last extremity of distress; but that every information which Major Campbell could pick up tended to convince him, that it was the nabob's determination the commissioners should never reach his camp, nor an English prisoner be released, so long as Mangalore remained in our hands; that as no alternative was therefore left for Major Campbell, but to make the best terms he could or surrender at discretion, he had preferred the former, and taken away the garrison. To keep back this information, Tippoo had adopted the mean expedient of intercepting all letters addressed to the commissioners. When however his duplicity and want of faith were known, and a strong remonstrance delivered by the commissioners, he defended his conduct by recriminating on that of Colonel Fullarton, who, he said, had proceeded, after their departure from Madras, against the fort of Paliacacherry, fired upon it, got possession of it, and plundered it of sixty thousand pagodas, stores, and provisions; that he had proceeded from hence to the fort of Coimbatore, which he also plundered and sent the spoil to Trichinopoly. Colonel Fullarton, as it

afterwards appeared, had received official information of the breach of faith, on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, with regard to Mangalore, and very properly lost no time in securing the possession of the important fortresses of Paliacacherry and Coimbatore. The commissioners were not a little perplexed by these untoward occurrences. The affair of Colonel Fullarton had been communicated to them by the vakeels on the road, and orders were sent in consequence to that officer to deliver up those two places long before the treacherous acquisition of Mangalore by their master had been made known to them. At this stage of the business the commissioners received a variety of complaints against the conduct of Tippoo Saheb, most of them exaggerated and some wholly unfounded; and many brilliant prospects were held out by the army, if permitted only to recommence hostilities; but there is often a wide interval which divides prospect from possession. However crafty and treacherous Tippoo might be, and however justly irritated we might be against him, the commissioners were fully aware of the folly of suffering resentment to stifle prudence, and of sacrificing the real interests of the Company on a doubtful issue. They saw that nothing short of actual hostilities on his part could warrant offensive operations at this stage of the negociation, either consistently with the obligation of fidelity to the most sacred engagements, or of obedience to the orders from Europe, or of attention to the relief of the Company's possessions from the burdens and calamities of war, or the liberation of many hundreds of unhappy prisoners from a long and miserable confinement.

At length the commissioners arrived before Mangalore, and after much discussion and subterfuge on the part of Tippoo and his ministers, and no little risk of personal inconvenience from their firmness, they concluded and signed a treaty on the 11th March, by which a mutual restoration of places and prisoners taken by both parties during the war was agreed upon, according to the treaty of peace concluded in Europe.

Thus was happily terminated one of the most ruinous, destructive, and expensive wars, in which the English were ever engaged in Hindostan; since the commencement of which no exertions of the government nor valor of the troops had succeeded in expelling the enemy from the Carnatic, much less in carrying the war into his own country, and compelling him to sue for peace. Yet under every disadvantage, by thus entering into a separate negociation with Tippoo Saheb, and excluding all interference on the part of the French, Lord Macartney preserved to the Company and to the Princes under its protection, all their territories entire and unmutilated as they stood before the war. He considered it as more prudent, under all the difficulties and dangers that surrounded the settlement, to accept of such a peace, than to persevere in a war, the success of which must have been doubtful and distant, but the expense certain and immediate. A desolated country, a menacing famine, an empty treasury, an exhausted credit, a loaded establishment, dubious resources, and universal distress, all conspired at that moment to render any peace desirable, by which the honor of the nation was preserved inviolate, and its former

possessions and independencies, already too extended, entire. He considered that the affairs of the Company could only be retrieved by a speedy peace, and by a strong government incorruptibly administered. He had reason therefore to rejoice that, under the pressure of so many untoward circumstances and distressing embarrassments, when almost every other peace, that with the French, the Spaniards, the United States, and the Mahrattas, had admitted of the loss of entire provinces, this peace of his own government, which restored tranquillity to India and the Carnatic to our possession, was concluded without the abscission of a single inch of territory, without the humiliation of purchasing the mediation of any Indian chief, or the more indelible disgrace of delivering up an ally into the hands of his enemies, though the recent instance of the Bengal government having abandoned Ragonaut Row to the Mahrattas was strenuously urged by Tippoo Saheb as an example for delivering up to him his vassal Hyat Saheb the former chieftain of Biddanore. Yet honorable and beneficial as the terms of the Carnatic peace were, it was a general opinion that had Mr. Staunton, with whom private considerations always yielded to the public interest, proceeded alone, his great abilities, temper, and firmness would have procured still more advantageous terms. In his colleague, Mr. Sadlier, he had to encounter much petulance, unsteadiness, and a timidity which sometimes rendered him ridiculous, and which did not escape the observation of the ministers of Tippoo Saheb.

None had greater reason to rejoice at the peace thus happily concluded than the unfortunate prisoners, whose situ-

ation and sufferings had been deplorable to the last degree. Many of them, it appeared, had fallen sacrifices to poison, to famine, and to disease brought on by long confinement in filthy dungeons; and several of those that survived were reduced to a condition of extreme wretchedness. No efforts had been spared by Lord Macartney, no means left untried by him to alleviate their distress; but the comforts he endeavored to administer did not always reach them. The sense which these unfortunate persons entertained of his Lordship's benevolent intentions appears in the following address presented to him by the officers on their return from confinement in the fort of Bangalore:

“As the obligations you have conferred on us have inspired sentiments too warm to be extinguished or suppressed, we must request your Lordship's permission and acceptance of this general acknowledgment of them. While we endeavor to do justice to our feelings, we hope not to trespass on delicacy, or the forms usually attended to of your Lordship's high character and station, though on such a subject we are free to say, that the formality of common rules would ill apply to the grateful effusions of the heart.

“Our's, my Lord, is not a common acknowledgment for the favors or kindnesses of ordinary life. The miseries of long captivity, aggravated by barbarian cruelty and insolence, and the horrors of famine; these were the sufferings which your beneficent hand alleviated, which your unremitting attention enabled, and alone enabled, us to support,

“ and which your successful wisdom has finally removed. If
“ any motive can add force to our duty, or impel us with
“ additional zeal to the public service, it will be the most
“ lively and most grateful recollection of the attention with
“ which we have been honored, by which we have been
“ saved ; of the generous care of government, which, though
“ immersed in the complicated and actual difficulties of the
“ state, forgot not the suffering soldier.

“ As men restored to life, as members of society restored
“ to our friends and our country, as soldiers restored to our
“ profession and to honor, permit us, my Lord, with the sin-
“ cerest and most lively gratitude, and the most respectful
“ consideration to assure you, that we shall ever retain the
“ deepest sense of the essential protection you afforded us,
“ and that we are, &c. &c.

(Signed) “ THOMAS LEAF,” and 28 others.

An event so favorable as that of a general peace throughout India, it might be supposed, would remove the greater part of those distresses and difficulties under which Lord Macartney had to struggle from the first moment of his landing at Madras. Many of them indeed by perseverance and an unsullied integrity he was able to subdue ; but there were others, and those of the most serious kind, over which he could exercise no control. Instead of that assistance and cordial co-operation which the public interest demanded from the superior government of Bengal, a most decided and systematic counteraction prevailed in its councils to the plans and measures of the presidency of Madras. An im-

partial person, on reading over the correspondence between the two governments, would be apt to conclude that the gentlemen, who composed the supreme council, were somewhat like those judges who consider themselves seated on the bench to exert their penetration in discovering the faults of those who are brought before them; and that it never once occurred to them, that the Madras government was as much interested in doing what was right as their own. It would be difficult to trace, and indeed it will not here be attempted to trace, beyond what the facts themselves declare, the feelings and the motives which operated on the minds of those who composed the supreme council; but as it is exceedingly important to the character of Lord Macartney that the measures of his government in India should be publickly known, for the more they are known the more will that character be revered, so will it be necessary to bring before the public eye that part of the conduct of his opponents in Bengal which bears relation to those measures.

It was pretty generally understood that the character which Lord Macartney had established in Russia, in Ireland, and in Grenada operated very powerfully in procuring for him the appointment to the chair of Madras; and that two of the leading points in his instructions were, the reformation of abuses in the civil and military departments; and the improvement of the Company's finances, by economical arrangements and by maintaining and consolidating peace with all the country powers. The time that intervened between his appointment and departure from England was too short for any intelligence of the event to reach Bengal before he himself ar-

rived at Madras. He thus came upon them, as it were, by surprize ; and it is not improbable that the sudden arrival of a new man of his rank and character, together with the knowledge of the circumstances under which the appointment took place, might have awakened a spirit of jealousy in the supreme council. The rivalship of his known abilities might perhaps have been as much dreaded as the weight of his supposed interest, which some of the council apprehended could not fail to relieve Mr. Hastings from his station sooner than either he or they wished. The caution of his conduct, the success of his measures, the being armed with the power of correcting abuses, the economy he instantly adopted in the expenditure of the public money, and, above all, the firm and manly tone of independence which appeared in his public and private correspondence, seem to have determined the supreme council at a very early period of his government, to exert against him, as often as occasion offered, the whole weight of their Indian experience, the fertility of their imaginations, and the dexterity of the person who held the pen, which he seems to have possessed in so eminent a degree, that if wrong measures could by casuistry be converted into right, or supply the place of good sense and propriety, the writer might justly set up his claim for admiration. But however ingenious and acute the supreme council of Bengal showed themselves to be in argumentation, yet in them this quality appears to have been subordinate to their fancy and to their feelings, by which all their opinions and resolutions were evidently tinctured, that had any relation to the government of Madras.

Lord Macartney had very early information of the apprehension entertained of him by the members of the Bengal government; and he omitted no occasion to efface from their minds an impression so injurious to a cordial co-operation of the two presidencies. In vain however did he give to Mr. Hastings the most positive assurances that he had never harbored a thought of succeeding to Bengal; that his views were very remote from any thing in India; that he had brought out with him no prejudices, no resentments, no connections nor plans to serve or promote; but that the general prosperity of the country was his sole object; that although nothing could make him lose sight of his reputation, or draw him for a moment from what he conceived to be his public duty, yet so highly had he estimated the wisdom and experience of Mr. Hastings that he arrived in India with a determination to lend his most cordial support to all his measures. And with the view of accomplishing this intention to its fullest effect, he lost not a moment in giving him information of his arrival at Madras, expressing, at the same time, a hope that an unreserved confidence and friendship might be established between them. Mr. Hastings, in his reply, regrets exceedingly that he was not apprized of the probability of his Lordship's nomination, that he might have been prepared with materials to obviate the impressions, which he probably would receive, concerning the relation in which the two governments stood to each other. "These," says he, "will be represented to you as proceeding from a spirit of encroachment, nor will it be easy for you, until you have had time to look into the depth of affairs, to avoid yielding something to the sugges-

“tion *.” And in a subsequent letter, he again takes occasion to observe, “I have already expressed my regret that I
“had not known of your appointment in time to have furnished you with explanations on some particular points, of
“which I expect that an advantage will have been taken to
“prejudice your mind with injurious and dangerous opinions
“of the designs of this government with relation to yours †.” After thanking him for the return of confidence, held forth in his letters, Lord Macartney observes, “that it is scarcely
“possible for two persons distant from each other to coincide always exactly in the same opinion on every particular
“point; but minute differences can never effect our general
“views, or in any degree weaken that union which I most
“sincerely wish to cultivate and maintain with you. If any
“measure proposed by you should happen to militate with
“the ideas which I know are entertained at home, it must
“have arisen from a supposition of necessity calling for the
“exercise of discretionary latitude to be allowed and taken
“on extraordinary occasions.” And in the same letter he further observes, “New as I am in this country, and totally
“devoid of local prepossessions, I cannot have been biassed
“by any of those rooted and popular prejudices, which you
“foresaw you would have to encounter in other breasts.
“With me the general security and promotion of the British
“interest in India are the only objects; placing, as I do, my
“personal advantage solely in the success of the whole plan,

* Extract of a letter from Mr. Hastings to Lord Macartney, dated July 7, 1781.

† Ibid. dated July 23, 1781.

“and aiming at no kind of importance from the extent or
“value of any part which may continue under my immediate
“care*.”

The uneasiness which Mr. Hastings thus evidently felt at the moment of Lord Macartney's arrival, appears to have arisen principally from an undue interference on the part of the supreme council, in matters which concerned only the government of Madras, and especially on the three following points.

Shortly after the invasion of the Carnatic, the governor-general of Bengal had made a proposition for concluding a treaty with the Dutch, in which he consented to cede for ever to the latter the whole district of 'Tinevelly, a country as large as England, for the temporary loan of one thousand European troops, for which the Company was besides to furnish pay and clothing. This treaty, which Mr. Hastings says, “was extorted by the cries of despair and judged in “the elation of a sudden return of success,” had been treated with derision by the late government of Madras, and the nabob of Arcot, to whom the country belonged, refused to confirm it. Whether it was meant to be carried in the teeth of those opponents does not appear; but the arrival of Lord Macartney with the intelligence of a Dutch war put an end to this most extraordinary scheme.

The second point on which Mr. Hastings was apprehensive Lord Macartney might not agree with him in opinion,

* Extract of a letter from Lord Macartney to Mr. Hastings, dated August 10, 1781.

was as much more extraordinary in its nature, as it was more important than the first. This was the restitution of the northern Circars to the nizam or soubahdar of the Decan, for the loan of a certain number of cavalry to act against Hyder Ali in the Carnatic. The nizam's assistance, for which the governor-general proposed so high a price, could, in fact, be of little consequence, even had it been voluntarily offered and without cost, because, from the spirit and discipline of our own troops, it was clearly not numbers, but the means of maintaining numbers, that were wanted. Besides, Sir Eyre Coote had more than once declared that such cavalry, from its irregularity and want of discipline, could be of no sort of use to him, and might be dangerous. The measure however had been resolved upon by the Bengal government ; but as the final orders had not been dispatched for carrying it into execution, Mr. Hastings paid Lord Macartney the compliment of submitting the treaty for his opinion, which he pressed him to give without any reserve, acquainting him however at the same time, that it had already passed into a resolution. The grounds, it appears, upon which Mr. Hastings proceeded were, the inconsiderable value of the territories proposed to be ceded, which, in a season of peace, he estimated at no more than a clear annual profit of forty-three thousand rupees ; adding, that he could not even conjecture what it might be in time of war ; but presumed boldly to state it at a loss. Lord Macartney, in his reply, assured him that since his arrival he had taken uncommon pains to be accurately informed of the several possessions entrusted to his care ; that the value of the Circars was no longer to be estimated by the calculations of the committee of the House

of Commons in 1773, upon which he had proceeded; that in the present year 1781, they would actually produce, as he would observe by the authentic statement accompanying his letter, the sum of six hundred and twelve thousand pagodas. Another reason employed by Mr. Hastings for the cession of the Circars was their great longitudinal extent. "The proper method," he observes, "of estimating the power of any territory is by comparing its means with the line of its defence, or, in other words, the extent of its frontier where it is accessible to an enemy, and the strength and value of the military establishment, which it will require for its ordinary defence compared with its income. The extent of the Circars is like the definition of a mathematical line, length without breadth*." To this part of his argument Lord Macartney observes, that "in proportioning our defences to the dimensions of our territories we actually find the difficulty increase, not with their length but breadth. Our armies move with ease, and almost without control, along the coast; but to penetrate far into the country requires means which are not always within our reach. The narrowness of the Circars in that view facilitates our protection of them. Where we can approach by sea we are certain of success†." Mr. Hastings then proceeds to state that, "of the consequences of the Circars, in other respects, we know no instances. Perhaps one motive for seeking the possession of them was to command the means of collecting a larger investment. The communication which it

* Extract of a letter from Mr. Hastings and his council to Charles Smith, Esq. and select committee at Madras, dated July 2, 1781.

† Extract of a letter from Lord Macartney to Mr. Hastings, dated Aug. 10, 1781.

“ is supposed to afford between the two presidencies, is ano-
 “ ther advantage which we know to have been ascribed to
 “ it: but this we believe to be purely ideal*.” To which
 Lord Macartney replies, “ that, from the result of inquiries
 “ he has made and the public records, it appears the in-
 “ vestment, since our possession of the Circars, has evidently
 “ increased. From thence really proceeds, for some time
 “ past, the most valuable part of our cargoes for Europe.
 “ That country is comparatively found of so much more con-
 “ sequence than the Carnatic, that if one or other was to be
 “ yielded by us, the prospect of profit to the Company would
 “ lead to a preference in preserving the Circars. They
 “ besides are our own immediate property. In the Carnatic
 “ it is with reluctance that the present nabob submits to our
 “ influence. No double government, such as subsists in the
 “ Carnatic, can be durable, uniform, or prosperous. The
 “ Circars besides approach nearer to our great and important
 “ possessions in India, which are under your immediate com-
 “ mand. The narrow slip which divides them, negotiation,
 “ or address, or accident, may make our own in times less
 “ suspicious of encroachments; and thus join our territories in
 “ Orissa to those of Bengal. We should lose in the
 “ opinion entertained of our wisdom, as well as in our real
 “ wealth and power, if we were to cede a valuable, solid,
 “ permanent possession for the hollow friendship and pre-
 “ carious assistance of an oriental prince, who has already
 “ betrayed us, and who is thought to have raised the storm
 “ which now blows upon us from every quarter†.” Mr.

* Extract of a letter from Mr. Hastings and his council to Charles Smith, Esq. and select committee at Madras, dated July 2, 1781.

† Extract of a letter from Lord Macartney to Mr. Hastings, dated Aug. 10, 1781.

Hastings is aware that one objection may be alleged against the surrender of the Circars at this particular time, which he mentions for the sake of obviating its impression; "that it
" will be imputed to us as proceeding from weakness, and
" the desperate condition of our affairs; and that of course it
" will raise the consequence and confidence of our enemies,
" and prove a discouragement to others who may be disposed
" to befriend us:" On which Lord Macartney observes;
" the retrocession of the Circars, once so precious in our
" estimation, by a voluntary offer to the nizam, when we
" are involved in a tedious and expensive war, might argue
" not only unsteadiness of councils but inability of defence,
" without gaining us any credit for justice or moderation; a
" character less to be obtained by the disposal of that which
" we possess without actual dispute, than by avoiding to
" contend for advantages to which we cannot claim a right.
" It must be remembered too that this proposed ally, on a
" former occasion against the same enemy, abandoned us
" with perfidy. It ought not to be thought wise to place so
" much confidence in so treacherous a friend; nor is a
" Soubahdar of the Decan to be slightly invited into the
" Carnatic, over which, from the old constitution of the
" Mogul empire, he has a claim to exercise authority and
" exact a tribute. It may rather be our interest, therefore,
" that the nizam should remain in a state of quiet at Hydra-
" bad *." After stating these among other arguments to show the impolicy of ceding such a valuable country for so precarious, and, at all events, a mere temporary advantage, his

* Extract of a letter from Lord Macartney to Mr. Hastings, dated Aug. 10, 1781.

Lordship concludes by observing; "To you who have, in so
"handsome and liberal a manner, called upon me for my
"opinion on a measure upon which that reference implies
"you had not formed a decisive judgment, I have little occa-
"sion to offer an apology, though my sentiments should lead
"to a conclusion different from the result of your own
"thoughts; for it would not be obeying your commands if I
"was not to communicate to you the genuine and candid
"reflections that have occurred to me on the subject: They
"are declared with diffidence; but they press upon my mind
"with a conviction that must prevent the possibility of my
"reconciling it to my duty to accede, without special autho-
"rity from home, to a proposal which every consideration I
"can give it entirely rejects*."

This letter of Lord Macartney saved the Circars, which constitute the most valuable part of the Company's possessions on the coast of Coromandel; but it went a great way towards losing the friendship of Mr. Hastings. It called in question the validity of his opinions, and, what appears to have been still more dear to him, the right of interference in a matter which exclusively belonged to the presidency of Madras.

It may here be remarked that, in the preservation of the four northern Circars, which were then in the peaceable possession of the Company, and which immediately after the conclusion of the war yielded a net annual revenue of half

* Extract of a letter from Lord Macartney to Mr. Hastings, dated Aug. 10, 1781.

a million sterling, was involved the fate of the fifth Circar or province of Guntoor, valued at 150,000*l.* a year, which, under the same title and treaty as the other four, was to devolve to the company after the death of Bazalet Jung, the Nizam ul Moolk's brother. Had the first four Circars been yielded to the nizam, the cession would have virtually included the fifth. Upon the death therefore of Bazalet Jung in October 1782, Lord Macartney conceived it his duty to assert the Company's right to the province of Guntoor, in an address to the nizam to that effect, which, in pursuance of his general orders he sent to the governor-general to be transmitted to Hyderabad. Mr. Hastings, however, having before this time showed something very like a systematic opposition to the measures of Lord Macartney, did not transmit the claim, but suffered it to lie dormant at that time, and, in fact, it was never enforced during his or his successor's government. Thus the Guntoor Circar remained quietly in the nizam's hands for several years after the death of Bazalet Jung, until Lord Cornwallis very properly revived the Company's pretensions to it, and, in 1788, obtained that possession which had been claimed by Lord Macartney in 1782.

The third point on which Mr. Hastings was anxious to furnish Lord Macartney with some explanation, in order to prevent his mind from being "prejudiced with injurious and dangerous opinions of the designs of the Bengal government," was the agreement he had recently concluded with Mr. Richard Joseph Sullivan and Assam Cawn on the part of Wallau Jah the nabob of Arcot. We have already seen

that long before Lord Macartney's arrival, the government of Madras had in vain endeavored, by persuasion or by threats, to extort from the nabob a single pagoda towards the expenses of the war; disgusted with that dependence which he had transferred to the Company from the soubahdar or viceroy of the Decan and the throne of Delhi, he sought by an embassy to England to free himself from their interference. He conceived also that a deputation to the government of Bengal might add to the advantages, or supply the deficiencies of an European embassy. Accordingly in March 1781, he sent the two persons above mentioned as his ministers with certain requests to the governor-general, which indicated his aim at an increase of possessions and of power that the Company was not more unwilling than they were then unable to confer. To those demands or requests he joined, as has already been observed, an offer to assign, during the continuance of the existing troubles, the revenues of the countries yet remaining to him, towards defraying the charges of the war; on certain conditions however in favor of his creditors, who seem to have been concerned in this embassy, of obtaining Company's bonds equal to the revenues of the districts which had been assigned to them; but to which conditions the government of Fort St. George had as little authority from the Company to agree, as that of Bengal had to enter into any such treaty. This assignment however was pressed forward by the nabob's ministers as the first object of their deputation; and as it appeared to Mr. Hastings that it promised a seasonable relief to the Carnatic, it was readily accepted in April 1781, and the replies of the governor-general and council to the nabob's requests were transmitted to Madras,

with an intimation that they should be considered as having all the sanction, force, and validity of a treaty; and Mr. Richard Joseph Sullivan returned with credentials as minister from the governor-general and council of Bengal at the court of the nabob of Arcot, for the purpose of maintaining the faith of that government in the execution of the treaty, and also as its representative at the presidency of Madras*. Had this treaty and this embassy happened to arrive at Madras during the preceding administration, they would, no doubt, have been treated with that derision and resentment of which Mr. Hastings, in his letter to Lord Macartney, expressed, not without reason, his apprehensions†. The select com-

* See letter from the governor-general and council of Bengal to the Honorable Charles Smith and select committee of Fort St. George, inclosing certain papers purporting to be an agreement of equal force and validity with a formal treaty between the governor-general of Bengal and the nabob of Arcot, dated Fort William, April 2, 1781; and, letter from the governor-general and council of Bengal to Richard Joseph Sullivan, esq. appointing him their representative and minister at the court of the nabob of Arcot, of the same date. Appendix, No. 9. A, B, C, and D.

† The impression which this extraordinary proceeding of the governor-general and his council made at Madras may, in some degree, be collected from the following extracts:

Extract of a letter from Sir Eyre Coote to Lord Macartney, dated camp at Terroor, September 2, 1781.

"The part of your letter which has most engaged my thoughts and attention is that which mentions the nabob's new agent from Bengal. It is an arrangement which I by no means approve, being a direct infringement of that regular line of executive authority, which has been constitutionally established by act of parliament. It is, in my opinion, an act of supererogation in the governor-general, and an attempt to annihilate a power which can only be diminished or abolished by an authority above any existing in this country; and I am thoroughly convinced that the government of Madras cannot, without being liable to a charge of breach of trust, tacitly acquiesce in so glaring an encroachment upon those privileges which have

mittee, in their reply to the governor-general and council, express their doubts how far they might be justified in sub-

been assigned to them by a constitutional act of parliament. I hope therefore your Lordship will not allow it to pass unnoticed. I can only say, that had I been sitting as a member of the board of Bengal, when such a measure was proposed, I should have protested against it."

Extract of a letter from Samuel Johnson, esq. member of the select committee to General Sir Eyre Coote, dated Madras, May 13, 1781.

"A few days ago letters arrived from Mr. Richard Sullivan at Calcutta, announcing his being appointed minister or resident from the governor-general and council at the nabob's Durbar; and intimating in consequence his resignation of the employ of military secretary. We have as yet received no public advices from the governor-general and council on the subject of this appointment, its object, or intended duration; but from private letters it would seem that Mr. Sullivan is invested with powers, totally independent of this government, to negotiate a treaty with the nabob, for the cession of the Carnatic, or certain parts of it, to the Company; and that he is afterwards to remain here as the minister and representative of the governor-general and council, or, in fact, of the Company.

"When I wrote to you of Assam Cawn and Mr. Richard Sullivan being sent by the Nabob to Calcutta, extraordinary as it appeared that he should adopt such a measure, without consulting with or even informing us, I had no idea of what was in agitation, nor could I indeed conceive that Mr. Hastings would have thought either his own dignity and consequence increased, or the Company's interest advanced, by bringing dishonor and contempt upon this government; whatever charms he might expect to find in the display of superior power, and the exhibiting to the world our subordinate situation, I imagined his good sense would have shown him, and his integrity have made him guard against the danger of weakening our hands at a time when all the influence of government, aided by the public confidence, is absolutely necessary to afford us the smallest hope of being able much longer to strive against the difficulties which surround us. For my own part were I to consult merely my own ease, or indeed my state of health, I should instantly resign my station and withdraw from a scene which, in addition to the difficulties inseparable from our situation, now presents a prospect of new troubles, vexatious alterations with the government-general, accumulating insults and encroachments on their part, and the entire destruction of that harmony and mutual confidence which, as long as they exist for the steady exertion of our united power and resources would inspire hope (as they have done heretofore) superior to any misfortune.

scribing to the exercise of an authority contrary to the system of the Company's establishment; they point out the ill conse-

“ Since the passing of the act in 1773, as well as before, all letters, orders, and instructions from home, relative to the affairs of the nabob of the Carnatic, and the Company's connection with him, have been addressed to us, as the agents and representatives of the Company, and the guardians of their interests on this coast. Can then the governor-general and council legally take from us a trust which we hold from their constituents, as well as ours, and appoint another servant of the Company to represent them here, to act separately from and independently of us, in the very seat of our government, to negotiate a treaty with the nabob of the Carnatic, and enter into stipulations which are to be binding upon us, and must involve many important points of which we are or ought to be the most competent judges, and cannot but materially influence the affairs of the Company committed to our care, and for the management of which we are held responsible? Neither do I see any thing in the act that empowers Mr. Hastings, or the governor-general and council, to take a Company's servant from his station at another presidency, free him from his obedience to those whom the Company have constituted his superiors, and whom he has covenanted to obey, and invest him with powers to act independently of them on the spot where they reside; nor can, in my opinion, a Company's servant so situated withdraw himself from their authority and accept of such powers, without their leave and approbation.

“ We are ever ready to acknowledge the superior authority of the supreme council to the utmost extent of the words and meaning of the act which renders us subordinate to them, as far as regards the making peace or war, and makes it unlawful for us to enter into any treaty without their consent and approbation; but we cannot allow that it confers on them a right to empower any person to act for the Company in this settlement, or negotiate with the nabob of the Carnatic, independently of our authority; that conformably to this opinion we, as the Company's representatives on this coast, are ready to coincide with them in any plan for a treaty with the nabob that they may be pleased to suggest, and to exert ourselves to accomplish the same in the most speedy and effectual manner; but that neither our sense of duty to the Company nor to ourselves will allow us to acquiesce in a measure calculated (as far as we know of it at present) to make this government contemptible in the eyes of every prince and power of Hindostan; to render abortive our best exertions, to lessen the public confidence, and increase the difficulties we already have to strive against, in the most pressing exigency that ever threatened the Company's affairs on this coast.”

quences that might arise from the assumption of a power on the part of the Bengal government, which it was not authorized to exercise, and reprobate, in the strongest terms, the impropriety of suffering an individual appointed by the supreme council, to exercise any executive authority at the presidency of Madras. They observe that as neither their president, nor any other member of the select committee as then composed, were in the temporary administration which subsisted on the 2d April, when the Bengal government thought it necessary to withdraw its confidence from that board, they cannot feel themselves hurt at the preference given on that particular occasion to an individual for maintaining the faith of their government; but that they did not hesitate to expect a candid concurrence with their opinion that the governing members of Madras, appointed after mature and solemn deliberation by the Company, charged with their interests and vested with their authority on the coasts of Coromandel and Orissa, had a claim for their exclusive confidence, in the endeavors to be pursued at that presidency for the Company's welfare *. The committee in their letter observe how very much it was the wish of Lord Macartney to avoid even the appearance of any interruption to the cordial co-operation in the measures of the two governments, and that he had expressed to them a strong desire, that the whole of this extraordinary proceeding should be suspended until he had learned through the governor-general, in their private confidential communications, whether he still meant to pursue the

* See letter from the president and select committee of Fort St. George to the governor-general and council, dated Fort St. George, Sept. 8, 1781. Appendix, No. 10.

whole of the plan ; but, they remark, the return and the success of the embassy was announced at Madras with such ceremonies of solemn and public notoriety, that the alternative of silence was no longer in their power.

In the observations of Lord Macartney on Mr. Hastings's letter, both of which are inserted at full length in the Appendix *, it will be seen how studiously he wished to preserve that harmony which he considered essential to the public safety, at the same time feeling it his duty to communicate fully and frankly the objections that weighed on his mind to a measure, which he was told " could neither be revoked " nor qualified." This letter it seems, coupled with that from the select committee on the same subject, gave mortal offence, probably not so much for the difference of opinion it contained, as that the mature consideration given to the subject by Lord Macartney pointed out the precipitancy and want of judgment with which the propositions had been made by Mr. Hastings. These letters vindicated moreover the legitimate authority vested in the government of Madras, and disputed the legality of that now attempted to be exercised by the governor-general and his council. Men who are wedded to power with more than an uxorious fondness can rarely bear to have their authority called in question however unduly exerted ; and the power of the Bengal government had hitherto been exercised almost without limitation. There were a number of other circumstances, in addition to those above mentioned, which tended to widen the breach be-

* Appendix, Nos. 11 and 12.

tween the two governors. The reports of Lord Macartney's economy, integrity, and disinterestedness were ill received and ill relished in Bengal, where qualities of such a nature were not of the most thriving kind. At Madras a contract had been given to Mr. Paul Benfield for supplying the army with carriage bullocks. The terms of this contract Lord Macartney reduced by nearly one-fourth part, and annexed conditions which made this gentleman think fit to give it up; but to please the commander in chief and engage the services of a person, who was represented as very capable of rendering them, he was appointed agent for supplying the troops. Whether the emoluments in this office were below his consideration, or whether he expected that a disappointment in the agency would lead to a renewal of the contract, he is said to have suffered many of the cattle, committed to his care, to perish for want of food. He demanded for the immediate expenditure of his employ double the amount of the money which he knew to be in the treasury, and otherwise conducted himself in such a manner as to compel Lord Macartney to dismiss him, which gave great offence to his friends in the supreme council. In fact, the detection and reformation of abuses, which was strongly recommended by the court of directors to the early attention of Lord Macartney, could not fail of exciting a jealousy in that place where a profuse expenditure of the Company's funds had involved the government in an enormous and accumulating debt; where agencies, embassies, and contracts had drained the public coffers to fill the pockets of individuals*, and where

* Several instances are on record, where agencies on provisions and grain for the use of government were granted to servants of government; where ambassadors

there was a total want of economy both in the civil and military department. At Bengal therefore no character could be more obnoxious than one of an established reputation for inflexible integrity, armed with the power of correcting abuses.

Lord Macartney on his part, while determined to do his duty, omitted no occasion of showing a disposition to conciliate the good will of Mr. Hastings. He was aware that their private cordiality was the most likely to lead to public prosperity. He reprobated the idea of an unworthy jealousy, and was for a long time unwilling to believe it could have any existence in an enlightened mind like that of Mr. Hastings, in favor of whom he seems to have gone out to India with the strongest prepossessions. He arrived there with a determination to promote to the best of his power, that system which the situation, the experience, and the sound judgment of the governor-general had, as he supposed, laid down for the Presidency of Madras; but instead of system he complains that he found only a mass of capricious and contradictory orders, with the assumption and exercise of powers unauthorized by act of parliament or the Company's instructions. If Lord Macartney had any difficulties, they appear to have arisen solely from a sense of duty, and a resolution to sacrifice every thing to the public service. His whole government clearly evinces that he had no personal views to

were appointed with large salaries, who never proceeded on their embassies; but as there is no intention to particularize abuses, the fact only is mentioned to show the different systems pursued by the two governments.

forward, no angry passions to gratify. To Mr. Hastings he was always ready to do most ample justice. Though it was impossible he could acknowledge Mr. Sullivan in the capacity he was placed by the supreme council, he did not set aside the appointment. The commission, recommended by the governor-general for the arrangement of the nabob's finances, he suffered to take place, and put Mr. Benfield, who was a favorite at Bengal, at the head of it. He was always ready to acknowledge to the court of directors, in terms of unqualified praise, the assistance he had met with in money and provisions from Bengal: and although Mr. Hastings had intimated, at a very early period of Lord Macartney's government, that no cordiality or even familiar intercourse could subsist between them, his Lordship seized the very first occasion of showing him there was no resentment on his part by congratulating him on his narrow escape from and the happy suppression of the rebellion of Cheyt Sing. Mr. Hastings however did not think fit to renew the correspondence, even on public subjects, or to observe the decency of common civility by acknowledging the receipt of his letters. To prevent the very serious inconveniences that would necessarily result to the Company's affairs from a complete disunion in the sentiments and measures of those to whom they were entrusted, Lord Macartney resolved to make an effort of a different kind towards a reconciliation. With this view, in February 1782, he sent his confidential friend and secretary Mr. Staunton to Bengal for the purpose of explaining his motives to Mr. Hastings on a variety of points, where their opinions had not coincided. On this occasion, he wrote to

the governor-general as follows: "The interruption in our
"correspondence, occasioned by your tour, joined to an ap-
"prehension that my letters may not have sufficiently con-
"veyed to you the sentiments of my mind, has given me a
"good deal of concern. And I will confess to you, that it
"was not a little encreased by some intimations I had re-
"ceived of your not having taken in so good part as I wished
"the freedom with which I gave you my opinion upon some
"points, where it was impossible for me to avoid it. To re-
"new this subject, at present, would lead to discussion which
"I trust our mutual dispositions will render totally unneces-
"sary, as I can very sincerely assure you, that the same
"desire, which I formerly expressed, of most cordially co-
"operating with you and deferring to your opinions, as far
"as may be in my power, continues not less strong at this
"moment than ever. I trust that Mr. Macpherson will have
"done justice to what I said upon this subject when he
"passed here; and to give it every possible weight, I now
"dispatch to you a gentleman of my inmost confidence, to
"whom you may, with the greatest safety, communicate
"every idea of your's which you wish me to possess, and
"who will with perfect freedom communicate to you mine.
"As soon as Mr. Staunton has received your commands, he
"proposes to return here; indeed nothing could be more in-
"convenient to me than to lose him at this moment; but I
"had long intended to send a confidential person to you, and
"Mr. Staunton, from the long friendship between us, from
"his abilities, integrity, and every other circumstance is so
"much better qualified for the office than any one I know,

“ I could not be so far wanting, either to you or myself, as
“ to detain him when he could be thus employed *.”

With this mark of his Lordship's attention Mr. Hastings seemed to be greatly flattered, and received Mr. Staunton in the kindest manner. By this gentleman's address and explanations he appeared also to be satisfied so effectually, with regard to Lord Macartney's amicable and cordial sentiments, and his desire to gain his friendship and good opinion, that Mr. Staunton could not doubt of the object of his mission being fully accomplished. Mr. Hastings, in fact, assured him that he was so perfectly satisfied, in all points, that he could use, in his letters to Lord Macartney, no expressions so strong of the fullness of his determination to co-operate with and to support his measures, and to act with cordiality, friendship, and affection towards him, that his (Mr. Hastings's) sentiments and conduct should not ratify. To corroborate these assurances he writes, on the 21st March, to Lord Macartney as follows: “ I am truly sensible of the
“ force of your Lordship's sentiments in my favor, when I
“ consider that, in the most arduous and critical situation of
“ affairs under your government, you have deprived yourself
“ of the able assistance of your confidential secretary for my
“ ease and information. The impressions which so flattering
“ a mark of your Lordship's attention has made upon my
“ mind I will not attempt to describe, persuaded that Mr.
“ Staunton has observed and will do justice to them. I will

* Letter from Lord Macartney to Mr. Hastings, dated 3d February 1782.

“ content myself with simply making my warmest acknow-
“ ledgments. I have endeavored to give effect to your Lord-
“ ship’s design in this ingenuous proceeding, by the most free
“ and unreserved communication of my sentiments to Mr.
“ Staunton upon every subject which you have charged him
“ with ; and, I trust, they are such as will convince your
“ Lordship of the anxious desire which I have to co-operate
“ with you firmly and liberally for the security of the Carna-
“ tic, for the support of your authority, and for the honor of
“ your administration, by every aid which this government
“ and my personal influence can afford *.” Yet notwithstand-
ing all these assurances made to Lord Macartney, under his
own hand and repeated to Mr. Staunton, at the very mo-
ment he was thus pledging himself to both “ for the support
“ of his Lordship’s authority, and for the honor of his admi-
“ nistration,” did this same Mr. Hastings, even while Mr.
Staunton was living in his own house, sign the letter of the
11th March already quoted †, by which was transferred to
Sir Eyre Coote “ an unparticipated command to the fullest
“ possible extent of his wishes,” thereby reducing to a mere
cypher that government and that administration of it, whose
authority and honor he had almost in the same breath
pledged himself to support ‡. Yet even to this letter, injuri-

* Letter from Mr. Hastings to Lord Macartney, dated 21st March 1782.

† In page 142, and following.

‡ Sir Eyre Coote, it seems, had dispatched his secretary to Bengal just about the time when Mr. Staunton was there, to announce to the governor-general and council, the intention of the general to return to Calcutta, and take his seat at their board, unless he was indulged with very extraordinary and exclusive powers, both civil and military. Whether the representations of this gentleman, or the anxiety of the supreme council to keep Sir Eyre Coote away from Bengal, most prevailed does not appear ; but the letter of the 11th March was the result of the mission, and was carefully concealed from Mr. Staunton.

ous in its consequences and offensive as it could not fail to be considered at any time, but more especially so under the circumstances it was written, Lord Macartney condescended to return a private reply, explaining, in the most candid and friendly manner, the ill effects that might be apprehended from the full exercise of the powers they had thought fit to transfer to the commander in chief, assuring him, at the same time, of his perfect acquiescence in their orders without a single murmur, and laying fully before him the state of his own mind and views with respect to India. To this letter the governor-general did not find it convenient to make any reply ; but the sentiments it contains are so honorable to the writer, and display so well that exalted and disinterested character, which eminently distinguished him through the whole course of his life, that it would be unjust to withhold it from the public*.

From this time, it may well be supposed, all private and confidential correspondence ceased between the two governors, and that of a public nature on the part of the supreme council was henceforward tinged with so much asperity in the language, and with such harsh and unbecoming expressions, as their superior and relative situation could not justify under any circumstances whatsoever. But the intemperance of their language, however reprehensible, was not half so injurious to the public service as that system of hostile conduct, which, from this time, appears to have been directed personally against Lord Macartney, and of which it will be

* Letter from Lord Macartney to Mr. Hastings, dated Madras, May 22, 1782. Appendix, No. 13.

necessary to take some notice on particular points only, as a history of the systematic opposition of the Bengal government to the measures of the presidency of Madras would alone occupy a volume.

Long before the intelligence had arrived in India of the peace which had been concluded in Europe, Lord Macartney had made every exertion to dissolve the connection between the French and the family of Hyder Ali, and by effectuating a peace with the latter to defeat the views of the former on the peninsula of India. But the superintending power of Bengal did not find it expedient to give him the authority which was necessary for such a purpose, or to send any instructions or communicate any information respecting their views as to peace or war, or negociation with any of the country powers. Neither did they continue to furnish those remittances which the increased expenses of the Carnatic more than ever demanded; on the contrary, they forbade the presidency of Madras to draw on the government of Bengal for a single pagoda. In such a state of things a peace with the successor of Hyder Ali became almost indispensable, and letter after letter was dispatched to the superintending government for their instructions on this point. No instructions however were sent till the commissioners for settling the treaty of peace had left Madras, and when they did come they seemed to refer so mysteriously to something which they did not communicate, that whatever line the presidency of Madras should take, it would equally have been liable to the misconstruction of the uncandid, and the censure of the ignorant. They therefore adopted the line which appeared most

consonant with the intentions, the reputation, and the true interests of their employers, and effected, as we have seen, an advantageous and an honorable peace. Agreeably with the terms of the treaty this peace was to be ratified within three months by the government of Bengal. When it was transmitted thither for this purpose, the governor-general happened to be at Lucknow, but it was acknowledged in due form by the persons for the time vested with, and in the exercise of, all the powers of the governor-general and council. It was returned thus ratified, sent to Tippoo Saheb, the receipt of it acknowledged by him, and there was not the smallest doubt of his being perfectly satisfied with the ratification. Yet, many months after this event, about the middle of July 1784, a new acknowledgment was received at Madras of the treaty with Tippoo Sultaun, signed as before by the members of the supreme council at Fort William, and bearing the additional signature of Mr. Hastings at Lucknow. It might not have appeared merely superfluous and awkward in the committee of Fort St. George to forward to Tippoo a fresh acknowledgment; it might, to his mistrustful mind, have seemed to argue a consciousness of a defect in the former transaction, dishonorably concealed from him by the government of Madras. But to this new acknowledgment there was appended a declaration of the governor-general and council relative to the nabob Wallau Jah, who, though substantially and effectually included in the treaty, precisely as he had been in the former one of 1769, and also in the Mahratta treaty, had, in pursuance of his schemes for independent sovereignty, wished to be considered as a contracting party. Such a proposal to Tippoo Saheb, relative to the

nabob Wallau Jah, whose very name was hateful to him, would, at any favorable change in his affairs, have furnished a colorable pretext for breaking the treaty. It might reasonably have been supposed, that the fatal consequences of plunging anew into a war with the Mahrattas, after treaties had already been concluded with them, would have furnished the government of Bengal with an useful lesson against endangering a war with any other power with whom peace had been concluded. The members of this government ought to have known and considered that the embarrassed situation of the Company's affairs, at home as well as in India, was but ill suited for the commencement of a new war. Had they permitted themselves to take a dispassionate view of the situation of those affairs in every quarter, they would probably have spared themselves the trouble of so silly an interference. Just emerged from a scene of general warfare, in which their exertions had been far beyond the natural resources of the Company ; plunged into distresses and burdens from which there was little hope of safety or even of temporary relief, but, in the continuance of tranquillity, the government of Madras had full conviction that nothing but inevitable disgrace and ruin could be the result of a renewal of the war. They felt that the interest, indeed the very existence, of the Company and of the British power in India, depended on their observing a temporizing conduct with Tippoo, and obtaining time to breathe and recover from the arduous struggle in which they had been so recently engaged.

In every point of view therefore this new interference was as unnecessary as it was impolitic. The nabob himself did not

pretend that his name was omitted in the treaty, or that the omission of it operated any degradation or disadvantage; he had fears only that such omission was with a design of effecting those purposes. But if the governor-general and his council had supposed those fears to be really felt by him, it would have been more consistent to dispel them by addressing the declaration to him and not to Tippoo Sultaun. By sending their declaration and their orders through the channel of the Madras government, they rendered it liable to the imputation of inconsistency and guilt if it partook in the measure, or of disobedience if it resisted. It is true they were not authorized to give any such orders to the government of Madras, which could not indeed negotiate or conclude a treaty or commence hostilities without the previous consent or approbation of the Bengal government; but here there was no intention to negotiate or to treat; there was assuredly none to commence hostilities. Lord Macartney saw at once the drift of this new acknowledgment and declaration, and convinced in his own mind that the chief view of his enemies was to embarrass his government, he prepared himself to meet their design with a calm and manly contempt for those consequences, at which their hostility seemed to aim. He was conscious that the ground on which he stood would support him with firmness. After an able and dispassionate survey of the danger, the folly, and the wickedness of their present proceeding, he thus concludes his minute in committee on which a letter was grounded from the Madras presidency to the governor-general and council of Bengal. "But if the governing members of Bengal are determined to prosecute their point until they can succeed in the

“ suspension, which it is assured some of them already have
“ seriously had in contemplation, the president, who would
“ seem to be the main object of their adverse pursuits, is will-
“ ing to take upon himself the whole responsibility of declin-
“ ing for the present to participate in the proposed measures
“ from Bengal. His mind is resigned to any personal con-
“ sequences that can happen to him from an adherence to
“ his duty. He is ready to expose himself to suspension,
“ rather than execute measures which, at this time, in his
“ judgment, threaten the welfare and safety of the public ;
“ or, if the government of Bengal chuse to persist in their
“ present orders, under the present circumstances, and re-
“ peat them under the penalties of disobedience, he will
“ spare them the formality of suspension, and retire from
“ his present station on their first notice. The Carnatic eva-
“ cuated ; the war at an end ; the assignment productive ; and
“ the constitution of the government ascertained ; his suc-
“ cessor may meet with less difficulties than he has had to en-
“ counter. In the critical and laborious scene in which he
“ has been engaged, his health, his time, his satisfaction, and
“ most of the comforts of life have, with honest and unremit-
“ ting zeal, been sacrificed to the public service *.

To the same effect his Lordship addressed also a separate letter to the governor-general and his council, signifying his readiness to take upon himself the whole responsibility for not complying with their orders, and exculpating his colleagues from any charge of disobedience on their part. The

* Lord Macartney's minute in the select committee, July 15, 1784.

proceedings of the latter, on this separate letter of the president being laid before them, convey so honorable a testimony, and speak so strongly their sense of the zeal, the ability, and the inflexible integrity of Lord Macartney, that it would not be doing justice to his memory to withhold them from the public*.

By this peremptory refusal to comply with the proposal to Tippoo Saheb of new, disgusting, and useless conditions, even after the final ratification of the treaty, the general tranquillity of India, which had so recently been restored, was not at this time put to the hazard of a rupture; and Mr. Hastings found it expedient to spare himself the odium which the measure of suspending Lord Macartney would not have failed to excite against him from every quarter, except indeed among the friends of that narrow circle † where such a measure would have been carried. His Lordship however was so disgusted with measures and orders that could neither be justified by precedent, reason, or necessity, and which proceeded so glaringly from no other motive than that hostile disposition, which had but too frequently manifested itself against him, that he would at once have retired from the chair of the presidency, if any person appointed at home to succeed him had been upon the spot to fill it. He earnestly entreated the Court of Directors to make such appointment. Previously indeed to this period, in his letter of the 24th January 1784,

* Extract from the minutes of the select committee of the presidency of Fort St. George, July 31, 1784. Appendix, No. 14.

† The supreme council was composed of Mr. Hastings, Mr. Macpherson, and Mr. Wheeler.

to the secret committee of the Court of Directors, he had observed, " I will freely own to you that, during the whole
" course of my public life, nothing has given me such real
" concern as that it should have fallen to my lot to conduct
" your administration here at a period when every measure I
" take is so full of hazard, and when I find it utterly impos-
" sible to execute what I conceive to be the duties of my
" trust, and even the first and most essential rights of your
" government, without various opposition and much private
" animosity. But as I happened to embark in your service
" at a very critical and alarming period of your affairs on this
" coast, it would have ill become me to suffer any circum-
" stance of ill health, danger, or disgust, to incline me to
" abandon, during such a period, the station in which you
" had placed me, whilst I was able to undergo, at any risk,
" the fatigue and anxiety with which it has been accompa-
" nied. You will also easily conceive that as I have religi-
" ously observed my covenants to the honorable Company,
" the state of my private fortune would but ill bear a sudden
" resignation of my present appointment. Yet as my health
" has suffered much, and as it may be doubted whether a
" further sacrifice of it would be repaid by such a success in
" my future efforts, for the more solid and permanent esta-
" blishment of your affairs here, as to determine me on re-
" maining in the charge of them, I think it my duty to sug-
" gest to you the propriety of appointing an eventual successor
" to the government of Fort St. George, in the case of my
" death or departure from this place. The administration of
" your affairs in this part of the world immediately succeeding
" the restoration of peace, must decide the future stability

“ or declension of your commerce and dominion ; and unless
“ you appoint the ablest and honestest men that can be found
“ to fill the first situations, your possessions most assuredly
“ will soon slip from you, and your Indian empire will pass
“ away like a shadow, and be only remembered as a
“ dream.”

The Directors however found it expedient to detain Lord Macartney in India for further mortifications, before they thought fit to relieve him from his government. Those mortifications seem principally to have arisen out of the assignment of the revenues of the Carnatic, which he had with great skill and management procured from the nabob of Arcot to enable the Company to carry on a war which had for its object both their and his own annihilation. The history of this transaction, and its consequences to the personal feelings, the future fortunes and the character of Lord Macartney, is too important to be passed over without particular notice. It may serve also to throw some light upon the character and conduct of those dependent princes which the Company's servants have, unwisely as it would appear, set up between their masters, who ought to hold the real sovereignty of the conquered countries in their own hands, and the numerous and oppressed subjects of those countries.

When Lord Macartney with infinite address, perseverance, and difficulty had, at length, succeeded in obtaining from the nabob of Arcot a voluntary assignment of the revenues of the Carnatic for the support of the war, of which he had been the principal cause, and in the event of which he was most

materially concerned, although hitherto he had not in reality advanced a single pagoda towards the vast expense of carrying it on, his Lordship immediately placed the collection and the application of the assigned revenues under the direction of a committee, of which Mr. Oakley was president, whose integrity and ability gained them universal applause. The gentlemen however, who composed this committee, soon discovered that, notwithstanding all their precautions, the terms of the agreement were most grossly violated by the agents of the nabob. By their vigilance they detected the secret orders, which were sent into the provinces, to counteract their regulations, and the plans that were adopted for instilling into the minds of the renters a distrust of the validity of the engagements they had entered into with the English government. In fact, the committee had ample proof that delays and evasions were created, and scenes of oppression and gross mismanagement committed in every district, where the influence of the Durbar had secretly worked its way; that large sums of money had been embezzled and sent privately to the nabob's second son the Ameer ul Omrah. This prince had, in fact, been greatly instrumental in obtaining the assignment, and became security to his father for the due performance of the conditions of the agreement on the part of Lord Macartney*. Having long obtained a complete

* Translation of an obligation given by the nabob Ameer ul Omrah Bahauder to his Highness the Nabob Wallau Jah, dated 14 Zehgi 1195, or 1st December 1781.

"I do hereby represent and declare to his Highness the Nabob in the most solemn manner, and with the utmost sincerity, that what I have hitherto perceived in the conduct and verbal assurances of Lord Macartney is for his Highness's good, and

possession of his father's mind, he had for many years before been intriguing to secure to himself the succession of the Carnatic to the disherison of his elder brother Omdut ul Omrah, on whom it was settled both by grant and treaty ; and he now conceived that by rendering this signal service to the Madras government he would establish a claim on its support and assistance for the accomplishment of his unjust views. He calculated likewise on the vast sums of money he would be enabled, by his secret influence and management, to embezzle to himself from the aumildars or principal renters appointed by the committee of the assigned revenue. But the stubborn integrity of Lord Macartney, and the vigilance and activity of the committee, soon put an end to the expectations he had formed on this head, and baffled all his schemes of ambition and of wealth. Thus disappointed in the strong hope he had entertained of making the assignment subservient to his views, he set at work every engine that cunning and falsehood could supply, to recover the assignment of the revenues. For purposes of this nature fit instruments are seldom wanting in India. There was a man in the Company's service, whose enmity Lord Macartney had secured by being obliged

that his Lordship considers the injuries and advantages of the Company and the Nabob to be one and the same. And I hereby bind myself to the nabob, in case his highness shall invest Lord Macartney with power over the revenue of his country, and to appoint renters for the Circar's share, that his Lordship will apply himself solely to the collection of those revenues, without the least interference in his highness's government ; and further, that his Lordship will strictly adhere, without the least deviation, to every promise or engagement that he may make with the nabob, relating to this business. Thus do I become bound to the nabob for the above ; and in case it shall hereafter be departed from, I will take the blame and responsibility upon myself."

to dismiss him from some of his employments. Men of unbridled passions are oftener connected by their enmities than their regards. The Ameer ul Omrah and this man were well known to each other. Mutual esteem did not appear to attach them by any tie of friendship; but as soon as the object of their antipathies was the same they united at once. This man, though a servant of the Company, without the permission of the governor, and contrary to the Company's orders, had constant communication with the nabob and the Ameer ul Omrah. Though a servant of the Company he publicly devoted himself to the service of the nabob, misinforming his mind, misleading his judgment, exciting his passions, and fomenting his designs, contrary to the real and ultimate interest, satisfaction, and tranquillity of the nabob himself, and contrary to the interest and reputation of the British nation, the Company, and the Company's government at Madras. By the machinations of these two men the good effects that were calculated to arise from the assignment were for a time successfully opposed; and, in consequence of them, considerable perplexity and confusion prevailed in the country districts. But the scrupulous exactness and the indefatigable labors of the committee of assigned revenue led to a speedy detection of the secret influence, which had so powerfully and successfully been employed to counteract their proceedings. The determination of Lord Macartney to apply an effectual remedy for those abuses, and to expose that secret influence heightened the disappointment of the Ameer and the displeasure of the nabob into resentment. The latter, finding it impossible to avoid the reproach of violating a solemn and voluntary engagement, had recourse

to the language of recrimination; he taxed the committee with ignorance and mismanagement of his country, and ascribed to those causes that want of success which was, in fact, owing entirely to the exertion of his own and his second son's secret influence against them.

Disappointed in the plan he had formed of converting the assignment to his personal advantage, the Ameer ul Omrah, always on the look-out for occasions that might be turned to his own benefit, lost no time in endeavoring with the assistance of his new friend to bring about a reconciliation with Sir Eyre Coote (between whom a most cordial hatred had long subsisted) from the moment it was known that the Bengal government had conferred on that general an unparticipated command over the forces in the Carnatic. With this view the old nabob was prevailed upon to write to him to the following effect: "that as the governor-general had found it expedient to invest him with full power to act as he should think proper for the public good, and as his highness had experience of his abilities, exertions and bravery for many years, he had thought fit to confer on him (Sir Eyre Coote) alone full powers over all the officers of his government and revenues." But although the general had the prudence not to accept of this *fourth* assignment of the nabob, so many new and opposite authorities and pretensions could not fail to impede the management of the revenues and distract the minds of the inhabitants.

Lord Macartney was now convinced that every obstacle would be thrown in the way to render the assignment un-

productive, and to vilify his conduct; that every practice which could allure or deter would be employed by the Durbar. But he was determined to persevere steadily, unshaken by menace and unseduced by temptation. His rigid adherence to covenants, and his positive refusal of all presents from the first moment of his arrival in India, were matters so new to them that they were totally at a loss to what motive they ought to be ascribed. At one time such conduct was imputed to his ignorance of the mode of governing the black people of India; at another it was suggested that his avarice might aim at something more than had yet been offered; and under the idea that by encreasing the bribe, the temptation to accept it would be strengthened in proportion, the usual lack of pagodas presented to a new governor was encreased to two, with an apology from the nabob for having, in the first instance, offered to a man of his rank in life the sum only which was due to a commoner. The embarrassment into which the refusal of 80,000 *l.* threw the whole Durbar was extremely amusing to Lord Macartney. Another lure had been held out to him at a very early period of his government. According to a custom, which it seems is very common among those powers of India, who are said to be under the Company's protection, every governor, admiral, or commander in chief who may happen to wear the insignia of any order of distinction or merit, is almost certain of being presented with a diamond star—he is given to understand that a plain silver badge in India would be considered as incompatible with his rank and station, and that he must therefore allow them to supply him with one more becoming his dignity—it is said to be “only a little *betel* among

“ friends”—of this ceremony some idea may be collected from Lord Macartney’s account of it in a letter to a gentleman, whom he had considered for some time as his friend *. “ Before I conclude,” says he, “ I must tell you that yesterday his highness Wallau Jah, attended with all the royal family, gave a grand breakfast to Sir Edward Hughes, Sir Eyre Coote, Sir Hector Munro, &c. and all the principal officers of the squadron. The latter were invited to be witnesses of his highness’ munificence to their admiral on account of his eminent services. The admiral arrived in his uniform but soon retired into another apartment, where he was untrussed, and then returned in a fine brocade coat with a diamond star upon it that far outshone

“ The wealth of Ormus or of Ind.”

“ Charles Binney read aloud the nabob’s compliment upon the occasion, which was re-echoed by Arthur Cuthbert, who, in his turn, read the admiral’s reply. The Captains were sprinkled with rose water, bedewed with ottar, and had rings of flowers put round their necks, but no other sort of rings or even shawls made their appearance, which I hear the sea fish expected to have had a bite at, and were not a little ruffled at the disappointment. *Entre nous*, had I known it in time, I should have contrived to put the admiral on his guard against such a ceremony, because some persons may possibly make an ill use of it, and I really have a very great regard for him. I must add a particular which Sir Hector Munro told me. The admiral, it seems, had desired that the governor might be

* Extract of a letter from Lord Macartney to Mr. Macpherson, dated Fort St. George, July 26, 1782.

“ invited to this breakfast, and both he and Sir Hector were
“ assured it should be so. To their great surprize he was not
“ there, and upon inquiry it was found that Paul’s * preach-
“ ing had prevailed against their’s, and the governor was not
“ invited ;

Sic me servavit Apollo.

“ for it would have embarrassed me confoundedly to have
“ been asked, as the act of Parliament speaks very strong
“ language against this same star, and there is not a ragga-
“ muffin here but may recover in the mayor’s court double
“ the value of it. It was once thought that no Knight of the
“ Bath could resist the dazzle of one of these gewgaws ;
“ yet out of half a dozen brethren there is one at least, who
“ has not been blinded by them. That lure, among others,
“ was thrown out, when still stronger was rejected, and was
“ called *only betel among friends* ; but it was a kind of *betel*
“ I was determined neither to chew nor swallow, and I wish
“ some of our friends had been of the same way of thinking.”

Finding the inefficacy of every attempt to allure by presents, or deter by menace, the nabob’s son and his associate had recourse to the writing of letters, in the nabob’s name, to Bengal, filled with misrepresentation and falsehood, and to Lord Macartney couched in gross and abusive language. Many of the former, as will hereafter be seen, were entered on the public records, sent home with the public proceedings, but carefully concealed from the government of Madras. To the latter for some time his Lordship condescended to

* Paul Benfield, it is presumed, is the person here alluded to.

reply in terms of respectful civility, and declarations of his good intentions towards himself and his family. "In all events and at all times," he observes, in one of his letters to the nabob, "your highness may perfectly rely on the rectitude of my intentions. I have no other view than to render your highness's situation honorable and happy, to restore peace and prosperity to your dominions, and provide for the heavy debts due to the Company and your private creditors. These are the objects nearest my heart, and I have no doubt of their being fully accomplished if your highness will follow the natural dictates of your own mind, and afford me that hearty support and co-operation which, as a sincere friend to your highness and a faithful servant to the Company, I have a right to expect."

But to render the situation of the nabob honorable and happy would not have answered the expectations and views of the Ameer ul Omrah and his new friend. The steadiness of Lord Macartney tended to exasperate these unprincipled associates. Every species of calumny was cast upon his character, and the most illiberal reflections upon his conduct. They fabricated letters in the name of the nabob which were sent direct to England, imputing corruption to him who, from the hour of his arrival in India, they were well convinced had never accepted for his own benefit "a single pagoda, a diamond or even a shawl;" to him, who, to their own knowledge, had refused what, in the opinion of most men, would constitute a princely fortune. They prevailed on the nabob to address himself to the whole council of Madras collectively, where they knew they had some

friends, abusing the president in the grossest terms, and inventing the most malevolent and improbable falsehoods with the view of sowing a division between him and the members of his government; but this expedient failed them. The select committee, in their general letter to the Court of Directors observe, on this occasion, "We cannot deny ourselves the
"satisfaction of giving this public testimony of our indig-
"nant sense of the injuries which our president has drawn
"upon himself by his disinterested zeal for the welfare of
"your affairs, and the just and necessary measures which
"that zeal has dictated; nor should we acquit ourselves of
"our duty to you, or do that justice to our president, which
"he merits at our hands and yours, if, when every species
"of calumny and abuse is employed to traduce and vilify his
"character, and every expedient tried that low cunning and
"disappointed ambition can suggest to embarrass his admi-
"nistration, we omitted to declare our most sincere and con-
"scientious belief, that to those very measures you princi-
"pally owe the salvation of your interests, and the nabob
"any reasonable hope of being restored to the possession of
"his country. We have also pride and satisfaction in assur-
"ing you, that although the nabob has not thought proper
"to include your select committee in his reproaches, we have
"uniformly supported and acquiesced in the conduct by
"which they have been incurred; and we claim our share of
"responsibility for that conduct, and of the censure or ap-
"plause which it shall be found to deserve of you and of
"the public*."

* Extract of a letter from the select committee of Fort St. George to the court of directors, dated Oct. 31, 1782.

Thus disappointed and defeated in all their projects, they had the audacity of addressing a letter to the king of Great Britain, stating, in the nabob's name, that he had been induced to submit powers over the revenues of his country to a man unequal to the great trust reposed in him, "to one who
"has exercised all manner of oppressions and cruelties, and
"even impeded and prevented religious worship throughout
"my countries, who has ruined all my affairs, and has even
"proceeded to the usurpation of my government, and the
"violation of all my rights as the sovereign of the Carnatic...
"And whilst the advantages that should have attended
"the cession of the revenues to the public have been totally
"neglected and defeated by his Lordship's measures, his
"conduct and pursuits have been directed to serve his own
"private interest only*." This letter was accompanied by many others addressed to the ministers and the Court of Directors, all filled with complaints and accusations against Lord Macartney, unsupported by any proof and without the shadow of foundation; but so artfully constructed as easily to mislead the ignorant and interest the passions in favor of the nabob. The man who held the pen calculated, it seems, on the probability that among the number and variety of aspersions with which they were filled, some of them, at least, might gain credit. By throwing out a multitude of calumnies against Lord Macartney, a hope was entertained by them, that some of the charges could not fail to make an impression at home, that there must exist some ground of

* Extract of a letter (said to be a translation, but known originally to have been written in English) from the Nabob Wallau Jah to his majesty the King of Great Britain, dated October 13, 1782.

accusation against him. The artful writer was not unacquainted with the weak side of his countrymen's character; he knew well enough that to excite their passions by a tale of feigned distress was the surest means of obtaining his object. Sympathy indeed would seem to be an affection of the mind, whose strength increases in proportion to the distance of the exciting cause. Distant distress has the advantage arising from the powers of the imagination to operate in its favor; hence the supposed sufferings of a Mahomedan Khan or a Hindoo Rajah are able to dissolve the hearts of the whole nation, while objects of real distress at home, from their want of novelty, are contemplated with comparative unconcern. A tale of distress well represented is capable sometimes of exciting a kind of sensation that renders almost unwelcome the conviction of its falsehood; it is one of those pleasing errors, which, as Doctor Johnson observes, is not always willingly detected. The nabob's tale was meant to be told, but there was no intention to prove any part of it. It was equally calculated to deceive the real friends of justice and humanity, to afford to the pretenders to them an occasion of displaying their oratorical talents, or to bring forward some unknown candidate for fame to public notice. The substance of this tale of groundless complaint and accusation is contained in a letter written in the name of the Nabob to Lord Macartney, and said to be translated from the Persian, but proved to be originally written in English by the Ameer's associate. To this extraordinary and audacious compilation of falsehoods, which was not meant to operate at Madras, where the malignity of the writer was as well known as his want of veracity, but in a more distant quarter, Lord

Macartney did not condescend to make any reply. On learning however, some time after, that it had been sent home, he conceived it might be adviseable to enter on the records of the presidency, a justification of his whole conduct towards the nabob of the Carnatic. This justification, together with the abovementioned letter, to which it is an answer, are deserving of particular attention, and will be found in the Appendix *. His Lordship thought it right also to address a private letter to Lord Hillsborough then secretary of state, giving him some account of the infamous practices of the Durbar which aimed at nothing less than his destruction †.

That a considerable portion of thinking men in the British nation should suffer themselves to be so long and so repeatedly abused, with regard to the complaints of the dependent Mahomedan princes of India, can only be explained by the little trouble that is taken to inform themselves accurately on the subject: but the enormous sums of money which these intriguing men are always ready to lavish on those who may either be sufficiently ignorant, or sufficiently corrupt, to undertake their cause, will readily account for the zealous advocates which now and then stand forth as their avowed

* Translation of a Persian letter from his Highness the Nabob Wallau Jah to Lord Macartney, dated 7th Ramdan 1196, or 17th August 1782. Appendix, No. 15.

Minute of the president of Fort St. George, relative to a letter in English from the Nabob of Arcot to Lord Macartney of the 17th August, dated 16th September 1782. Appendix, No. 16.

† Letter from Lord Macartney to the Earl of Hillsborough, dated Fort St. George, 3d September 1782. Appendix, No. 17.

champions ; but the real fact is, that there is not perhaps a single individual among these mock princes which the Company's servants have created, who has not violated his engagements with those who raised him to power ; and so base are their characters and conduct in general, that every honest man, who may have had occasion to witness them upon the spot, and whose integrity has been proof against their insidious practices of corruption, must acknowledge, that there is not perhaps, upon the face of the earth, a set of creatures so depraved, so licentious, so unprincipled, and, in every respect, so worthless, as those dependent upstarts, in whose cause the powers of rhetoric have so frequently been exhausted in the British House of Commons, to rouse and to abuse the generous feelings of the nation. How few on such occasions have ever believed, that an English governor could be innocent when an Indian nabob was his accuser ; yet how very easy is it for a man, with whom truth is not considered as a moral obligation, and intrigues and treachery the whole study of his life, to produce a series of unfounded calumnies ; how difficult, at such a distance, to disprove them before the poison has worked its effect. But the time is probably not very distant, when the public, in this respect, will be undeceived ; for as a great moralist has observed, it seldom thinks long on any subject without at last attaining to think right. It is however really surprising that, after a lapse of more than half a century, the people of England should still continue to be deluded by every new declaimer, who, bent upon thrusting himself into notice, and fed by the bounty of a nabob, impudently ventures to step forward to mislead the public mind, and to arraign the conduct of those who have really

deserved well of their country by a conscientious discharge of their duty. Whoever will give himself the trouble of examining the records of Bengal and Madras must unavoidably be convinced, that so long as the system is continued of setting up nizams and viziers, nabobs and rajahs, without any real claims or pretensions, as the ostensible governors of countries, provinces, and districts, but, in fact, mere tools of the Company; no governor-general of Bengal, nor president of Madras, provided he be an honest man, can possibly escape their intrigues, their hatred, and their calumny; but if he will allow them to break their engagements with the Company, to corrupt its servants, to purchase indulgencies by bribes, to oppress the inhabitants by extortion and cruelty and murder, and to plunder and encroach upon every petty power that borders on their respective countries, he will be extolled by them as the wisest and best governor that ever ruled in India. Nothing has most assuredly had so strong a tendency to injure the British name among the real and substantial powers of Hindostan, as the impolitic measure of setting up these puppets of authority, and nothing probably would have more influence in consolidating the peace and the prosperity of India, than the abolishing of those double governments, and taking the management of such countries as avowedly belong to the British empire, entirely into our own hands. As a matter of expediency the Company seem now pretty well convinced, that the measure must be adopted; and that those nurseries of oppression, intrigue, and corruption must be destroyed: millions of unhappy yet unoffending natives would then know to whom they were to look up for protection, which, under the present

system of things, is, at least, with them a matter of doubt and distress; by discontinuing the creation of dependent nizams, nabobs, rajahs, and khans, the Company would get rid of so many stumbling-blocks to their prosperity, and stepping-stones to their enemies. And better far would it be for them even to double the already large emoluments of their servants from the highest to the lowest rather than, out of consideration to their interests, to keep up those phantoms of power with influence and wealth, however, sufficient to corrupt their conduct, and feed their avarice. Those who conceive, that a government in India, while embarrassed by the intrigues of dependent nabobs and rajahs, is an enviable situation, are little acquainted with the difficulties and dangers with which it is surrounded. To a strictly honest man, bent on doing his duty, a more heart-rending situation can scarcely be imagined; he must either lend the aid of his authority to the most horrid oppressions, cruelties, and murders, or if he resists, incur the charge of oppression himself; thus he treads on thorns at every step, and after years of toil and anxiety for the public welfare, he will retire from the scene with the mortification of finding that all his endeavors have been exhausted in vain to eradicate that system of corruption, which is nurtured in every petty court of Hindostan; that he has only drawn upon himself the malignity of those who float within its vortex; and, what is worst of all, he may almost lay his account of meeting at home with the frigid indifference of his employers.

But to return to his Highness Wallau Jah, the nabob of Arcot, a sketch of whose history will apply pretty nearly to all the others. The treacherous conduct of this

faithful ally to the Company (as he affects to stile himself), in exciting and encouraging its enemies, and corrupting its servants, was alone sufficient to deprive him of any favorable consideration; for he was and had long been, in every sense of the word, a traitor to the interests of those to whom he owed every step of his present elevation, and every pretension to rank and power. Whatever these pretensions might be at any other time for independent sovereignty, he had now made a temporary resignation of them by a voluntary act of his own, and a voluntary declaration to the Court of Directors that he had done so. His subsequent repentance argued no violence nor unkindness in those to whom he had assigned the management of his country, but fickleness of judgment and inequality of temper in him. His pretensions indeed were not at any time grounded on the best foundation. He first rose into notice by a train of sudden and unfortunate accidents to others. His father held a very subordinate office under the soubahdar or viceroy of the Decan in one of the northern Circars, from whence he was removed to the command of the garrison of Arcot in the room of Abdalla who, on the eve of his intended departure from that fortress, was found dead in his bed. No one doubted that this sudden accident was brought about, as Wallau Jah expresses it, "according to the rule and practice of Hindostan *." The government of this place had been destined for Seid Mahomet, a youth not yet of an age fit to govern. This youth was assassinated by the same rule and practice in the presence of him who had succeeded Abdalla, and to whose care

* *Requests* of the Nabob Wallau Jah to the Governor-general. Appendix, No. 9.

he was entrusted. By these two acts he seated himself in the government, which he continued to hold till, in the course of the contests with opposite claimants and the avengers of young Mahomet's death, he fell bravely in battle at Amboor. His eldest son, whilst pursuing his father's courageous example, was taken prisoner in the field, but the second, Mahomet Ali, afterwards the nabob Wallau Jah, secured himself by flight. With a singular and fortunate foresight of those accidents, he had procured from the Soubahdar of the Decan, in preference to his elder brother, a reversion to the subordinate government of the Carnatic; or, with a boldness and quickness of address, suited to the occasion, and countenanced by frequent examples in the confusion of the Mogul empire, he asserted at once that he had such a reversion. To this title real or pretended, which however was generally believed to be a forgery, he had very little in addition to recommend his pretensions. The authority was not supported by reputation, troops or treasure. The people were attached to his opponents, the family of their former governors. He applied for support in vain to the French East India Company; they were engaged in different views—those views extended to the exclusive possession of the country. Their representative claimed the honors and privileges of a nabob in his own person, and the nabobship of the Carnatic for Chunda Saheb. The English East India Company saw they must either abandon the coast or dispute the possession of the country with their European rivals. Their interference was a matter of necessity not of choice. The constitutional authority of the Mogul was hid in the anarchy of the times. It was, for that period, a va-

cated dominion which converted occupancy into a right. Under such circumstances, Mahomed Ali, afterwards the nabob Wallau Jah, accompanied the English troops. He gave them the assistance of his advice, and he contributed the influence, such as it was, of his new office. But so little at that time did he or the English think of conquering merely for him, that the Company's colors were regularly hoisted on the forts that surrendered to its arms. He afterwards desired, not as a matter of right but to encrease his authority, and to convince the people of the Company's esteem for him, that the flag of the Circar or nabobship might be hoisted in the country forts. Before he joined the English he did not, in fact, possess a single village in any part of the province: the French had conquered the whole, possessed the whole, garrisoned the forts with their troops, and collected the revenues; those forts were afterwards retaken, the French driven out, and the whole country reconquered, not by the nabob nor his people, but by the English alone, at a vast expense of blood and treasure. After they had done this nothing prevented them from keeping the whole, as a dependent country, but their moderation, which was then no less signal than their victories. They delivered all these conquered provinces into the nabob's administration; and, on his part, he was well content to bear the name only of managing their affairs in the Carnatic, leaving, in effect, the power still in the hands of the conquerors. By this short sketch, which is true in every part, may be seen how much idle declamation has been employed, on various occasions, to impress upon the minds of the public an idea that our Indian empire was originally obtained by violence and injustice

towards the natives ; whereas it was, in fact, obtained by conquering those who had seized it by violence, and held it by injustice.

The office of nabob was uninterruptedly continued to Mahomed Ali. The sanction of the Mogul's name and a genuine commission for the nabobship were obtained for him by the influence of the Company ; but as well in the signification of the name, as in the nature of the office, it implies deputation and dependence. It is an office entirely confined to military command. It is utterly distinct from the administration of the revenues which belongs independently to the office of Dewan *. In prevailing upon some of the Company's servants to unite these offices for a time, the nabob met with considerable difficulty and opposition, and succeeded only upon a revertible condition in case of a failure in his engagements. The friends he gained to his support on this trying occasion, supported him only in the allegation of their inexperience, at that early period, of the country government. It was stipulated, that the Company should receive a certain portion of the revenues towards reimbursing the vast sums they had expended, leaving him an ample share to support the dignity of his station, and, in their mutual connection, he acknowledged the Company to be the giver and himself the receiver. He offered to make these payments in monthly proportions, and he agreed, that the Company should resume possession of the country if he should be found guilty of any secret practices,

* Orme's History of Hindostan.

or endeavor to alienate the revenue ; and that if he, at any time, gave just occasion, the Company should break all connection with him ; and again taking possession of the whole, should only settle upon him and his family such an allowance as might be considered necessary for his subsistence, without leaving him in any authority *.

All these motives, promises, and reservations were not sufficient to prevent strong dissent from granting such indulgence, grounded upon the character and the conduct of the nabob from the commencement of the Company's connection with him. Whether it arose from that deadly hatred, which the creed of a Mahomedan teaches him to bear "to those Christian dogs," or whether his views extended to independent sovereignty, it was soon discovered that the Company was nourishing a serpent in its bosom, who was anxiously watching for the first favorable moment to give it a mortal sting ; the Company knew it, but wanted the resolution to crush this treacherous ally, while in the mean time he discovered the secret of closing the eyes of their representatives at Madras. The conditions of the lease were often broken, but the resumption was as often forgotten. His want of faith and total dereliction of principle were overlooked in consideration of the amiable manners, the engaging deportment, and dazzling magnificence for which he was long distinguished. He soon found out that private munificence to those who were in power was the surest and the readiest way to procure public indulgences. His former obligations were

* Consultations of Fort St. George, June 13, 1761.

lost in the demand of fresh favors. It is the misfortune of men who have no original claims to know, when successful, no bounds to their views. The former limits of his government soon became too narrow to contain him, and claims were laid to new districts. Every inferior rajah or Hindoo chief was to be reduced by the Company's forces to the nabob's subjection, "according to the rule and practice of Hindostan," for which he compensated his friends the Company with thanks*. He considered his family to be the favorite objects of the Company's encreased power. When the provinces of Bengal became subject to the Company, Mahomed Ali had the modesty to propose that his eldest son Omdut ul Omrah should be transferred to the nabobship of that country, whilst his favorite son Ameer ul Omrah was to succeed to that of the Carnatic. His views to the Decan, his earnest wishes even for all Hindostan were well known to the native powers, and were highly injurious to the British interests. But among the princes of Hindostan he was no more reckoned than the nabob of Oude, both being Europeans in connections, in dependence, and in the jealousy and hatred entertained against them; it could not indeed be expected that the real powers of the country would ever place a perfect reliance on the equity, moderation, or good faith of the English East India Company, while any of its chief servants lent their authority and countenance to those dependent nabobs in the commission of acts derogatory from those principles.

* Requests of the Nabob Wallau Jah to the Governor-general. Appendix, No. 9.

The whole revenues of the Carnatic were at length suffered to be absorbed and indeed were found insufficient to keep up the nabob's dignity, and to make such frequent purchases of indulgence from the Company's representatives at Fort St. George, as were necessary to secure their attachment to his person. By extreme mismanagement of the country, by that strange misapplication of the revenues for purposes of corruption, and as strange a passion for accumulation, his troops were neglected, their pay withheld and, at the breaking out of the Carnatic war, were actually compelled to seek subsistence from the enemy. Yet this bankrupt nabob of Arcot, as was observed in the House of Commons in one of the debates on the India bill, had contrived to thrust five or six members into the British parliament; and his acts of generosity at the Durbar had hitherto secured him the countenance of the Company's servants at Madras. Each succeeding governor seemed anxious to rival his predecessor in extolling the virtues and the fidelity of the Company's ancient ally, the nabob Wallau Jah. Indeed on one occasion, so condescending and compliant was the conduct of this Mahomedan prince, that he even suffered himself to be prevailed upon to violate his religious faith in favor of Christian infidels, by pledging himself as a sponsor at the solemn sacrament of baptism, to a child of one of the Company's servants at Fort St. George.

The different line of conduct, pursued by Lord Macartney towards this substitute of the Company's authority in the Carnatic, will readily account for the resentment of the latter;

it was of all others the most mortifying and alarming circumstance to him and his numerous dependents, that the universal specific which had hitherto been found capable of lulling to repose the consciences of so many governors of Fort St. George should fail of producing its usual effect on the stubborn constitution of Lord Macartney. His obstinate refusal to take the Durbar's prescription, under any disguise or mode of preparation, convinced them that his disorder was incurable, and that the only hope left for them was to get rid of him as soon as they could. Had this infatuated man listened to his Lordship's advice, the misfortunes that subsequently visited his family would, in all probability, never have happened; and the millions of money, which are said to be due to the creditors of that family, and now under consideration of payment by the Company, would not have remained at this time a burden on the revenues of the Carnatic. "Had
" I," says his Lordship, "endeavored to delude him by flat-
" tering his passions, by giving him hopes of repossessing
" Tanjore, of extirpating or expelling every Zemindar or Po-
" lygar of the Carnatic, whose riches or territory excited his
" avarice or ambition, and of aiding him to elevate his se-
" cond son to the disherison of his eldest; or had I endea-
" voured to delude the Company by representing that he
" truly was what he affects to style himself, the *hereditary* in-
" dependent sovereign of the Carnatic, and a man of strict
" honor and integrity; that he had the purest intentions and
" wishes for your interests and prosperity, and that you
" might rely on his generosity and liberality of sentiments for
" the performance of all his engagements with you, I should
" have been extolled by him as the best governor you ever

“ sent to Fort St. George, and I might possibly have been
“ one of the richest. But ever attentive to the various orders
“ and instructions with which you have thought necessary to
“ guard your presidency of Madras, your apprehension of the
“ nabob's aspiring views, the jealousies you had expressed of
“ his designs at different periods and on different occasions,
“ your wise policy in endeavoring to hold in your own hands
“ the whole military power of the country, and that the na-
“ bob should depend entirely on the Company for protection
“ and support, I regulated my conduct accordingly, and
“ never for a moment lost sight of those great lines of direc-
“ tion for my government.

“ To conciliate the nabob's mind to his real situation, which
“ he seemed willing to forget; to revive in his memory,
“ without wounding his delicacy or his pride, the steps by
“ which he had risen to elevation; to lead him to feel his
“ obligations to the Company, that whatever rank or terri-
“ tory he had ever possessed, either by his paper titles or by
“ actual occupancy, he derived from their arms, their influ-
“ ence, their generosity; and that his interests and security
“ were so involved in theirs, that to attempt or pretend to a
“ distinct, separate, independent sovereignty, as he talked of,
“ or to imagine that he could exist without the Company, or
“ to expect that the Company would go on defending the
“ country at their own expense, without an adequate share of
“ the revenues of it, were absurdities that, though in some
“ measure warranted by former friendship or connivance, he
“ ought no longer to indulge in, as they would prove a fatal
“ deceit upon himself, and must soon end in his total destruc-

“ tion, and in that of his best friends on the coast. To
 “ engage the nabob’s mind to a calm consideration of these
 “ points was not an easy task ; but it was a necessary one,
 “ and was performed with success : the result was his assign-
 “ ment of the revenue.

“ Having obtained this assignment, I held it fast with a
 “ steadiness and perseverance which the Durbar, I believe,
 “ did not expect ; that whether from pride, prudence, or
 “ principle, I held myself above temptation, that from my
 “ growing experience in your affairs I became proof against
 “ imposition, and against those arts which, having been
 “ practised, perhaps successfully, upon others, it was pro-
 “ voking to see lost upon me, and that through every trans-
 “ action with them I endeavored to discharge the duty of an
 “ honest man and a faithful servant to the Company and the
 “ State—these are offences that I know the Durbar will never
 “ forgive me ; and I have therefore little doubt that wherever
 “ I am, I shall meet in my way with frequent traces of their
 “ malignity as long as I live*.”

* Letter from Lord Macartney to the committee of secrecy of the Court of Directors, dated Calcutta, 27th July 1785.

Some idea may be formed of the difficulty and vexation which Lord Macartney suffered in this business from the following extract of a letter from him to Mr. Sullivan, chairman of the Court of Directors, dated January 28, 1782.

“ The proceedings will inform you at large of the nabob’s assignment of his
 “ revenue. In the course of my life, I have had the conduct of several very dif-
 “ ficult negotiations with very difficult men, in different parts of the world ; but
 “ never had I more occasion for all the little prudence, caution, and address that
 “ I may possess, than on this point ; and after all, I will confess to you that I be-
 “ lieve I never could have made any impression *upon him*, if I had not given him
 “ the most convincing proofs that he could make no impression *upon me*. And if

The last expedient they tried was those fabrications which were sent to England; but as on a former occasion their embassy to England had been followed up with tolerable success by an embassy to Bengal, so in the present instance the same two ministers Assam Cawn and Mr. Richard Joseph Sullivan were once more dispatched thither, with memorials of complaints and accusations against the president of Fort St. George, all equally unfounded as those transmitted to England. There appeared indeed, at this time, but a slender probability, that the ambassadors of Mahomet Ali would make any impression favorable to their cause on the governor-general and his council. These gentlemen had, in their official as well as private capacity, applauded the ability and the address of Lord Macartney, in procuring from the nabob a voluntary assignment of his revenues. They had officially condemned the nabob's conduct in withholding his assistance towards defraying the expenses of the war, and declared unequivocally that the case would justify a demand from him of the immediate transfer of his whole country in exclusive assignment. They had proceeded so far as to advise the preceding government of Madras to adopt this measure, adding that "had they the authority to command, they should peremptorily command it*." And when the voluntary assignment was obtained which ex-

"any of my predecessors had acted upon the same system, good God! what a glorious situation would your affairs in the Carnatic have been in! I cannot, without tears of grief and indignation, think upon the subject for a moment."

* Letter from governor-general and council to the governor and select committee of Fort St. George, dated 26th February 1781.

torted their applause of the zeal and ability which dictated and brought to effect so important a measure, "they regret
"that the government of Madras should have suffered any
"consideration even of delicacy towards the nabob or atten-
"tion for those feelings, which it might be natural for him to
"retain for the interests of the Carnatic, to restrain them
"from availing themselves as effectually of the assignment
"as the desperate necessity which exacted such a concession
"inevitably demanded." "Happy," continue they, "would
"it be for the national interests and reputation, if the same
"disinterested and forbearing spirit should invariably dictate
"the conduct of their affairs *." After many professions of the
high estimation in which they held the character of Lord
Macartney, they recommend that he assume and exercise the
entire and undivided administration of the revenues of the
Carnatic, and every power connected with it. "In a word,"
say they, "the whole sovereignty, if it shall be necessary to
"the effectual exercise of such a charge, not admitting the
"interposition of any authority whatever which may possibly
"impede it. If you continue the nabob's agents, or suffer
"them to remain, under whatever denomination, in the actual
"or virtual control of the revenue, they are your servants,
"and you alone will be deemed responsible for all their acts;
"and your intercourse with the nabob may and ought to be
"restricted to simple acts and expressions of kindness †."

* Letter from the governor-general and council to the president and select committee of Fort St. George, dated 5th April 1782.

† Ibidem.

So much indeed did Mr. Hastings affect to be captivated with the assignment of the Carnatic to Lord Macartney, exclusive of the other members of the government, that when Mr. Staunton was at Bengal he made no scruple in expressing his admiration at the address, which must have been used to procure it, and in recommending his Lordship to proceed with a high hand ; he applauded it because it was a bold measure, before he seemed to know that it was a necessary one, in which case only it is laudable to be bold.

These sentiments of the governor-general and his council, though as well known and understood at the Durbar as at Fort St. George, did not however prevent a second visit of Assam Cawn to Bengal. This wily Mahomedan was well aware that the sentiments of men were liable to change with a change of circumstances, and to vary with the tide of the passions ; and that it did not therefore by any means follow that the opinions of the Bengal government should point the same way in January 1783, that they appeared to do in April 1782. His calculations, it seems, were not ill founded. The difference which nine months had produced in the feelings of the supreme council towards the presidency of Madras, or the solid arguments which Assam Cawn had to offer, or their united influence, were found of sufficient weight to obtain a hearing. A memorial which, but a few months before they had recommended him to withdraw, was now, with a second memorial, received and read, and, together with his deposition, entered on the records of the presidency, and sent home with other papers of complaint and accusation against Lord Ma-

cartney, without referring such papers to him for his justification against the groundless charges they contained, and even without acquainting him that such charges had been preferred, until they had been sent away to England without an answer and without a comment from the person accused. These memorials were carefully entered on the records before the departure of the Lively packet for England. "In mentioning them," says the select committee of Fort St. George *, "in your letter to the Court of Directors, you simply refer to the papers themselves; you state no remark upon them; you had not indeed then taken them into consideration; you had not as yet had the accuser's testimony; but you send the accusation. You did not chuse to have to send the answer of the accused. This partial transaction is however to be considered as impartial justice, because you added no remarks. You did not therefore remark that you kept those accusations carefully from us, by which means you left them to their full operation against us, and secured for them the benefit of a first and long impression before any defence could follow on our part, depriving us, until it may prove too late, of the opportunity to deny, or refute, or explain the charges, or to offer what we had to offer in our justification; it was a cause, it seems, to be heard only on one side." In the same letter they accuse the supreme council of not suffering the Lively packet to call at Fort St. George, though it was usual, and agreeable to the orders of the Court of Directors, for packets from Bengal to call at Madras for public dispatches; though no season was

* Extract of a letter from the president and select committee of Fort St. George to the governor-general and council, dated 25th May 1783.

more favorable for calling there than when the Lively sailed ; though she carried from Bengal no particular dispatches, but that no time had occurred at which recent accounts from Madras, the seat of war, could more anxiously be sought or were more requisite to be known by the Court of Directors ; they state that Lord Macartney had requested, in a note to Mr. Hastings, that the Lively packet might be directed to touch at Fort St. George, as he had few opportunities of sending dispatches immediately from thence by any quick conveyance ; but that neither this request nor those reasons, neither motives of public duty nor private civility had been sufficient to allow the Lively packet to touch at Madras. “ Of whatever “ information,” they continue, “ you might have been pos- “ sessed in relation to charges brought before you against “ any individual in a public or private capacity, it would “ have been suitable to the wisdom and dignity of the most “ enlightened tribunal to announce such charge specifically “ to such individual, to call upon him for his defence, to “ give him an opportunity to offer it before you would pro- “ ceed to pronounce upon his conduct. However evident “ might have appeared our guilt, and whether it went to the “ loss of fortune, fame, or office, or was, in the first instance, “ to consist in the heavy misfortune of your censure, the es- “ tablished maxims of justice, the regularity and solemnity “ of judgment, the tenderness and precaution of humanity “ required that, before sentence was passed, we should be “ put upon trial and heard in our defence. It with our “ cause was complicated the public cause ; if in consequence “ of the conviction of our misconduct, the Company whom “ we represent were to be deprived of the benefit of an as-

“ signment, which was deemed proper, just, and necessary,
“ which you advised, authorized, and applauded, such a
“ consequence did not entitle you to proceed more lightly to
“ such conviction *.” On the indecency of taking the depo-
sitions of two persons, interested as they must necessarily
be from their situations at the Durbar, they thus observe:
“ His highness’s two memorials, which are in the English lan-
“ guage, and said to be translations, were probably framed
“ by Mr. Sullivan, though presented by Assam Cawn, a Ma-
“ homedan not conversant in our language. These two per-
“ sons, as if not without bias in the cause or interest in the
“ event, as if not committed by the assertions advanced al-
“ ready by them in the memorials, were the persons you se-
“ lected to stamp veracity on those memorials. Before you
“ called on them you had abundance of time to obtain from
“ hence, where the transaction passed, the whole of the testi-
“ monies relating to it. Perhaps it might have been no su-
“ perfluous caution not to rely implicitly on those willing and
“ interested witnesses, furnished by one side only, and who,
“ from temper and situation, might have observed with pre-
“ judice, and might report with partiality. Of these wit-
“ nesses one, indeed, Mr. Richard Sullivan, acknowledges he
“ was not present at the principal transaction on the 18th
“ April 1782, concerning which you called for evidence; he
“ reports what the nabob represented to him, and this spe-
“ cies of testimony he gives you very circumstantially. As to
“ Assam Cawn, the single witness, speaking from his own
“ knowledge of the transaction, when examined, not merely

* Extract of a letter from the president and select committee of Fort St. George to the governor-general and council, dated 25th May 1783.

“ the possibility or perhaps the propensity of such a man,
 “ so circumstanced and engaged as he was to mistake or mis-
 “ take the cause of his master or his own, might have oc-
 “ curred to the wisdom of your board ; but the recollection
 “ of his actual imposition on you, upon a former occasion,
 “ should, as destructive of the credibility of his testimony,
 “ have precluded the admission of it. This man, to forward
 “ the views of his patron, the nabob’s second son, the Ameer
 “ ul Omrah, not only asserted, in his first embassy to you,
 “ that his master the nabob was possessed of letters from the
 “ Company, and the king’s ministers, and the king himself,
 “ all expressing a clear acknowledgment of the nabob’s right
 “ to appoint a successor to the government of the Car-
 “ natic * ; but he had the audacity to impose upon your con-
 “ fidence †, in producing pretended copies of those from the
 “ king and the Company, thus adding the crime of forgery
 “ to that of falsehood : a falsehood so glaring from the pe-
 “ rusal of the king’s and Company’s express instructions,
 “ that the succession so settled should be maintained. From
 “ such a man, in such a cause, no precaution could assure
 “ that you would receive a genuine or perfect relation of the
 “ case ; you gave him previous warning of the subject of your
 “ intended inquiries. His answers were prepared. The scope of
 “ the notice reached no farther. In this cause he had been hi-
 “ therto a solicitor if not a party. He had been accustomed to
 “ speak the smooth but loose language of solicitation. His ob-
 “ ject was to persuade. Truth might not always have led him to

* Replies from the governor-general and council to the requests of the Nabob
 Wallau Jah, article vi. Appendix, No. 9.

† Ibidem.

“ that object ; but justice being the fit object of your inquiries,
“ and truth the most direct road to such an object, if you
“ expected to have extracted from Assam Cawn, and that he
“ really might be brought to bear testimony to truth, on this
“ occasion ; it must have been by impressing him with a sense
“ of the new character in which he was to appear, and before
“ his examination solemnly swearing him to declare the very
“ truth, in the manner of his law. But there was no such
“ preface to his examination. He was, as in any former
“ conference, requested to inform the board of the circum-
“ stances of the transaction to the best of his recollection.
“ He had notice to prepare his answers ; and there was there-
“ fore no more danger of his failing in recollection, than in
“ preserving a consistence with the representations he had
“ already made, either in his memorials or his conferences.
“ His examination over, he was then, and not before, by a
“ singular reverse of all regular and just proceedings, asked
“ if he would swear to the truth of all he had declared ? He
“ neither wished to swear to the truth, nor yet to lose the
“ benefit of his assertions. He added a new assertion, that
“ by the custom of India it was reckoned dishonorable for
“ a gentleman, or a man of certain rank, to take an oath,
“ though he acknowledged that by the Mahomedan law he
“ might attest the whole upon oath : but all he had related
“ his eyes had seen, his ears had heard, his tongue had ut-
“ tered, and he had heard from the mouths of others *.
“ This declamation must not have been intended to imply,
“ what nature has rendered incompatible, that each of the

* Bengal consultations, Jan. 8, 1783. Examination of Assam Cawn.

“ facts had struck upon each of the senses ; but rendering to
“ every sense its proper object, he had heard what was
“ spoken, and seen what was shown ; and if no more was
“ necessary to constitute the truth of what he had related, we
“ believe he might have sworn without any danger from our
“ laws. But many of the circumstances mentioned by Seyed
“ Assam Cawn, as within his own observation, actually
“ passed when he was not present, and in a language he did
“ not understand. It cost him nothing to confound what he
“ heard with what he knew, and what he wished with either.
“ In fact, the whole examination of Syed Assam Cawn,
“ though before so respectable a tribunal, and leading to so
“ important a decision, has the appearance of being almost as
“ loose and as merely plausible, as if it had been meant for
“ nothing more than an ostensible preamble to a purpose
“ predetermined.” Mr. Richard Sullivan, it seems, had little
to state, but what he had heard from the nabob, and that
little he is said to have stated incorrectly. “ The language of
“ the nabob’s agents,” they observe, “ slid into this witness’s
“ testimony. This testimony was indeed not given under the
“ awful impression of the absolute necessity of its veracity,
“ which the previous administration of a solemn and religious
“ oath cannot fail to make on a man of principle and honor.
“ This friend, this confidant, this former agent of the nabob,
“ after representing his friend’s case and partly his own ; after
“ the interrogatories were over, and he was committed by his
“ answers to them, was then asked, as in the case of Seyed
“ Assam Cawn, whether he was ready to attest all he had
“ said on oath ? This gentleman could not allege the exemp-
“ tion of gentlemen from oaths. He was in an awkward

“ predicament. He must unsay what he had just said, or he
“ must acquiesce in a sacred assertion of it. A retrospective
“ oath was tendered to him ; and he took it. The words were
“ guarded by legal and technical terms. He had given, to the
“ best of his belief and remembrance, the truth and nothing
“ but the truth, but, accidentally, perhaps, omitting that he
“ had told the whole truth *.”

Such was the nature of the examination of these two persons, upon whose evidence the governor-general and his council pronounced their final judgment. On the same day, the 8th January, their resolution was taken for the immediate surrender of the assignment to the nabob. It did not seem however that they acted under the conviction of the absolute necessity of its being immediate ; for before the order was even dispatched from Calcutta, it might have arrived at Madras by the usual channel of the post ; and after all, it was sent by a conveyance which could not be very quick, and happened to be tedious. Before its arrival orders of an opposite tendency were received at Madras from the Court of Directors, who observe, “ that upon the maturest consideration of the paper entitled, *Requests of the Nabob*, and “ also of the *Replies of the Supreme Council* thereto, they “ cannot be of opinion that the agreement made by the “ governor-general and council with the nabob in 1781, was “ either necessary or expedient ; and they therefore direct “ that the same be forthwith annulled.” The Court of Directors likewise express their surprise at the appointment of

* Extract of a letter from the president and select committee of Fort St. George to the governor-general and council, dated 25th May 1783.

Mr. Richard Joseph Sullivan, in consequence of the above-mentioned agreement to reside with the nabob as the representative and minister of the governor-general and council; and they add; "that the residence of the nabob in the vicinity of Madras clearly points out their governor and council as the fittest persons to negotiate any matters with his highness from the government of Bengal, and therefore they revoke the appointment of Mr. Sullivan." These orders were given by the Court of Directors before they knew of the voluntary assignment made to Lord Macartney; but on the receipt of this information they add, in a subsequent paragraph of the same general letter, their entire approval of the arrangement, and direct the Bengal government to give their assistance to render it effectual. When therefore the orders from Bengal to restore the assignment arrived at Madras, the superior orders from the Court of Directors had already been received to render it as effectual as possible. And accordingly they applied to the governor-general and council, as directed, for their assistance; but their application was not attended with success. The solidity of Assam Cawn's arguments had made so strong an impression on the mind of the governor-general and his council, that they even ventured to risk the displeasure that might arise from their disobedience of the orders of the Court of Directors; and after a few months' hesitation what line to take, they, at length, made a discovery that, in one of the letters from the Madras government, it was acknowledged that the assignment had sprung out of the *Replies of the governor-general and council to the Requests of the Nabob*, which was to have the sanction, force, and validity of a treaty; and as this treaty of theirs which

they themselves had abandoned, and the Court of Directors annulled, was to continue only during the war, they took their ground on this point; and, the war being now at an end, they at last acquaint the government of Madras, that they should assume the right of judging for themselves, and that in pursuance of that judgment they found it expedient to repeat their order of the 13th January, and to require “ that
“ they render back to the Nabob Wallau Jah the assignment
“ granted by him to Lord Macartney on the 2d December
“ 1781, together with the full charge and administration of the
“ sovereignty of the Carnatic, in as full and complete a manner
“ as he did or could exercise the same before the conclusion
“ of his agreement with this government of the 2d April 1781,
“ or as he can exercise the same now,” &c.

The most charitable construction that can be put on this transaction of the Bengal government is to suppose that its members suffered their passions and their prejudices to get the better of their judgment, and to close their eyes against the inevitable consequences of so rash and imprudent an act. The pay of the Madras army was at this very moment seven months in arrear. Every resource, but those within themselves, had failed; not a single pagoda, since the death of Sir Eyre Coote, had been sent from Bengal, and had it not been for those supplies drawn from the northern Circars, which Mr. Hastings would have given up, and from the assigned countries which he now ordered to be given up, the presidency of Madras must have found itself in a situation which cannot be contemplated without horror. Nothing less than a mutiny or dispersion of the troops could be expected,

and they might have been driven to the dreadful extremity of levying military and indiscriminate contributions to preserve their existence. The private sepoys, if not supplied with provisions or money, must have disbanded ; the Europeans in the Company's service were to be paid wholly in money, and so dissatisfied were both officers and men in the king's service, that if not punctually paid the worst consequences were to be apprehended. Yet under all these embarrassing circumstances, without the offer of the least assistance, and in defiance of the positive orders of the Court of Directors, the government of Bengal, after long deliberation, or, at least, after a sufficient time for that purpose, still thought fit to repeat their orders for the immediate restitution of the assignment, that rock, as Lord Macartney justly terms it, of the Company's strength upon which it rests in the Carnatic. But his Lordship had made up his mind to resist, at all hazards, the ruinous and fatal requisitions of the governor-general and his council. "From the moment," he observes to the Court of Directors, "you surrender the assignment, you cease to be a nation on the coast : and as a faithful servant and trustee for the Company, I hope not to be made a witness or an accessory to the period of your power." Notwithstanding therefore the furious menaces, in case of disobedience, which accompanied the second mandate from Bengal, he was determined to hold fast that assignment to which, under the able management of the committee of assigned revenue, was owing the salvation of the Carnatic ; and by which those very countries that, for eighteen months after the invasion of Hyder Ali, had not contributed a single pagoda towards the expenses of the war,

had actually yielded at the close of the second year between eighty and ninety lacks of rupees, or about one million sterling. One-sixth part of all the collections was punctually delivered to the nabob according to the agreement, which gave him the command of more money than he could ever boast of having during the confusion and mismanagement of his affairs which followed the invasion of Hyder Ali. The nabob himself had indeed every reason to be happy and satisfied, and, in all probability, would have felt himself so, had not his mind been poisoned by the wicked insinuations of his second son and his associates, encouraged, as we have seen, by the strange and inconsistent conduct of the governor-general and his council.

Still however the mandate of Bengal, which was soon known at the Durbar, was highly injurious to the public service, by creating in the renters doubts and apprehensions, and undermining the authority of the officers appointed for the collection of the revenues. Lord Macartney however persevered steadily and unshaken:—and when we reflect upon the numerous and apparently insurmountable difficulties he had to contend against, from the first day that he entered upon his government to the moment he resigned it; when every measure he took for the public welfare was opposed and thwarted by a hostile and superior authority; when we consider that he found the whole Carnatic overrun and laid waste by an enemy whom repeated victories could neither intimidate nor repel; that the army was frequently in a state little short of mutiny for want of their pay; that few resources could be found to supply that want; and when

found, that every attempt was made which intrigue and treachery could invent to render them inefficient ; that there were no means of moving that army towards the enemy's country, no draught cattle, no magazines, no provisions ; that in the midst of a dreadful famine he had neither authority nor control over the army or the navy, which might have aided the fertility of his mind in pointing out and obtaining resources ; that there was no unity of counsel in those who possessed the sole and unparticipated command over the forces, who appeared to have no settled plan of operations ; that he was continually harrassed by the intrigues and counteraction of a faithless ally, fomented and encouraged by a superior power ; and to crown all was, at last, ordered to surrender to that ally the only source that remained of revenue to meet the various and heavy demands on the public treasury —when all these points are duly weighed, it cannot fail to excite astonishment, not only how he contrived to keep the wheels of government moving, but that every inch of the Carnatic was not lost for ever, and the Company's affairs, on the coast of Coromandel, involved in inextricable ruin and disgrace : instead of which, notwithstanding all these difficulties, he preserved their credit and their possessions entire, and raised them to a state of comparative prosperity.

The sudden, though not quite unexpected, removal of Mr. Hastings from his government, and the anxiety which the next in succession probably felt to step into the chair, seem to have diverted for a time the thoughts of the supreme council from the affairs of Madras ; and the concerns of their old friend the nabob appear to have been forgotten in attend-

ing to their own. Lord Macartney was thus, for the first time, suffered to breathe and to make his arrangements in quiet for the future welfare of the presidency. He drew up a plan which not only provided for the current expenses of the civil and military establishments, but also for the gradual liquidation of the heavy load of debt due to the Company, and the still more heavy one contracted by the extravagance of the nabob to individuals, as well as for an accumulating fund against sudden emergencies. By this plan the debt due to the Company would have been liquidated in four years, that of the creditors in twelve years, at which time would have remained in the treasury 3,750,000 pagodas, and in the thirteenth year there would have been a net annual revenue wholly unencumbered of 3,000,000 pagodas*. Had these plans of Lord Macartney been carried into execution; had the measures he proposed been adopted, and had the Company held fast that assignment which gave them voluntarily what they have since been compelled to take violently, Madras, as he observes, from being a shop of pitiful usury, would have become a city of honorable commerce, of opulence instead of misery, and of real resource, not of temporary expedient.

He had not proceeded far however in his plans for the benefit of the Company's affairs, before an order was received

* Plan of arrangement for the nabob's affairs, and observations thereon. Appendix, No. 18.

It is but tantalizing to show what once might have been done, when the time is past; but as the Carnatic revenues are once more within the Company's own jurisdiction, and the debts of the Nabob under consideration of payment, a good share of public attention is naturally turned to the subject.

from England for the immediate restitution of the assignment to the nabob, upon the ground, as was stated therein, of giving to all the powers of India a strong proof of the national faith; for although, according to the agreement made by Lord Macartney, the term of its duration was indefinite, and could not be less than five years; yet, the war being concluded, it was deemed expedient by his majesty's ministers for the affairs of India, to show to the nabob another instance of the honor and generosity of the British nation, however undeserving he had proved himself of it. Being perfectly aware of the value of the assignment, and the great benefit resulting from it; approving likewise of the principles upon which the management of it had been conducted, and knowing the trouble and anxiety it had occasioned to Lord Macartney, the measure was not adopted by the Board of Control without considerable regret; but it was thought to be necessary. By the same packet the Court of Directors signified their nomination of Mr. Holland to succeed Lord Macartney as governor of Madras. His Lordship was not in the least taken by surprise at the receipt of these dispatches. He had, in fact, repeatedly requested the Court of Directors to appoint an eventual successor; and he thought it extremely probable that the assignment would be upset at home. He had taken his measures therefore so as not to be unprepared for either event. By a careful administration of the revenues, and a rigid economy in the expenditure of them, he had amassed in the treasury no less than three hundred and twenty-one thousand star pagodas, being a greater amount than was ever delivered over by any former governor of Fort St. George.

to his successor*. “I had, indeed,” says his Lordship, “some time before been providing against this emergency, “for, well apprised of the nabob’s extensive influence, and “of the ability, industry, and vigilance of his agents, and “observing a concurrence of many other circumstances, I “was not without apprehensions that, before the govern- “ment of Madras could have timely notice of the train, the “assignment might be blown up at home; the sudden shock “of which I knew must almost instantly overthrow the Com- “pany in the Carnatic. I therefore employed myself most “assiduously in making preparations to mitigate the mischief, “and by degrees collected and stored up all the money that “it was possible to reserve with safety from other services “and demands, so that when the explosion burst upon us “I had provided an unexpected mass of little less than thir- “teen lacks of rupees to resist its first violence †.”

As Lord Macartney had made up his mind, and expressed his determination, not to be made a witness or an accessory to a premature surrender of that assignment, which he had guarded with unremitting care and equal vigilance against the assaults of the Durbar and the menaces of the governor-general and his council, he neither chose to wait the arrival of his successor, nor to enter into any negotiation with persons of whose duplicity, disaffection, and unworthiness he

* A great part of this sum consisted of such presents and fees on presentation to appointments, as had been usual for governors to take for their private emolument, but which had rarely, if ever, before been applied to public use.

† Extract of a letter from Lord Macartney to the committee of secrecy of the court of directors, dated Calcutta, 27th July 1785.

had but too long an experience. He thought it better at once to resign his government and to retire from the scene. But, ever ready and solicitous to employ all the means in his power for the welfare of the public service to the last moment of his stay in any part of India, he offered, notwithstanding the unhealthy season of the year, to take Bengal in his way to England; and to endeavor, by a personal representation, to impress on the minds of the governor-general for the time being* and his council, such a sense of the embarrassments and dangers likely to arise from the last instructions from home, as would probably induce them to delay the execution of those instructions, or, at least, obtain their immediate and cordial assistance. This offer was eagerly embraced by the select committee on finding his determination was fixed to resign the government. Accordingly in less than a week after receiving the instructions from England, he embarked on the Greyhound packet for Calcutta. "I was hastened," says he, "and animated by an idea that I should have the rare felicity of saving the Company twice from destruction; having rescued it once before by obtaining the assignment, I hoped it was now reserved for me to avert the fatal consequences to be apprehended from its sudden abolition †."

Previous to his departure from Madras, he laid before the council of that presidency a minute to be entered on the records, in which he expresses his warmest thanks to the members of the board for their cordial and unremitting sup-

* Mr. Macpherson.

† Extract of a letter from Lord Macartney to the committee of secrecy of the court of directors, dated Calcutta, 27th July 1785.

port in the execution of the laborious duties of his office, without which, he observes, he must have sunk under the peculiar embarrassments of his situation. "The painful moment," says he, "is now arrived when I must bid you farewel: my feelings on the occasion are too strong for my expression; may your administration, gentlemen, be happy; I am fully persuaded it will be just, prudent, and honorable. Before I conclude, I beg leave to enter upon your records two papers. One is an affidavit, and the other a declaration, both of which it is proper to have transmitted to England for the information of my honorable employers *."

AFFIDAVIT.

I George, Lord Macartney, governor and president, of Fort St. George in the East Indies, do solemnly swear and declare that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, from the day of my arrival here on the 22d June 1781 to this hour, I have never by myself, or by any other person for me, directly or indirectly, accepted or received for my own benefit, from any person or persons whomsoever, a present or presents of any kind, except two pipes of Madeira wine from two particular friends (one of whom never was in India, the other is at Bengal) a few bottles of champaign and burgundy, and some fruit and provisions of very trifling value: and I further swear and declare, that I have confined myself solely to the honorable Company's allowances, which are 40,000 pagodas per annum,

* The president's minute in council, June 1, 1785.

and the commission and consulage on coral which, during my government, have produced on an average 1000 pagodas per annum. That I have never embezzled or misappropriated to my own use any part of the Company's monies or effects, and that I have not been engaged in any trade, traffic, or dealing of any kind; but strictly and bona fide observed all my covenants with the honorable East India Company, and acted in all things for their honor and interest, to the best of my judgment and ability. So help me God.

(Signed)

MACARTNEY.

Fort St. George.

Sworn before me this 1st day of June 1785.

(Signed)

PHILIP STOWEY, Mayor.

DECLARATION.

Fort St. George, June 1, 1785.

Having in January 1784 made up my account of the clear benefit (after paying my expenses) of the government of Fort St. George to me from my arrival to that time, I transmitted it to the honorable Court of Directors by the Busbridge, which sailed from hence for England early in the February following; the balance in my favour was then 52,224 pagodas. Since that period to this day, the 1st of June 1785, the net benefit, according to the most accurate settlement that I can draw out, amounts to 29,572 pagodas; so that upon the whole, during my four years residence in India, my fortune has been encreased by the sum of 81,796 pagodas, from which ought to be deducted my expenses and the price of my passage to Europe, which I conceive can scarcely be estimated at less than 5000 pagodas.

Although the provision of the 58th section of the act of the 23d of his majesty declares, that no person returning from India before the 1st January 1787 shall be compelled to deliver an inventory or account of his property, I have thought it necessary so far to anticipate the wishes of the legislature in this respect, as to record the foregoing account in the books of this presidency where I have been serving, and desire it may stand there as a public record, open to the inspection of every person who may be inclined to peruse it.

(Signed) MACARTNEY.

The amount of the above mentioned sum, at the exchange of eight shillings the pagoda, is equal to 32,798 l. 8 s. sterling, which by subsequent expenses at Bengal and the passage home was reduced to little more than 28,000 l. “When the “whole of this sum”, says his Lordship, “is applied to the “arrangement of my private affairs, I can venture to assure “you, as a gentleman and a man of honor, that then, after “having passed upwards of one and twenty years in several “public employments of rank, trust and emolument, I “shall possess a very small if any addition to my family “inheritance *.”

On arriving in Calcutta, about the middle of June, he took the earliest opportunity of laying before the supreme council the true state of the presidency of Madras, to apprise them of its embarrassments, and to solicit their assist-

* Extract of a letter from Lord Macartney to the committee of secrecy of the court of directors, dated Calcutta, 27th July 1785.

ance towards its relief. The gentlemen, however, who composed the supreme council, did not venture to delay the execution of the orders from home relative to the assignment; and as to relief, he soon had the mortification to discover that little if any assistance was to be expected from this quarter. The enlivening and happy prospects which had been held out in the late governor-general's letter to the Court of Directors, of the 16th December 1783, and which was published in several newspapers, both foreign and domestic, had buoyed up the hopes of his lordship that such resources were to be found in Bengal alone as might relieve any exigency or distress on the coast that must inevitably result from the loss of the assignment, or from other misfortunes; but in the whole range of his inquiries, not one distinct trace was to be discovered of those prognosticated funds; he found he had formed a visionary estimate on fallacious grounds; the reality disappeared like a phantom on the approach of experiment, and he searched for it in vain in Bengal. The government declared themselves perfect strangers to Mr. Hastings's letter, and indicated not a few symptoms of their own necessities. They made no scruple of acknowledging that the consequences likely to result from the surrender of the assignment, and the difficulties that might be expected to occur in realizing a sufficient revenue for the security of the Carnatic, were subjects of deep concern and critical embarrassment. They were convinced that the exhausted state of the finances of the Bengal government would not admit of any extraordinary and continued aid to Fort St. George; but they assured his Lordship that every assistance of resource and co-operation within their power should be

cheerfully granted to relieve any distress or remove any inconvenience that might arise in the Carnatic, from the execution of the Company's commands, which they could not take upon themselves to postpone or disobey *.

The same general letter, which contained the order for the restitution of the assignment, communicated to his Lordship the unanimous thanks of the Court of Directors for his zeal and activity in their service, and for his assistance in procuring the late peace in India. His reply to that part of the letter deserves to be recorded. "I beg leave to express the high
"sense I must ever entertain of this mark of your favor.
"That I have served you with zeal and activity, and, let me
"add, with a disinterestedness unexampled in my station, I
"have the unequivocal testimony of my own heart, without
"which no other applause could minister any sincere
"satisfaction.

"That I gave my best assistance *in procuring the late*
"*peace with Tippoo Saheb* is no less true than that I was
"tardily, scantily, and ungraciously assisted by the govern-
"ment of Bengal. The records before you will show how

* A gentleman well versed in India politics thus delivered his opinion on the surrender of the assignment: "The new arrangements from England, however specious and plausible on paper, will be found fallacious and impracticable in execution, and terminate, at last, in unspeakable confusion and distress. Mr. — and a few artful or overbearing, unprincipled men about the Durbar may help themselves in the scramble; but the fair creditor, to whom the nabob is justly indebted, will, in all likelihood, be baffled, and have little chance of receiving a single fanam till the Company itself resume the receipt and management of the revenues, and distribute as well as ascertain the proportions."

“ early I applied for powers and instructions, how late any
“ were obtained ; and the contents of those which were
“ afforded at last, so long had they been withheld, that our
“ commissioners to Tippoo had set forward without them.

“ Whatever praises therefore may be due to them who
“ made the peace, the late governor-general and his council
“ had no pretensions to participate.

“ However honored and confirmed as it has been by your
“ sanction and applause, *they* condemned it without reserve,
“ and would have risked its disruption.

“ Happily indeed before they ventured on the second step,
“ they began to see the danger of the first, and retired from
“ the precipice, although with reluctance ; and yet what could
“ have been the object that drew them to approach it ? It
“ was not surely to mortify the government of Madras ; it was
“ not surely to gratify the vanity of Mahomet Ali ? Miser-
“ rable indeed must be the condition of the Company in the
“ Carnatic, if a new conflagration may be lighted up there by
“ a little spark from Chepauk *—if interests of such magni-
“ tude as yours are to be hazarded so slightly, and your
“ tranquillity and safety made to oscillate and traverse with
“ the passions and intrigues of the nabob’s Durbar !

“ If then this peace of ours, so criminated by the late
“ governor-general and his council, has been concluded with

* The name of the nabob’s residence.

“ such precautions for your dignity and safety: If at the
“ time, when almost every other peace with our enemies,
“ with the French, the Spaniards, the United States, and the
“ Mahrattas, had admitted of the loss of entire provinces,
“ this peace of ours was concluded without the abscission of
“ a single inch of territory, and, let me add, without the
“ disgrace of purchasing with money the neutrality or forbear-
“ ance of any Indian power—if these distinguishing circum-
“ stances be considered, I flatter myself I shall be pardoned
“ for any little animation I may feel in defending the attacks
“ or reproaches of the Bengal government. You will indulge
“ me too, I hope, if I value your approbation so highly, if
“ I am so proud of it, that I wish to enjoy it pure and un-
“ alloyed, and that the transactions of my administration,
“ which are the object of it, may stand separate and distinct
“ from those of the Bengal government which, by the mode
“ of expressing your thanks to the late governor-general for
“ his endeavors, and to his council for their assistance, in
“ procuring peace with the several powers in India, would
“ not seem to be the case.

“ If the phrase, *several powers in India*, means more than
“ the powers of India, and includes our European antago-
“ nists in India, those thanks, so worded, might, when they
“ passed, have appeared to some observers as of rather too
“ great a latitude, if not prematurely applied. The peace
“ with France and the peace with Holland were procured at
“ home. Before the news of the former could reach Calcutta,
“ before any official communication arrived in the Carnatic, the
“ moment I received intelligence which ascertained the fact,

“ the government of Madras took the prompt and decisive
“ step of notifying it to Monsieur De Bussy without delay, and
“ of concluding with him an immediate cessation of arms, by
“ means of which your affairs were rescued from the desperate
“ state which they had been thrown into by the various mis-
“ fortunes of the month of June in the neighbourhood of
“ Cuddalore.

“ Such being the exact state of the case, and the peace
“ with Tippoo being, as you have seen, reprobated and al-
“ most disclaimed by the late governor-general and his coun-
“ cil, the only peace then either with a native or a foreign
“ power in India, which they have a just claim upon, is the
“ peace with the Mahrattas. That certainly, but that alone,
“ properly belongs to them, and no others pretend to have a
“ share in it. If therefore, too delicate as well as too just to
“ encroach upon their ground, I am desirous of standing only
“ on my own (being resigned to fall if it will not support me),
“ I trust you will excuse this digression which arose so natu-
“ rally from the feelings of a grateful mind, anxious to discri-
“ minate thanks from compliments, and to evince that the
“ thanks which you had been pleased to honor me with were
“ not entirely unmerited *.”

Although Lord Macartney had received too many proofs of the hostility of the Bengal government towards him personally, yet till the clandestine manner in which the papers of his bitterest enemies were sent home in the Lively packet,

* Extract of a letter from Lord Macartney to the committee of secrecy of the court of directors, dated Calcutta, 27th July 1785.

he was unwilling to believe that a man of Mr. Hastings's enlarged mind and exalted station would condescend to be concerned in any hidden transaction of a mean or unworthy nature. But his visit to Bengal was the means of bringing to light a circumstance which could not fail to decide and fix his opinion for ever of Mr. Hastings. On looking over some old London newspapers, and among them the Public Advertiser of the 3d of June 1784, he happened to cast his eye upon a letter inserted in it, dated from Calcutta, December the 3d, 1783, and signed W. M. Observing his name in one of the paragraphs he read as follows: "At the moment I am writing, we are informed that Lord Macartney is appointed governor-general of Bengal, and that General Smith and Mr. Edward Moncton are arrived at Bussorah in their way here, as members of the supreme council. This is further corroborated by a letter from the nabob of Arcot to Mr. Hastings, entered on the consultations the 25th November, in which the nabob says, that Lord Macartney had told his highness he had received letters from Mr. Fox and Mr. Burke, assuring him that Mr. Hastings was to be dismissed, and he, Lord Macartney, appointed governor-general of Bengal."

"Well acquainted," says Lord Macartney, "as I was with the forgeries and inventions of the Durbar, I could scarcely bring myself to believe, that the nabob had sent a letter of such a nature to Mr. Hastings; but the respect due to your honorable court, and to the distinguished names which have been mentioned with such freedom, and the justice I owed to myself, rendering it necessary to know

“ the truth, I applied to the government of Bengal for in-
“ formation, and found that he certainly had, and that *his*
“ *letter was upon record.*

“ The whole story is not only absolutely false and impro-
“ bable in every particular, but it is impossible. From the
“ month of March 1782 to this hour, I have never had any
“ conversation whatsoever with the nabob or any of his family,
“ nor have seen either him or them, except when accidentally
“ passing in a carriage, the nabob having broken off all per-
“ sonal intercourse with me, even so far as to refuse receiving
“ from me, in the usual ceremony, your honorable court’s
“ letters to him.

“ For a considerable time past, indeed almost ever since
“ the resolution of the House of Commons for the dismissal
“ of Mr. Hastings, there have been various reports fabricated
“ and industriously spread through several parts of India
“ relative to the succession to that gentleman’s government,
“ and the names of Lord Cornwallis, Lord Chatham, Mr.
“ Leycester, Mr. Vansittart, Lord Macartney, and others
“ have been mentioned for it, at different times and in dif-
“ ferent modes, in whispers, private letters, and public news-
“ papers: but, with regard to myself, I never held but one
“ uniform language upon the subject, and I appeal for the
“ truth of it to the gentlemen of my council at Madras, and
“ to every other person there, with whom I have had occasion
“ to converse. I always declared that were I to consider a
“ removal from Fort St. George to Bengal merely in a pecu-
“ niary light, it was not an object to me, as the difference of

“ emolument between 17,000*l.* and 26,000*l.* *per annum* would
“ be absorbed by the difference of expense ; but that my
“ views did not at all point towards it ; and that they were
“ bounded entirely by the faithful discharge of my duty
“ where I was, and by the hope of being able to complete
“ the plan I had begun ; and thus to leave the Company’s
“ affairs, at my departure for Europe, on such a footing in
“ the Carnatic as would ensure their stability and permanence
“ against every accident that might have been apprehended
“ from without or within.

“ Such were my declared sentiments, and I can appeal to
“ Mr. Hastings himself whether he was not more than once
“ informed by my direction, that I entertained no thoughts
“ or desire of his office ; and I could appeal, if necessary, to
“ much higher authority at home.”

“ Your honorable court in whom rests the nomination to
“ it, and to whom I should therefore naturally look up, well
“ knows that I never have solicited or applied for it in any
“ address to you, either collectively or individually, and I do
“ solemnly assure you that I never solicited or applied for it
“ through any other channel, whether private friends or public
“ ministers. Having said thus much, I must express my re-
“ gret that this government (Bengal) did not, by informing
“ me of the nabob’s letter, afford me an opportunity of doing
“ myself justice to them, instead of suffering such a false-
“ hood to contaminate their records, uncontradicted and
“ unremarked on ; and thus furnishing, in the transmission

“home, a sure vehicle for the poison to work its purpose
“against me in the minds of my honorable employers *.”

It was not the mere falsehood of the nabob's assertion that could, in any degree, affect Lord Macartney; but the circumstance of his keeping up a correspondence with the governor-general, and this latter suffering what every one, in Madras at least, and most persons in Bengal, knew to be the most infamous calumnies, to be entered on record and sent to Europe. The circumstance of the nabob's letters being written in the English language, for the records of Bengal were searched vain for the original Persian, might have guarded Mr. Hastings from considering them to contain the genuine sentiments of the nabob's mind. One among many of these fabrications, with a short history of the whole of them, may serve to give some idea of the disgraceful system of persecution that was carried on against Lord Macartney at the nabob's Durbar †.

* Extract of a letter from Lord Macartney to the committee of secrecy of the court of directors, dated Calcutta, 27th July 1785.

† Copy of a letter from the Nabob Wallau Jah Bahader to the Honorable Warren Hastings, Esq. dated 17th October 1783, and recorded in council 25th November 1783.

“MY FRIEND,

“Among the various artifices by which Lord Macartney has endeavored to terrify me into an accommodation upon his own terms, he has lately labored to impress me with the assurance that, from letters he pretends to have received from Mr. Fox and Mr. Burke, he shall be invested with the high dignity of governor-general in the place of my much respected and valuable friend. I am well aware of his impositions and, from dear bought conviction, place not the smallest dependence upon his most solemn assertions; and I fully conceive that the Company and the English nation at large must too sensibly feel their own interest to remove so able, so experienced, and so disinterested a vicegerent, to make way for an arbitrary and ca-

His Lordship's continuance at Calcutta was protracted by an illness that threatened his life. It was occasioned by a

precious tyrant; but even the idea is dreadful, for the removal of my friend must be my utter destruction, and what raises greater apprehensions is his Lordship's desire to the council, not to answer the letter containing your positive orders to restore me to my country, until a ship, which is daily expected, shall arrive from Europe; should not therefore the English nation distinguish their welfare from their ruin think, my friend, to what inexplicable misery myself and my family must be plunged for ever? Let not this man triumph over your measures, and in my misfortunes; be speedy, I conjure you, in your last and definitive orders, and rescue me even from the terror of Lord Macartney's vengeance. I hear that such is the universal detestation of his very name, that the execution of your orders will receive the assisting hand of every individual in this settlement; at the same time be assured that, though destruction hangs over my head, I shall never place my confidence in any power but that of my friend, to restore me to my country and hereditary rights. May my friend enjoy many happy days and every earthly blessing. What can I say more?

A true copy,

"Chepauk, 17th October 1783.

(Signed)

E. HAY, Secretary."

Now for the history of these compositions. It is contained in a letter from the president and select committee of Fort St. George to the governor-general and his council, dated 25th May 1783, and consequently Mr. Hastings could not plead ignorance when he caused the foregoing letter to be entered on the records.

"Mr. Benfield, to secure the permanency of his power, and the perfection of his schemes, thought it necessary to render the nabob an absolute stranger to the state of his affairs. He assured his highness that full justice was not done to the strength of his sentiments and the keenness of his attacks, in the translations that were made by the Company's servants from the original Persian of his letters. He therefore proposed to him that they should for the future be transmitted in English. Of the English language or writing, his highness or the Ameer cannot read one word; though the latter can converse in it with sufficient fluency. The Persian language, as the language of the Mahomedan conquerors and of the court of Delhi, as an appendage or signal of authority, was, at all times, particularly affected by the nabob. It is the language of all acts of state, and all public transactions among the Musselmen chiefs of Indostan. The nabob was thought to have gained no inconsiderable point in procuring the correspondence from our

wish of setting an example in his own person, which he conceived might be attended with some degree of benefit to the inhabitants of the presidency. It is scarcely necessary to observe, that the establishment of palankeens in Calcutta is not only attended with serious expense to many families who can but ill afford to bear it, but that every young stripling, from the moment he sets his foot on shore, must have his palankeen and his eight bearers to dance attendance upon his person; and it often happens that the greater part of these poor creatures, if age and infirmity could plead for consideration, ought with more propriety to be carried by himself.

“ predecessors to the raja of Tanjore, to be changed from the Mahratta language,
“ which that Hindoo prince understands, to the Persian, which he disclaims under-
“ standing. To force the raja to the nabob's language was gratifying the latter with
“ a new species of subserviency. He had formerly contended, with considerable
“ anxiety, and, it was thought, no inconsiderable cost, for particular forms of
“ address to be used towards him in that language. But all of a sudden, in favor of
“ Mr. Benfield, he quits his former affections, his habits, his knowledge, his
“ curiosity, the increasing mistrust of age, to throw himself upon the generous
“ candor, on the faithful interpretation, the grateful return and eloquent organ, of
“ Mr. Benfield. Mr. Benfield relates and reads what he pleases to his excellency
“ the Ameer ul Omrah. His excellency communicates with the nabob his father
“ in the language the latter understands. Through two channels so pure, the truth
“ must arrive at the nabob in perfect refinement. Through this double trust his
“ highness receives whatever impression it may be expedient to make on him. He
“ abandons his signature to whatever paper they tell him contains, in the English
“ language, the sentiments with which they had inspired him. He thus is sur-
“ rounded on every side. He is totally at their mercy to believe what is not true,
“ and to subscribe to what he does not mean. There is no system so new, so
“ foreign to his intentions, that they may not pursue, in his name, without possi-
“ bility of detection; for they are cautious of who approach him, and have thought
“ prudent to decline, for him, the visits of the governor, even upon the usual
“ solemn and acceptable occasion of delivering to his Highness the Company's
“ letters. Such is the complete ascendancy gained by Mr. Benfield.”

Lord Macartney was sufficiently aware that the climate of Madras, from the regular sea breezes, admitted of the exercise of walking with less danger than that of the inland city of Calcutta. Still however he determined to make the experiment in the latter; but the consequences of much exposure to the sun and the fatigue of walking had nearly proved fatal. This was not the only narrow escape he had in India. He was wounded in a duel. There are certain situations in which the greatest command of temper cannot prevent the escape of a hasty expression that, in cooler moments, the person who uttered it will rarely attempt to justify, unless the provocation happens to be of a nature not to be excused. Mr. Sadlier, a member of the select committee, a fickle, intemperate, and unaccommodating man, one day took it into his head to oppose a resolution, to which he, with the other members, had on a former occasion given his assent. The whole board agreed, that such assent had actually been given by him; but he persisted in contradicting the assertion of his colleagues in the most positive and provoking manner. The question was the granting of an additional allowance to Mr. Huddleston as military secretary, to which every one, except Mr. Sadlier, considered him to be fairly entitled. Lord Macartney, provoked at so unjust and illiberal a refusal to what, on a former day, he had acceded, lost, for the moment, the usual command of his temper, which indeed rarely forsook him, and he declared that Mr. Sadlier told a lie. The transaction was entered on the records; but Lord Macartney took occasion to observe, in his letter to the Court of Directors, that such part as was merely of a private personal nature might have been omitted, "but the insertion of which," says

he, "I acquiesced in, because I never will attempt to conceal from you any thing, however unimportant, which the meanest member of this community might wish to be laid before you. Every gentleman of feeling knows that there is a species of audacious contradiction which can only be stopped by a particular mode of expression. In the case now alluded to, that expression, although arising from absolute necessity, was no sooner used but apologized for to the board."

Mr. Sadlier however was told, by some of his military acquaintances, that it was absolutely necessary for his honor and character that he should call out Lord Macartney, and Major Grattan, a gentleman that Lord Macartney had not thought proper to confirm in a staff appointment, which he considered to have been made without authority, offered himself to be the bearer of the message. The particulars of this transaction will be found in a paper drawn up by the two seconds in the Appendix *. It may be observed, that this was the only dispute and almost the only difference of opinion that he had to encounter in the select committee in the whole course of his difficult government.

One night as he was sitting with a friend in Calcutta, an officer from one of the Company's ships brought him a dispatch, addressed to him as governor-general of Bengal. He tore off the cover and cast it to his friend, who warmly congratulated him on an event so wholly unexpected; but Lord

* Appendix, No. 18.

Macartney very calmly observed, before he had read the dispatch, that he did not mean to accept the intended honor. He did not however immediately communicate this intention to the provisional governor-general who is said to have felt himself in a very awkward situation ; and all the legal authorities in Calcutta are supposed to have been consulted, whether Lord Macartney, appointed by the Court of Directors to succeed Mr. Hastings, could legally step into the chair occupied by Mr. Macpherson. The anxiety of the supreme council to keep their appointments could not fail greatly to amuse Lord Macartney, who had no desire to deprive any of them of their situations.

It was no easy matter to reconcile the apparent inconsistency of the Court of Directors towards Lord Macartney in ordering the surrender of the nabob's assignment, advising him of the nomination of a person to succeed him at Madras, and appointing him, almost immediately afterwards, governor-general of Bengal, without any solicitation on his part, or any avowed desire to succeed to that situation. The fact was, that the supporters of Mr. Fox's India bill, in the debate that took place in the House of Commons, had been loud in their encomiums on the character and conduct of Lord Macartney, whose wisdom and moderation were contrasted with the opposite qualities of Mr. Hastings, against whom they directed a most violent attack. Mr. Fox declared, that his Lordship had proved himself the most obedient to direction from home, the purest in principle and the most zealous in conduct for the national honor of any governor ever sent to India. The opposite side of the House, from that moment,

considered Lord Macartney as closely connected with their adversaries; and although he was then on the other side of the globe, unconnected with any party, and indeed had left England before the parties as then formed and debating were in existence, though he was known to be intimately acquainted with Mr. Fox, but sent to India under an administration in which Mr. Fox had no concern; yet the praise bestowed on him by Mr. Fox, and those who supported his opinions, was supposed to be not a little injurious to his interest, though it was pretty well understood, and Lord Macartney himself firmly believed, that he was not the person whom Mr. Fox, had he carried his point, had intended as governor-general of Bengal. The nabob's letters and Assam Cawn's memorials had also contributed to create a strong prejudice against him in the minds of many persons high in the administration and among the directors of the East India Company. The calumnies they contained did not, it seems, make much impression, nor influence the opinions of the board of control just then established by Mr. Pitt's bill, of which Mr. Dundas was the efficient head; but such was the effect produced by other representations sent home from Bengal, that when this new board went into the examination of the differences between Lord Macartney and Mr. Hastings, Mr. Dundas frankly owned to a friend of his Lordship, that they began it with a very unfavorable impression upon their minds against Lord Macartney. It is almost unnecessary here to observe, what has always been admitted by all parties, that Mr. Dundas, by his great ability and an unremitting application, speedily obtained so profound a knowledge of the real state of India, as certainly

no other man in the kingdom possessed. When therefore Mr. Dundas, at the head of the board of control, had attentively perused and carefully considered all the papers on the various subjects of Lord Macartney's government, as connected with that of Mr. Hastings, he, with great candor and honor to himself, declared, at the next board that met, that after having fully investigated the whole matter, he had totally changed the opinion he had formed of Lord Macartney's conduct, and was now firmly convinced that his Lordship had acted in every respect as he ought to act, and that he had conducted himself with a degree of firmness and ability which did him the highest credit. Mr. Dundas did not stop here. Feeling that every mark of respect and consideration was due to his unwearied zeal and unshaken integrity, and as a proof of the favorable sentiments he entertained of his administration at Madras, and that he considered him as the fittest person to fill the chair of Bengal, although wholly unacquainted with his Lordship, and unsolicited by any of his friends, he informed Mr. Pitt of his sentiments on the subject and the grounds on which he had formed them. Mr. Pitt, whom the multiplicity of other business did not allow to enter so deeply into Indian affairs as Mr. Dundas had done, but who could place implicit reliance on the report of his able coadjutor, so fully acquainted with the subject, made no hesitation in approving of Mr. Dundas's choice, though the object of it was equally unknown to him. His Lordship's nomination immediately followed. Considering therefore all the circumstances of this transaction, it cannot be denied that there never was an appointment of such great trust, power, patronage, and emolument conferred, which did more honor

to those who had the nomination to it, or to him who was thus appointed, than that of Lord Macartney to Bengal. There were not wanting however persons high in the administration, whose names it is not material to mention, who were not only averse from the choice of the minister, but were ready to foretel many bad consequences that would attend it; that in resentment to Mr. Hastings his Lordship would show his hostility to all those who had been patronized by him; that he would reject measures, however salutary, which the former governor-general and his connections might have planned, and a thousand wild and extravagant surmises which party feelings suggested; but the very reverse of which a man of no party, actuated solely by the desire of serving his country, would be likely to adopt. Such forebodings therefore had no effect in shaking the conviction of Mr. Pitt. The opinion, which this truly great and disinterested man entertained of Lord Macartney, may be collected from his reply to a note which had been addressed to him by an intimate friend of his Lordship, to know if he had any particular wishes or recommendations to forward for India. "Allow me," says he, "to add, that although I have not the honor of any personal acquaintance with Lord Macartney, I felt from public grounds the most sincere pleasure in his appointment to a situation which, I was persuaded, no one could fill more to the advantage of the country. I must also beg you to accept my best thanks for your obliging expressions of your inclination to promote any wishes of mine relative to objects in India. I have in truth none that interests me, but that which will be safe in Lord Macartney's hands without any recommendation—I mean the

“ credit and prosperity of the governments of which he is at
“ the head.”

But however flattering it must have been to Lord Macartney to receive so distinguished a mark of the minister's approbation, together with that of the court of directors, spontaneously conferred without any solicitation from himself or his friends, he had many strong reasons for declining at this time to take upon himself the government of Bengal. The ill state of his health, broken down by the fatigues and vexations which he had undergone in his late government, required a speedy removal to his native climate. The general situation of affairs in India likewise pointed out to him the propriety and, indeed, the necessity of submitting to his majesty's ministers certain regulations which he considered indispensable for the salvation of this part of the empire ; and of laying before them those conditions on which only he felt himself able to fulfil the purposes of his appointment with advantage to the public and reputation to himself. Other circumstances, which applied peculiarly to him, rendered every precaution on his part, if not necessary, at least expedient. Some of the members who continued to form the government of Bengal, where he would have presided, had been in the habit of submitting to every opinion of the late governor-general, and consequently of condemning and counteracting many of his measures when at Madras ; they had also joined in resolutions equally harsh and unjust upon his conduct. Much cordial co-operation or public benefit could scarcely be expected from such associates ; and a hollow and insidious support would not have answered the purpose he had in view, which

was that of a complete and radical reform. The public measures of the governor-general, especially if they happened to interfere with the avarice or ambition of individuals, might be thwarted, and perhaps successfully counteracted, unless it was unequivocally understood that he had the entire support and countenance of his majesty's ministers as well as of the Court of Directors. Feeling therefore, as he did, that however profitable, powerful and brilliant the situation might appear to common observers, the mere office and its emoluments would afford him but little gratification; and too strongly impressed with its importance to conceive it fair or honorable for any man to undertake it, unless he were persuaded that he could make it an instrument of essential permanent benefit to the public, he was bound from principle to decline it for the present. His experience had fully convinced him that the affairs of the East India Company were fast sinking into irretrievable ruin, and that nothing could save them, but an administration of exact discipline and rigid economy in every department both civil and military; but a system of this kind was so novel in India, he had met with so much opposition and counteraction in his endeavors to establish it at Fort St. George, as were sufficient to convince him that nothing could enable even the first talents and integrity to carry it into execution at Bengal, except only with the assistance of colleagues actuated by similar principles, and with such a confidence and support from home as it would have been almost romantic in him to expect. "Many
"a man indeed," observes his Lordship to the Court of Directors, "may be found, who, consulting the gratification
"of his own vanity and avarice before your honor and advan-

“tage, will undertake your affairs without scruple on any
“terms, and, at all events, run the chance of things lasting
“his time in their usual train, amuse you with trifling plans,
“fallacious deductions, and undeterminable references;
“flatter you from season to season with prospects and pro-
“mises, and then face your displeasure with a fortune per-
“haps huge enough to defy an inquiry or outreach an act of
“parliament: But your interests involving, as they still do,
“a vast extent of empire, an immense population, and many
“millions of revenue, demand that you should send out the
“ablest and honestest men that can be found to administer
“them; and that these men should be encouraged and up-
“held by all the trust and authority you can venture to give
“them*.”

But the subject which of all others claimed, in Lord Macartney's estimation, the earliest attention of his majesty's ministers, was that of methodizing the claims and allowances of the military establishment, and of reducing the heterogeneous parts of which an Indian army is composed to something like system, and bringing them under one command. He considered it as indispensably necessary that the civil and military authority should be united in one person, without pretending to decide from what line of life that person ought to be taken. If a military commander could be found superior to the bias of education, and to the views and attachments of his profession, such commander, he conceived,

* Extract of a letter from Lord Macartney to the committee of secrecy of the court of directors, dated —.

ought to be employed, not because of his profession, but in despite of it. As a maxim of choice, however, he was inclined to think that it would be safer to take a man, otherwise well qualified, out of the general mass of society, for the purpose of presiding over and promoting the welfare of the British dominions in India, than another, who would have to combat with the exclusive preferences and partial considerations to which his mind had been accustomed in favor of that portion of the community which is united in its nature, and whose combinations and encroachments, as being the most likely and the most dangerous, it is the first duty of government to watch over and resist. The experience of his government in India corroborated the experience of other countries and ages, that the elevation of military leads to the interruption and to the destruction of all other authority; and was strongly exemplified in the unwise and inconsiderate measure of the Bengal government, which transferred to the commander in chief of the forces *an unparticipated authority to the utmost possible extent of his wishes*; the consequence of which was, as might naturally have been expected, that there was not a subaltern in the army who did not consider himself as great a man as the president of Fort St. George, and entirely independent of his authority. It has indeed been since discovered that the military power in the east particularly requires the curb and vigilance of a superior authority in the state to press and direct it to the proper object of the public welfare, as well as to restrain within due bounds the pretensions and exertions of that strength, which feels its own importance, and looks to the aggrandizement it is able to procure. The most eminent military achievements, under Clive and Lawrence,

accompanied the most perfect obedience to the civil power, because in their time no other pursuits interfered with pursuits against the enemy.

The conflicts that arose between the civil government and some of his majesty's officers serving under it in the Carnatic, seem to have been unavoidable, unless Lord Macartney had assented to demands in direct violation of the Company's rights, and the first powers inherent in the civil authority established in the country. While their claims extended only to opinions little notice was taken of them; but when it became a question, whether the civil government should exercise, according to its own judgment, the powers placed in its hands, and for which it was solely responsible to the nation, or suffer them to be openly disputed and disobeyed by those who were sent out, at the Company's expense, to assist and serve the civil government, the least hesitation might have been fatal. If his majesty's troops were not as absolutely under the direction of the civil power as the Company's own force, there was at once an end to all system. Anarchy and confusion must pervade every department, and his majesty's gracious intention, in sending his forces to India, might be perverted into the worst evil that could befall the Company. It was doubted by no one that, if the firm and decisive step which was taken, with regard to General Stuart, had been delayed but a few hours, the civil authority would have been at an end. Some idea may be formed of the lengths to which the king's officers were proceeding after this event, from the following circumstance. On the trial of Sir John Burgoyne (whom Lord Macartney had been reluctantly

obliged to put under arrest), it appeared, from the evidence of the lieutenant colonel of his majesty's 23d regiment of dragoons that, at a meeting of the king's general officers at the mount, the day after the arrest of General Stuart, a proposition was made by one of them to remove Lord Macartney from his government, to appoint another in his place, and to seize General Lang the new commander in chief. This proposition was not however approved by Sir John Burgoyne, the senior of those Generals, whose prudence probably suggested to him the absurdity of attempting a government which had so recently shown how well guarded it was against outrage or surprise.

On the other hand, the king's troops had great reason to be dissatisfied; they received only one-half, and in some instances scarcely one-third, of the pay and allowances granted to others with whom they were serving; these, on their part, not satisfied with their superiority in point of pay, contended for an equality of rank. The governor had it not in his power to meet the wishes of one or the other. As little was he able to apply a remedy to the abuses and grievances of which the army had just cause to complain. When money was not to be procured to pay the troops, it was not unusual for the paymaster to issue tickets to enable the men to purchase necessaries in the market; these tickets suffered a discount in the bazaar of twenty, thirty, and sometimes fifty *per cent.*; and at such depreciation were frequently bought up by the Company's servants. When money was issued to the paymaster these servants had generally interest enough to secure to themselves the full amount of the soldiers' tickets.

By this abuse, which the want of funds and public credit seemed to render unavoidable, both officers and men suffered serious inconveniences, whilst some of the purchasers of the tickets are said to have accumulated fortunes. The conclusion of the war with Tippoo Saheb appeared to hold out a fair opportunity for commencing that system of reform which, by his instructions, Lord Macartney was authorized to carry into execution. But he soon discovered that this Herculean labor was not likely to be brought to perfection under the state of things then in India. On the first attempt to discontinue the allowance of half batta, in order to equalize the pay of the troops, a mutiny broke out in the regiment that was stationed at Arcot, which however, by the decided and peremptory orders of government, was quelled without the effusion of blood, and with obtaining from the mutineers an unconditional submission and resignation to the will of the civil government. This spirit of resisting every plan that might lead to economy and reform was not less diffused through the Company's own troops, to whose pretensions, though Lord Macartney showed not the least countenance, he was erroneously supposed to be favorably inclined. In fact, he never ceased to reprobate the distinction that was unavoidably kept up between the King's and the Company's forces. "I have always," says he, "held the same opinions upon this subject, and as they were not taken up upon slight grounds, I think nothing is likely to change them, but my being better taught from home. I can have no improper motives to sway my judgment in matters of this kind which, if it could admit of bias, would, from the line of life in which I have been bred, more easily have taken the other turn; but I

“ look merely to the public service, divested of every prejudice or partiality *.”

That his majesty's Hanoverian regiments had no grievance to complain of against the civil government, and that his majesty himself was satisfied with the attention they received from Lord Macartney, will be sufficiently obvious from the following letter :

“ MY LORD,

“ The particular attention which your Lordship has been
“ pleased to bestow on the two Hanoverian regiments at Madras, has been mentioned by Colonel Reinbold in terms expressive of the grateful sense of that corps ; and I am happy
“ in adding that his majesty has been pleased to notice and
“ honor your Lordship's kind attention with his most gracious approbation. It is by his majesty's command, my
“ Lord, that I communicate his royal pleasure on the occasion ; and I am, at the same time, directed to solicit the
“ continuance of your Lordship's protection for that corps, which, I trust, will always be anxious to merit the honor
“ of your Lordship's approbation.

“ I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed)

“ ALVENSLEBEN.

“ London, 20th September 1785.”

Until therefore the proper authority should be obtained at home to new model the military system, Lord Macartney did

* Extract of a letter from Lord Macartney to General Stuart, dated 10th May 1783.

not think himself justified in accepting the government of Bengal. He repeatedly warned the Court of Directors of the danger to be apprehended from the want of a proper arrangement. "You will find," says he, "that the military throughout India is likely to be much less manageable than you seem to be aware of. The time probably draws near when many things that have been long concealed, misrepresented, and misunderstood, will be laid open, verified, and explained. Sure I am that my struggles to maintain a system of discipline duly subordinate to the civil power proceeded from no kind of prejudice or encroachment, but from an adequate knowledge of your service, of the principal characters belonging to it, of the temptations and abuses to which it is liable, and the dangers resulting from the slightest relaxation or remissness. Whilst expressing myself in this manner, I trust I shall not suffer the imputation of a meaning which I do not entertain. No man can be more sensible than I am of the importance and necessity of exciting and diffusing a martial professional spirit among the troops here: this ought to be the care of every wise government; but it ought to be no less your care to direct the spirit of those troops to its proper object, which is the defence of your possessions under your own orders, and to restrain them from any licentiousness or eccentric flights, lest being dazzled by elevation they lose sight of their true purpose and original appointment *."

* Extract of a letter from Lord Macartney to the committee of secrecy of the court of directors, dated 27th July 1785.

It is not every man who has sufficient virtue, courage, or disinterestedness to tell unwelcome truths to his employers. The flattering statements of the Company's affairs that are transmitted from the different presidencies, as remote generally from truth as light is from darkness, either prove that the governors themselves are imposed upon, or that they wish to impose upon the Company. Lord Macartney however never attempted, by assertion or implication, to flatter them with ideal prosperity. "My statements," says he, "are real" and not imaginary, which half of the public estimates are, "and particularly those of India, which usually include" things of no value as valuable." He told them without disguise that the first step towards relief in their exigencies was to ascertain the full extent of their embarrassments; that upon this knowledge they might be enabled to frame such a general system of economy and policy as was suitable to their actual situation; that any other system founded on partial or fallacious statements must ultimately lead to irretrievable ruin; but that a well digested plan, which embraces the whole evil and adapts its provisions accordingly, was the most likely to carry back their affairs to safety and prosperity. All his letters to the Court of Directors urge in the strongest terms the necessity of maintaining peace and friendship with the country powers, which but too frequently have been interrupted on our part by motives of ambition or avarice. He let slip no occasion of assuring them that nothing but peace and a long series of good administration could possibly restore their affairs to their former prosperity, and advised that no prospects of conquest, however tempting, should prevail on them to engage in fresh wars with the natives; but, on the con-

trary, that their whole influence should be employed for the establishment of the tranquillity and increase of the prosperity of Hindostan. He recommended that the country they already possessed should be kept entirely in their own hands and under their own management; that no subsidiary troops belonging to the nabob or any other Indian power should be suffered to remain in their employ; but that both cavalry and infantry should be their own, and that a sufficient portion of the revenues should be secured for paying them. He had no doubt that, by the exercise of wisdom and moderation, the government might succeed in regaining that opinion which was, for a long time, favorable to the English nation in Hindostan, from its supposed attachment to real and substantial justice distinct from power, and fidelity to engagements in opposition to its interest; principles that were the more admired as being, among the natives, almost romantic sentiments.

Among the numerous abuses he had occasion to bring forward before the Court of Directors was a sort of bargain which even some of the members of government were concerned in, and considered merely as a fair perquisite of office; this was the purchase of a forbearance of payment made by the debtors of the public. To prevent so scandalous an abuse he recommended that ample salaries should be appointed to seats in the council, and that those who held them should be totally excluded from every kind of traffic and from every other employment; he considered that on the choice of proper persons to fill this important situation every thing that was valuable depended; that the wisest provisions and

regulations that could be framed would have no effect, if the execution of them were left to weak, negligent, or corrupt hands; that the rule of promoting to the council invariably by seniority, however just in the principle, is often pernicious in the practice; that he had therefore formed a decided opinion that whenever any of the servants of the Company should particularly distinguish themselves in offices of trust and consequence, it would be greatly for the interest of the Company, and a just reward to those servants, to prefer them to situations wherein their knowledge and principles might be still more usefully employed for the public. But above all, he urged the absolute necessity of selecting the ablest and most unexceptionable men to fill the first situations in their governments, without regard to those considerations of rank and seniority which had hitherto guided them in the rule of promotion among their own servants.

ON the 9th January 1786, Lord Macartney arrived in London, and on the 13th of that month had a conference with the chairman and deputy chairman of the East India Company on the subject of his appointment as governor-general of Bengal. He then informed them that, having had several *fits* of the gout and rheumatism at Madras, and having suffered greatly in his constitution from the climate of India, as well as from the oppressive cares and vexations which occurred during his presidency, it became absolutely necessary for him on those accounts to decline entering upon a new and

arduous scene of affairs, until by a voyage to sea and a relaxation for some time from business, he should acquire sufficient health and strength for the undertaking. But in addition to these motives he was aware, he told them, that in order to acquit himself of the office of governor-general of Bengal with essential permanent advantage to the company and the state, and with credit to those persons who had concerned themselves in his appointment, as well as to himself, it would be necessary for him to receive a decided support from home, of which, till he came home, he could not be certain, as the mere circumstance of his election, which he attributed more to chance than a decided measure of government, did not ensure it. That however, he added, the most decisive support from home did not appear to him sufficient, in the present view of things in India, and the new spirit of combination and opposition that had gone forth both in the civil and military departments in that country, without many new regulations to meet and compose it. He observed to them that due subordination on the part of the troops in India to the civil governments there could be secured only by restoring the system subsisting in the Company's instructions for India till 1774, and always subsisting in the other dependencies of Great Britain and in Ireland, by which the commander in chief of the troops is, in all respects whatsoever, under the immediate control of the representative of the civil power; whereas the instructions of 1774, framed on the spur of an occasion, and not on general principles, created in effect two independent powers in the same government; that a line had been attempted to be drawn between the respec-

tive prerogatives of the civil and the military chief, a line about which there has been and ever will be a contest; the troops looking up to the military chief alone are totally withdrawn from all obedience or attention to the regular government of the country.

With regard to the persons who formed the civil department in India, they were not likely, he observed, to be brought back to the original object of their institution of being useful and obedient servants of the company, agreeably to their covenants, in any other way than by leaving a discretion in the Company's representative to substitute others in their room, whether before in the service or not, as he shall see occasion, and by removing the claim to office, as matter of right, from seniority of rank, trusting to the government there, as is entrusted to every government, that it will pay due regard to merit and length of service when accompanied with the qualifications which the offices to be disposed of respectively require. At present it would seem that some of the civil servants acted in India, as if they conceived they had an irremovable tenure of their respective stations: persons holding some of the most considerable offices there are, from an idea of independence, among the most forward to oppose the acts of the legislature of this country, which has placed a check on the abuses of offices there. It did not appear, he added, that any were deterred, in joining this opposition, from the dread of not succeeding to future vacancies, as it was conceived that such succession was to depend upon rank in the service, and not upon the discretion of the Com-

pany's representatives, who could not object to that act in any individual in which almost all of the Company's servants had joined, and to whom alone their choice was confined.

With these two leading regulations, and, perhaps, a few others of a subordinate nature, Lord Macartney said he conceived it possible that the government of India might yet, in the hands of a prudent and honest man, looking to the welfare of the state and to his own character, be rendered an instrument of happiness to that country and of substantial permanent advantage to this; but that unless the person dignified with the name of governor-general, was entrusted also with authority to act, he might become a shadow without substance, and might undertake responsibility for an object without the means of attaining it. If therefore, he added, a certain number of gentlemen be appointed as a council to assist him, as is proper, he should be allowed, in cases where he thought it expedient, to become alone responsible for the Company and the state, and be authorized, as in all other dependencies of Great Britain, to act independent of his council, or, at least, he should be sure of a general conformity of sentiments between him and his council. In the first case, he observed, the gentleman then acting as governor-general of Bengal might be considered to be inclined to retire from a diminished share of power; and, in the second case, the records of the company showed a marked and personal opposition, on his part, to his (Lord Macartney's) sentiments and public conduct; that the propriety, in either case, of that gentleman's recall, on the grounds already mentioned, spared him the painful necessity of giving more pointed

and particular reasons for depriving him of any degree of power in that government before he (Lord Macartney) could be placed at the head of it. It was likely too, he further observed, that the present commander in chief of the troops in India, having once tasted and exercised independent *military* power, could not relish the subordination which Lord Macartney thought so essential to the *civil* power, for the same reasons, among others, which have contributed to establish that subordination every where else.

On these terms only Lord Macartney felt he could accept the appointment, observing, that if he could have been dazzled by the splendor, the emolument, the power, or the patronage of a governor-general of Bengal, without a serious consideration of all the duties of that station, which was not more eminent than arduous to him who really meant to render it the instrument of establishing the solid and durable welfare of the Company, he might have availed himself of the appointment conferred upon him; he thought himself therefore to have some claim to the belief of the chairman and deputy chairman when he assured them that the hope alone of rendering public service could possibly induce him to take upon him that office, and that the considerations he now submitted to them were not occasioned by any private views, partialities, or prejudices, and had only been brought forward from a conviction of the necessity of them.

A minute of this conversation was transmitted by the chairs to the board of control, and nothing further on the subject was mentioned to Lord Macartney till the 20th Fe-

bruary, when he received a note from Mr. Dundas desiring him to meet Mr. Pitt and himself the next morning at the office of the commissioners for the affairs of India. In the interval, however, he had every reason to suppose that he stood on high ground with at least the leading characters of administration. At the opening of the session of parliament of 1786, on the 24th January, when debating on the king's speech, Mr. Fox took occasion to observe, in touching on the affairs of India, that Lord Macartney had acted throughout the whole of his stay in India upon the most upright principles, and had come home with hands perfectly clean and unsullied. His Lordship, he said, from a conviction of the necessity of the measure, had taken the collection and the management of the revenues of the Carnatic out of the hands, not of the nabob of Arcot, but of his agents and usurers, who plundered the natives and robbed him, and that he had vested both, where they ought to be, in the hands of the Company: This measure the board of Control had overthrown by their orders, and had directed the collection and management of the nabob's revenues to be restored to him, or rather to those agents and plunderers; that the fatal effects of this order had spread alarm and terror through the Carnatic, and impressed the council at Fort St. George with so strong an idea of its impropriety, that Lord Macartney went himself to Calcutta to remonstrate with the government there and to deprecate the consequences. Let the house, said Mr. Fox, imagine the surprize of his Lordship on finding Mr. Hastings departed for Europe, and a commission there appointing him governor-general, a situation it was impossible for him to accept, while the order to restore

the collection and management of the Carnatic revenues to the nabob continued in force. Mr. Fox bestowed the highest encomiums on the zeal and talent, the integrity and disinterestedness of Lord Macartney, declaring he did not speak from any authority derived from his Lordship, nor did he wish it to be understood that what he had said was any thing more than what he, in common with the rest of the public, was well acquainted with.

To this part of Mr. Fox's speech, Mr. Pitt, in his reply, took occasion to observe, that with respect to the supposed inconsistency of Lord Macartney being appointed to the presidency over the general affairs of the Company in India, at the same time that his conduct in the assignment of the revenues of the Carnatic was not approved of, he desired it to be recollected that, although he and Mr. Hastings had differed upon more points than one, yet, in that affair alone excepted, his Lordship had acted in such a manner as entitled him to the highest applause that words could possibly bestow. Here Mr. Pitt launched into a most copious and warm strain of panegyric on the character of Lord Macartney, which he concluded by observing that, from the whole of his administration of the government of Madras, he was perfectly eligible to that of Bengal; that the only point in which his conduct at Madras had been thought objectionable was one in which, though justified by the policy of the measure, the good faith and credit of the nation rendered it necessary to make a sacrifice. Mr. Pitt said, he was happy to find the right honorable gentleman entertained so high an opinion of the noble Lord, because it would tend perhaps to reconcile

him to a part of the East India bill he so much complained of, to find that a nobleman of such great reputation and such distinguished virtue had borne, in the most pointed manner, the testimony of his approbation to the system of calling all persons returning from the Company's service in India to account, upon oath, for their acquisitions. For though that restriction did not extend itself to him, yet so much did he approve the spirit and principle of it, nay so necessary did it appear to him for his own honor, that he voluntarily came forward and complied with the clause, even before its operation commenced; and he hoped that after so illustrious an example, no man would take upon him to depreciate the good policy and justice of the restriction. He observed, that this action of Lord Macartney was in itself so noble, so disinterested, and showed so pointedly the dignified sentiments by which he was actuated, that even if his opinion of that nobleman's virtue and character were inferior to that of the right honorable gentleman; nay had he even disapproved of his general conduct in his government, yet this action alone would have been sufficient to atone for all former miscarriages, and to have entitled him to the highest glory and the loudest applause*.

Such were the honorable testimonies, which the friends of Lord Macartney had the gratification to hear, for the second time, from the two distinguished leaders of the contending parties in the House of Commons. Under such favorable circumstances did he meet Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas on the 21st of February.

* Parliamentary Debates, Jan. 24, 1786.

Mr. Pitt began by saying, that a variety of business and some particular circumstances had retarded him from coming to so speedy a conclusion as he could have wished on the subject of the appointment of a governor-general of Bengal ; that as to the points mentioned in the minute of his Lordship's conference with the two chairs on the 13th January last, he was clearly of opinion it would be proper to give to the governor-general a power of deciding singly, even against his council, on great points where he saw it necessary to undertake such responsibility ; that it might also be proper to extend the authority of the governor-general in military subjects, perhaps to the length that his Lordship had proposed ; but that this measure should not be immediately adopted, though it might be adopted in a little time ; that as to Mr. Macpherson, he would probably not wish to remain long in a subordinate situation at Bengal, after having filled the first ; and that with regard to General Sloper, the immediate removal of him from his present situation, considering the particular circumstances of his nomination, and the light in which it was conceived he stood, would not be so easily accomplished, and it possibly might not be found necessary ; but he assured Lord Macartney that if he should determine on going to India as governor-general, he might depend upon his decided countenance and support.

Lord Macartney said he was sensibly impressed with the liberality of his conduct in his former appointment, unsolicited as it was, either by himself or any of his friends, and with the very honorable mention he had since made of him both in parliament and elsewhere ; that he was

persuaded of his good intentions towards him ; but that since his return to England many things had come to his knowledge, and some circumstances had occurred, to make him particularly cautious in undertaking the affairs of India ; and that it would neither be safe nor honorable for him to do so, unless he (Mr. Pitt) would take the necessary precautions to prevent any counteraction either here or at Bengal, which he had sufficient reason to apprehend from the unprovoked enmity of Mr. Hastings and the weight he might still have in India, founded on the idea entertained of his standing so well in the opinion of many persons high in the administration. He thought therefore that if he were sent to India, it would be necessary for his own reputation and for the public service, that he should receive such a distinguished mark of favor as would unequivocally show to the world, that he went out with the united support of the crown, the ministry, and the Company ; that in mentioning this he begged Mr. Pitt would be assured that he was not a man desirous of starting idle difficulties, or making what was called terms or bargains ; but that he had not been without some ground of hope, that what he now said would have been anticipated by him (Mr. Pitt) ; that the distinguished mark, to which he alluded, he had long looked to as an object of honest ambition, and had therefore preferred distant, laborious, and troublesome employments abroad, as more likely, from the opportunities they might afford for distinguished exertions, to lead him to it, than the usual routine of the boards and parliamentary offices at home ; he observed that he had passed twenty-two years of his life in public business of that kind, and hoped it was not unreasonable to aspire to the king's favor,

as a reward for past service, and an encouragement to future.

At the same time, he observed, it was right for him candidly to avow that he did not feel any very great eagerness for the appointment; that, knowing as he did, the real state of India, indifferent as he was to the acquisition of wealth, and possessing his mind in tranquillity and content, he did not think it would be wise in him, or fair to his friends at his time of life, to banish himself from his country, his family, and dearest connections, and undertake a task of infinite difficulty, responsibility, and risk, unless he had a very fair prospect of being able to do some essential permanent service to the public and honor to himself; that if he undertook the government, it would be with an unalterable determination to retrieve it, and to effect, at all hazards, what was wished to be effected; otherwise, he observed, he might have remained at Bengal instead of coming home with the sentiments he had expressed.

After some further discourse, in which he perceived that Mr. Pitt, with every disposition to enter into his views, laboured under some difficulty in assenting to them, he rose to take his leave, concluding by repeating the opinion he had often given to the Court of Directors, that he hoped their choice would fall, as it ought to do, upon the honestest man they could find, on a man much superior to himself in other qualifications; requesting them to believe that his having mentioned, what he conceived necessary to be done, in case they had pitched upon him, proceeded solely from the con-

viction of his own mind ; not from the slightest disinclination to the service, or to his majesty's administration as it then stood ; for that, whatever his situation was, his conduct would always be the same, consistent and agreeable with those principles which, through the course of his life, had uniformly guided him. Three days after this he was informed that Lord Cornwallis was appointed governor-general of Bengal.

Nothing could possibly be more gratifying to Lord Macartney than this choice of his majesty's ministers. His own wishes, in fact, had never tended to the acquisition of that high office, and the acceptance of it on any terms would have been a sacrifice of his private feelings to public duty. That he had a strong disinclination to accept the appointment, and that the conditions on which only he could accept it were made solely on public grounds, the following anecdote, obligingly communicated by Lady Macartney, is an unequivocal proof. Her Ladyship being one evening at a large party, Lord Macartney came in, and being impatient to communicate some intelligence to her, took out a card and wrote with his pencil upon the back of it as follows : " I am
" the happiest man in England at this hour. Lord Corn-
" wallis, I hear, is governor-general of India." The card is still in her ladyship's possession with the pencil writing upon it.

The mark of favor to which Lord Macartney conceived himself entitled, even independent of public considerations, was a British peerage ; but he would not have asked it on any other ground than the fullest conviction in his own mind,

how impossible it would be for him, considering the past and present situation of things, to carry on the government to his own satisfaction and the public benefit, unless he should be armed with this or some other distinguished ensign of his sovereign's favor, and some unequivocal mark of the minister's determination to support him. Something more, in fact, than the mere nomination to the government of Bengal was absolutely requisite for his own sake and that of others, to resist or soften the impression already made in India by the recent destruction of the fabric he had raised for the support of the Company there. For although he could not entertain a doubt that both Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas wished him to accept the government of Bengal, and would have supported him in it, yet he had many reasons to convince him that there were others, very high in power and influence, who were hostile to his being appointed. A great law officer of the crown, to whose opinions it was usual to pay much deference, is said to have declared in the House of Lords, "that twenty Lord Macartneys could not compensate to the Company the loss of Mr. Hastings."

To do away the effect that such a comparative disparagement was likely to produce, as well as to prevent a repetition of such language from being of prejudice to the public, Lord Macartney had unquestionably every reason to expect that, beside the strength of his claim for what he had done, he might have been distinguished on such an occasion in a manner that would materially aid him in what he would have still to do. A mark of his sovereign's favor, at this time, could not fail to give an impression both at home and abroad

of the steady purpose of the crown and its executive ministers, to support a person they had judged worthy of being placed in the first great office of trust they had to bestow. He conceived also that, in this country and under his present majesty's government, a gentleman of good family, fair inheritance, liberal education, and emblemished character, was not ill founded in hoping that a faithful exertion of his abilities in many trying situations might lead him, after two and twenty years employment, to such a reward as he then aspired to. Several peers had been made without the merit of public service to plead, although they might have to plead that of large fortunes; that his Lordship had not *that merit* could scarcely be imputed a demerit to him who, of all men, might easily have possessed a fortune sufficient to support the highest rank; but even public merit alone without great opulence had, on many occasions, been justly rewarded in the manner Lord Macartney desired: and as to himself, he might have been justified in observing, that if the custom now subsisted, as it did formerly, of giving reasons for the creation of peers, the testimony which the minister himself (Mr. Pitt) bore of his conduct, both while in India and since his return, would make a more complete and distinguished preamble to *his* patent than could be furnished to a great many by all the ingenuity of the heralds' office.

But although Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas felt they could not, consistently with the principles they had then laid down with regard to Indian appointments, accede to the only

terms on which Lord Macartney could accept the government of Bengal, the considerations he had suggested to them and to the court of directors were generally adopted, and led to the choice so judiciously made of Lord Cornwallis for that important office. The grounds on which his majesty's ministers thought it expedient to refuse the peerage to Lord Macartney are fully explained in a letter of Lord Melville; and though they may not be found to apply strictly to his peculiar case, yet the general principle, on which they were adopted, is deserving of the highest praise. "We thought it a bad precedent," says his Lordship, "to establish by our authority, that so high and important a situation should not of itself be thought sufficiently exalted to invite the first persons in the kingdom to look up to it as the object of their ambition. It appeared to us a most proper road to the acquisition of an hereditary honor, as a reward for services actually performed, and Lord Macartney would certainly have obtained it soon after his return to India; but we could not listen to the idea of a grant of a peerage being a preliminary to the appointment of a governor-general of India. The stand on our part became the more necessary, because the resolution was then taken of not confining the high situations in India to the servants of the Company, as it was anxiously wished that men of rank and consideration in their own country should become candidates for the first and most important situation under his majesty; and it would take from the grace and character of future appointments, if such men were to be induced to accept the situation by the allurements of a British peerage

“ as a necessary requisite, previous to acceptance. If that
“ was recognized, candidates might offer merely to accom-
“ plish that object, and they would return again almost as
“ soon as they had landed in India, having secured the fa-
“ vorite object they had in view. I will not, at the same
“ time, disguise from you that perhaps another feeling ope-
“ rated to a considerable degree. You are rightly informed,
“ when you suppose that the appointment of Lord Macart-
“ ney was not a favorite measure with several members of
“ administration. Neither was it popular with a great body
“ of the directors and proprietors of the East India Com-
“ pany. I need not mention that it was not agreeable either
“ to the partisans of Mr. Hastings or of Sir John Macpherson.
“ When, therefore, against such an accumulation of discon-
“ tent and opposition, Mr. Pitt was induced by me to concur
“ in the return of Lord Macartney to India as governor-
“ general, it was not unnatural that both of us should have
“ felt hurt, that he did not rather repose his future fortunes
“ in our hands, than make it the subject of a *sine quâ non* pre-
“ liminary. And I think, if Lord Macartney had known us
“ as well then as he did afterwards, he would have felt as
“ we did.”

The new governor-general, Lord Cornwallis, possessed al-
ready all the qualities, qualifications, and distinctions for that
high station, yet it was very soon afterwards thought proper,
on the general principle of marking the particular favor of
government towards the persons invested with important si-
tuations in India, to superadd some new honor to those they

already possessed ; thus the order of the garter was conferred on Lord Cornwallis, and of the bath on General Campbell, previous to their departure from England.

For some years after this, notwithstanding the most honorable public testimony of the minister to his conduct and character, notwithstanding the many great and eminent services in arduous and trying situations, and a steady and uniform attachment to his majesty's person and government, Lord Macartney had the mortification of experiencing the inattention and neglect of government ; being suffered to remain almost a singular instance of all those employed in high stations in India, in not having received any kind of favor from his employers, whilst many others, whose services were scarcely ever heard of, were particularly distinguished. Yet surely it will not be considered as presuming too much to say, that the preservation of the northern Circars of the annual value of half a million sterling, the obtaining an assignment which saved the Carnatic, a rigid economy which saved millions to the public, an inflexible integrity which gave an eminent example, where an example was so much wanted, an honorable and advantageous peace which restored the tranquillity, the commerce, and the prosperity of India, exhausted and incapable of further resistance, a steady perseverance of duty, regardless of all personal consequences, and an invariable preference of public to private interest—it cannot surely be thought too much to say, that such important benefits, joined to many other eminent services in former employments, did not render Lord Macartney less.

worthy of distinction than many others on whom it had been bestowed : but

Diis aliter visum est.

There were however many gentlemen in the direction of the affairs of the East India Company, who thought so highly of Lord Macartney's services as to declare, that not to notice them by some distinguished mark of approbation, would be a severe reflection on the justice as well as the gratitude of the Company; and therefore proposed that an early day should be named for taking those services into consideration. On application being made to Mr. Dundas, he readily admitted Lord Macartney's claims to be entitled to the most favorable consideration; but felt an apprehension that the case of Mr. Hastings would interfere in such a measure, as the friends of the latter, asserting he was worth only 60,000*l.* had already been stirring to procure a pension for him, an attempt on which he (Mr. Dundas) had always thrown cold water; and that the application would certainly be renewed in the event of a precedent made in the instance of Lord Macartney, whose services, he said, should otherwise have met his most cordial support. But whatever might have been in reality the conduct of Mr. Hastings, the opinions concerning it differed greatly, it being, at least, as much reprobated by a part of the public, as it was approved by another; but Lord Macartney's conduct was approved on all sides; with regard to him, there was no doubt and but one voice; nor was there any inquiry about it, or motions for impeachment for it before parliament.

His friends however in the direction were determined, as an act of justice, to bring the matter forward, and accordingly on the 12th April the question came before the court, when the following resolutions were passed :

“ Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Court, that the Right Hon. George Lord Macartney, whilst he was governor of Madras, upon all occasions manifested the greatest zeal in support of the interests of this Company, and that he faithfully discharged his duty as such ; more especially by adhering strictly to his covenants and engagements with the Company, in declining to accept any presents from the country powers, or from any person whatever in India ; that the example set by his Lordship, in giving in upon oath a state of his property gained in the Company’s service, was highly meritorious, in as much as such conduct was afterwards sanctioned by an act of the legislature, and by which statement it appears that his Lordship’s fortune had been very moderately increased during his residence in India, and that the same arose solely from the savings he made from his salary and allowances authorized by this court.

“ Resolved, That it is incumbent upon this Court to show their fullest approbation of such upright and disinterested conduct, in the hope that so laudable an example will be followed by their servants in India ; and moreover that it is fitting, that some compensation should be made to his Lordship, and that it will be a proper reward for such distinguished services and strict integrity, to grant his Lordship an

annuity of fifteen hundred pounds during the term of his natural life.

“ By order of the Court,

(Signed)

“ THOMAS MORTON, Secretary.

“ East India House, April 13, 1786.”

Long before this time an annuity had been granted of five hundred pounds to his secretary Sir George Staunton, for his distinguished assistance and meritorious services in India, for which also he had received an Irish baronetage. This consideration for his secretary was highly gratifying to Lord Macartney ; nor did he complain at the very scanty recompence for services so signal as those which he had performed in India ; but it could not escape observation, that this parsimony to one whose slender acquisitions had arisen solely from self-denial and the surplus of his salary above his expenses, was the more remarkable on account of superior favors heaped on others, whose claims could never be brought in competition with his. Lord Macartney's appointments, for instance, ceased the day he left Madras, whereas Sir John Macpherson's, as governor-general of Bengal, were continued to him for two years after his return to England.

IT could scarcely be supposed that a man of Lord Macartney's character, who, fearless of any consequences to himself, followed steadily the strict line of his duty, and never suffered any dereliction in others, whatever their rank

or situation might be, to pass unnoticed, would escape the making of a number of enemies. Major-general Stuart, whom he had found it necessary to dismiss from the Company's service in India, having failed to obtain that redress at home to which he thought himself entitled, took the earliest opportunity of renewing his attack on his Lordship by enclosing to him, the very day after his arrival in London, an offensive extract of a petition which, he said, had been laid before his majesty. The correspondence led to a duel in which Lord Macartney was severely wounded. The particulars of this transaction will be found in the Appendix*. It was the general opinion that his Lordship ought not to have gone out with General Stuart, as the misconduct of the latter, in his public situation, had caused the necessity of the step that had been taken in India, and approved at home; but so conscious was Lord Macartney of the rectitude of all his views and intentions, that he frequently took occasion to declare his fixed purpose of never shrinking from responsibility, either public or private, for any one act of his government or his life. As it was conceived from some circumstances which occurred that the affair would not end with the first meeting, Lord Townshend made it a point to go to the king, who laid his injunction on the parties to proceed no further.

Notwithstanding the treatment which Lord Macartney had experienced from administration was not exactly such as he

* Notes of Lord Macartney's transactions with Major-general Stuart, after his arrival in England, in January 1786. Appendix, No. 20.

conceived he had a right to expect, notwithstanding the number of respectable friends which he had among the leaders of opposition, he never suffered any circumstance of disappointment to betray the smallest degree of dissatisfaction, much less to incline him towards any sort of hostility to, or public disapprobation of, the measures of his majesty's government. He was indeed of the most conciliating disposition; and however he might at times feel himself hurt by ill treatment, this made no difference in his conduct towards those who he had reason to believe were the cause of it. Through the whole course of his life he felt the most loyal and dutiful attachment to the king, and omitted no opportunity of expressing his grateful sense of obligation to his majesty, both in public and in private; and this attachment to the person of his sovereign, added to the impression of the propriety of supporting the existing government, induced him to give to administration his constant and invariable suffrage, except indeed in one instance where the public opinion was decidedly against the government; to a systematic opposition, he never gave a single vote in the whole course of his political life.

But although he had some grounds for supposing himself neglected, the favorable opinion entertained of him by Mr. Pitt had not, in fact, suffered the least change; and, some time after the appointment of Lord Cornwallis, he received a message from that minister, through a confidential friend and colleague, expressive of his good wishes, and desiring to know if he found himself inclined to accept of office. Lord Macartney made no hesitation in giving an explicit answer in the affirmative, wishing

it however to be understood, that he must decline any appointment at the board of Control, having resolved, in his own mind, to have nothing more to do, directly or indirectly, with Indian affairs. Whether this was the precise situation which Mr. Pitt had marked out for him, or what other circumstance might have induced the minister to alter his mind, Lord Macartney never presumed to inquire, nor was he ever made acquainted; but from that time he was suffered, according to the usual expression, to lay on the shelf for several years.

In this interval of rest from public office, he was by no means inactive either in public concerns or in his private affairs. In 1788, he took his seat, for the first time, in the Irish House of Peers. A regard for the welfare and prosperity of his native country, which he had always very much at heart, induced him to undertake the duties of trustee of the linen manufacture for the province of Ulster. He accepted also the honorable appointment of *custos rotulorum* of the county of Antrim; and the command was given to him of a regiment of militia dragoons. Thus for six years a great portion of his time was passed in Ireland, and this gave him the opportunity of making very considerable improvements in his paternal estate at Lissanoure; reclaiming, by a judicious drainage, a large tract of boggy ground, and adding extensive plantations of the larch fir, a tree which, at that time, had been little tried in this part of Ireland, and which, he had the satisfaction to find, grew with uncommon rapidity. He caused a whole town to be built on his estate at Dervock, consisting of small neat dwellings, so that every one of his

tenantry might be cleanly and comfortably lodged, which is not usually the case among the peasantry of Ireland. He had no middle men upon his estate; but let it out in small allotments immediately from himself to the respective occupiers, and gave them every possible encouragement which could tend to the promotion of their happiness and prosperity. A strong attachment to his native country communicated an additional pleasure to the happy success of his labors, and he probably would have passed the greater part of his life at Lissanoure, had not an event taken place which called him once more from his retreat to bear a part in the busy scene of politics.

THE beneficial effects which were immediately experienced from the commutation act, whose operation threw almost the whole of the tea trade into the hands of the British East India Company, were attended however with the temporary disadvantage of draining the country of its bullion to make good the large yearly balances in favor of China. The exportation of broad cloths and camblets, of lead, tin, and some trifling articles of manufacture, to that country, kept no sort of pace with the vast increase in the importation of tea: but it was conceived that if a new market could be opened on the northern part of the coast of that extensive empire, a new and increased demand for these articles, and others not wanted in the southern provinces, might there be created,

and thus diminish the inconvenience arising from the difficulty of procuring bullion. Another circumstance had for some time occupied the attention of the Court of Directors. Their commercial concerns, at the only port in which they were permitted to carry them on, had long been subject to many inconvenient and humiliating restrictions; and the persons, who were occasionally resident there to manage their concerns, were liable to many gross impositions and indignant usage. This kind of treatment, it is true, was exercised in common against all foreigners, but the English in particular were cut off from any hope of redress to their grievances, on the part of the government, being wholly unknown to it as the avowed subjects of any sovereign. The French, the Dutch, the Spanish, and the Portuguese, were either represented by the missionaries of their respective nations, residing at the court of Peking, or were known from occasional embassies which had been sent to that court by their respective sovereigns. But the English were a set of adventurers who had originally forced their way into the trading ports of China, and were known only by the opprobrious name of *Hung-mao* or red pates, which, though bestowed in common on all Europeans, was more particularly applied to them.

To establish therefore a more equal and, at the same time, a more creditable intercourse with China, the president of the Board of Control was strongly impressed with the expediency of opening a communication with the court of Peking by means of an embassy; to be conducted on a more liberal and extensive scale than a former mission entrusted to Co-

lonel Cathcart a few years before, which was rendered abortive by the death of that deserving officer, before he reached the point of his destination. Mr. Dundas justly concluded that if such an embassy should answer no other good purpose than that of procuring a due respect for the national character, and protection for the trading part of its subjects who might visit China, the expense would not be ill bestowed. The time was most proper for such an undertaking; for England was then at peace with the whole world. It was a suitable and distinguished attention on the part of his majesty's ministers to the manufacturing and commercial interests of the nation, who, overlooking the consideration of expense in the magnitude of the object, omitted no probable opportunity of extending the fame, intercourse, and commerce of Great Britain to the remotest regions.

The Court of Directors of the East India Company entered with becoming spirit into the views of Mr. Dundas. The choice of a proper person to fill a situation so new and delicate as that of ambassador to the emperor of China, a situation which, from its nature, required great address, strong talent, steady perseverance, and inflexible integrity, was not however thought difficult to fix; he who, in fact, originated the embassy had coupled, with the first suggestion, Lord Macartney as the only person capable of undertaking the mission with a probability of success. But as his Lordship had not yet been consulted, it was doubtful whether he might be inclined to accept the appointment. Having however laid it down as a rule to refuse no public employment, wherein he conceived there was a probability of being useful

to the state, he felt not the least hesitation in acceding to the proposal, but with this single condition that, as the nature of the employment was altogether new, he should be allowed to make choice of the several persons to be attached to the embassy, as a knowledge of their characters appeared to him an essential point towards ensuring its success. "I flatter myself," says he, in a letter to Mr. Secretary Dundas, of the 7th January 1792, "you will forgive me if I take the liberty to observe that, in preparing for all distant expeditions, one ought to use every precaution for ensuring success in proportion to the difficulties of finding resources against accidents. None of any kind happen more frequently or are more pernicious than those which arise from disunion among the persons engaged in such undertakings. And as none, in fact, are to be sent in the present instance, but such as are deemed necessary in the prosecution of it, so there are none who might not, in their several situations, have it occasionally in their power by a perverse spirit, to cause delay or throw obstructions in the progress of the business, or, at least, to render it more irksome and embarrassing. Such a spirit often breaks forth where the source of authority is too far removed to check it in time, or to punish those who are actuated by it, and substitute others in their room; but it is not so likely to take place in men whom a sense of gratitude for their appointments attaches to him with whom it is their duty to concur." The truth was, that a secretary of embassy had been recommended from a very high quarter, which made his Lordship deem it expedient to start the above objection to a stranger, having already determined in his

own mind, that his confidential friend and former secretary, Sir George Staunton, should accompany him on this new and interesting mission. "But," says he, "were Sir George Staunton out of the question, I doubt whether it would be in my power to gratify any of those who have applied, as there are some gentlemen with whom I have been nearly connected in the course of my public employments, during a period of twenty-eight years, a neglect of whom, on such an occasion, would be equally unjust in me and unmerited by them; especially as I have never had credit with government to obtain the smallest favor for any of them." To which Mr. Dundas, with great candor and pleasantry, observed, "A secretary in my opinion is no more a subject of recommendation than a wife is, and in this, as well as in every other part of your arrangement, I mean to give one uniform answer—that I will recommend nobody."

Nothing indeed could be more flattering to Lord Macartney than the conduct of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas on this occasion. They seemed to feel an anxiety to remove from his mind any idea that he might have entertained of the apparent want of attention on the part of government for the last six years. The salary recommended was so liberal, that a governor-general of Bengal might not have been offended with the offer. It was fixed at 15,000*l.* a year, on the ground that his Lordship ought not to be permitted to double the Cape of Good Hope at an inferior salary to what he had formerly enjoyed in those regions, especially as his new office of ambassador extraordinary to Peking

was neither inferior in dignity nor exposed to less difficulty or danger, or less likely to call for the exertion, in this first essay, of talents and address, than his former employment of president of Fort St. George. Nor did such salary, considerable as it was, bear the proportion to the emoluments of some of the Company's servants in India, which the difference between their rank and situation and the rank and situation of an ambassador, would seem naturally to point out. Not only every person in the civil department of the embassy was the choice of Lord Macartney, but the officers of the guard were likewise of his nomination. The first lord of the admiralty, then Lord Chatham, allowed him to select whatever ship of sixty-four guns then in commission he might think proper, and also to mention the Captain he wished to command her, and, by a singular indulgence, that captain was permitted to appoint his own officers. The directors of the East India Company, by whom the expense of the embassy was to be supported, made no difficulty in leaving to his judgment the selection of the valuable presents intended for the emperor of China, and they permitted, at his request, one of the finest ships in their service, the *Hindustan*, to accompany the embassy, together with a small vessel which they purchased as a tender. In short, it was impossible for any appointment to be conferred under circumstances more agreeable and flattering than that was of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary from the King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China.

Lord Macartney, on his part, from the moment the expedition was opened to him, gave to it his whole mind and

attention. "I have revolved," says he, in a letter to Mr. Dundas, "all the advantages that may result to the public, "and the disappointments which I may meet with myself. "From the first I feel the highest anticipated satisfaction, "and the latter, when they happen, I am prepared to "suffer.

"Non ulla laborum

"In terris nova mi facies, inopinave surget

"Omnia præcepi, atque animo mecum antè per regis."

As it would have been a fruitless endeavor to search for a person in England who possessed the least knowledge that could be useful in the Chinese language, Sir George Staunton set off for Paris without delay, in the hope of finding there some one qualified for the office of interpreter, or, in case of failure, to obtain information from the society of the *Missions Etrangères* respecting the most probable means of procuring one elsewhere. Here he was recommended to proceed to Naples, where the society *De Propaganda Fide* were known to receive occasionally young Chinese, sent over by the missionaries with a view to their being instructed in the Christian religion, and, at the same time, in the Latin and Italian languages. After some hesitation on the part of the heads of the college in venturing to trust their neophytes to the care of heretics, Sir George at length succeeded in obtaining two native Chinese who, having finished their instruction, and taken the order of priesthood, were preparing to return to their own country. These two men readily engaged their services as interpreters to the embassy, and two others, desirous of availing themselves of so favorable an opportunity of

getting to China, followed their companions to London, and were accommodated with a passage in the Hindostan.

As it was thought proper to give notice to the court of China of the approach of the embassy, Lord Macartney suggested that a king's consul should proceed to Canton for that purpose; a proposal which created some little alarm in the Court of Directors, lest an appointment of this nature might interfere with their patronage; it was settled therefore that the three commissioners in their own service, who were about to be sent out to make some new arrangements on the part of the Company, should, at the same time, announce the intended embassy. The two chairs seemed anxious likewise that his Lordship should apply to their supracargoes at Canton for information, adding, that the only chance of success in the embassy would arise from a perfect previous knowledge of the laws, customs, and manners of the Chinese; to which Lord Macartney could not avoid observing, "that there was something discouraging in the observation of the chairman and deputy chairman, that the only chance of success must arise from a perfect previous knowledge of the laws, customs, and manners of the Chinese; because I fear," says he, "that it cannot be acquired from the supracargoes and others who have resided at Canton, and with whom a personal communication is recommended, for I have not been able to discover any of them now living who had ever penetrated into the country above a mile from the suburbs; few of them have ever been in the city itself, and not one of them has had the industry or

“curiosity to acquire the language.” Upon the whole however the directors of the East India Company, while naturally jealous lest the embassy might in some shape or other affect their rights and privileges, behaved with great liberality; and they declared, “that the very able and honorable manner in which his Lordship had ever conducted himself towards the Company would justify every degree of confidence which they could place in an individual.”

The difficulty of finding interpreters being removed, the presents in a train of preparation, and the Lion man of war and Hindostan Indiaman in a state of readiness, Lord Macartney, on the 3d May 1792, received his appointment of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary from the king of Great Britain to the emperor of China, and the same day was sworn of his majesty's privy council at St. James's: and on the 28th June following, his majesty, by privy seal at St. James's, and by patent at Dublin the 1st day of August following, was pleased further to advance him to the title of Viscount Macartney of Dervock in the county of Antrim.

But, notwithstanding every exertion that could be made, the ships were not in readiness to proceed till the month of September, on the 26th of which they sailed from Spithead. The detailed account of their progress, and the honorable reception of the ambassador at the various places which they had occasion to touch at on the voyage, have already been made public in Sir George Staunton's *Authentic Account of the Embassy*. It is therefore unnecessary here to repeat those

particulars ; and the ambassador's own journal, which will be found in the second volume of the present work, contains so accurate and circumstantial an account of his Lordship's transactions, negotiations, and remarks, from the moment he came in sight of China till the day of his departure from it, that any abridgment of it in this place would be wholly superfluous. A few observations on the nature of a China embassy may not however be wholly uninteresting to those who shall be concerned in any future mission to the court of Peking.

In making preparations for this new and extraordinary embassy to a court and people, whose manners and customs were entirely unknown to Englishmen, the best, and, indeed, the only information to guide their proceedings, was sought for among the voluminous writings of the French missionaries. The accounts furnished by some of the most intelligent of these men convey the impression of a very extraordinary taste prevailing at the court of China for the sciences in general, and more particularly for astronomy and experimental philosophy. It was natural therefore that Lord Macartney should provide, among other presents, some valuable instruments of different kinds, and of the latest improvements. On delivering these articles however to those who were appointed to the care and management of them, it was presently discovered that the taste, if it ever existed, was now completely worn out. A large planetarium of curious and intricate workmanship, which to a poor German mechanic had cost the labor and thought of twenty years, and to the East India Company the expense of about fifteen hundred pounds—the largest and most perfect glass lens that perhaps was ever

fabricated—orreries, transit instruments, reflecting and refracting telescopes, theodolites, air-pumps, electrical machines, and an extensive apparatus for assisting to explain and illustrate the principles of science—were all lost and thrown away upon the ignorant Chinese, who immediately after the departure of the ambassador are said to have piled them up in one of the lumber rooms of *Yuen-min-yuen*. Not more successful were the various specimens of elegance and art displayed in the choicest examples of British manufactures. The impression which the contemplation of such articles seemed to make on the minds of the courtiers was that alone of jealousy; and if the novelty or beauty of some of those samples seemed to force their admiration, they were mindful to suppress any appearance of it, and to view them, in the presence of the English, with all the indifference and composure of men, who are in the daily and familiar habit of seeing things of the same kind. Such conduct may probably be ascribed to a kind of state policy, which discourages the introduction of all novelties, that the subjects of the emperor of China may not be tempted to entertain a higher opinion of the talent and ingenuity of foreigners than of themselves; and so deeply are they rooted in self-conceit, that the emperor of China has little to apprehend in this respect; his courtiers are well acquainted with that tacit species of insolence which is sometimes assumed, not exclusively by them, as a cover for ignorance. It will be prudent therefore, on any future occasion, to send out such articles only in the shape of presents (for presents are indispensable) as will be considered of real solid value by the Chinese; such as will neither

offend their pride, nor be thrown away upon their ignorance : their effect will be greater while the expense will be less. Gold and silver, for instance, are metals whose value is not better known to the Jews than to the Chinese, and will be acceptable to them under any shape. Derbyshire spars and red coral are articles that rank high in their estimation ; and broad cloths, kerseymeres, and camblets, to the manufacture of which they set up no pretensions, are in great demand in every part of the empire. Watches and musical clocks may serve as presents ; but the market has for some time been overstocked with them.

The humiliating ceremonial required by the Chinese court from all ambassadors has generally led to discussions in which, except in the instance of Lord Macartney, the Chinese have never failed to carry their point. And though such discussions may not materially affect the issue of the negotiations, it would be as well perhaps to avoid them, if possible, were it only to keep the agents of the court in good humor. If it be thought too degrading to submit to a ceremonial which the emperor himself is obliged to go through several times in the year before the person of his mother, if she be living, and before the manes of his ancestors, and from which no creature in the whole empire is exempt, some means should be devised for evading a ceremony, with which a reluctance to comply will always be construed into disrespect for the sovereign. The instructions of Lord Macartney left it to his own discretion to devise such means as might be satisfactory to the court of China, without compromising the honor of his sove-

reign or the dignity of his ambassador: the plan succeeded; but a person of less address and management might have found himself placed in an embarrassing situation. This offensive ceremonial might perhaps be avoided if, in the ambassador's credentials it were observed, that his majesty had particularly instructed him to approach the throne of China with the same ceremonial of respect as he was accustomed to appear before himself. Such an instruction from the sovereign to his ambassador might probably be admitted by those who are taught to consider the will of the prince as the law of the land.

The missionaries have pretended that all the presents carried by ambassadors to the court of China are considered there as voluntary offerings of tribute to the emperor. Such an idea is not likely to accord with the feelings of a high spirited Englishman justly proud of the honor of his country; but it is an idea that has been adopted without examination into the truth or falsity of the fact. The inscription on the flags of the vessels were translated by the interpreter to Lord Macartney's embassy, who had learned his European language from the dictionaries of the missionaries, by "*The English Ambassador bearing Tribute to the Emperor of China.*" By examining the literal signification of the two characters which these gentlemen have been pleased to translate into *bearing tribute* *, it will be found they have no such mean-

* The two characters are 進貢 pronounced *kin, kung*: the first *kin* signifies to *import*, to *bring*: The second *kung* is a compound consisting of two parts; that above 工 (singly pronounced *kung*) signifying a *piece of workman-*

ing; and that there is not in reality the least necessity for objecting to this display of such flags by which the vanity of the Chinese nation is flattered at a very trifling expense to another.

One great object of Lord Macartney's instructions was to gain an establishment for commercial purposes on some part of the Eastern coast of China, or on some of the numerous islands that are scattered over the Yellow Sea. However desirable such an object might have been, a request of this nature was not likely to be complied with at that time. Many persons were still living in China, and one of some rank had intercourse with the embassy, in whose recollection were still fresh those unfavorable circumstances to the English character, which caused their expulsion from one of those very islands where, in their early intercourse with China, they had been permitted to hold a factory. Other nations of Europe were known to the Chinese by their services, and had received rewards for those services; the English were known only by their broad cloths and their bravery; for the very first of their connection with China was brought about by forcing their way, in spite of forts and ships of war, to the city of Canton. The Dutch, in return for their assistance in destroying a powerful pirate, were allowed to erect commercial establishments at Aimoi, and on the island of Formosa;

ship, a specimen of art, &c. and that below  *pei*, meaning any thing *rare, valuable, or high in estimation*. The real meaning therefore of the inscription on the flags was, "The English ambassador bringing precious things to the emperor of China."

the Portuguese in acknowledgment of very slender services were rewarded with a grant of the strong and almost impregnable peninsula of Macao; but the English had no services to plead that could reasonably entitle them to any such favors*. But whenever an opportunity should present itself the endeavor to open a northern market ought not to be neglected, as such a measure would be attended with infinite advantage to the commercial and manufacturing interests of Great Britain. Few of the articles that are imported into Canton find their way to the northern parts of the empire, and such as do arrive there bear prices so extravagant as to operate almost to their exclusion. The true spirit of trade is but little understood in China; it is carried on by barter for other goods or for bullion; no system of credit has ever been established for facilitating distant intercourse. In fact, the merchant of Canton has no direct correspondence with the merchant of Peking: every article imported into the former must pass through several intermediate hands, and be subject to as many profits before it can reach the latter. If therefore permission could be obtained to land our cargoes at the mouth of the *Pei-ho* in the gulf of *Pe-tche-lee*, there can be

* An opportunity has recently occurred, where our exertions might, with proper management, have proved eminently serviceable to the Chinese government, and thus establish some claim to what we prematurely asked for. The alarm and confusion that have been spread over the coasts of the southern provinces of the empire from bands of pirates infinitely more powerful and more formidable than those which were vanquished by the Dutch, would, no doubt, make the offer of assistance on our part highly acceptable, provided it was made in such a manner as not to excite the jealousy of the government, which however would require great delicacy and great address.

little doubt that the demand for British manufactures in Peking alone would, at least, be equal to the present consumption in the southern provinces of the empire.

If however these solid advantages were not obtained by Lord Macartney's embassy, it was at least productive of other important results that amply compensated the very moderate expense occasioned by the undertaking, which, instead of half a million sterling, as was ridiculously supposed, did not exceed in the whole 80,000*l.* By this embassy the British character became better known to the Chinese, and protection and respect were obtained for the British subjects resident at Canton. At the request of Lord Macartney they have since been permitted to address their complaints personally or by letter to the viceroy, whom before they could never approach but through the channel of the Hong merchants, who are generally interested in the continuance of the grievances of which they had to complain. By the interposition of Lord Macartney's good offices many trifling but teasing inconveniencies and impediments were done away, and some more serious extortions removed. A considerable increase in the demand for broad cloths, from specimens circulated through the country, immediately followed the embassy. It opened an amicable correspondence between his Majesty and the Emperor of China, which has continued ever since, and which, it may be hoped, will ultimately produce those advantages that were, perhaps unreasonably, expected to spring up at once on the first intercourse. It furnished means to one of the gentlemen of acquiring a competent know-

ledge of the extraordinary language of this nation, which in England had been considered as an almost hopeless undertaking. This alone will prove, and indeed has proved, an invaluable acquisition *, by enabling us to communicate directly with the Chinese government, and not through the channel of the missionaries, who, from the difference of our national religion, are inspired with a national hatred against us, and are ready to avail themselves of every occasion to do us an injury. Thus, in the instance of the late embassy, they impressed the court with an idea that our religion was the same as their own, and that the ambassador was no doubt instructed to make proselytes in China as well as themselves, a circumstance which the Emperor thought not unworthy to notice in his letter to the King of England. By the mission to China we obtained a knowledge of the navigation of the Yellow Sea, hitherto unvisited by European ships, and of the wide gulph of *Pe-tche-lee* to the very mouth of the river leading to the capital; it furnished an opportunity to those who composed it of travelling more than a thousand miles through the heart of the Empire; and it has been the means of making us somewhat better informed of the real character of the Chinese nation, which has been most extravagantly misrepresented.

* See Barrow's Travels in China, page 618.

I hope to be pardoned on this occasion for referring for a fact to a work of my own, but the acquisition of the Chinese language by Sir George Staunton, and the great advantages it is capable of procuring, have already been proved in so eminent a manner, in saving the life of a British subject, which otherwise would most assuredly have been sacrificed as on former occasions of the like nature, that the truth of it can never be too strongly impressed on the minds of the British ministers and the Court of Directors.

sented. These are advantages which, few will be disposed to deny, were obtained by the embassy of Lord Macartney to the court of China.

It was his Lordship's intention, had not the war broken out, to proceed to the court of Japan, a nation concerning which our information is still more confined than that of China; but, having justly considered that the protection of a convoy of the value of several millions was paramount to the doubtful success of an experiment, he sacrificed his inclination to his duty, and determined to bring home the China fleet under the protection of the Lion. On the 17th March she left the coast of China, and on the 5th September 1794, Lord Macartney landed at Portsmouth, where he had the gratification to find that, in his absence from England, he had not been forgotten by his Sovereign, who, by patent at Dublin dated the 1st of March 1794, had been pleased to advance him to the title of Earl of Macartney in the county of Antrim.

THE winter which immediately followed his return from China, he was permitted to pass at his ease with his friends; but, in June 1795, he was again called upon to undertake an important mission to Italy of a delicate and confidential nature, the particulars of which there are many reasons for not disclosing at present; it may be sufficient to observe that the objects of his mission were conducted to the entire satisfaction of his Majesty's ministers. From Italy he returned

through Germany, and reached England in May 1796. In the same year, on the 8th June, his Majesty was further pleased to create him a British peer under the title of Baron Macartney of Parkhurst in Surry.

The appointments to which Lord Macartney had been preferred in the public service were so much the more gratifying to himself, as well as honorable to those who conferred them, by their being made on the ground of fitness only without solicitation on his part, or private influence on the part of his friends. Thus, while absent in Italy, and without consulting his inclination, the minister for the colonial department nominated him governor and captain-general of the extensive and valuable settlement of the Cape of Good Hope, which had surrendered to the British arms in September 1795. So justly did Mr. Dundas appreciate the acquisition of this important outwork to the British possessions in India, that he hesitated not a moment in declaring the high consideration to which it was entitled; he knew that the advantages it already possessed were capable of being greatly improved, but that their extent would depend much on the interior administration of the settlement, and the regulations that should be adopted for its future government; and he was not a little solicitous that these regulations should be of a nature most likely to ensure the prosperity of the colony, and secure those permanent benefits to the state, which, he had no doubt, it was capable of affording. With these objects in view no person appeared to him so well qualified, in every respect, for carrying them into execution as Lord Macartney. His information respecting Russia, Grenada and British India,

had superseded all former accounts of these countries ; and as those of the Cape were partial, contradictory and problematical, it was not doubted that his Lordship would bring back with him a full, distinct and accurate account of the real resources and importance of this new settlement in its various relations to Great Britain as a colony, and to British India as a grand military post for its defence and support.

Lord Macartney however had suffered so much from ill health and fatigue on his continental expedition (having on his journey to Italy rested only every second night) that he would willingly have excused himself from accepting the present appointment ; and with this in view he went to court the day after his arrival in England ; but his Majesty was pleased to speak in such flattering terms of the appointment, and seemed so desirous, as he ever is, to promote the happiness and prosperity of his subjects in every part of the globe, that he found it impossible to withhold his compliance. The state of his health however required that he should stipulate for one condition, namely, that he should be allowed to resign the government to the next in command, without waiting to be superseded from home, whenever he should find it expedient to return. In this and every other respect the conduct of Mr. Dundas was highly gratifying to his feelings. He willingly resigned much of his patronage as secretary of state for the colonies, to Lord Macartney. He allowed him to take out his former secretary Mr. Maxwell and the Writer of this Memoir with liberal appointments on the establishment, and as readily acquiesced in their promotion to other situations which became vacant before his Lordship's depar-

ture from the colony. His salary as governor was fixed at 10,000*l.* a year, and an additional sum of 2000*l.* a year as an allowance for his table, the latter of which his Majesty was pleased, in consideration of his long, faithful, and exemplary services, to settle upon him as a pension during the term of his natural life.

He sailed from Portsmouth in January 1797, in the *Trusty* man of war, and landed on the 4th May at the Cape of Good Hope. The events of a colonial government, especially when unmolested by an enemy, are seldom of that prominent cast, as to excite much interest in the relation of them. It may be sufficient to observe that Lord Macartney's administration at the Cape was distinguished by the same system of public economy, by the same integrity and disinterestedness which marked his steps in every former situation of life, and the same good effects were experienced here as in other places. "There is no praise," says Lord Melville, "to which he is not entitled on the score of his government of the Cape." By his high example indeed, and by the adoption of salutary regulations, the colony advanced with rapid steps to a degree of prosperity which it had never known under its ancient masters. The public revenue was nearly doubled without the addition of a single tax, and the value of every kind of property was encreased in proportion. The attention which he gave to the interests of the colonists secured their confidence and attachment; and the doubts they at first entertained of the intention of Great Britain to retain the settlement at the conclusion of the war were so far removed that not a man in ten either believed or wished that it would ever revert to its

former owners. His decisions in cases of appeal from the sentences of the court of justice gave general satisfaction. Before his time all appeals were made to the supreme court of judicature in Batavia and from thence to Europe, the expense and delay of which generally defeated the ends of justice.

The number of king's troops which usually composed the garrison of the Cape was about five thousand men, a number not much inferior to that which was employed in the Carnatic when he was governor of Madras. Yet in the whole of his government at the Cape not a single dispute occurred nor a difference of opinion arose between him and the commander of the forces. He was himself in fact the commander in chief and the line of authority was distinctly defined; and having the command in his own hand, while pursuing a system of rigid economy, so tenacious was he of the just claims of the soldier that, on no consideration, would he ever allow his pay to be made in paper currency. "I am the more solicitous" says he "on this point because I am apprehensive that an idea may be entertained of the probability of persuading the troops to take their subsistence in paper with the addition of the difference between it and specie. I do not absolutely deny the possibility of it, but I know the nature of these gentry so well that I could have little hopes of their long remaining satisfied, as from their not comprehending the fluctuation of exchange, and from their suspicious nature, they would be apt to complain of being cheated, and would bring forward the circumstance in addition to other imaginary grievances. I recollect," he

continues, "when I was secretary of Ireland, two artful soldiers of the 58th regiment applied to my Lord Townshend for redress of an injury, which they pretended to have suffered in being paid at Gibraltar in Spanish money at an exorbitant rate of exchange; and although their memorial was found, on inquiry, to have very little foundation, yet it occasioned a great deal of noise. Doctor Lucas and the other patriots were alarmed, and the affair might have made a serious sensation upon the garrison of Dublin, had it not been diverted by the prudence and address of the Lord Lieutenant."

An event however occurred which called for all that decision of character which Lord Macartney possessed in an eminent degree. The intelligence of the mutiny in the fleet at home produced a mutiny in the squadron stationed for the protection of the Cape, and then (October 1797) lying at anchor in Simon's Bay. The flag ship took the lead, and was followed by all the rest, in complaining of grievances, in depriving the officers of their commands, appointing committees and delegates, and imitating all the rebellious formalities of the naval mutineers in England. However after a few days of riot and anarchy, and by the firm conduct of Admiral Pringle, the royal standard was hoisted on board the *Tremendous* as a signal of good order and discipline being re-established in the fleet. On their return however to Table Bay, where they were joined by some king's ships from St. Helena, where they had carried a convoy, fresh disturbances broke out which, for several days, bore a more serious appearance than before.

The mutineers in the flag ship again took the lead. She was lying at anchor off the Amsterdam battery within point blank shot. As there appeared no immediate prospect of its subsiding, Lord Macartney determined at once to bring it to an issue. For this purpose, he repaired with his aides de camp to the battery, ordered the guns to be loaded, and the shot to be heated in the ovens. And taking out his watch he dispatched a message to the Tremendous, that if the mutineers did not make an unconditional submission in half an hour from that time, and hoist the royal standard as a signal of their doing so, he would blow the ship out of the water. The signal of obedience was made, otherwise it was not doubted that if a minute had elapsed beyond the time he would have played the whole battery upon her till she was either burnt, sunk, or destroyed. In a private letter to Mr. Dundas he observes, " From the most minute investigation of the second " mutiny I cannot discover that there was the shadow of a " grievance to be pleaded in its alleviation. It appears " solely to have proceeded from mere wantonness in the " sailors and a vanity of aping their fraternity in England. " Almost at the moment it was hatching at this place a similar contagion had caught the ships at St. Helena ; and I " should not at all be surprized to hear of some disturbance " of the same kind in Admiral Rainier's squadron as soon as " it is informed of what has passed here and elsewhere. " This spirit of sea mutiny seems like the sweating sickness " in the reign of Edward IV., a national malady which, as " we are assured by historians of the day, not content with " its devastations in England, visited at the same time every

“ Englishman in foreign countries at the most distant parts
“ of the globe.

“ The general air,

“ From pole to pole, from Atlas to the east,

“ Was then at enmity with *English* blood.”

“ That which must *now* be shed will, I trust, be the last that
“ shall be necessary to sacrifice on such an account in this
“ squadron.”

Lord Macartney's health suffered so extremely at the Cape of Good Hope that he found himself under the indispensable necessity of availing himself of his Majesty's permission to resign the government, and return to Europe as soon as he should have completed the arrangements he had in view. The private letter which he wrote to Mr. Dundas, on this occasion, marks so strongly his feelings, and some features of his public character, that it is inserted at full length at the foot of the page *. Having therefore placed the business of the

(*Private.*)

“ DEAR SIR,

“ Castle of Good Hope, Nov. 29, 1797.

“ I should ill requite the kindness and friendship which you honor me with, if I suffered any regard for my own private interest to weigh a feather against public considerations, or to desire a continuance in my present situation for a moment longer than I thought I could be useful in it.

“ I came into it under very great doubts, as you know, of being able, at my time of life and in my state of health, to answer the expectations your partiality formed of me; and I am now sure that, with every possible exertion I am capable of, I must fall very short of my own wishes. I speak to you in the sincerity of my heart. This place demands a younger and a more active man, with greater vigor of body and elasticity of mind, than I can boast of. Even the common detail of current business would be sufficiently fatiguing, exclusive of those objects of higher moment, which furnish constant food for reflection, and task the invention for ex-

colony on such a footing as to make it sufficiently easy for the next in command to conduct the government, he embarked

pedients and resource ; but feeling besides, as I do, the weight of years and infirmities coming heavily upon me, I must throw myself upon your goodness to relieve me from a burden to which I every day grow less equal, and to approve of my returning to England in the beginning of next summer. My situation here is in every other respect so agreeable to me, that I should not be desirous of removing from it, if I could flatter myself that a man at my time of life were likely to improve, either in his constitution or his faculties. I am now sixty years old, of which near four and thirty have been chiefly employed on public service, in different stations of distance, difficulty, and hazard, circumstances that formerly served to me rather as incentives than discouragements ; but of late, and particularly within these few weeks, I feel myself declining fast, and am, at this moment, afflicted with the gout in my head and stomach so much, as to render any exertion painful and ineffectual. I have the piles if not a fistula, and am not without apprehension of a stone in my kidneys. To this I am to add an increasing weakness in my eyes, which makes me more melancholy than all the rest. You will pardon me, my dear Sir, for troubling you with these matters, which I should not venture upon, did I not value your good opinion so highly that I cannot for a moment bear an idea of your imagining me capable of declining any public service at all in my power to perform. Certainly I am not able to perform my present duty in the manner that I am anxious to do. I have received so many favors from government, that it is justly entitled to every possible return on my part ; but it would be an ungrateful and ungenerous one, if I suffered either vanity or ambition, or any other passion, to engage me to persevere in a task above my strength, and thus deprive you of the services of an abler man. Whilst I do remain here you may rest assured that every interval of health shall be entirely filled up in pursuing your instructions, and in the discharge of every other duty of my station. Thus the business of the colony will be considerably advanced before I avail myself of the king's permission to leave it, as signified to me in your letter of the 7th of last January, and what I am unable to finish may, under your direction, be as well if not better accomplished by another.

“ If it be his Majesty's pleasure that the Lieutenant-governor Major-general Dundas should be continued as my successor, his experience and knowledge of the country, with such information as may be within my reach to add, and such other assistance as he may have here besides, will, I make no doubt, enable him to conduct the government with credit to himself and advantage to the public. I am happy on this

on the 20th November 1798, on board the *Stately* man of war, leaving the Lieutenant-governor Major-general Dundas, vested with all the powers of governor and commander in chief, and in the enjoyment of the full salary of 10,000 *l.* a year. The disinterestedness of Lord Macartney's character has shown itself on so many occasions, that it is scarcely necessary to mention the common custom of a governor, when not superseded, continuing to draw half the salary and to allow the lieutenant-governor the other half, until a new appointment shall take place from home. But Lord Macartney always made it a rule that all his appointments should cease from the day he resigned his office.

Here as in India he deemed it right to leave on record a declaration, the motives for which are best explained in his own words.

“ Although the temptations and means of corruption and
“ undue advantages here are comparatively much less than
“ those which may occur in other provinces under the British
“ sovereignty, and though the merit of resisting them (if any
“ merit can be presumed from the mere performance of a
“ common duty) is consequently but inconsiderable ; yet the
“ precedent which I set at my resignation of the government
“ of Fort St. George in India, thirteen years since, appears

occasion to express the perfect satisfaction I have received from his co-operation with me, in every instance during my residence here, and it would be great injustice to him, were I not thus to acknowledge it. I am, &c.

(Signed)

“ MACARTNEY.”

“ To the Right Honorable Henry Dundas, &c. &c. &c.”

“ to me no less proper to be now followed on the resigna-
“ tion of my present station in South Africa. I trust that it
“ will not be imputed to me as proceeding from any motive
“ of vanity, ostentation, or parade, but from a sense of that
“ propriety and consistency which I wish to preserve through
“ the whole course of my political life, now drawing near to
“ its conclusion. If it be a gratification to my private feelings,
“ it is equally the discharge of a debt which the public has a
“ right to demand from every public man.”

DECLARATION.

I George, Earl of Macartney, governor and commander in chief of his Majesty's colony of the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa, now on the eve of my departure for Europe, do, to the best of my knowledge and belief, solemnly swear and declare, in the presence of Almighty God, that from the time of my appointment to this moment, I have never received nor accepted, nor expect to receive, any gift, present, benefit, or emolument, except some small articles of fruit, venison, or such trifles which it was out of my power to refuse or elude, and which I am sure could not possibly exceed the value of from one to two hundred rix dollars, but have most strictly confined myself to the salary appointed by his Majesty, and to the use of the government-house and garden, with the slaves belonging thereto: and I further swear and declare, that I have never been engaged or concerned, for my own use or advantage, in any trade, traffic, or commerce whatsoever; but have directed my whole attention to the business of my employment, and endeavored to conduct the administration of this

colony and its revenues with zeal, integrity, and economy, for the honor of my Sovereign, and the true interests and welfare of the people committed to my care, to the best of my judgment and ability, according to my instructions, and the circumstances and necessity of public affairs.

So help me God.

“ Sworn before us at the Castle of Good Hope,
this 19th day of November.

(Signed)

“ W. S. VAN RYNEVELDT-FISCAL.

“ A. BARNARD, Col. Secretary.”

LORD MACARTNEY arrived in England in January 1799, in tolerably good health after a winter's passage, but with a determination to retire wholly from public life, to the perpetual hurry and bustle of which he now felt himself unequal. He had in China, as well as at the Cape of Good Hope, suffered grievously from repeated and severe fits of the gout, the returns of which he perceived became quicker and of longer continuance as he advanced in years. He felt moreover that, at his time of life, after passing his best days in active and laborious service in a variety of climates, it was but fair to himself and his family to be allowed to enjoy the remainder of them in the company and conversation of his numerous connections, from whom he had so long and so frequently been separated. On these considerations, when it was found expedient to place Mr. Addington at the head of a new administration, though strongly urged by Mr. Pitt to

take the presidency of the Board of Control, with a seat in the cabinet, or, in case of his disliking this appointment, any other not absolutely filled up which he should prefer, he entreated that he might be permitted to decline accepting any public employment on the score of the uncertain state of his health. His objection might also have been strengthened by political considerations, for though he never attached himself to any party, but from principle supported the existing government, yet he could not be insensible to the merits and defects of party men.

The last six years of his life were greatly embittered by the very frequent attacks of gout attended several times with alarming and dangerous symptoms, but in those intervals, which left him free from pain, he seemed to enjoy with peculiar felicity the company of his friends. His house was now the resort of every distinguished character; persons of all parties were glad to enjoy the society and conversation of Lord Macartney, in whose mind it was well known no political animosity ever found a place. During the whole summer of 1805, and the winter immediately following, the gout continued to hang about him without advancing to a decided fit; his stomach rejected its usual food, and at length he entirely lost his appetite. Still however, in the intervals of ease, he kept up his wonted flow of spirits, read, wrote and conversed as usual; but he continued to grow weaker from day to day, and still to refuse all kind of nourishment. In this declining state, the unfortunate turn of affairs on the continent seemed to impress him with deep concern; and the sudden death of Mr. Pitt, whose zeal for the pub-

lic welfare, unsullied integrity and disinterestedness, none more justly admired than he did, he felt and lamented as a great national misfortune. These two events were observed to cast a considerable damp upon his spirits; and his friends had now but too just grounds to apprehend that his recovery was more than doubtful. Yet in this languishing and reduced state he was declared, by some of the faculty, to be convalescent till three days before his death. Two days indeed before this event he was able to read the whole of the budget brought forward by the new chancellor of the exchequer, whom he pronounced, upon that performance, a promising young man. The same day he was given over by the physicians, and on the evening of the 31st March 1806, while reclining his head on his hand, as if dropping into a slumber, he sunk into the arms of death without a sigh and without a struggle. On examination it was found that the lower part of the oesophagus and the upper region of the stomach were considerably inflamed. His remains were deposited in the church yard of Chiswick according to his own desire, being near to a residence which he had hired a few years before for the joint lives of himself and Lady Macartney, and in the improvement of which he took great pleasure, as indeed he had always done in every place he lived at.

The greater part of his property which, independent of his paternal estate, is not considerable, being chiefly the savings from his salary as governor of the Cape and ambassador to China, he has left to Lady Macartney; after whose death

the whole of it descends to his niece Elizabeth Hume for her life, with remainder to her children beginning with the eldest son, who are to assume the surname and bear the arms of Macartney only : the title is extinct.

LORD MACARTNEY, on his return from his travels on the continent, was considered among the handsomest and most accomplished young men of the day. His features were regular and well proportioned, his complexion wore the glow of health, and his countenance was open, placid, and agreeable. This description appears to be correct from the concurring resemblance of two or three portraits that were painted before his leaving England on his embassy to the court of Russia, one of which by Sir Joshua Reynolds is now in the possession of Major-general Benson, a near relation of his lordship. The portrait at the head of this volume, from a full length drawing by Mr. Edridge, in his 65th year, is perhaps as strong a character as the pencil is capable of producing. From these two portraits it would appear that so great an alteration had been made in his features in the lapse of near forty years, in the course of which he was exposed to the extremes of heat and cold, to dangers, difficulties, anxieties, and mortifications, to severe and repeated attacks of sickness, and an unremitting application to business, as to render it difficult to trace any resemblance between them. His person was somewhat above the middle size and rather

corpulent; in the early part of his life it must have been powerful and athletic; his manners were engaging, and his carriage easy but dignified; in conversation he was extremely affable, cheerful, and entertaining; at the same time he was no admirer of that confident assurance, that easy familiarity and careless neglect of personal appearance, which are assumed by many young men of fashion in the present day. He possessed all the dignity of the old school without its stiffness; and he retained it in his dress, the fashion of which for the last forty years of his life could scarcely be said to have undergone any change; in his person he was always remarkably neat. Although the public character of the Earl of Macartney has, it is presumed, sufficiently developed itself in the course of the preceding pages, yet it may not be amiss to subjoin a few of the more striking characteristics by which he was distinguished, and of the general opinions which swayed his conduct. We have seen that his perseverance and address were amply put to the test in Russia; his indefatigable application to business and management of a turbulent assembly in Ireland; and the good effects of his conciliating disposition, his zeal and courage were sufficiently manifested in his government of Grenada; but India was the touchstone to try his sterling merit; and he was proof to the test. It has been observed, maliciously enough, that every man has his price; but if this satire on human nature were strictly true, taken in its greatest latitude, it must however be allowed that a few public men do now and then appear on the stage, whose price, at least, has never been ascertained. One of those few was Lord Macartney. The whole revenues of the Carnatic, which were, in fact, at his command, with

the fee simple of Bengal added to them, could not have bribed him to swerve one inch from his public duty. That wealth which is able to purchase power, and influence, and honors, and without which they are rarely attainable, had no temptation for him. "I think," says he, in a letter to Lord Hillsborough, "I am now worth about 10,000*l.* more than " when I arrived in India, and I do assure you that I might " have been easily worth ten times the sum, if I pleased, " without any reproaches but those of my own conscience." In fact, the system of corruption is so well established in India, that those who are disposed to avail themselves of that source of wealth run very little risk of detection*. No blame was ever thrown by the nabob of Arcot on any of Lord Macartney's predecessors for taking his money; but torrents of abuse were poured out against his Lordship, because he would not take it. It was a maxim with him that plain dealing and clean hands will always in the end be an overmatch for artifice and dishonesty; the truth of which he had very frequent occasions to put to the test. Nothing indeed could have supported him in the line of conduct he

* The nabobs, and rajahs, and khans, with others of inferior rank, deem it so dishonorable to discover their private transactions, even with those whom they are dissatisfied with, that no motive of resentment ever leads to their developement, and those in subordinate stations, who must necessarily be entrusted with such secrets, have the additional inducement of considering their inviolable fidelity to their employers as the basis of their future fortunes. When the East India Company sent out, in 1781, a gentleman in the law (Mr. Newman) for the express purpose of obtaining proof of the sums of money that were said to have been taken by some of their servants from the nabob of Arcot and other Indian powers, that gentleman, with all the assistance of the Madras presidency in the upright administration of Lord Macartney, embarked for England without having gained one single object for which he was sent out, or a single proof against the most notorious delinquents.

pursued in India, against the intrigues, the duplicity, and the universal corruption which surrounded him, but an unsullied integrity, and an inflexible firmness. Never perhaps was the *mens conscia recti** more eminently displayed than in the arduous struggles he was called upon to make in his government of Madras. But conscious of standing upon high and solid ground, perhaps on such as few, if any, ever stood before in that part of the world, he maintained his elevated position with the most perfect calmness in himself though surrounded by turbulence and agitation. Like the proud rock dashed by the waves of the ocean, he remained unsullied and unshaken in the midst of a sea of corruption. For the purity of his conduct he pretended to little merit. "Let it not be supposed," says he, "that the spirit of disinterestedness and integrity which governs my actions arises from any heroic virtue or better motives than those which actuate the generality of mankind. I am free to confess I have a stronger passion than the love of wealth—to reinstate India in its former glory would give me more pride and satisfaction than I should be able to derive from ten times the fortune of Mr. Hastings. It is, in fact, a bad calculation in the accounts of the world to sacrifice reputation for any increase of fortune. Such," continues he, "is the opinion of one upon this subject, who has had it twenty times in his power to make a large fortune, and yet never has had it in his thoughts." For the usual modes that are practised in India to obtain wealth, he entertained the most sovereign contempt. "Notwithstanding the indignation I

* The motto on his Lordship's arms.

“feel, I am really,” says he, “sometimes diverted with
“some of these woodcocks, who thrust their bills into the
“ground, shut their eyes, and then think nobody sees them.”
He used to say that a man who has not been in India knows
mankind but by halves, and that he who has been there,
knows mankind, alas! but too much.

Few men perhaps ever possessed more real disinterested-
ness than Lord Macartney. The moment that the public
service required his attention, every personal consideration
seemed to vanish. He was at all times ready to furnish
his own money, and the extent of his credit, to relieve the
public necessities, which in India he saw occasion to
employ in more than one instance. “Every private con-
“cern,” says he, “appears to me at this moment of the
“least consideration. I cheerfully leave to the chance of
“a very distant day the retrieval of my own affairs. I
“feel no uneasiness but for my friends who, upon deceitful
“representations, have accompanied me to this country,
“and given up better prospects elsewhere.” In another
place, he observes, “that I was disinterested so as no
“other man excepting perhaps Sir John Clavering, is well
“known. I have been twenty-two years in his Majesty’s ser-
“vice, and my appointments never, before that to India,
“equalled my necessary expenses. In Russia I sustained
“my character by involving myself in a debt of 6000 *l*. When
“I resigned the embassy I gave up the plate warrant, equi-
“page-money, &c. which I might have retained, as my
“predecessor who never left England kept to the value of
“10,000 *l*. I gave up the muster-master’s place in Ireland,

“ which was settled at near 2000 *l. per annum*, to accommodate
“ the lord-lieutenant, and received a pension, which pro-
“ duced in England 1000 *l. per annum*, and which I sold to
“ pay my debts. At Grenada I lost my service of plate and
“ all my property there to a very great amount at the storm
“ of the Hill, for which I never received the least compen-
“ sation, yet I do not complain, nor am I discontented.” So
scrupulous was he when in India in the rigid adherence to
his instructions, that he paid into the treasury all the *nazzars*
or presents that are made to the several governors on various
and unavoidable occasions, together with the dresses and
jewels that were sent to him from the Nizam and from Tippoo
Saheb on the ratification of the treaty of peace; and all the
little compliments of fine cloths, muslins, silks, shawls, and
other trifling articles which cannot be refused without giving
offence, he punctually delivered into the export warehouse,
without reserving a single article, however insignificant, for
the gratification of his dearest connections at home, being
determined to observe the same attention to correctness and
accuracy in the minutest lines of the Company’s service, as
to order and economy in the greatest *.

* I have somewhere met with the following passage from an epistle of Cicero to his brother Quintus, applied to Lord Macartney’s conduct and character while in India, and certainly with great justice and propriety :

“Præclarum est enim, summo cum imperio fuisse in Asia triennium, sic ut nullum te signum, nulla pictura, nullum vas, nulla vestis, nullum mancipium, nulla forma cujusquam, nulla conditio pecuniæ (quibus rebus abundat ista provincia) ab summa integritate continentiaque deduxerit. Quid autem reperiri tam eximium, aut tam expetendum potest, quam istam virtutem, moderationem animi, temperantiam, non latere in tenebris, neque esse abditam, sed in luce Asiæ, in oculis clarissimæ

His economy indeed, in all public expenditure, was not more rigid than his conduct was pure and disinterested. He made it a rule not to suffer a *fanam* to be expended that could be avoided. In the hope that example might have some effect, he would not allow any of the usual expenses to be incurred at the several government houses he inhabited on the public account for his private accommodation; and so desirous was he to discountenance that spirit of extravagance, which pervades every department in India, that he would neither suffer tatties to the windows to cool his apartment nor a palankeen to be kept for his own use. "I confess," says he, "I think I should not shine in the meridian of Bengal. "I should have ten times as many difficulties to encounter "there as I have had at Madras. Here I rumble on in the "same old equipage which I carried out with me, live in my "usual stile of moderation, and feel no increase of avarice "or ambition. My object for the public has been rather a "safe than a brilliant government. The same principle di- "rects my private views merely to independence, and that "the remains of my paternal estate when unencumbered will "give me." It was considered indeed at Madras that as a governor he entered too minutely into the detail of business, or in other words that he inspected too closely into contracts

provinciæ, atque in auribus omnium gentium ac nationum esse positam? non itineribus tuis perterreri homines? non sumtu exhauriri? non adventu commoveri? esse quocunque veneris et publice et privatim maximam lætitiā: cum urbs custodem non tyrannum, domus hospitem non expilatorem, recepisse videatur. EPIST. I. Lib. I.

and other transactions connected with his government *. “ I “ confess my fault,” says he, “ but I am too deeply engaged “ to think of any thing but proceeding forward, and proceed “ I will, though my life, I am persuaded, will be the sacrifice ; “ for though I have long been accustomed to intense appli- “ cation, I already feel the ill effects of it here in every re- “ spect, except on my temper which, thank God ! yet re- “ mains to me unshaken.” It has indeed been sufficiently shown, that the government of Madras was productive to him of nothing but excessive labor, continual exercise of mind, ill health and mortification ; but his spirit always rose to difficulties and distresses, and though frequently disappointed he never appeared to be discontented. It was observed that no one ever saw him out of temper, and that no one ever witnessed a harsh or unguarded expression in the midst of the most trying difficulties, except in the single instance when it was forced from him by a most audacious contradiction. “ It is

* As for instance : It is but too common a practice abroad to condemn what are called king’s stores upon very slight grounds, the disposal of them, and particularly the purchase of others to supply their place, putting money into the pockets of the persons concerned in such transactions. A quantity of beef of this description was condemned to be sold at Madras, at a time too when they were threatened with a famine. Lord Macartney attended the sale in person, bought a considerable quantity of it, had it served on his own table, invited the parties who were principally concerned in the business, and made them acknowledge the beef to be excellent. This was considered as *inspecting matters too narrowly*, and *unsuitable to the dignity of a governor of Madras*. The public however would not be the sufferers if we had a few more such governors as Lord Macartney ; and although their conduct, like his, would be sure of exciting the enmity of all those whose private views were disappointed or counteracted by such minute attention to the public interests, yet they would be sure to merit and obtain the applause of all those whose applause is worth having.

“a rule with me,” says he, “when any thing unpleasant happens that I cannot help, to divert myself with it, instead of letting it vex me; and by these means I make shift to rub through the thorns of the world, and convert them into roses and daffodowndillies.”

He possessed a firmness of character which those who did not know him well considered as bordering upon obstinacy. He was slow to act when the case was not pressing; but having once taken his ground he never deserted it. “Before I decide,” says he, “on any matter of moment, I revolve the subject well on my pillow, after which I have generally found my decision to be just.” If, by his integrity and impartiality, he inspired confidence, his steady and decided conduct never left a doubt remaining on the minds of others, that his measures would not be carried into execution. This steadiness extended to his opinions of men as well as to the prosecution of measures: “I am of all men,” says he, “perhaps the most cautious; but, at the same time, the most decisive. I have no malignity in my nature; I have only that steadiness which will prevent me from being twice deceived by the same person.” But if he was cautious in bestowing his confidence, he was equally steady in his friendships. There was nothing capricious in his nature; his actions were guided by cool and deliberate judgment, free from passion, prejudice, or precipitation. Yet in compliance with custom he twice found it expedient to expose himself to the fire of his antagonist, but he could very safely say on both occasions he took his ground without

being moved with the least resentment to the parties who had thought fit to call him out. “ I have never,” says he, “ had
“ a private quarrel in my life, but have unfortunately been en-
“ gaged in two public ones, and suffered severely from wounds
“ received in both. These I might easily have avoided,
“ had I not preferred the public service to all private consi-
“ derations. I have invariably adhered to my first principles,
“ an unshaken attachment to the King’s person and govern-
“ ment: and have acted up to them fearless of the conse-
“ quences. I have no malice in my heart against any one,
“ and I am more inclined to forward than to thwart the
“ views of others where I can do it consistently with my
“ public duty. Every strong measure I was compelled to
“ take in India was contrary to my own natural disposition.
“ The disobedience of the King’s officers was, in fact, to the
“ King; for the Company, to whom I was a sworn servant,
“ stood in the King’s place just as the Lord-lieutenant does in
“ Ireland. It is therefore an idle thing to pretend to make a
“ difference between the two services; the King has delegated
“ his authority in India to the Company, whether constitu-
“ tionally or not, it was not for me to judge; but this being
“ the law I was to obey it. It is now a matter of no further
“ moment to me, as I have done with India for ever; but I
“ wish to stand well with the King; to do away any preju-
“ dice that may be entertained of me, and also to have my
“ merits, whatever they may be, properly understood.”

He appears indeed to have observed in every situation of life the most steady and loyal attachment to his Sovereign.

Whether in place or out of place, whether favored with the smiles of the court or apparently neglected, his sentiments in this respect were invariably the same. On all occasions he boldly stood forward in support of the King's prerogative. To those who labored to abridge it, and among them were some of his particular friends, he would say—"surely you would not treat the sovereign of this country as the weird sisters did Macbeth,

" Upon his head to place a fruitless crown,
" And put a barren sceptre in his gripe ;"

" which must be the case if you refuse the King his just prerogative of conferring favor and rewarding merit. I know," says he, in the Irish House of Commons, " that the word *pension* gives great offence to some gentlemen of delicate ears and delicate feelings ; but, for my part, I have lived too much in the world to suffer myself to be imposed upon by a word or a name. In every other country in Europe a pension is considered as the most honorable recompense which a subject can enjoy. I speak of free countries such as our own. I know that in Sweden a pension to a person who deserves well of the state is the most honorable acknowledgment of his merit, a recompense which implies haste and eagerness in the sovereign authority to confer a reward where a reward is due ; to seize the earliest opportunity of recompensing it, not coldly waiting for a death or removal, not marking the winding-sheet of a decrepit old man in office as the only passport to retribution and gratitude. A pension," says he, " is infinitely more honorable

“ than a sinecure office ; the one loudly speaks its meaning ;
“ but the other hypocritally lurks under a supposition of duty
“ where there is nothing to do.”

As a minister at a foreign court his qualifications were of the first rank. By his extensive knowledge of men and things, by address and management, he could make himself master of intrigues and projects while yet hatching, and exhibit them to his court in all their various bearings. It was the opinion of many of his friends, that the minister could not have employed the talents of Lord Macartney to a better purpose in the service of his country, than as a negociator at the different courts of Europe, few men being perhaps so well qualified in every respect for such situations as he was.

Throughout a long and active life, and with a very extensive and intimate acquaintance among the leading characters of various administrations and oppositions, he had the resolution to keep himself totally unconnected with party in politics, the spirit of which, however gentle and good tempered the individuals who compose it might be, is always productive of violence and ill humour, which were so contrary to his disposition. This party spirit he considered as tending only to impede the public service, by embarrassing government, to create dissensions among intimate friends, and to unite the bitterest enemies and the most jarring dispositions. But a respectable opposition in parliament he conceived to be among the most efficient and salutary checks on any abuse of power in those who are entrusted with the administration of the government. The speech he made on this subject in

the Irish House of Commons is not unworthy of being recorded. "I most firmly hope," says he, "never to see opposition crushed. In a free government like ours, I hope always to see an opposition to a certain degree; but it is an opposition to check, not to enchain; to balance, not to overturn; vigilant but not jealous; spirited, not violent; neither vindictive nor rancorous; but candid, vigorous, and active. Such an opposition might do honor to an indifferent cause. Such an opposition might invite even a bad administration to a conduct, which craft or peevishness might never be able to obtain. But a systematic opposition to all the measures of government is what no man of sense or common honesty can approve. An opposition of this sort reminds me of a fable I have somewhere met with: An angel carried a simple European to the regions of Asia, where a hundred thousand Turks stood in battle array against a hundred thousand Russians. The man asked what was the cause of the war? To which the angel replied, because these men wear hats and those wear turbans." "I fear, Sir, we should not be able to assign a better reason for our present wordy warfare than that some gentlemen chuse to sit on that side of the house and others on this side. As to those indeed who have lost places and want to recover them, it is no wonder they should be angry when out of office since they were so when in. But those sound patriots whose only inquiry is, from whom does the question proceed? Who have no opinion of their own as to the right or the wrong of any measure, those gentlemen remind me of Mr. Bacon's pupils at whist, who were told that, whenever they were at a loss what to play, they should al-

“ ways play clubs, and I make no doubt the good gentlemen
“ I allude to will play their clubs against government to the
“ end of the game. Let no gentleman however imagine that
“ I have any wish to cut off opposition. I know it is most
“ salutary when the greatness of the occasion demands it,
“ when the time promises its efficacy, and the sincerity of
“ the opponents secures them both success and honor. It
“ has been hinted that I esteemed opposition a rope of sand.
“ I have seen such oppositions, made up of the most motley
“ materials, of men with different passions, different pur-
“ suits, without concert in council, or unity in action ; where
“ the firmness of individuals caused the weakness of the party,
“ which agreed in no one point but the obstinacy of wanton
“ opposition. Such is indeed a rope of sand ; but when
“ men unite on public not on private views ; when individual
“ advantage is sacrificed for the general good ; when there is
“ a harmony of council and a steadiness of action ; when
“ neither accident nor disappointment can make them lose
“ sight of the great object before them, and the firmness of
“ each individual is exercised to add strength to the whole—
“ then, I say, that opposition is not a rope of sand, but a
“ chain of adamant.”

In the Irish House of Commons he was considered as an able and energetic speaker, studiously avoiding any of those sallies of passion, impetuosity, and personal invective which were but too common in this assembly ; he fought the battles of his principal with great good humor, and with equal success ; he seldom failed, by the introduction of some pleasant story, to keep the house in temper, and divert any pe-

tulance or peevishness from mixing in the debate. In the latter part of his life, he attended the English House of Peers on questions of moment whenever his bad state of health would allow him, but he never spoke on any question; he used to say, that if ministers would give more of their attention to what was to be done rather than to what was to be said, on any occasion, the country would be no sufferer by the loss of a few fine speeches.

As a staunch admirer of the British constitution, he was an enemy to despotism under whatever shape it might be exercised. Nothing could more strongly convey his sentiments on this subject than the following *Note*, concerning the situation of the Wirtemberg troops in the service of the Dutch at Batavia, which, as he observes, was written there one night, "in a moment of indignation," after retiring from supper, during which he had held a long conversation with the young count Charles of Wirtemberg, a natural son of the late duke. This young officer had been sent out by his father as a captain in the regiment, and has long since fallen a sacrifice to the destructive climate like his brother victims in the same service.

Note relative to the Wirtemberg troops at Batavia.

"As the German Europeans (Wirtemberghers) weak and sickly as they are, form the principal military strength of Batavia, it may not be amiss to say a few words upon their subject.

“ If it be the duty of sovereigns to guard the lives of their people, to watch over their interests, and to promote their safety and welfare, what must we think of those princes who in this civilized and enlightened age, and in the face of all Europe, carry on a public mercenary traffic in soldiers, and having calculated the probable date and value of their existence, set a price upon their blood, carry them to market, bargain and sell them like common cattle, and knock them down to the best bidder. It appears by the journals of the House of Commons of November 21st, 1786, that no less a sum than 471,000 *l.* three *per cent.* stock was transferred to the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel for 15,700 of his soldiers sold, killed, or otherwise expended in the late American war, whom he estimated at the price of 30 *l.* *per* man, not so much as the price of an ordinary coach horse.

“ The Germans are a brave and generous nation, and of a gallant military genius, which some of their respective sovereigns observing, have endeavoured to turn it to their own private account, and dispose of it for money, like any other commodity produced in their dominions. Thus war is become a mere paltry hireling trade, neither kindled by the heroic spirit of revenge, nor exercised for the patriotic purpose of defence, not to guard the altars at home nor to repel and punish invaders from abroad.

“ His most Serene Highness of Wirtemberg is at this moment a perfect crimp for the Dutch East India Company, to whom he hires out, at a stipulated rate, the youth, health and strength of his children and his subjects, who are torn from

their dearest and tenderest connections, and banished without redemption from their native soil. Instead of being employed at home like men, and as soldiers only should be, to defend their country, to redress its wrongs and vindicate its honor, they are vended without compunction by their natural protector to a set of foreign merchants, who export them to be broiled alive on the sands of Columbo or to rot by inches in the hospitals of Java.

“Of those whom we saw at Batavia and that were able to crawl abroad, there was scarcely one, who did not totter under the weight of his arms and accoutrements, being either baked into a mummy, or dried and shrivelled like a stock fish. The lieutenant-colonel of the Wirtemberg regiment, a natural son of his most Serene Highness, and a youth of great hopes, fell a victim to the climate within six weeks after his arrival. His three younger brothers, Mr. Guillaume, Mr. Frederic, and Mr. Charles are yet alive, but will probably soon *follow him*. The last, who attended the embassy, as officer of the guard, has been well educated, is well informed and a good officer. Of the whole corps, the greater part of which came out here but a few months since in full health and vigor, I do not imagine there are a dozen likely ever to return. The regret of leaving Europe, the *necessary* duty of their profession, and the enmity of the elements, all conspire here to wear out the soldier, and to hasten his dissolution. Ambition is dead, relief is hopeless. He is undermined by decay, he drops gradually into the grave, and “*dulces moriens reminiscitur Argos*,” whilst the survivors are told, with a mockery superadded to their misery, that

he died nobly at his post in the exercise of an heroic vocation, not in the still shade of civil life, but in the career of glory on the field of honor. It is truly wonderful to what a pitch of senseless vanity the military bubble has blown up the human mind and, at the same time, debased it to the most brutish subjection. That one man should presume in the pride of his heart to arrogate the right of saying to his fellow creature

“ ’Tis mine to order and ’tis thine to die,”

is equally repugnant to common sense and to common humanity; and yet it is a right, that, however disguised, is usurped and assumed by all the sovereignties of Europe, whether monarchical, aristocratical, or democratical, for it makes no difference under what title or denomination despotic power is exercised. If the youth, to whom the mandate *de part le roy*, or *de part le peuple* is addressed, be not rich enough to bribe the sovereign for an exemption, he has no remedy, but must enlist with the recruiting officer. And this practice has been long looked on not only with indifference; but has been quietly acquiesced in as an indisputable prerogative. Even in England it is justified by the authority of some of our most* celebrated writers; for their premises, when fairly examined, warrant this conclusion, that children, relations, and subjects, every connection natural, moral, and political, may be sacrificed by power on the altar of avarice, to enable a little Suabian despot to give a masquerade at Stutgard, or to pass the Carnival at Venice. If protection and obedience

* Foster, Blackstone, &c. &c.

be reciprocal, as those very writers tell us, surely reluctance to slavery and opposition to oppression are equally rational and just; and were an insurrection to happen at the next registry of his Serene Highness's able-bodied subjects, or his next levy for equinoxial service, it is probable he would find but few advocates to plead his cause, or protect his person. On such an occasion resistance would be a virtue, and rebellion to such tyranny prove loyalty to mankind. It is impossible to think of this scandalous conduct of the little German princes, without a mixture of horror and contempt. Such avarice and apathy must find an enemy in every breast of feeling and generosity. To renounce, as these men do, all parental care of the people, committed by Providence to their charge, wantonly to tear in pieces the ties by which they were bound to them, and to deliver them over without mercy to the tormentors, is such a strain of ingratitude and depravity as cannot long continue unresisted or remain unpunished. The miserable negro on the coast of Guinea, who exchanges his child for a striped handkerchief or a bottle of brandy, is not a greater barbarian."

But though he held the slave-trade and slavery in utter abhorrence, he did not entertain those enthusiastic notions respecting the abolition of the latter, which have prevailed in this country for some few years past. He contended that all great changes, of what nature soever, ought to be gradual, not violent; that the objects of our humanity should be first prepared and fitted for that state of happiness in which we design to place them, or that otherwise the change might prove, instead of a blessing, the greatest curse that could hap-

pen to them or to their deliverers. But though not an advocate for a hasty abolition, he was most decidedly against the continuance of the trade; and he had determined, on taking possession of his government of the Cape of Good Hope, not to suffer the importation of a single negro into that colony. He was however prevailed upon by the very earnest supplications of the magistracy, in the name of the colonists, to grant a licence to a single ship to proceed to Mosambique for a cargo of slaves. It was represented to him, that the number of mouths to feed at the Cape had, by the army, the navy, and foreign vessels, been increased in a three-fold proportion since it became a British colony, whereas the quantity of tillage must remain the same without additional laborers. "We must therefore," says he, in a letter to Mr. Dundas, "either metamorphose every white husbandman
"into a Geryon or Briareus, or allow him, in some measure,
"to make up for his weakness by the strength of two-
"handed negroes. The question was, whether in a state of
"actual necessity we were to listen most to the dictates of
"good sense and public duty, or to the whims and ravings
"of ignorance and fanaticism? It appeared to me an indis-
"pensable obligation rather to provide for the sustenance of
"the people committed to my care, and of his Majesty's fleet
"and army *in esse*, than to argue with myself what might be
"the possible felicity of freedom to unknown blackamoors.
"I paid however such respect to the prejudices of the day,
"as to confine my licence to a single ship, and shall be cau-
"tious in extending it till the proper authority shall have
"decided this point, which seems to have been at issue for
"some years past between rashness and experience, thought-

“lessness and reflection, ancient wisdom and modern philosophy.”

Few men were more conversant in polite literature than Lord Macartney and his acquaintance was sought by the first literary characters of his time. With Dr. Johnson, Edmund Burke, David Hume, and all those who used to meet at Sir Joshua Reynolds's, he was particularly intimate. He was one of the original members of Doctor Johnson's Literary Club, which he continued to frequent with great pleasure in the latter years of his life whenever his health would permit him, and he was a member of the Royal and Antiquarian Societies of London. He was fond of social conversation, but reading was to him a never failing source of delight; a book was not merely a luxury; it was an article of the first necessity. It was rare to find him, when alone, without a book or a pen in his hand. He was considered, when a young man, as a sound classical scholar, and to possess a critical knowledge of the ancient poets and historians. It appears, from the correspondence of several eminent characters, that he was himself no mean poet, and that he took great delight in courting the acquaintance of the Muses*. In his letters to the late Mr.

* So late as the year 1800, he wrote the following lines as an inscription to be placed over the gate-way of the castle of Lissanoure, on his paternal estate:

Sub libertate

Quieti

Hos avitos agros, has ædes auctas ornatas

D. D. D.

Georgius comes de Macartney, Vice-Comes Macartney de Dervock; Dominus Macartney, Baro de Lissanoure in regno Hiberniæ; Baro Macartney de Parkhurst et de Auchenleik in regno Magnæ Britanniæ, ordinis regii et perantiqui Aquilæ Albæ necnon ordinis præhonorabilis de Balneo Eques, et regi a sanctioribus Consiliis utriusque regni, in patriam redux anno 1796.

Charles Fox, when a student at Oxford, he strongly recommends history as the best polisher of the manners, and the best introduction to the knowledge of the human heart. "Livy," says he, "is written in a style that must charm every one. He is master of our passions, and catches the soul by surprize. Look at that admirable passage where Coriolanus going to embrace his mother, she stops him with, *sine priusquam amplexum accipio, sciam ad hostem an ad filium venerim.*" Tacitus he thought less graceful in stile than Sallust, but more pungent, and he calls him the true anatomist of the human heart. The unadorned easy stile of Xenophon he preferred to that of Cæsar: but of Homer and Virgil he always speaks in raptures; the latter indeed he could almost repeat by heart. From a letter of the late Charles Fox to him, dated Oxford, 13th February 1765, it would appear that in the early part of his life he had no taste for mathematics, and that he valued them lightly. His opinion however must have greatly changed in this respect, on entering upon business, for no man could be more convinced than he was of the transcendent utility of what are usually called mixed mathematics as applicable to so many of the

"Erin nos genuit, vidit nos Africa, Gangem

"Hausimus, Europæque plagas fere visimus omnes;

"Nec latuit regio primum patefacta Columbo:

"Sinarum licuit dextram terigisse tyranni,

"Tartaricos montes, magnum et transcendere murum,

"Turbidaque impavide tentavimus alta Pechellæ

"Hactenus Europæ nullis sulcata Carinis;

"Casibus et variis acti terræque marique

"Sistimus hic tandem atque Lares veneramur Avorum."

common and important concerns of life; and he was sufficiently acquainted with most of the modern sciences to make a conversation on their subject interesting both to himself and to others. His memory was of the most retentive kind, and had stored up an abundant supply of anecdotes relating to persons and events, to times present and past; and the pleasing manner and genuine good humor, in which he could relate a story, seldom failed of communicating to it an additional interest. By some peculiar arrangement, or classification of objects in his mind, he contrived to recollect the date of an event as correctly as the more important circumstances connected with it. It was observed of him at Turin, that he was much better acquainted with the history and connections of the Italian and French families he met with there than they were themselves; indeed so wonderful was his recollection on points of genealogy, that there was scarcely a person of any note mentioned by sacred or profane writers, whose history and connections were not perfectly fresh in his memory. When he passed the Hague, on his way to Petersbrough, Sir Joseph Yorke, then minister at that place from the court of London, invited all his brother ministers to meet Sir George Macartney at dinner. The conversation, as might be expected, turned on the affairs of Europe, and although some of the company were pretty well hackneyed in the diplomatic service, and Sir George but just entering upon his career of public life, yet it was observed that he was much better informed with regard to the respective courts of Europe, than any of the ministers were themselves who represented them.

He had a peculiar facility in extracting information from those he conversed with, even where there might be an unwillingness to communicate it; but whatever knowledge he obtained in this way, he used to consider as problematical until corroborated or contradicted by other sources; thus the information he procured on subjects connected with his official situations was generally considered, in the department of state to which it was transmitted, as superseding all former information on the same points.

It is thought by some of his friends, and, indeed, has been confidently asserted by others, that he had employed some part of the latter years of his life in drawing up a connected narrative of the events and transactions, in which he had borne a principal share, with memoirs and anecdotes of distinguished characters. But it appears, from the best authority, that nothing of this kind was found among his papers; nor any notes or memorandums that could warrant such a conclusion. The only writings of Lord Macartney that were digested by him into any thing like the shape of regular treatises, may be said to consist of three articles, namely, *An Account of Russia in 1767*: *An Account of Ireland in 1773*; and *A Journal of an Embassy from the King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China*. Of these three articles it remains only to give a concise account, and with it conclude the present narrative.

His *Account of Russia* was drawn up into a regular form from the documents he procured from others, and from his

own observations when minister at the court of St. Petersburg*. A very few copies of it were printed at a private press for the use of ministers and for some of his most intimate friends. It is addressed to the secretary of state for the northern department. He observes, in the Introduction, that Russia at that time was but little or indistinctly known; that she had no writers of her own growth; and that foreigners had been either incurious or unsolicitous about the subject. "It appeared," says he, "like the view of an immense waste, "the prospect seemed lost in its vastness, and wearied the "eye with its gloomy distance. If I am able to throw a new "or stronger light on some things already known, or to de- "velope others unnoticed or obscure; if I can convey to you "a clearer idea of this country and its inhabitants, I shall "esteem myself happy. I shall trust to your candor if I fall

* The following very handsome testimony of the value of these papers is given by Sir Joseph Yorke, ambassador at the Hague, in a letter to Sir George Macartney, dated Leicester-square, June 12, 1768.

"DEAR SIR,

"I ought to ask pardon for presuming so much on your politeness as to keep your curious and instructive papers so long; but as you were so good as to indulge Lord Hardwicke as well as myself with the perusal of them, I ventured to detain them a little longer than I fear was proper or discreet. After having begged your forgiveness for that indiscretion, allow me to return my brother's thanks with mine for the communication, which is the most interesting that has ever appeared concerning that great empire; my brother, whose judgment and knowledge I do not pretend to name mine with, was more delighted than I can express, and hopes the minister who had attention, judgment, and ability to investigate and lay open so complicated a scene, may continue to be employed in the service of his country, in every way which may be agreeable to himself, and which must always be useful to the public. I have the honor, &c.

(Signed)

"JOSEPH YORKE."

“into errors ; I flatter myself they neither proceed from pre-
“judice nor partiality, but are such only as every man is
“liable to that ventures to describe a nation whose manners,
“religion, and government are dissimilar to those of his own.
“Whether,” continues he, “this great body is likely to preserve
“long the same state of health and strength of frame ; whe-
“ther it promises short life or longevity, shall be my business
“to inquire in the following pages : and to do this with the
“greater truth and precision, it will be necessary to consider
“at large the geographical situation, the form of government,
“the riches and resources of this empire, the genius and
“manners of its inhabitants, and the particular periods and
“events of its history, which either smoothed the paths for
“gentle changes, or, at length, flung open the gates to an
“extensive reformation.” From the concluding paragraph of
the introduction may be collected the light in which he
modestly considered this performance, at that time, par-
ticularly valuable. “I must observe,” says he, “that
“this account will appear, in a variety of instances, very
“different from any that has hitherto been published ; indeed
“so many changes have already been made by the present
“Empress, and so many still greater are expected, that a dis-
“course of this kind ought scarcely to be considered in any
“other light than as an annual calendar : I therefore do not
“presume to give it you under a higher title than that of
“*a Russian Almanack for the Year 1767.*”

By a short analysis of the work, together with those parts
of it, which will be found in the second volume, it will be

seen that it merits a much higher title than that of an almanack. The subject is divided into twelve chapters, and followed by an Appendix.

CHAPTER I. *Situation.* Under this head are described the extent and boundaries of the Russian empire, and the three very eminent advantages derived from its geographical position. The first of these is the great variety of climate and diversity of soils, from which it is capable of being supplied with almost every article of luxury and necessity of its own growth and production, and consequently of becoming one of the most rich and independent empires in the world. Secondly, its exclusive frontier inaccessible to armies is unexposed to conquest or invasion: and the third great advantage is the infinite number of navigable rivers, and her happy position with regard to seas. "But," he adds, "many of these happy circumstances, whether arising from climate, soil, position, or power, are, in a great measure, either lost or useless to the inhabitants of this country in its present state; and seem to have made little, if any, forcible impression upon their understandings. To avoid being accused of speaking too largely here, I must observe that all the great discoveries and improvements made in this empire have been imagined and conducted by foreigners. The conquest and colonization of Siberia was performed by a Cossack. The opening of a trade between Archangel and England, and by that means introducing Russia to the acquaintance of the civilized parts of Europe, was entirely the work of an Englishman. It was an Englishman who,

“ even so early as 1560, projected the carrying on a com-
“ merce with Persia across the Caspian ; he not only pro-
“ jected it, but did actually put it in execution ; and from the
“ accounts we have of his voyage to Ghilan we plainly per-
“ ceive what a flourishing trade might have been struck out
“ with that country, if the Russians had been animated with
“ the smallest spark of adventurous boldness or commercial
“ enterprize.” It was an English merchant, we are told,
that created the port of Onega, in the White Sea, till then
entirely unknown, but frequented annually, in his time, by
thirty thousand tons of shipping. All their manufactures
were established by foreigners, and many of them still con-
tinued under their direction. Even the mines, a point of
natural wealth which seldom escapes the attention of the
most barbarous nations, were never managed with any de-
gree of advantage until Saxon workmen discovered their real
riches.

CHAPTER II. This chapter on the *Population*, together
with CHAPTER III. on the *Genius and Character of the
Russians*, and CHAPTER IV. entitled, *A View of the Russian
History*, being finished sketches of a nature very different
from the transitory information of an almanack, are printed
at full length in the second volume of this work ; as is also
the Appendix, which bears the title of *The present State of
the Church of Russia* 1767.

CHAPTER V. *Title of the Sovereign*: The title assumed
by Catharine II. was Empress and Autocratrix of all the

Russias, &c. This title, we are told, is affected on every occasion to a most ridiculous excess; insomuch that the Russians, whether in writing or speaking, join the word *Imperial* to every thing indiscriminately that has the smallest relation to the court; and that the court is so enamoured of this epithet, that the omission of it would be seriously considered as an intentional disrespect. The ancient stile of the monarch, it appears, was *Veliki Knez*, Great Duke or Great Prince.

CHAPTER VI. *Government and Laws.* Lord Macartney considers the government of Russia, notwithstanding its senate, its colleges, and its chanceries, as completely despotic; that all the attempts which have been made to abridge the sovereign authority have entirely failed; that liberty is a plant which never grew kindly in the soil of Russia, but either withered of itself, or was easily eradicated; that the sovereign power, legislative and executive, was then in the person of the Empress, who, without form or process of law, could deprive any subject of life, liberty, or estate; that she could seize the public treasure however appropriated; raise or debase the value of the coin; make peace or war; augment or diminish her troops; frame new laws or repeal old ones; and finally, nominate her successor to the throne, without regarding any of those circumstances which establish the right of inheritance in other kingdoms. "Such," says he, "are the undoubted and indisputable prerogatives of the crown." This chapter contains likewise a detailed account of the dignities, the authorities and duties of the senate, the

synod, and the different colleges for carrying into execution the orders of the Sovereign, and for facilitating the administration of public business.

CHAPTER VII. *The nineteen Governments into which the Empire is divided.* The interior administration of each government is conducted by a chancery, under whose authority are other particular chanceries in the several provinces and districts of the said government; from these subordinate chanceries an appeal lies to the general chancery of the government, and from that to the superior colleges in the capital according to the nature of the case; from those to the senate; and from the senate to the sovereign; "for in this country," he observes, "the course of justice is a chain of appeal, delay, chicanery, and corruption." The civil magistrates of the provinces he states to be poor and ignorant, being commonly inferior officers discharged from the service, or persons who despair of a more honorable advancement; their salary seldom exceeds six hundred roubles, and often does not amount to so much; so that rapacity and extortion frequently become necessary for their very support and subsistence. If a sentence of the senate or any of the inferior colleges be reversed upon an appeal to a superior tribunal, the members of the former are fined or reprimanded for their injustice or their ignorance. "In mentioning these fines and reprimands," says Lord Macartney, "I cannot avoid taking notice of a ridiculous affair which happened not long since at St. Petersburg: the college of justice having made a decision which, upon appeal, was determined to be unjust, the se-

“nate ordered the judges to be publicly censured; a revolution soon after happening, the members of the college of justice were wholly changed; the mandate of the senate however still continued in force, and the new members, who were entire strangers to the former proceedings of their college, were obliged to attend, and were very solemnly and severely reprimanded for a sentence of which they were totally guiltless and ignorant.”

CHAPTER VIII. *Of the Revenues.* “The revenues of this empire,” says Lord Macartney, “are by no means proportionable to its extent, population, and commerce; they are however, in general, very dexterously managed, very wisely appropriated, and so happily employed that no sovereignty in Europe ever arrogated such power, maintained such armies, extended such influence, or accomplished such great designs, with treasures so slender, means so seemingly inadequate, or on terms so moderate and easy.” The whole revenues of Russia, he tells us, at the period when he is writing, did not exceed twenty-four millions and an half of roubles, or 4,900,000*l.* “To us,” says he, “who have been accustomed to see upwards of twenty millions sterling swallowed up by the expenses of a single year, this revenue will appear poor and inconsiderable; yet it is sufficient to pay an army of 400,000 men, well clothed, well armed, and, in every respect, well appointed; to maintain a fleet of twenty-two ships of the line, nine frigates, and fifty gallies, with 14,000 seamen; and to defray the expenses of a most numerous and splendid

“ court, which, in grandeur and magnificence, excels every
“ other in Europe ; whether we consider the sumptuousness
“ of the table, the richness and brilliancy of the dress, the
“ blaze and profusion of jewels, the taste and elegance of
“ equipages, or the good order and propriety which conduct
“ and regulate the whole.” And all these, he assures us, are
not only defrayed with the standing revenues without con-
tracting any debt, but an annual saving remains of one mil-
lion sterling over and above all the expenses of the state.
The chapter concludes with a schedule of the annual reve-
nues of the Russian empire.

CHAPTERS IX and X. *Of the Army and Of the Navy.*
These two chapters are accompanied with several tables con-
taining the names and numbers of the different regiments,
their divisions and fixed quarters, expense of field regiments
and staff officers ; and the mode of raising recruits for the
army. He gives also a comparative state of the Russian
navy under Catharine II. and as it stood at the death of
Peter the First. His observations on the Russian navy, at
the latter period, conclude with this remark. “ The Russian
“ marine is far inferior in every respect to that of Sweden or
“ of Denmark ; and indeed whether considered compara-
“ tively or by itself is extremely insignificant. For my part
“ I am persuaded, from what I have observed myself, joined
“ to very good information, that a dozen English line of
“ battle ships would be an over-match for all the naval force
“ of the Russian empire. However they have such re-
“ sources that, by proper attention and management, their

“marine may grow considerable, may be rendered even
“respectable, but never can become formidable in Bri-
“tish eyes.”

CHAPTER XI. *Resources of Russia.* This short chapter merely enumerates the advantages and resources which might be brought in aid of the standing permanent revenues of the state.

CHAPTER XII. *Of the Manufactures and Commerce of Russia.* In this chapter we have a minute and detailed account of the commerce between Russia and the different nations of Europe and Asia digested into nine tables from authentic and voluminous documents, with explanations to each table. No part of the subject at the time it was written could be more highly important to this kingdom than that which is contained in this chapter, and Lord Macartney seems to have given to it an uncommon degree of attention, and to have spared no pains nor expense in procuring materials which indeed his official situation and intimacy with Mr. Panin alone could have enabled him to collect. The *Appendix*, as before observed, will be found at full length in the second volume of the present work.

Nearly on the same plan as his *Account of Russia*, Lord Macartney, on his return from Ireland, drew up *An Account of Ireland in 1773*. Of this treatise he likewise printed a few copies for his particular friends. The scope of the work is distinctly pointed out in a short introduction which runs as follows.

“ Whence Ireland derived its name, and by what nation
“ it was first peopled is a matter which may interest the an-
“ tiquary, but is of little moment to a minister or politician.
“ The early periods of its history are involved in obscurity
“ and fable, and no dependence can be placed on any ac-
“ counts of it previous to the invasion of the English under
“ Henry the Second.

“ That it was great, powerful, and learned, at a time when
“ the neighbouring kingdoms were weak, divided, and igno-
“ rant, has been boldly asserted by some writers, and not
“ less positively denied by others. These are points of curi-
“ osity, of national pride, and national affection, but are fo-
“ reign to my present purpose, which is principally to speak
“ of Ireland as now connected with Great Britain and subject
“ to its dominion.

“ A concise and impartial account of that country, its his-
“ tory, constitution, commerce, and revenue, may pos-
“ sibly be not unacceptable to those whose situation and
“ more important cares must preclude them from minute in-
“ quiry and laborious research.”

In the *General Description of Ireland* we are informed that it contains upwards of seventeen millions of acres; that the number of houses on the hearth-money books in 1766 was 424,026, and the population at that time supposed to exceed two millions and a half. It is observed that the exemption from toads, vipers, snakes, slow-worms and all venomous creatures, is a circumstance so fortunate and so singular as

to merit particular mention. In speaking of the inhabitants of Ireland as a mixed race, descended from various adventurers who, engaged by different views at different periods, established themselves in that country, he observes, "The present motley generation is composed of parts not less heterogeneous than the inhabitants of Great Britain, being a mass of aboriginal Irish, Spaniards or Milesians, Danes, Saxons, Normans, English, Scots, Hugonots and Palatines. In such a miscellaneous variety," says he, "one might be led to imagine that all national characteristic must be lost, yet no people in Europe seems more distinctly marked or to bear a stronger original impression: whether nature frames and models the disposition of the inhabitants to the soil and climate of the country, or whether the form of government gives a complexion to their manners, it is curious to observe how quickly the various dissimilar parts coalesce and amalgamate into one body.

"The Irish," he observes, "are a strong and hardy people, active in body, and of a bold and daring spirit; patient of cold, hunger, and labor; dauntless in danger, and regardless of life where glory is in view; warm and constant in love and friendship, but quick in resentment, and implacable in hatred; generous and hospitable beyond all bounds of prudence; credulous, superstitious, and vain; talkative, disputatious, and strongly disposed to turbulence and contest: they are almost all fond of learning, and are endowed with excellent parts, but are usually more remarkable for liveliness of thought than for accurate expression. They possess neither the industry of the English, nor

“ the perseverance of the Scots ; but, when properly directed,
“ have displayed spirit and abilities equal to every un-
“ dertaking.”

This treatise on Ireland is not, like that on Russia, strictly speaking, divided into chapters, but broken into sections. The third of these sections gives so clear and concise a sketch of the political History of Ireland, from the Conquest to the Conclusion of Lord Townshend's Administration, that the reader will not be displeased to see it entire ; and under this idea it is printed in the second volume, under the title of *A Short Sketch of the Political History of Ireland*.

Under the head of *The Constitution and Government of Ireland*, he contends that it is of very little consequence to the ancient Irish or the later settler, whether their country was conquered or not. “ They are all,” says he, “ equally
“ subject to Great Britain, and enjoy her protection ; every
“ individual feels the genial influence of her liberty and, as an
“ individual, claims every privilege which she can bestow.
“ If, for political or commercial reasons, restrictive regulations
“ are adopted with regard to Ireland, it is not Ireland that is
“ meant to be injured ; the safety, the interest of the parent
“ and protecting state, which all its subjects are equally
“ bound to cherish and promote, is the only object. If that
“ object seems injudiciously pursued, the great national
“ assembly is open to the Irishman as well as to the English-
“ man and the Scotsman, and the arguments and eloquence
“ of the one may be as forcible as those of the other.”

He is decidedly of opinion that Ireland, under whatever predicament it may be considered, to be prosperous and happy, must be subordinate to and dependent upon Great Britain; that one great superintending and controlling dominion must exist somewhere; "and where," says he, "can that dominion reside with so much dignity, propriety, and safety, as in the British legislature?" He was firmly persuaded that nothing could tend so much to the mutual advantage of the two kingdoms as an union, and urged it strongly at the time of the disturbances in America. But as the minister did not seem to think that measure expedient or practicable at that time, he recommended at all events that every advantage and indulgence should be given to Ireland, as an inseparable limb of Great Britain, which ought to be nourished and supported by the same vital principle. "It would be true policy," he observes, "to widen, as much as possible, our European bottom; to consolidate and bind together all the parts that can naturally unite, so as to form one great compacted dominion, moved by one interest, cemented by one affection, subsisting by its own strength, acting by its own force, supplied by its own resources, neither to be shaken nor injured even by the loss of extreme branches, but, firmly rooted in its genial soil, flourishing, independent, and secure." On the subject of an union, he never for a moment altered his opinion, and when this measure of true policy was effected, he thus warmly and feelingly expressed his sentiments on the subject, "I bow with admiration and respect to those by whose wisdom this great and important object has been brought so near to its completion; consi-

“dering many things that have happened in my time, painful to recollect and invidious to mention, I little imagined to see this happy day. Thank God! I have seen it. I thank the Father of all mercies that he has been graciously pleased to prolong my days to this auspicious period. The measure before us has my dying voice. It will annihilate the vain hopes of a vain invidious foe from without, and, I trust, will contribute to defeat the projects of a dark and treacherous enemy within.”

In the Sketch of the Political History printed in the second volume, it will be seen how strongly he reprobates those severe laws relating to popery which were enacted in the reign of Queen Anne, and which are still in force. He condemns them as cruel, unjust, and impolitic.

The following section contains a short account of the *Office and Powers of the Lord Lieutenant; his Commission and Instructions*, on which he makes a few observations, and points out the impropriety and inconsistency of some parts of them. These are necessarily, since the union, entirely changed, and cease at this time to be interesting. Another section contains an account of the duties and the expense of all the public offices under government; and the work concludes with a very particular account of the public revenues of Ireland, and observations on each head, with several tables of public receipt and expenditure, all of which were highly important at the time they were written, but from the nature of the subject must cease to be so after a lapse of more than thirty years.

All the materials which Lord Macartney had collected, respecting Grenada and the Grenadines, with many other important papers relative to the different states of Europe, were, as already has been observed, plundered and destroyed by the savage soldiery of D'Estaing, whom this officer not only permitted but actually excited to this disgraceful proceeding, bad enough under any circumstances, but doubly so after so gallant a defence by a handful of men, which alone, to an enemy possessed of the least spark of generosity, would have been an inducement carefully to protect the vanquished from insult and injury. But D'Estaing, as Lord Macartney has emphatically remarked in one of his memorandum books, was *une Bête*. It was likewise observed, that the duplicates of these papers perished in the flames of the storeship, in which Lady Macartney had taken her passage for England. These losses were never attempted to be repaired by Lord Macartney. A task indeed of this kind is not only ungrateful to the feelings, but is in its nature next to impossible. No memory, however retentive, can embrace the details of statistical accounts, in which numbers are so frequently recurring, and so material to the subject.

The Journal, which was kept by his Lordship, of his proceedings in China, is a document that cannot fail of being read with pleasure and satisfaction. A detailed account of the progress of the embassy, and of the conferences and negotiations with a court and people who had hitherto been supposed to hold so high a rank among the civilized nations of the world; but of whose true character, we had but, at

the most, a doubtful portrait, must be considered as curious and interesting. This document is important in another point of view—it will convey more instruction to any future ambassador with respect to the conduct of his mission, than he will be able to glean from all the volumes which have been written on the subject of China. In the authentic Account of the Embassy to China, Sir George Staunton has very ably shown the necessity which gave rise to the mission, the views and objects proposed by the measure; the progress of the embassy from England to China, and its return to the former place. He has sketched with a masterly pencil, a picture of the manners, customs, genius, and character of the Chinese, and supplied much important and interesting information respecting their public revenues, the state of their agriculture, their trade and manufactures. Nor has he omitted to trace the progress of the negociation and its result; to state what was done and what was attempted to be done; all of which he collected and digested from the papers of Lord Macartney, from his own observations and those of some of the gentlemen in the train of the ambassador. But though the Journal, now published, was a material document in the hands of Sir George Staunton, in furnishing him with facts and occurrences, yet, in every other respect, it may be considered as a new and valuable addition to our stock of knowledge with regard to the genius and character of the Chinese nation. It not only tells us what was done on different occasions, but also what was said. The principal characters in the piece are brought before us, and introduced to our acquaintance. It not only conveys to us a general description of the manners and character of the court; but presents us, at the same

time, with accurate sketches of individual portraits. It possesses besides a very material advantage in one respect over a regular composition intended to meet the public eye; all the observations it contains were made upon the spot, and immediately committed to paper in the shape they now stand; nothing comprehended in the whole compass of this Journal was afterwards inserted on the ground of recollection; observations made on this ground, Lord Macartney justly remarks, are apt to vary their hue considerably. From the concluding paragraph of the Journal may be collected precisely its nature and aim. "I now," says he, "close my
" China Journal, in which I have written down the trans-
" actions and occurrences of my embassy, and my travels
" through this empire, exactly as they passed and as they
" struck me at the time. My sole view has been to repre-
" sent things precisely as they impressed me. I had long
" accustomed myself to take minutes of whatever appeared
" of a curious or interesting nature, and such scenes, as I
" have lately visited, were not likely to obliterate my habits
" or to relax my diligence. I regularly took notes and me-
" morandums of the business I was engaged in, and the ob-
" jects I saw, partly to serve for my own use and recollec-
" tion, and partly to amuse the hours of a tedious and pain-
" ful employment, but I will not flatter myself that they can
" be of much advantage or entertainment to others.

The Cape of Good Hope was a situation in which a governor had it in his power to do a great deal of good or a great deal of mischief; but it afforded only a very limited field for the display of brilliant talents. Whatever degree of prosperity followed

the capture of this settlement, whatever new or accurate information of its value and importance to the British empire was obtained, they were the result of Lord Macartney's administration. What the amount may be of our additional knowledge of this angle of Southern Africa, procured by his direction, it would ill become the writer of the present article to form the estimate. It is before the public, and he can vouch for nothing more than its authenticity and accuracy; for the means of collecting the materials he is wholly indebted to the distinguished favor of Lord Macartney.

But the place, in which the great powers of Lord Macartney's mind were called forth in all their energy, was India; and in the proceedings of his government there the statesman may find the finest lessons of wisdom and virtue. The minutes on various subjects, which he found it necessary to lay before the select committee, are masterly performances; and the whole correspondence with the hostile and counteracting government of Bengal is characterised by a clearness, closeness, and cogency of argument, and by a firmness and moderation which distinguish it, in a very striking manner, from the loose, the puerile and fanciful reasoning, and the haughty, harsh, and acrimonious language of the letters from Bengal. Both are now consigned to the archives of the East India Company, and both are doomed, in all probability, to undergo, with many other documents of great importance, the common fate of neglect and oblivion.

If that part of them, employed in the foregoing pages, to exhibit an illustrious example of great talents, directed solely

for the public welfare, of integrity superior to the temptation of wealth and power, of unwearied zeal in every cause for his country's honor and disinterestedness in every public transaction, may have the good effect of carrying conviction to the mind of any future governor of the presidencies in India, that a steady perseverance in honorable and upright conduct will secure him the esteem and regard of all whose esteem and regard is valuable, and afford him that peace of mind and heartfelt satisfaction which no wealth nor power, however great, can bestow, the present Sketch of the Public Life of Lord Macartney will not have been written in vain.

END OF THE NARRATIVE.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

*Letter from Sir GEORGE MACARTNEY to WILLIAM BURKE, Esq. dated
St. Petersbourg, Aug. 24, (Sept. 4,) 1766.*

“BELIEVE me, my dear Burke, I am highly sensible to all your instances of friendship, and believe me too that, on all occasions, you will find me eminently grateful.

“ I am very particularly obliged by your letter of the 27th July, which I found no sort of difficulty to decypher. The nomination of Mr. Stanley did not at all surprise me; the only thing that surprises me is that, since they chose to put a slight upon me, they did not turn me out without further ceremony. It is true, I have happily accomplished a very laborious and a very difficult negociation, and brought to a conclusion a treaty of commerce, which, but for my zeal, industry, and activity, I will venture to say would have been lost to us for ever. I will make no scruple neither to own to you that, in my opinion, my first treaty was preferable to my second; probably I may be called on one day or another to defend it, and I think I have irrefragable proofs to support my opinion. I must add besides that to me alone is the treaty owing. It was extinguished and dead, to all intents and purposes, till I revived it; and by indefatigable labor, and at a considerable expense, worked it through in the teeth of

every opposition. Mr. Panin here makes no scruple publicly to say that no other man could have obtained so much as I have done ; and seeing the conduct of my court in this and in other objects, it was merely from personal consideration to me that he concluded it at all. Mr. Stanley I know not ; but I respect his character and abilities : if he were my enemy I could not wish him a greater punishment than his present commission ; were he my friend I could not wish him a greater happiness than to be relieved from negotiating with this court. Had he been informed of the real situation of things here, I am persuaded he would have declined so disagreeable an employment ; and had the gentlemen at home known the footing I am upon with the Empress and her ministers, they never would have dreamed of appointing another in my place. I am by no means however mortified at it ; when I accepted this commission, which you know I gave value for (having resigned a seat in parliament for it) I resolved to execute it with cheerfulness, however disagreeable I might find it : and had not Mr. Stanley been named to succeed me, I should have persevered till I had fulfilled every object of my instructions : but the affair being now settled otherwise, I cannot avoid expressing to you how very well pleased at it I am. To be sure the proceeding is extraordinary to turn a man out, if I am turned out, immediately after he had finished a treaty which had been the object of nine years' negociation, and which the other contracting party declares aloud could be finished by nobody else, and which the gentlemen concerned in the trade have thanked me for in such terms as I blush to repeat. But some people tell me I am not turned out ; no matter : I cannot in honor continue here whilst Stanley is in Russia, because in the language of a great minister, I should not wish to be responsible for measures which I am not permitted to guide ; or, supposing I met with success in conjunction with him, I should certainly get no thanks for it ; for, to borrow the expression of a minister of the gospel, as I have just now done that of a minister of state, " When we " have done all that we can, we are unprofitable servants ;" and what is worse, unprofited too I assure you. I know at least I have found it so ;

for not to speak of the expense of living here, which is very great, I have spent above a thousand pounds of my own money for secret service. This I never mentioned before, nor do I intend to speak of it to the office, though, upon my honor, it is true; but I am above it, and though I have got no thanks for my service, yet since it has been of use to the public, I do not regret it. For these reasons I have demanded leave to return to England, at least whilst Stanley is here. I have another, which perhaps you may think better than all—I have an ambition of sitting in the next parliament, where, I hope, I shall be able to serve both my sovereign and my country with more approbation and with better success. Be assured that in all situations I shall act as a man of spirit, of honor, and independence—no friend shall ever blush for me; no enemy ever triumph over me.

“ I must entreat that you will use your interest with Mr. Conway for my leave to return home this winter, and also beg that proper instructions may be given to Mr. Stanley, to inform himself in the most particular manner of my conduct here as a minister, and especially, whether what I say of Mr. Panin's yielding to the treaty merely from personal friendship to me be true or not. In short, let the flat question be put to Mr. Panin himself. Seeing by the general's last dispatches, that I have not the confidence of the present administration, I am reduced to the mortifying reflection, that it is possible my veracity may be questioned, and to the necessity of having that veracity justified. Stanley is a man of honor, and will nothing extenuate, nor set down aught in malice; and his report, I will venture to say, will be, that no man ever served his king and his country with greater zeal, nor with a more unblemished reputation than I have done. It is in vain to say, as possibly some may do, that no dissatisfaction is meant to me by naming an ambassador. Certainly there is, otherwise would they have named one without being sure whether it was agreeable or not to this court? and as it happens it is not. This letter, my dear Burke, will appear a very vain one; but called upon by

this occasion, I am obliged to speak a great deal of myself: I have this satisfaction however, that whatever I have said is literally true.

“ I am much mortified at missing Ned’s letter; but hope he will find some method of forwarding it to me. I have made very ample collection of every thing relative to this country, and shall with infinite pleasure impart to you and Ned all my stores. If I have leisure between this and my return, I will finish a treatise which I have been long working upon, and which I flatter myself will give the completest and most impartial account of this country that has yet visited the press *.

“ Adieu, my dear friend, be assured of the highest sentiments of esteem and regard, &c. &c.

(Signed)

“ GEORGE MACARTNEY.”

No. II.

Letter from Sir GEORGE MACARTNEY to the Right Honorable HANS STANLEY, dated St. Petersburg, September 1st (12) 1766.

“ SIR,

“ IT seems to me very happy for the public that administration did not entertain such favorable sentiments of me as you are pleased to do; for had their opinion, either of my abilities or address, been in any degree answerable to the flattering expressions of your letter, in all probability the care of his Majesty’s affairs here would never have been transferred to your abler hands.

* For an account of this work, see page 393 of this volume.

“ Though it must give me some pain to leave a court, which has distinguished me by such uncommon marks of attention and regard, yet I shall certainly do it with less regret, when I consider that your Excellency is to be my successor ; persuaded too that your superior talents will easily accomplish what my humble ones have attempted in vain. If you think it is in my power to be of the smallest use to you here, during the interval that remains till your arrival, I beg you will freely lay your commands on me ; I shall esteem myself extremely happy in being honored with them, and I shall execute them with infinite pleasure. And as you are so obliging as to offer me your services in England, I take the liberty of entreating you to employ your good offices in obtaining for me the King’s immediate permission to return home for a few months, during the winter, for the recovery of my health, which is in a very declining state. In doing this you will confer upon me the highest obligation, and on all occasions you may depend on finding me eminently grateful.

“ I beg leave to conclude this letter by assuring you, without any compliment, how much I respect your character, how much I honor your abilities, and (whatever may happen in the revolution of public affairs) how ambitious I shall always be of your private friendship.

“ I am, &c.

(Signed)

“ GEORGE MACARTNEY.”

No. III.

Letter from Sir GEORGE MACARTNEY to the Right Honorable HENRY SEYMOUR CONWAY, dated St. Petersburg, November 16 (27), 1766.

" SIR,

" I AM honoured with your very obliging letter of the 24th October, and beg leave to assure you, that if of late I have felt any of that uneasiness which is attributed to me, it was by no means on my own account; so very indifferent am I to every sentiment of ambition or vanity, that I could scarcely feel the smallest mortification, even from the supposed loss of my credit as a minister; and when I spoke of that circumstance in my dispatch to you, a zeal for the service, and a desire of informing you of every thing which I imagined necessary for you to know, were my only inducements. I myself could suffer nothing from the adoption of such an idea here, but I was apprehensive the public affairs might. Considering the accounts which the ministry here received from all hands, particularly the communications of Mr. Gross *; considering that they saw an ambassador named over me, supposed to be charged with a commission not judged proper to be entrusted to me, and that they knew also how I had been reprehended for consenting to the only method, by which it was ever possible to conclude the treaty of commerce, it was natural enough for them to suppose that I could not enjoy any great share of favor or confidence at home. Nor indeed did I presume to have much; for till I was honored with your letter of the 30th September (which letter I did not receive till three months after Mr. Stanley's appointment) I was left entirely ignorant of my own destination, and therefore, whenever questioned upon the subject, always declined

* The Russian minister at the court of London.

giving any explicit reply. I continued however to walk on as before in the ministerial track without deviation ; I endeavored to do my duty to the best of my abilities, and equally resigned myself to the obedience of whatever orders I might receive, whether depressive of my hopes or flattering to my wishes. I take the liberty of mentioning to you, Sir, these particulars solely in the intention of destroying every suspicion which might be entertained of me as if I was in any degree discontented. Disappointed I possibly might have been ; but I am not discontented. I feel too much gratitude for his Majesty's gracious permission of returning home for the recovery of my health, to suffer the slightest ill humor or peevishness to intrude upon my sentiments or behaviour ; and I have such confidence in your generosity and good nature, that I am persuaded if any such ideas have been imbibed to my prejudice, you will not refuse to contradict or remove them.

“ And here, Sir, I must entreat you to accept my sincerest thanks for the very obliging expressions of your last letter. Your good opinion must be particularly flattering to me, and I might justly be vain on this occasion, were I not humble enough to know that the best minister, even when, like the best christian, he has done all that he can, is after all but an unprofitable servant.

“ Nothing can be more just than what you are pleased to observe ought at present to be the objects of attention to a British minister residing at this court ; and, I flatter myself, that no marks have been perceived of my want of vigilance. Ever since I have had the honor of being employed here, I have been watchful of every circumstance of every kind, whether productive of foreign negociation or domestic intrigue ; but I laid it down as a rule never to communicate any thing to you, the truth of which I had not the strongest reason to rely upon, and particularly endeavored to avoid swelling my dispatches with dissertations or conjectures. For these reasons the private broils of the court, and

the silly squabbles of the bed-chamber, unless attended, or likely to be attended, with serious consequences, have seldom found a place in my letters. It is true, that we are frequently alarmed with accounts, at some times of smart repartees, and at others of sullen quarrels, between the Empress and her favorite, either arising from *her* excess of sensibility or *his* excess of presumption, but I have never found them of any great violence or duration; and they seem only to resemble those clouds of summer which never descend in storms—they obscure the sun but for a moment, soon disperse, and leave the sky in its former brightness and serenity. It has often happened besides, that reports of such misunderstandings have been purposely spread and artfully propagated, merely to sound the opinion and temper of the public; and this is so much suspected, that if a serious quarrel was to happen, perhaps it would be regarded with less attention than it really deserved. I have therefore avoided sending you relations of this nature, generally persuaded that the history of to-day's dispute would vanish before the account of to-morrow's reconciliation. The report of the late misunderstanding, which you allude to, had no real foundation; but took its rise merely from a hunting party which count Orloff went upon some time since, and which occasioned his absence from court for eight or ten days. His favor with the Empress seems rather increased than diminished, and he is in appearance on the best terms with Mr. Panin, who, perhaps, would be sorry to see a minion of genius or ability in his place."

No. IV.

Letter from Sir GEORGE MACARTNEY to the Right Honorable HENRY SEYMOUR CONWAY, dated St. Petersburg, Jan. 26 (Feb. 6), 1767.

“ SIR,

“ I Resume my pen to answer your letters of the 19th December last, and to assure you that though I am persuaded my residence at this court, in my present situation, can be of very little use to public affairs; yet since your commands are such, I shall most certainly remain here, and drag on a miserable existence till I am relieved either by the arrival of my successor, or by a natural dissolution.

“ Since you are pleased to mention the late season of the year as a reason for Mr. Stanley's delaying to set out from England, I cannot but regret how unfortunate it was that I did not sooner inform him that the months of December, January, and February, are by far the most agreeable, and undoubtedly the most proper, for travelling in this part of the world, as the greater half of the journey, that is to say, from Dantzic to this city, is then performed by sledgeway, and in a much more expeditious manner than can possibly be done at any other season upon wheels. I remember that I was ordered to set out on the 1st November exactly two months after my nomination, and the Earl of Buckinghamshire left this in the middle of January; and I don't recollect that either of us suffered any great inconvenience from the coldness of the weather or the congelation of the roads.

“ Having very carefully perused your dispatches, I will endeavor to answer them as methodically as I can; and I must begin by observing, what I flattered myself must be supposed without my repeating it, that had I been

even dismissed with disgrace, such a circumstance could never alter the rectitude of my conduct as a minister, abate my diligence, or diminish my attention. No, Sir, let what will happen, my actions shall always be the result of a most steady obedience to my Sovereign's commands, and of the sincerest devotion to the public service. I flatter myself that my behaviour and correspondence, since the ambassador's nomination, have carried no marks of dissatisfaction or ill-humor on my part; on the contrary, I believe that, without uncommon discernment, it may be observed that, since that event, I rather redoubled my activity, as long as I was able to be active, than lessened my zeal; and I do assure you, Sir, that, (however unfortunately I may augur of my endeavors) yet, as long as I continue here, they shall be exerted with as much earnestness and vigor, as if I flattered myself that they would be crowned with success. As to my sentiments upon the appointment of Mr. Stanley, you really do me too much honor in supposing them to arise from very elevated motives; for I will honestly confess I had no such feelings on the occasion as are imputed to me. I think I know the world too well to suffer myself to be tormented by evils which I cannot reverse, or to give way to discontent, when it can only recoil on myself; and I hope I have not lived to so little purpose as not to bring my mind to that pitch of philosophy, which is neither to be darkened by the worst fortune, nor dazzled with the best. A man who has not calmness of temper and equanimity of soul to smile at almost every disappointment, must be very ill-qualified for the character of a public minister.

“Why then, Sir, should you imagine that I am dissatisfied? I really am not, and have humbler thoughts perhaps than are laid to my charge. I have too little merit to expect consideration, and know myself of too little consequence to be spared in a sacrifice if a victim was wanting; therefore I do assure you, Sir, that I think the not being dismissed from my employment rather claims my gratitude than that any supposed slight could call forth my discontent. I should be the weakest of mankind if I could

testify either anger or surprise at any events whatsoever, that the enmity of fortune, directed by any political convulsion, could inflict. Far from yielding to any of these emotions, I look upon the appointment of Mr. Stanley as a very wise measure, and, had he arrived here some months ago, might have been a very happy one. I should be as ill a patriot as a courtier to think otherwise; and to convince you that my opinion was directed by my judgment, I have in every dispatch told you, how useful his speedy arrival here might be, and on that account how ardently I wished it. I find notwithstanding that he is still retarded; I unfortunately find too, that when I speak of his coming here, I am looked upon by all my diplomatic brethren as the most consummate hypocrite that ever attempted to impose a falsehood for a fact; for the general opinion is (such is the vain and absurd notion entertained of my ministerial credit with Mr. Panin) that I shall not be permitted to leave this at all. God forbid their ideas should be realized! God forbid any new accident should still delay Mr. Stanley, whose coming here I cannot but look on as of the greatest importance; because I have not only declared it as a mark of particular attention to the Empress; but have represented it in such a light that I will venture to promise, that as soon as it is certain that Mr. Stanley is set out, an ambassador will be immediately appointed from this court to that of London. From this circumstance you will easily perceive, Sir, that so far from being dissatisfied with Mr. Stanley's appointment, I have endeavored to give it all the merit and relieve that either private insinuations or public declarations could do; and I hope to have been in some degree successful. Before I finish this part of my letter, I beg leave to repeat, once for all, that if any uneasiness has appeared in my correspondence, it arose only from the pains of indisposition, the uncertainty of my situation, and my anxiety for the public service; and by no means from discontent or misapprehension. And now, Sir, after many apologies for troubling you with so long a dissertation upon myself, which nothing but your having enlarged on the same subject could excuse, I proceed to the other parts of your letter.

“ I do most sincerely agree with you in your opinion of the absurdity of Russia's inflexibility, and have done all in my power to engage her to agree with us both ; but I might as well dream of governing human society by the laws of Plato's republic, as of working upon this ministry either by the common rules of negociation, or the principles of our ancient engagements. And, at this moment, I should think a treaty of alliance with the Empress of Russia (during Mr. Panin's ministry) as distant and unlikely to be brought about, as a league with Prester John, or the King of Bantam. I mean as long as no method can be hit upon for removing the fatal, the only, difficulty that remains between us.

“ And here, Sir, lest you should look upon this court's sending an ambassador to London as a favorable omen, I must put you on your guard, and assure you that it arises merely from a sense of propriety in the Empress, who will not in this instance suffer herself to be outdone in politeness or civility. If I might presume to know this court from a very attentive perusal of two years, I would give my opinion by declaring that we flatter ourselves with the vainest hopes, if we imagine that either the late advances on our side, or the return on her's, will, in the present sentiments of this court, have the smallest effect in bringing about a closer union between us.

“ We have no credit here, at present, the whole of it now lying between Mr. Asseburg and Count Solms*. What these gentlemen may have to negotiate together beyond the terms of private friendship I am at a loss to conjecture; but certain it is, they see one another of late much more frequently than formerly, and that too in a sort of mysterious manner, avoiding, as much as possible, the appearance of any great connection in public. In so much that though Mr. Asseburg goes generally four or five times a week to Mr. Solms' house, and that usually like

* The Danish and Prussian ministers.

Nicodemus by night, yet either being afraid of his brother ministers, or for some other reason, he conceals this intimacy very carefully even from his own family. These gentlemen being both Prussians have talked to Mr. Panin, I believe, pretty much in the same style upon the subject of our alliance. And as the King of Prussia intends, if possible, to monopolize the friendship of Russia to himself, without suffering any other power to share it that he can hinder, I dare say that, even supposing the present impediments to our union with this court removed, he would find means to throw other *remoras* in the way; so far from his forwarding or assisting us, he has been all along, ever since my residence here, the grand enemy of our interest. And I do really believe that the Mufti of Constantinople might, with as much probability, expect a blessing from the Pope, as the court of London flatter itself with hopes of assistance from the court of Berlin in any Russian negotiation.

“Your sentiments upon our affairs here, as expressed in your last letter, are entirely mine; and I have at every favorable opportunity endeavored to impress them upon Mr. Panin. I have been answered perhaps of late in gentler terms than formerly; but always with the same meaning and determination of never yielding the point relative to Turkey. My own opinion is, that this court has long since resigned all thoughts of bringing us into the system, and therefore endeavors to compose it as well as she can without us. My fear of this happening induced me, in my dispatch of June 23d, old style, to beg of you to send me a counter-project of a treaty of alliance, which appearance of negotiation would probably have prevented this court from taking any sudden resolution, which might be dictated by despair of ever agreeing with us. But even supposing she still may have views of allying herself to us, I cannot avoid conceiving them to be very distant, and that it would be impossible to put them speedily in execution, even if both parties were sincerely agreed. The Empress seems of late to give much less attention to foreign politics than formerly, and, at present, chiefly to turn her thoughts to the inte-

rior government of her dominions. She sets out in a few days for Mosco, from Mosco she goes to Jeroslaff, from Jeroslaff to Kasan, from Kasan to Saratoff, from Saratoff to Astracan, and from Astracan heaven knows where the genius of travelling may conduct her. Now, Sir, if you will please to look over the map of this country, and consider the distance of these places from one another, and the time necessary for making such journeys, as well as the dissipation and confusion naturally attendant on them, you must allow, I think, it will by no means be a season favorable for negociating.

“ When these peregrinations are over, another grand object will claim her attention, I mean the convention of the states of the empire, in order to compose and establish a new code of laws. Now as these states are to consist of a number of deputies, perhaps eleven or twelve hundred, chosen out of all ranks of people, and out of all nations under the Russian dominion, whether Christian, Pagan, or Mahometan, it is not to be expected that the proceedings of so tumultuous an assembly should be very regular, or their decisions very speedy. These circumstances, together with many others too tedious to be here enumerated, will probably blunt the edge of every appetite for foreign politics, and, during a considerable time, totally engross the attention of the Empress, of her ministers, and of her people.

“ The only chance we have of this court's abating her inflexibility upon the Turkish clause is, that from the dissatisfaction of Sweden, or from the convulsions in Poland (if France exerts herself in the one, and Austria intermeddles in the other) some incidents may arise which will render our alliance necessary to Russia on her own terms. For this reason, joined to many others, I dare say you will readily agree how useful, nay, how necessary, the presence of a minister of Mr. Stanley's abilities is now become here, and he must be sensible what advantage will result to his country, and what glory to himself, if he can conquer that obstinacy, and remove those mountainous difficulties, which have hitherto held at defiance all the talents and address of his predecessors.

"I conceive too that it would be of infinite service to his Majesty's affairs, if I was permitted to return home immediately, that I might give to administration and to Mr. Stanley, a clearer, more accurate, and more particular account of things here, *vivâ voce*, than I can possibly do by letter, and which being delivered to both at London would certainly be of more utility than if communicated separately to each at different times and at different places. But this I submit with every sentiment of deference to the wisdom of my superiors, assuring you, however, at the same time, that until the ambassador arrives, your office-keeper could perform the functions of a minister here, not only to as good purpose as myself, but as well as a man of much higher abilities in my situation. Let me therefore once more entreat you, Sir, to interpose in my favor for permission to return; and be convinced that as soon as my health is re-established I shall with uncommon readiness and pleasure obey his Majesty's orders, whenever and wherever he is pleased to command me.

"I am, &c. &c.

(Signed) "GEORGE MACARTNEY."

No. V.

Letter from Lord MACARTNEY to Lord GEORGE GERMAIN, dated St. George's, Grenada, July 5, 1779, giving an Account of the Capture of that Island by the Enemy.

"MY LORD,

"I HAVE the honor to acquaint your Lordship that on Friday the 18th past, a vessel which had escaped the day before from St. Vincent's, arrived here, and brought me an account of the taking of that island by the

French, and of an expedition being intended from Martinique against Grenada. I immediately dispatched several expresses to communicate this intelligence to Admiral Byron, and instructed them to proceed to different places in search of him. At the same time I ordered martial law to be proclaimed, and gave directions for as many of the militia as could be useful to come to town without delay. I then convened the legislature, which most cheerfully passed a vote of credit for supplying them, during a certain time, with provisions and other necessary articles.

“ Early on Friday morning the 2d instant, two of the dispatch boats, which I had sent to look for the Admiral, returned without having met with him either at St. Kitt’s or Antigua, Barbadoes or St. Lucia. About half an hour after nine in the forenoon of the same day, thirty-seven sail appeared in the offing, at a considerable distance, steering for this island. We, at first, flattered ourselves that it was a British fleet; but soon discovered it to be a French one, and learned that it consisted of twenty-five line of battle ships and twelve frigates, having six thousand five hundred land troops on board, the whole under the command of the Count D’Estaing.

“ I made, without loss of time, the best disposition I was able of the little force I had for our defence. At one o’clock the French fleet came to an anchor near Boismaurice Point, about three miles north of St. George’s, and immediately pushed on shore, under protection of their guns, a large body of troops, which quickly begun to invest us. It was not possible for us to prevent them from landing where they did, as we had no coast batteries, nor indeed could we afford to divide our strength, the whole of which consisted of one hundred and one rank and file of the 48th regiment, twenty-four recruits of the royal artillery, a few sailors from the vessels in the port, and between three and four hundred militia.

“ As our casemate was incapable of containing any numbers, and in no part of it bomb-proof, as every discharge of the windward guns set the barracks and other buildings on fire, and, as from the heights around us, the very buckles of our shoes could be plainly seen on the parade, the fort was considered to be totally incapable of resisting any serious attack. It therefore became necessary to turn our chief attention to the Hospital-hill, which, for some time, we had been endeavoring to fortify, and to make our principal stand there, as being the strongest ground in our power to occupy, and commanding at once the town, the fort, and the harbor.

“ Our people were distributed as follows:—The light infantry of the 48th regiment of twenty-five men, and a picket of fifteen, commanded by Captain Montresor, took post below the battery at the east end of the Hospital-hill, together with eighty grenadiers, and light infantry of the St. George's militia, under Lieutenant-colonel Black. The remainder of the St. George's militia, the St. David's, and the St. Andrew's, under Colonels Lucas, Winniet, and Williams, amounting to near two hundred men, occupied the north and south sides of the ridge. The St. Patrick's and St. John's militia, of about seventy men, under Colonel Grant and Lieutenant-colonel Eames, were appointed to defend the lower battery at the Hospital barracks, supported by Lieutenant Brown's detachment of ten men from the 48th regiment. Captain Darcy, with fifteen men of the 48th, and a militia picket of the same number, was ordered to the barrier, at the north entrance of the town, for the purpose of guarding that pass. The troop of horse, consisting of twenty-four cavaliers under Colonel Maxwell, was stationed at the foot of the hill, near the east road, and sent out regular patrols every hour to reconnoitre and bring intelligence. Two companies of the 48th regiment, of eighteen men each, and a body of sailors under the command of Major Hedges, remained in the fort where our magazine was, with which we maintained a free communication. The battery, commonly called Monckton's Redoubt, on the south of the Carinage, was manned by a party of seamen,

under Lieutenant Neale of the Adventure storeship. I established my head-quarters at the west-end of the Hospital-hill, and there waited Mr. D'Estaing's motions.

“ In the evening one of the enemy's line of battle ships advanced into the bay, and fired several shots on shore. Finding that the fort-guns did not reach her, she paraded for some time before the town; but one of our four and twenty pounders from the Hospital-hill having passed between her masts, she bore away and returned to her former station. After this every thing remained pretty quiet till two o'clock the next morning, at which hour an attempt was made by a party of the enemy to penetrate on our left along the river; but we gave them such a reception, that they were soon thrown into confusion, lost their way, and were obliged to retreat, which occasioned them a detour, when the day broke, over a great deal of steep and difficult ground. They had several killed and wounded in this affair; but I have not been able to ascertain the number. We did not lose a man—a prisoner whom we took informed us, that a great many pieces of cannon and mortars were landing from the ships, and I perceived, during all the forenoon, large bodies of troops taking post on the principal eminences opposite to us. About three o'clock Mr. D'Estaing sent a flag by one of his aid-de-camps, towards our lines, I dispatched an officer to stop him at a proper distance, and receive his message, which was a peremptory summons to surrender. My answer was as peremptory a refusal. I have the honor to send you a copy of each. In the subsequent evening the enemy extended themselves so as entirely to cut off our communication with the country, and all their motions gave us reason to expect a speedy assault, against which we continued to hold ourselves as well prepared as the smallness of our numbers would permit. Between two and three o'clock in the morning of the 4th instant, a large 74 gun ship begun to cannonade the town and fort, and a body of five hundred men, commanded by the Count de Pontdevaux, attacked the north-west end of the Hospital-hill, near the place, where they were repulsed before,

whilst three columns of five hundred men each, led by the Viscount de Noailles, and the Counts Arthur and Edward Dillon, with an advanced guard of two hundred, under the Count de Durat, pushed forward to our lines near the east battery. Their onset was sustained by our people with great steadiness and resolution for above an hour and an half, notwithstanding that our little strength had been very considerably diminished in the night, by the desertion of almost all the colored people, and the greatest part of the new subjects, so that at the time of the attack we had not three hundred men to oppose to the great force which was brought against us. At length being overborne by dint of superior numbers, we were obliged to quit our ground and retreat to the fort. The enemy poured in with such impetuosity and in such multitudes, that the orders for nailing up all our cannon could not be entirely executed, the gunners on the great battery being killed with the matches in their hands. We lost Lieutenant Carr of the 48th regiment, Lieutenant Willis of the militia, two non-commissioned officers, and several privates who were killed in the trenches. Our wounded are pretty considerable. Among them are Captain Montresor, (who was taken prisoner, and whose behaviour deserves every commendation,) one serjeant, one drummer, one fifer, and nine privates of the 48th regiment, together with about twenty-five of the militia, some of whom I am afraid cannot recover. There were also several sailors killed and wounded; but I have not yet received the account of them. I must beg leave to express my satisfaction at the behaviour of all the officers and men employed under me, and particularly to acknowledge my obligations to Lieutenant-colonel Edmeston, who commanded the 48th regiment, and by whose opinion and advice our military operations were chiefly conducted. His merits as a soldier, his long service and many wounds are too well known for me to say more upon this subject. Lieutenant Horne, my major of the brigade, distinguished himself much by his alacrity and clearness in delivering orders, and the indefatigable pains he took in every part of his duty.

“ I must not omit the assistance I received from the spirit and activity of Lieutenant Ross of the royal artillery, and of Lieutenant D’Obree of the York sloop of war, from the officers of the Adventure store-ship, and the masters of the merchantmen in the harbor. Though I have mentioned a few only by name, it would be great injustice to the rest, if I did not testify my entire approbation of them. The loyalty and spirited conduct of the gentlemen of the colony, on this occasion, do them the highest honor, and will, I doubt not, recommend them to the King’s favor, when the island shall revert to his dominion.

“ From the best information I can obtain, the French lost about four hundred men killed and wounded, amongst whom are some persons of note. The Count D’Estaing was present in the affair, and in order to animate his troops to the attack, promised them the pillage of our quarters. Among the sufferers I am the principal, having lost my plate, papers, cloaths, and most of my other effects to a very considerable value.

“ The enemy were now become possessed of all the commanding heights, with mortars and heavy artillery, and being thus effectually enabled to bury us under the ruins of the fort in a few hours, without their risking a man, or our having it in our power to molest them in the smallest degree, opened their cannonade upon us. As the place was absolutely untenable, and we had no other resource, being hemmed in on all sides ; as the enemy were entire masters of the coast, and in our situation, even the admiral if he had arrived could not assist us ; there was nothing left for me, but to endeavor to obtain such a capitulation as might be honorable to his Majesty’s troops, and advantageous to the inhabitants of the island. And this I conceived we were entitled to from the defence we had made, and the example given by British commanders on similar occasions : I therefore dispatched a flag to the Count D’Estaing to propose a parley, who at first would only consent to an hour and an half. It being however extended to three hours, I sent my aid-de-camp,

Mr. Staunton, who is not unknown to your Lordship, with articles founded on the capitulation of Dominique and St. Lucia, as a basis of negociation; but our weakness being too well known, and a system, it seems, having been long fixed by the French with regard to this colony, as formerly belonging to themselves, the Count peremptorily refused to enter into any treaty, rejected my articles *in toto*, and instantly transmitted to me a letter with certain propositions as his *ultimatum*, which, I believe, will appear to your Lordship the most extraordinary project that ever entered into the mind of a general or politician. Monsieur D'Estaing, who imagined that the mere appearance of his force would have enabled him to take the island without a blow, had brought this capitulation with him ready manufactured from Martinique, possibly it may have originated at a greater distance; for though obscure and inconsistent in some parts, it bore internal evidence of having been composed at leisure in the closet, not suddenly drawn up in a camp. It filled thirty-four folio pages, and was produced and delivered in a shorter time than would have been necessary to transcribe the title. Several copies of it were handed about at the same time.

“ The Vicomte de Noailles, who was charged with it, had instructions to inform me in the most solemn manner, that the Count D'Estaing considering us at his discretion, and being fully sensible of his advantages, would not admit of the slightest alteration in any article whatsoever, and had taken his resolution in case of our refusal.

“ It required no deliberation in me to declare, that I never would put my hand to such conditions, and all the principal proprietors of the island then assembled, to whom I communicated them, unanimously preferred to surrender at discretion rather than subscribe to, or undertake to comply with, terms, which were not merely unprecedented and humiliating, but so ensnaring and so uncertain in their nature, extent, and aim, that

they might at any time supply pretexts for taking away the lives, together with the fortunes of the capitulants.

“ Thus then having neither means of resistance nor possibility of relief, determined never to consent to the capitulation offered to us, and yet unable to obtain a better, we found ourselves reduced to the hard necessity of yielding up the island without one. My only consolation under so great a misfortune is that nothing was omitted, which could possibly have been done to avert it.

“ In the inclosed paper, No. 6, your Lordship will find an exact list of the French sea and land forces employed against us on this occasion. No. 7 is the monthly return of the five companies of the 48th regiment in garrison here the 1st instant, which, with the twenty-four artillery recruits above mentioned, were all the regulars we had for our defence.

“ An assurance has been given that the inhabitants shall retain quiet possession of their estates, and that during the present war they shall not be obliged to bear arms against his Majesty. The remains of the five companies of the 48th regiment, and the recruits of the artillery, together with the officers and myself, are, I understand, to embark for France in a few days. Mr. D’Estaing would on no account consent to any exchange in the West Indies, or to our going on parole to a British or even a neutral island. How far his conduct in this instance, so contrary to the usual practice, how far his orders for plundering, or his refusal of an equitable capitulation, and his pressing an inadmissible one, may be authorised or approved of by those of his own nation, I know not; but he has now established a precedent by which, in the course of the war, they must undoubtedly be the greatest sufferers.

“ The address, No. 8, which I take the liberty of transmitting, was presented to me a few hours ago by the principal gentlemen of this colony.

No. 9 contains a rough sketch of the principal attack of the Hospital-hill, together with the fort and town of St. George's; I hope soon to be able to procure a more correct one. There are some other papers which I wished to send, but I have not time at present to get them transcribed.

"I must be indebted to your Lordship's indulgence to excuse this long and desultory letter, which is written by snatches in the midst of hurry and confusion. I am afraid the style of it in some parts may appear to have an air of military parade, which in me, who have not been bred in a military line, would be particularly unbecoming; but being desirous of giving your Lordship the most distinct and accurate account of the late scene here, I rather chose to run the risk of such a censure, than to omit the slightest circumstance which might contribute to your information.

"I have the honor to be with great respect, my Lord, your Lordship's most obedient and most faithful humble servant,

(Signed) "MACARTNEY."

P.S. The French are usually very industrious in concealing their losses, and their officers, who had a share in the late action, differ somewhat in their accounts; but I have just received a list of their killed and wounded, which I should imagine may be depended on.

Privates killed - - - 111

Ditto - wounded - - - 195

Total 306

Officers killed.—Le Chevalier de la Bretonniere, *Major*.

Le Comte Dubourg, *Captain*.

Mr. Shee, *Lieutenant*.

Officers wounded.—Le Chevalier De la Pelin, *Captain.*

Mr. Maurgan, *Lieutenant.*

Mr. Dugan, *ditto.*

Le Baron de Kergus, *ditto.*

Mr. De Gautier, *Aide Marechal-general.*

No. VI.

Intercepted Letter from the Nabob NIZAM UD DOWLAH to FAZEL BEG CAWN, endorsed, received 25 Raimzan, or 25th September 1780.

“ I Have at this time received a letter from Zulphecar ud Dowlah Nagef Cawn Bahauder, which contains some particular matters, and I herewith forward you a copy of the answer I have written to it. It was not necessary to send you a copy of his letter, as my answer will sufficiently inform you of what he wrote me.

Letter to Nagef Cawn.

“ I have received your affectionate letter, in which you say, that we are united by the fidelity and loyalty we both equally have for the sacred person of his illustrious Majesty, and by the sincere friendship which subsists between us. You say, that I have heard how much you exert yourself in supporting the dignity of the Imperial House ; that if I will follow the example of my illustrious ancestors, it will be the means of raising my good name, and manifest the loyalty I profess for his most sacred Majesty ; and in order to do this, you request me to give you the assistance which you expect from the sincerity of my friendship for you. You desire, at the

same time, to be informed of the particulars of the alliances I have entered into with the warfaring powers in this part. Your above letter has given me inexpressible satisfaction, and I fully understand the contents of it. In conformity with the loyalty and fidelity which I have since my birth entertained for his Majesty's illustrious house, it is my sole occupation at all times, as God is my witness, to search after occasion to raise the glory and power of his sacred Majesty, whose reign may the Almighty ever render flourishing! It was with this view that, some time before I received your friendly letter, I wrote you to assure you of my fidelity towards his Majesty, and the sincerity of my friendship for you.

“ The world is now involved in calamities through the turbulence of the English. The deceits of this wicked nation are spread over the whole empire; wherever the seed of their malignity has been sown, it has shortly grown up into a tree, bearing the fruits of their wickedness. These people, with the greatest inward deceit and treachery under the cloak of sincerity, and professing a strict adherence to their engagements, have stretched forth their hands over what they, in a most humble manner, at first affected to borrow—a people worse than women, who, by their fraud and the fire of their cannon, which without distinction is an enemy to all, have trod under and consumed the honor of the most illustrious families in this country—a handful of people, without a head or foundation, have possessed themselves of the three richest provinces in the empire, every one of which is equal to a kingdom—a set of merchants, without a name and scarcely known, have ingrossed and disposed of, as they please, the revenues of the Imperial Crown—a handful of tradesmen, who, in their nature, are like foxes, have pretended to put themselves on a footing with tygers. Since the necessity of punishing this wicked people is obvious, there is no time to be lost in considering of it; for these shameless people are not able to face the heroes of war, or bear their deadly blows. They are indebted to fortune alone, which has favored them hitherto, for the acquisitions they have made with hostile intentions, which they conceal

under appearances of a friendly epistolary correspondence; they are, since the last wars against them, enjoying ease and tranquillity in their corners. We owe this to our misfortunes and sins. The Almighty changes not the situation of men until they change it by their own actions; yet the Almighty has been pleased to infuse his divine light into me, and point out by inspiration a way to punish these people; for I was the first, through the favor of his gracious Majesty, to contrive the means of rooting them out. As these shameless people have established settlements in different parts of the empire, under the pretence of giving assistance, to such as are powerful in wealth and territories, against their enemies, and raised the flame of war, it will be difficult to root them out entirely, unless a resolution takes place to attack and chastise them at once from all quarters. For if the fire of war is not lighted at the very foundation of this people, wherever they are, their settlements cannot be finally destroyed. It was with this view that I stirred up the Poonah ministers and Hyder Ally Cawn against them; the Poonah army was to attack the troops which, under Colonel Goddard, are raising troubles in Guzerat and at Surat.

“Hyder Ally Cawn, agreeably to this plan, is destroying the country about Arcot and Madras, and engages their attention on that side. Modojie Bunsila will attack the Bengal provinces, which are in the neighbourhood of Berar. I contrived so that these people should be so closely attacked, and invested on all sides, that they should want for all sorts of provisions, so as to be reduced in a short time to the extremity of their former situation. All those, whom I engaged in this, have performed their parts, and agreed to make war and peace with the concurrence of each other; that neither of the parties should get any advantage or suffer any loss without the other sharing in it.

“His gracious Majesty has without doubt been informed of this my plan from the intelligence papers from the Decan; the crown Muttsiddees

in the different Jaghyres, whose constant employment it is to write the occurrences of the day, have no doubt transmitted accounts of it. As this plan has been shown to all the Tonjdars and Jemadars of the Decan, they, seeing the advantages likely to accrue from it to themselves, have acquiesced and paid obedience to it. Hyder Ally Cawn accordingly has marched towards Arcot and Madras, and lighted the flame of war in that country; Modojie Bunsila has sent his son Candajee Bunsila with twenty thousand horse towards Bengal; the fair season being almost over, they remained in the Cattack country; but, by the blessing of God, they will enter into Bengal at the beginning of next year. The forces of the Pundit Perdhaun sought opportunities to attack Colonel Goddard to the westward; but the rains setting in they were obliged to go into quarters; but first destroyed, according to their custom, all the grain and provisions in the country. They will, with the blessing of God, effectually destroy the enemy at the beginning of the year.

“ I have thought proper to give information of all this to his Majesty, before it happened, lest he might imagine this confederacy was intended for something else. Without a blow is struck at the enemy, they cannot be destroyed effectually. The discovery of this plan cannot be any detriment to it now, and I have therefore given you a particular account of what has been done, and of the advantages which will accrue from this great undertaking. Modajie Bunsila's forces are employed to invade Bengal; but as they are not very considerable, it would be proper to send his Majesty's army to the number of two hundred thousand horse by Lucknow into Bengal, and join with Holker and Modojie Scindia, the two Mahratta chiefs, for that purpose. The more quarters in which these Christians are engaged, they will be more divided, and at a loss how to act against such attacks. Keep this in your view, and let no one have the leading of this expedition but yourself, and embrace this opportunity of establishing the imperial authority and power of his sacred Majesty.

No. VII.

Lord MACARTNEY's private Note of Application to his Highness the Nabob of the Carnatic, dated 4th July 1781.

“ Fort St. George.

“ **A**LL the interests of his Highness the Nabob, and those of the Company on the coast of Coromandel, are now in the greatest danger. The Company has a considerable army in the field, but money, provisions, and cattle, all which must be amply supplied in order to carry on war with success, are almost entirely wanting. Lord Macartney has a perfect knowledge of the friendly sentiments of the King of Great Britain towards his Highness, and is instructed by the Court of Directors to cultivate and preserve, by every instance of service and attention, the close connection which has long subsisted between his Highness and the British nation. His Lordship thinks it therefore the first and most pressing object of his duty, on finding his Highness's dominions invaded, to make the most speedy and spirited efforts to repel the enemy. The first and immediate point to be accomplished is to find a fund for defraying the charges of the army. His Lordship is driven to the necessity of applying to his Highness to furnish such a fund; and his Lordship flatters himself, that his Highness will please to signify to him, without delay, what his intentions are in this respect. It has been recommended to this presidency in the strongest terms by the governor-general and supreme council of Bengal to require from his Highness the immediate transfer of his country, in exclusive assignment, during the war only; and for the sole purpose of defraying the expenses it occasions: his Lordship however would be still better pleased that his Highness could procure, on this important occasion, a sum of money of at least five lacks of pagodas to be solely applied to the recovery of his own dominions, than to take such an assignment, especi-

ally if it was not perfectly agreeable to his Highness to grant it. But the alternative seems essential as, without cash to pay the troops, or such an effective assignment as will ensure a loan, the most fatal consequences may await his Highness and the Company. His Lordship is deeply concerned at being obliged to begin his government with proposals of this kind, and has only the consolation of hoping that, on the restoration of peace, he will be able, as he is desirous, to promote the honor and prosperity of his Highness, and of his illustrious house.


(Signed) "MACARTNEY."

No. VIII.

Nabob's Chop (O,) being the Assignment of the Revenues of the Carnatic to Lord MACARTNEY, for the Use of the EAST INDIA COMPANY.

"THIS paper is to have all the force and validity of a Saned, and no other instrument is necessary between his Highness the Nabob and the Governor on the behalf of the Company. His Highness empowers the Governor to appoint all renters or amuldars to be confirmed by his Highness. The Governor to settle with them for rent. The time of renting to be for three or five years as the Governor shall settle with the renters. Rent not to be inferior to net revenue of his Highness's exchequer in similar circumstances. The orders which his Highness will give shall not affect the revenue. Orders relative to the revenue shall proceed from Lord Macartney alone. Orders from his Highness and from his Lordship to be communicated to each other. His Highness will give usual cowles

to the amuldars who shall be appointed by the Governor, with the addition of a clause, declaring that all monies are to be paid to the orders of the Governor only. The Governor obliges himself to pay to his Highness the sixth part of the revenue from time to time, as the same shall be received by the Governor, and to pay it agreeably to his Highness's orders here, or in the respective countries where the same shall be collected, as his Highness shall please to direct. The remaining five parts of the net receipt of the revenue shall be placed to his Highness's credit with the Company. The Governor to furnish receipts to his Highness from time to time for the sums that shall be received on his Highness's account. His Highness declares, that during the period now agreed upon, of five years, he will not remove or dismiss any renter without the knowledge and consent of the Governor. His Highness also empowers the Governor to regulate and receive all peishcash, and all other revenues of the Carnatic: allowance to be made only by the Governor for the amount of his Highness's Saneds for giving peishcash for one or two years, granted before the 2d day of April last. All new Saneds to Polygars to be given by his Highness and not by the Governor; such revenues to be so regulated as not to be inferior to the net receipts in similar circumstances. The Governor to pay one-sixth part also of such peishcash and other revenue to his Highness. The remainder to be placed to his credit, as in the case of the amount of rents. Lord Macartney will please to act conformably to this paper, which is signed and sealed in duplicate, both by his Highness and the Governor, and reciprocally delivered to each other.



Nabob's signature.

(Signed)

"MACARTNEY.

" Madras, December 2, 1781."

No. IX.

Letter from the GOVERNOR-GENERAL and COUNCIL of BENGAL to the Honorable CHARLES SMITH and SELECT COMMITTEE of Fort St. George, enclosing certain Papers purporting to be an Agreement of equal Force and Validity with a formal Treaty, between this GOVERNOR-GENERAL and COUNCIL of BENGAL, and the NABOB of ARCOT, dated Fort William, April 2, 1781.

“ HON. SIR AND SIRS,

“ **T**HE Nabob having deemed it expedient, in the present critical state of his affairs, to send his minister Assam Cawn on a deputation to us, and to invest him with full powers to treat with this government for the attainment of several points, as particularly set forth in his instructions, we have maturely considered the nature and extent of the requests preferred by the Nabob, and have in consequence come to such resolutions upon them, as we doubt not will contribute equally to the support of the Nabob's honor and character, the satisfaction of his numerous creditors, the benefit of the Company, and the preservation of his country. For your complete information upon this subject, we enclose you a copy of the requests of the Nabob, together with a copy of the replies we have made to every article separately, and earnestly recommend it to you to conform strictly to the agreement entered into on our parts, and on the part of the Nabob; which, though not executed in the terms of a formal instrument, we look upon to have all the sanction, force, and validity of a treaty.

“ And for the better security that the plan of public arrangement, settled as we hope now, upon a permanent basis, and in such a manner as to secure to us the thanks of the creditors and the approbation of the

Company, shall not be interrupted by secondary private considerations, or the interference of individuals, to the detriment of the general interests, it was our original intention to appoint a servant of this establishment to be our resident at the Nabob's durbar, and the instrument of communication from us to you upon all matters that mutually relate to the Nabob and the Company, in the points abovementioned. Though we still admit the propriety of such a measure, and are unwilling to deviate from our original intention, in preference to any of the Company's servants upon another establishment, yet the very particular manner in which the Nabob has recommended Mr. Richard Joseph Sullivan to this appointment, and the intimate confidence with which it appears he has distinguished this gentleman, by joining his name in the commission with Assam Cawn, and thereby making him a party to the agreement which has been concluded, would argue a want of respect in us towards the Nabob were we to withhold our assent; especially as we have an opinion of the abilities and integrity of Mr. Sullivan, and believe him qualified for such a trust.

“ We have therefore thought proper to appoint Mr. Richard Joseph Sullivan the representative and minister of this government at the court of the Nabob Wala Jah, for the purpose of maintaining the faith of this government in the agreement concluded with the said Nabob, and for the representation of such matters as may at any time require his interposition in that character, and in our name, either with the Nabob, or with the President and Council or Select Committee of Fort St. George, and we have accordingly granted him credentials to this effect, a copy of which is enclosed.

“ We are, honorable Sir and Sirs,

“ Your most obedient humble servants,

(Signed)

“ WARREN HASTINGS.

“ EDW. WHEELER.

“ Fort William, April 2, 1781.”

Letter from the GOVERNOR-GENERAL and COUNCIL of BENGAL to RICHARD JOSEPH SULIVAN, Esq. appointing him their Representative and Minister at the Court of the NABOB of ARCOT, dated Fort William, April 2, 1781. Enclosed in the above.

“ WE the Governor-general and Council, in virtue of the Powers vested in us by the King and Parliament of Great Britain, and by the English East India Company, to direct and control the political affairs of all the Company's settlements in India, relying on your fidelity, prudence, integrity, and circumspection, have deputed and appointed you to be the representative and minister of this government at the court of the Nabob Waula Jah ; for the purpose of maintaining the faith of this government in the agreement which has been this day concluded with the said Nabob, and for the representation of such matters as may, at any time, require your interposition in that character, and in our name, either with the Nabob, or with the President and Council, or Select Committee of Fort St. George ; and we do hereby delegate to you full powers and authority to act in that country.

“ Given in Fort William under our hands, and the seal of the Company, this 2d day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-one.

(L. S.)

(Signed)

“ GOVERNOR-GENERAL and COUNCIL.

“ A true copy.

“ E. HAY, Act. Sec.”

The Requests of the Nabob WALLA JAH to the GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

“ I. LET a treaty be firmly established between us which may last for ever, and be subject to no deviation.

“ II. I am the hereditary prince of the Carnatic, and of Balla Ghaut under Pianghaut, and am independent of every one; and I have entire right and authority over my country, my children, my family, my servants, and subjects; and have power in the political and domestic administration of my country. This ought to be altogether dependent on me, and let not my friends interfere in it.

“ III. As the Company and English nation are the protectors of my honor and government, they will act in those points only where the advancement of my interests is concerned.

“ IV. Ten battalions of well-disciplined troops are stationed by me with the Company, and are paid by me, let them take nothing from me except the pay of them; and let all the contingent expenses, the batta for their marches, and the repairs of the forts be by my consent, and let the accounts of every three months be punctually delivered to me within the sixth month. When peace shall be restored, I will discharge the amount regularly; and let the Governor and Council of Madras give me a full receipt, and in time of peace let them assist me with these ten battalions, that I may settle the country subject to me, and derive some advantage from the expense.

“ V. Many Poligars notwithstanding that they have met with the greatest favor from me in time of peace have, from their ambitious and rebellious views, joined my enemy Hyder Ally, and begun open war. I

can therefore never place any reliance upon them, or look upon them as deserving of favor. In this case my subjects are to be kept in awe by the punishment of these people, for which assistance is necessary.

“ VI. After peace and alliance is made between me and the English Company, the enemies, the security, and the dangers of both will be the same; that is to say, whoever of us suffers any injury, it will be felt by both of us. I therefore wish that the English in India, or the King of Great Britain, would make a treaty of peace with the King of France: and let the peace and security of the Carnatic, and the rights of my government without the connection of any one, and my power to appoint a successor in the Carnatic be settled in a solid manner, and concluded in the treaty.

“ VII. In the garrisons of my forts, commandants and paymasters are sent, who, at the advice of their Dobhashes with a view to profit, lend money to the Ryots at an exorbitant interest, and afterwards are pressing for the money, and interfere in the government, and assist one another, by which great injury is done to my subjects and to myself. Let it be positively ordered that without my permission no one lend money to my subjects, and that for what is past as well as future, the interest on all loans be 12 *per cent. per annum*; and that if any person should act contrary to this, and should distress the Ryots, I shall complain against him and request his removal, and the Governor and Council of Madras will remove him from his office, and appoint another person in his room.

“ VIII. My constant wish has been to discharge the money due to the troops stationed by the Company, and I have always exerted myself for this purpose. From the commencement of my connection I have paid very considerable sums on this account, and on the day that Hyder invaded the Carnatic, I owed the Governor and Council of Madras less

than one lack of pagados, which I was in hopes of discharging by receiving bills from the bankers in the country; when in the mean while the attack of our enemy began, and instead of paying the balance in money to the Company, provided in my country a greater amount than that in rice and bullocks, and sheep for the army, besides the stores in my forts, of which there is a large supply in Trichinopoly, and a less quantity in Vellore, &c. and what was in those forts which our enemy has taken is in his possession. Had not my bad destiny produced many obstacles, there is no doubt but at this time I should not have been indebted one single pagoda to the Company. Of several Talooks of the Carnatic, which are still secure from our enemy, the collections are included in the accounts of the Company; but some Talooks are assigned to my creditors, and some I have received the Peishgall in advance for. Whatever is collected from those Mahals, let it be expended for the Company; but for the satisfaction of my creditors, my friends must be just as soon as the enemy shall have left my country, let the collections of those Talooks be given to my creditors, in order to pay off their principals, agreeable to my engagements with them.

“ IX. For several reasons, and from the invasion of my enemy, which are not unknown to my friends, I am greatly distressed, and my subjects are not in a state to suffer me to have any hopes from them; with my exertions and endeavors alone it is difficult to adjust my concerns: it is necessary that my friends should be just and favorable to me, and should assist me in this manner by giving into my hands, after the defeat of our enemy, the talook of Keerpah and Zeerghaut, and several Mahals in Ballaghaut belonging to Carnatic Pianghaut, which are in my country, and are my right: and I will maintain in my service five thousand well-disciplined horse for the collection of it.

“ X. The Talooks of Tanjore which is my right, I at a considerable expense, conformably to the rules and practice of Hindostan, took pos-

session of; in this my friends assisted me, for which I returned them thanks: since that they have, at the sole instigation of self-interested people, taken it from me by force, which has brought great damage to me, my subjects, and creditors. To this time such is the situation.

“ Numbers of my creditors are Englishmen, which is not unknown to you, as I have repeatedly written to you. From that time my right has been given up to a Ryot of mine; but no advantage has accrued from it to the Company's concerns; but, on the contrary, he has connected himself secretly with Hyder Ally and the Marattas, and has refused to supply money and stores, but keeps all his money in Nagpatam, a Dutch settlement. If my friends would act justly, and give the Talook to me, great advantage would be derived from the Company's and my affairs; and the views of our enemies would be counteracted; otherwise let the whole collections of Tanjore be appropriated to the payment of the Carnatic army, my public and private debts, and the expulsion of our enemy. Tanjore is a Talook of the Carnatic, and let a share of it be assigned to my creditors, that they may be quieted and pacified in some degree, till my friends in England shall have done me justice, and let the Governor-general and Council, conformably to their justice and greatness, write about this matter, which is my right. The Governor-general and council have the administration of the affairs of India; if the inquiry into this matter depends on the gentlemen in Europe, it is for the general advantage that they should write about it. I am the friend of the Company; the great weight of debts, the mortgaging my jewels, and the sale of them, have brought on me a disgrace and distress, which the Company never meant to have come upon their old friend.

“ XI. Besides the expenses of the Company, the pay of my troops, the native bankers my creditors, the Hindoo and Mussulmen securities, I am indebted about seventy lacks of pagodas to European creditors, both old and new, and people living under the protection of the Company. When I reflect on the payment of such large sums, I am plunged into a

sea of distress. Except from the assistance of my friends, I can see no release from this heavy load, that having escaped from such anxiety might apply myself to the cultivation of the country, and the protection of the Ryots. I therefore beg your advice and sentiments on this point, which I request you to give in such a manner as no injury may arise to my concerns and reputation, no detriment to my creditors, and no loss to the Company.

“ A true Copy,

“ E. HAY, Act. Sec.”

*Replies from the Honorable the GOVERNOR-GENERAL and COUNCIL to the
Requests of his Highness the Nabob WALLAH JAH.*

“ A temporary treaty shall be made subject to the revision and approbation of the Company, and it is hoped that this may serve as the basis of another treaty, to be concluded under the orders and instructions of the Company, and even with the sanction of the English parliament, which may endure for ever, and rendered so binding, that it shall not be in the power of any individual to break it, or to depart from it.

“ II. The right and authority which the Nabob possesses over his country, his children, his family, his servants, and subjects, in all the political and domestic administration of his country, we will maintain and support.

“ III. Certainly.

“ IV. Both the pay of the troops, and their batta and contingent expenses, and even the repairs of the forts, if any repairs are necessary, ought undoubtedly to be charged to the Nabob's account, because these are expenses incurred for his own immediate service, and in the time of

war must depend upon the commander in chief of the forces under the customary regulations and restrictions. The remainder of this article is very proper; but it seems strange to us that a claim should be made of this kind, or any doubts implied concerning it.

“ V. The Nabob is the master of his own country, and the distributor of justice to his own subjects. This is so clear that it appears as if something more was meant than is expressed in the proposition.

“ VI. In whatever treaty shall be concluded between the Nabob and the Company, it will of course be stipulated that the friends or enemies of either party shall be held as equally the friends or enemies of the other, and their interests, their safety, and their danger the same. Such has been the implied condition of the alliance hitherto subsisting between the Nabob and the Company, although unsupported by any written engagements. Respecting the latter claim of this article, we are informed by Assam Cawn the Nabob's Dewan, that the Nabob possesses letters from the Company, and the King's minister, and the King himself on the subject of his will, and he has produced copies of those from the King and from the Company, which all express a clear acknowledgment of the Nabob's right to appoint a successor to the government of the Carnatic. It is therefore unnecessary, and would be unbecoming in this government to make any provision, even in a temporary treaty, for such an event, which we hope is far distant. Such acknowledgments are equivalent to treaties, and of the highest possible authority, and must be binding on all the servants of the Company, and on all the King's subjects.

“ VII. We are greatly afflicted that any occasion should have been afforded for such complaints as are stated in this article. They are no less repugnant to justice, than injurious to the English reputation. We are willing to engage on the part of the English Company, and of all their

dependants, that no one under their authority shall be permitted to lend money to any of the Nabob's subjects for the time to come. That it shall be prohibited in public orders; and it is equitable that if any person shall act contrary to this prohibition, or shall oppress the Ryots, the Nabob shall have a right to require his removal, and the Governor and Council of Madras shall be bound on such requisition to remove him, and to bring him to a public trial, that he may suffer such sentence as shall be due to the degree of the offence, if it be established against him. But as we conceive that it will be often difficult in cases of this nature to obtain such evidence of the facts, as the strict forms of our military laws shall require; and must in every case render the Nabob popularly obnoxious by standing forth, as he necessarily must, in the character of a prosecutor, against the servants of the Company, to whom he ought never to be known but by acts of benevolence; and as the appointment to military commands in his country is intended for his sole benefit, and the support of his government and interests, we proceed yet further to declare, that the Nabob has just claim to object to the appointment of any person of whom he shall disapprove to any command in his country, or to the continuance of any person in any such command, against whom he shall have cause of sufficient validity for his own conviction to object, and that in every such case the Governor and Council ought to conform to his objections. But the invariable application of this rule can only be admitted in a time of peace. In a state of actual war it might be productive of dangerous consequences, and the principle on which it is constructed must be therefore in such a season left to the equity of the Governor and Council, and the discretion of the Commander in Chief of the forces.

“ VIII. This is just. Let the Nabob consent and engage to assign all the revenues of his country during the war, without any exception, to the Company, for the actual support of the war. Let the collections and these assignments be made by his own Aumils in conjunction with persons appointed by the President and Council of Fort St. George, and invested

with an authority from him to receive from the Aumils all the money which shall be collected, and to intercept and seize all sums of money which the Aumils or others shall attempt to secrete from the districts under their jurisdiction; that the whole may be applied and exclusively appropriated to the service of the war, excepting such sums as the Nabob shall require to be paid immediately to himself for his own and the necessary disbursements of his country; that he will remove and punish such of his Aumils as shall attempt to elude this regulation; and that the persons abovementioned appointed to receive the revenues, as the pledge of their integrity, shall be required to swear that they will be true to the trust reposed in them, and that they will neither receive, nor permit to be taken, either directly or indirectly, any portion of the revenues, but such as they shall bring to a public account. That of such Talooks as have been assigned to the Nabob's creditors, the nett sums of the collections shall be received into the Company's treasury for the services of the war, as above provided, but carried to the credit of the collection head of the Nabob's creditors, to whom they have been assigned, to be hereafter distributed amongst them according to their respective claims. By this arrangement the resources of the Carnatic will be applied, as they ought to be, to its immediate defence and preservation; and the Nabob's faith and the rights of the creditors will be secured. And this is agreeable to the request which the creditors themselves have formally made.

“ IX. The recovery of the Carnatic from the hands of the enemy must be our first object; that of its dependencies will be the second; but it will rest upon our ability. It cannot be made a fixed article of a treaty. The purpose for which the proposed annexations of Curkapah and Zeer Ghaut Gutti, and the several Mahals in Balaghaut, which belong to Carnatic Payen-Ghaut, is professed to be intended, is equally necessary for the service of the Nabob and of the Company, and the future security of their common interests, and therefore must be equally the desire of both.

“ X. This government hath no authority to inquire into the reciprocal claims of the Nabob and the Rajah of Tanjore. They are before a higher and a competent tribunal. We can only require that as the Zemindary of Tanjore is a member of the Soubah or province of Carnatic, its resources shall in like manner be primarily, and at this time of common danger, be exclusively applied to the maintenance of the forces employed in the defence and preservation of the whole. That the revenues be taken in assignment, and put under a commission similar to that proposed for the rest of the Carnatic, and received and applied in the same manner, and for the same purposes. This requisition has been partly made, and shall be repeated in the above terms to the President and Council of Fort St. George. But it will rest with them to conform to it, or by rejecting it to take the responsibility of it upon themselves.

“ XI. Our advice is this, that a new adjustment be made of all the Nabob's debts, contracted with British subjects, without any distinction of old debts, of those of a more recent kind, called his consolidated debts, or of others newly contracted, but not yet brought to any public account or adjustment. That the interest upon the whole and upon each debt shall be allowed and added to the original debts to the 25th November 1781, and thenceforward shall cease. That from such debts as have been transferred from the original proprietors by purchase or otherwise, a deduction shall be made of 25 *per cent.* from the whole amount; and that the remainder be the sum for which the Nabob shall be finally debited. That the adjustment being made in this manner, the sum adjudged to be respectively due to each creditor shall be brought to his separate credit. That Company's bonds with the usual interest shall be granted to each who shall be entitled to a share in the sums received on account of the assigned revenues, in the proportion of his respective debt. And in like manner to the creditors, for advances made on the security of the public revenue for the sums brought to their account. And that it shall be left to the Nabob with the concurrence of the President and Council of Fort St. George,

and the sanction of the Governor-general and Council, to appropriate such a portion of the revenues after the conclusion of the war, or any period of it, which shall admit of such an application of them, as an assignment for the annual payment of the debt, until the whole shall be discharged. That this plan is recommended both to the Nabob, the President and Council of Fort St. George, and the creditors, and will be submitted to the Company, in the first advices to them from this presidency.

“ If an agreement shall take place according to the abovementioned plan, it will be necessary, both for the purpose of rendering it effectual and for preventing the like distresses from falling on the Nabob and individuals in future, that the Nabob shall solemnly engage that he will never hereafter borrow money from the Company's servants, or any other British subjects. That the most public notice shall be given, that no loans to the Nabob, or bonds accepted upon such loans, shall be valid, or the loans recoverable by any influence or interference of the Company or its representatives. And the Governor-general and Council will engage on their part for themselves, the Company, and their representatives, that no authority of the Company, or of the Presidency of Fort St. George, shall be employed for the recovery of any debts so contracted.

“ A true copy.

(Signed) “ E. HAY, Act. Sec.”

No. X.

Reply of the PRESIDENT and SELECT COMMITTEE of Fort St. George to the foregoing Letter of the GOVERNOR-GENERAL and COUNCIL, dated Fort St. George, September 8, 1781.

“ HON. SIR AND SIRS,

“ ON the 22d of last month we had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2d April last, inclosing a copy of requests made by the Nabob Wallaw Jaw to the Governor-general, with your replies to them; and also credentials to Richard Joseph Sullivan Esq. as your minister at his Highness's court, and the representative of your government. Your letter earnestly recommends to us to conform strictly to the agreement entered into on your part, and on the part of the Nabob, which, though not executed in the terms of a formal instrument, you look upon to have all the sanction, force, and validity of a treaty. No paper entitled or purporting to be an agreement, or appearing to have been executed by contracting parties, was included in or accompanied your letter, though your expression is that the agreement was not executed in the terms of a formal instrument. However as there is an additional clause of mutual acceptance in the copy of your replies, which has been transmitted by the Nabob to our President on the 29th past, we consider ourselves possessed of the outlines of your plan respecting his Highness.

“ The task of simple obedience to the commands of our superiors is not only a safe and easy but is a chearful one to us, who, far from finding our honor concerned in the possession of extensive or independent authority, place our pride in faithfully and zealously fulfilling, though not in exceeding, whatever trust may happen to have been reposed in us. In this disposition, we should feel ourselves lightened of no common burden,

if we had a certainty that our strict conformity to the agreement entered into by you with the Nabob of the Carnatic, (which you consider in the light of a treaty,) or to the plan of public arrangement, which it is also called, made by you with that Prince in the first instance, without any previous application from or concurrence of the Presidency of Madras, would free us from all responsibility in acknowledging their validity, or abiding by their contents. We find ourselves obliged by the dictates of duty, and of prudence, to restrain the inclination, which the habit of recurring to your superintending power in some instances agreeably to act of parliament, and our personal respect and esteem for the Governor-general and other members of your board, on all occasions have naturally excited in our minds to yield implicitly to every direction we receive from you. But having accepted the employments in which we are now engaged, we are not to call in doubt the wisdom of our masters in the limitation of the authorities they have delegated to their respective servants. The extension of power beyond the bounds prescribed by them, in whatever part of their possessions, must be equally contrary to the system of their establishment. And they who subscribe to the exercise of authority in contradiction to this system would be condemned for being ignorant and incapable, as well as negligent of their duty. We have, in search of our own justification for acknowledging your right to make an agreement with the Nabob of the Carnatic, gone through a careful perusal of such of the public records, as contain the sentiments of our employers on the subject of alliances or connections with the Princes of India. We find that the Company, desirous, at all times, to restrain its principal views to commercial objects, for which it was originally instituted, has repeatedly recommended to its servants, to avoid entering into the political pursuits, or intrigues of the Princes of India; and considered "a rage for negotiations, treaties, and alliances to have private advantage more for its object than the public good." The Court of Directors therefore, previously to the act of parliament establishing your government, never delegated the general power of making treaties in India, to its servants in

any one settlement ; but confined the intercourse of its several presidencies with the country powers, to those in their respective neighbourhood, the instructions from the Company to each separate presidency, particularly pointing out the line of conduct which was to be pursued towards those Princes with whom it was from situation inevitably connected. This precaution appeared to them to become the more essential after the period took place, when, notwithstanding the use of the Mogul's name in all transactions throughout India, as well as the coin of our own mints, and the existence of Nabobs in every province, the English Presidencies of Fort William and Fort St. George were directed, and really had an inspection over the general administration of the countries respectively adjoining to them. Before the controlling power given by parliament to your Board, as well as since, it would have been thought a most unwarranted and preposterous interference in the government of Bombay or of Madras, to propose any treaty or arrangement with the northern Nabobs of Bengal or Oude ; and we must admit it as a fact, that the President and Council of Fort William before that period had not attempted to negotiate, either with the distant Nabob of Arcot or Rajah of Tanjore. The political views and conduct of those southern Princes and the general government of their territories, without meddling in the detail of their administration, form indeed a great part of the instructions, from the Court of Directors, to the Presidency and Council of Fort St. George. Those countries are either by express words, or by implication, constantly included within the limits prescribed to the authority of the Madras Presidency ; and their forts are garrisoned by troops under its sole and immediate command. The Nabob of Arcot and the Rajah of Tanjore, who owe their possessions to the arms of the Company, are almost in every letter directed to be kept dependent on its protection. Alarm is taken at any intelligence of either of them aiming at independence. The President and Council of Madras are particularly and alone commanded to frustrate every such attempt. Before the establishment of your Board by the Legislature of Great Britain, the power of making treaties and arrangements, and even

of controlling the Nabob Waulaw Jaw in certain cases, thus seems to have been originally vested in this Presidency. Not able to trace, in the gradual institutions of the different Presidencies, or in the subsequent orders of the Company, or in the history of their transactions, any ground for authorizing us to acknowledge the power of the government of Bengal to treat with the Princes of the Carnatic, we have anxiously sought for it in the act of the British parliament establishing regulations for the better management of the affairs of the East India Company. In this act, however, we cannot find any new and positive authority to the Governor-general and Council to make treaties directly and immediately with Indian Princes. It does not take away; but it does not extend the power which, under the instructions of the Company, the Presidency of Fort William had hitherto enjoyed of forming alliances. The additional authority delegated by law in this respect, we must confess, appears, as far as the expression extends, to be merely negative. “Without its consent and approbation first had
“and obtained, the other Presidencies cannot legally make any orders for
“commencing hostilities, or declaring, or making war against any Indian
“princes or powers, or for negotiating or concluding any treaty of peace,
“or other treaty with any such Indian princes or powers, except in such
“cases of imminent necessity as would render it dangerous to postpone
“such hostilities or treaties, until the orders from the Governor-general
“and Council might arrive; and except in such cases, when the said
“Presidents and Councils respectively shall have received special orders
“from the Company.” This negative power established somewhere was indeed absolutely requisite for the preservation of a consistent system in the treaties to be formed by the different Presidencies with the different Princes of India. It is possible that a desire of adhering to this principle of consistency may have prevented the extension of your power to form alliances with those Princes whose situation and affairs connect them with the other Presidencies, lest in the cases, provided by the act of imminent necessity, or of special orders from the Company, the treaties thus entered into by those other Presidencies with their respective neighbours without

your knowledge or concurrence might be defeated by those you might have contracted with them, had you the authority of immediately and directly treating with all the powers of India indiscriminately.

“ To this important and remedial law we think ought to be given the most liberal and extensive, but a just and candid construction. We hold that it virtually gives the lead and supereminence to your Board in all general transactions ; and ought to be considered as having, though it has not literally, committed to you the exclusive charge of arranging the great line of policy with those sovereigns who are really and totally independent of any of our governments. If however this controlling power, which is wisely entrusted to your Board residing at Fort William, had been transferred to another Board, consisting of the same persons established at Bombay, and even expressly empowered to treat directly with all Indian Princes, yet an attempt on its part to form arrangements with the hereditary Princes, still governing considerable territories in the provinces of Bengal or Bahar, without the knowledge or concurrence of the Presidency at Calcutta on whom those Princes depend, would be considered as a misapprehension of the meaning, and an abuse of the authority of the legislature. It would be equally improper to meddle in the concerns of the hereditary Rajahs of the Circars, dependent on the Presidency of Madras. We do not apply this reasoning to the Nabob Walaw Jaw, who, notwithstanding the express commands to prevent his independence, notwithstanding the double or divided government which has in consequence subsisted in the Carnatic, still claims, and enjoys superior privilege. But we must be guided in our determinations upon this subject by the instructions of our honorable employers. In their letter of the 18th of last October, after delivering their opinion on the plans proposed for remedying the defects in the present system on the coast, “ They direct “ this Presidency,” to negotiate the business with the Nabob, “ and express the continuance of their hope that his Highness may,” in concert with us, forthwith establish certain resources, “ and heartily join us in

“ the most powerful exertions, and make such speedy and judicious
“ arrangements as shall appear proper and satisfactory to us. But if that
“ Prince should finally refuse his consent to arrangements which equally
“ involve his welfare and the safety of their property in one common
“ cause,” they then desire us to apply to you who, *in such case*, are
empowered to furnish us with instructions how to proceed.

“ These positive directions appear to mark the precise boundaries of the
authority confided respectively in this Presidency and in your superintend-
ing Board. We are bound not only by the general instructions founded
on the nature of our situation and the connection of our affairs; but also
by the special orders of the Company to be the actors in the negotiation
and arrangement with the Nabob. If we fail in accomplishing our pur-
poses we are to apply to you for instructions how to proceed for securing
their accomplishment. Then commences your power, which consists,
not in acting yourselves, but in instructing us how we shall act. We
apprehend that the duty of acting, when we are ordered to act, is as obli-
gatory upon us as a forbearance from what we are prohibited to attempt.
Were we to pretend that we were sheltered under the authority of your
immediate interference, your own words might be brought to convict us
of a wilful perversion of the Company's instructions. In your letter of
the 26th February 1781, on the subject of the Nabob of the Carnatic,
you tell us, that in your opinion we had a claim of right to assistance
from him; you tell us, that the present case would certainly justify us in
demanding from him the immediate transfer of his whole country in ex-
clusive assignment for the expenses of the war; you earnestly advise our
adoption of this measure, and you add, *that had you the authority to com-
mand, you should peremptorily command it*. After this strong and solemn de-
claration we fear that we should find no excuse, in considering the commu-
nication of the sentiments you held, in regard to the Nabob on the 2d
April, in any other light than that of those others which you held con-
cerning him on the 26th February preceding, which is simply as your:

earnest advice ; and that we should not be justified in supposing that the term recommendation which you use in the letter we now answer, ought to be understood as a method of conveying your commands for that purpose. A strict conformity to your wishes has the less chance of freeing us from a responsibility of the measures we adopt, that we cannot deny the latitude you have not only allowed, but commended in the use of our own discretion, on subjects even where your expressions had been peremptory ; as in the case of the regular treaty executed by you in January last, for ceding to the Dutch the southern provinces of the Carnatic, in return for a loan of troops against Hyder Ally : You have, with a candor that must reflect the truest honor on your proceedings, declared, in a second letter, of the 2d of April, from your Board, that you were *pleased* at our *rejection* of that treaty. And we doubt not but you will be equally satisfied with any solid objections offered to you against similar proposals.

“ The result of our investigation is doubly painful to us, as it has strengthened our doubts concerning the power exercised by you on the present occasion ; and as it consequently forces us, not merely to obey, but previously to examine, and only if we approve, to conform to the plan of arrangements you have made with the agents of the Nabob. This plan we must suppose contained in your replies to the Nabob's requests, being the only paper which you have communicated to us expressive of your sentiments. Its name and nature show that it must bear relation to the paper to which, very properly, it is a polite and respectful answer, and must in some degree partake of its qualities. Both are somewhat general and diffuse as all primary discussions must be, though they are meant to lead afterwards to terms more precise and definitive. The first request is for the firm establishment of such a treaty between the Nabob and you as shall last for ever, and be subject to no deviation. Though you look upon these replies to have all the sanction, force, and validity of a treaty, yet you promise that a temporary treaty *shall be* made,

which you hope may serve as a basis of another treaty such as he desires ; but as neither of these is directed to be made by us, we avoid the pain of observing on this sort of triple alliance, in contradiction to those maxims, by the pursuit of which we have kept in the strictest friendship with his Highness for near thirty years, without the intervention or assistance of a single article of agreement ever executed between us, exclusively of other powers. To the assertion of the Nabob, that he is hereditary Prince of the Carnatic and independent of every one, and that he has entire right over the same, and to his desire that his friends should not interfere in the political and domestic administration of his country, as you reply simply that you will maintain his rights without agreeing to his assertions of what they are, or complying with his desire of not interfering with his government ; we have only to observe, you have avoided a discussion that might prove disagreeable to his Highness, and left us on those points to our own discretion. To the assurances he gives himself that the Company and English nation being the protectors of his honor and government, will act on those points only where the advancement of his interests is concerned, you in one word *certainly* accede. As this article alludes to an interference in the administration which, in some points, it seems to allow, we wish to have those points ascertained, or to be informed who shall be judges of them, and what restriction those words are really meant to convey.

“ That part of the fourth article, in which he requests that the marches of the troops should be by his consent, and that in time of peace the Governor and Council should assist him with ten battalions, to enable him to settle the country subject to him, you shortly declare to be very proper. We must however observe, that the command and disposition of the troops depending on their marches have ever been held with a most jealous eye by our honorable employers, who have ever constantly persisted in denying to the Nabob even the satisfaction of calling those ten battalions by the name of *his troops*, lest even so trifling a circumstance

should have the chance of giving him any kind of influence over them. What is meant by a demand of the assistance of those ten battalions for settling his country, we wish to know, before we form any judgment of its propriety. We know not how troops can be properly said to contribute to the settlement of a country. If it be meant that he should have the Company's forces to enable him to punish or extirpate any of his tributaries, and if it be proper to lend our forces for such a purpose, should we not plainly say so, without reserve or ambiguity? If the Nabob is to be assisted only in certain cases, and on certain conditions, those cases and conditions should have been precisely ascertained and fixed, in *that* article which is to be as valid as a treaty, without which it is impossible to know whether its intent be followed or neglected; and without which it is a form, without substance or effect. If it were meant that he should always be assisted on his simple requisition, it is not impossible but he might soon require what he has hitherto in vain solicited from the Court of Directors, the means of attacking contrary to their express commands, those principal tributary Rajahs who claim and depend upon the protection both of the Crown and of the Company. If it be intended to leave to the discretion of the President and Council of Madras, in what instances the Nabob is to have the assistance of our troops, there appears not much occasion for a clause compelling men to do what they shall think proper to be done; but the misfortune of such a clause is, that it is apt to establish in the minds of such of the contracting parties whom it seems to favor, a sort of claim which, being undefined, is measured only by the wishes of the claimant. These observations may apply in some degree to the subsequent article concerning the refractory Polygars.

“ The sixth reply, as far as it foresees the stipulations of a future treaty, to take place under the immediate sanction of the Company, commands our respect, but can be no object of discussion at this Board. We hope also that the succession to the Carnatic is an event so distant that we may safely postpone the consideration of it. We must however ob-

serve that nothing has been found upon our records to confirm the information you mention to have received from Assam-Cawn, implying an acknowledgment of the Nabob's right to appoint a successor to his government. We possess the copy of a letter from his Majesty simply expressive, as to this subject, of his receipt of the Nabob's will, and of his royal promise, that the same shall be preserved as a sacred deposit till his Highness's decease. Another copy of the will has been entrusted to this Presidency, to be kept unopened during the testator's life. But we have not been able to trace any recognition of his right to dispose of the Carnatic, nor any other order on the subject, except an instruction from the Company, "to secure to his Highness's children the government of the Carnatic in a just and lineal succession, according to the phermaund from the Emperor, Shau Allum, and the treaty of 1768, between the Company, the Soubah of the Decan, and the Nabob;" any choice made by the Nabob, though indifferent in itself, in a political light might be productive of confusion, if it should happen to clash with the line of succession abovementioned. After those plain and positive commands we must suppose some mistake in the copies, or some misapprehension of the meaning of papers presented to you, inferring that the appointment of a successor to the Carnatic is entirely open to his Highness.

"The complaints stated in the seventh article, which we understand are in many instances well founded, are a disgrace to the Government which has suffered them to continue. It will require a strict and steady hand to prevent a conduct of which the habit and frequency seem to have deadened the sense of its impropriety among many of the military, as well as civil, servants of the Company. The crime of disobedience superadded in this instance to the baseness of usury, ought to be publicly and positively reprobated; wherever by legal evidence it could be brought home to the officer or paymaster, the punishment, no doubt, should be exemplary: he should not have the subterfuge of ascribing his disgrace to the caprice,

displeasure, or political views of the Nabob. His Highness might render himself perhaps as much obnoxious by procuring the removal of men from profitable situations on reasons for objecting to them confined to his own conviction, as by the allowance of proofs, to satisfy the world that they were really not worthy of being continued in such trusts. He would never have occasion to step forward as actual prosecutor: that office would fall to the charge of some of his principal ministers or servants, as it falls in England to the Attorney-general; nor does it appear essential to be more tender in committing the character of the Nabob than that of our own sovereign. We find that the acts of benevolence, by which only you think his Highness should be known to the servants of the Company, if exerted in gratuities, *whether pecuniary or otherwise*, are utterly disapproved by the Directors of the Company. The consequence of such benevolence having been thought pernicious to the service, and the strictest covenants exacted from the servants of every denomination to prevent its continuance. Declarations such as these, which bear a meaning subversive of the orders and opinions of the Company, corroborated by our other observations on your replies, contribute to persuade us, that proper and becoming as they may have been thought, and necessary even as they may have been found, in the light of preparatory discourses, to soften, and gradually lead the Nabob's mind to a further acquiescence with the real and just intentions of your government, it would not be fair to consider them as forming part of the strict and serious covenants of a treaty, or as doctrines to become operative upon our conduct. We can in this view easily account for your assurance to the Nabob, that the appointment to military command in the Carnatic is intended for his sole benefit; such assertions may be supposed to have their use, and can be inconvenient only when construed literally, and made a ground for consequences or claims which the public interest will not allow.

“ Thus it appears to us, that it might be of dangerous tendency, and what guides us much more than our own opinion, it is absolutely contrary

to the views and instructions of the Court of Directors, to suffer the Nabob to possess any degree of influence over our army. The obligation, however, which you conclude from the above declaration, ought to be imposed upon the Presidency of Madras to conform to the desire of the Nabob in the removal of officers from their commands, would necessarily give such influence to his Highness. It is the intention of the Company that the disposal of their officers and troops should remain in time of peace as well as war, with the President and Council, to whom, among other matters, they have delegated that high trust. It is their duty to remove all officers on reasonable grounds, and to be attentive to the objections, and even to the wishes of the Nabob in this and in every other respect. But the ultimate decision and determination must be in the Company itself, through the medium of its servants residing on the spot.

“ Your eighth reply contains a plan concerning the finances of the Carnatic, different from the earnest advice you had been pleased to give us on this subject in your letter of the 26th of February last. This first advice coming with all the weight of your wisdom and experience, and confirmed by our own immediate observations, had taken such possession of our minds, that we with repugnance resolve on giving a preference to your latter over your former opinion.

“ The plan of collecting the revenues by the Nabob's own Aumils in conjunction with persons appointed by the Presidency of Madras, has been already tried in the province of Trichinopoly : and has answered no other purpose than that of giving rise to mutual complaints, altercations and suspicions between the Nabob's and the Company's servants. The latter do not hesitate to declare that the public orders given by his Highness are either not sufficiently decisive, or are so counteracted or evaded as to be rendered ineffectual for the collection of the revenue : while the Aumils impute the deficiencies to the interference of the Company's receivers. It is obvious that if a successful collection of the revenue depended,

upon the exertion and authority of the Nabob, and that his Highness had been sincerely disposed to let the Company have them to defray the expenses of the war, those revenues might have been thrown into the Company's treasury immediately from his Highness's officers without the intervention of our receivers. Whether the total failure which has happened in this respect be owing to the want of inclination, power, or skilful management on the part of his Highness, the fact equally proves the necessity of using other means than those which have hitherto proved to be ineffectual. It appears in a statement delivered to us by the accountant of this presidency that the Nabob is now in arrears to the Company upwards of twenty lacks of pagodas, and since the commencement of hostilities has scarcely furnished any thing towards the maintenance of the war. The revenues to be recovered during the troubles can indeed at any rate bear only a small proportion to the expenses they occasion: Yet the assignment you now propose under the authority of his Highness for the reimbursement of those expenses is to terminate with the war, during which they cannot be reimbursed. The immediate transfer of his country, which in your former letter you had considered as justified in demanding from the Nabob, in exclusive assignment for the expenses of the war, would no doubt afford a more simple, certain and expeditious method of retrieving the finances of the Carnatic from the disorder into which, by public and private debts, to the amount of about one hundred lack of pagados, they are plunged to such a degree at last, that no weaker remedy has a certainty of being effectual. However, though it does not depend upon our will to adopt your present sentiments on this occasion, we can adapt our conduct to them, and shall endeavor, by the means, and in the manner you now propose to effectuate objects, in the accomplishment of which the Company, the Nabob, and most of the individuals of this settlement, are essentially interested. We join with you in thinking that the territory of Tanjore is not in circumstances so dissimilar from those of the rest of the Carnatic, as to prevent us from attempting to

try the same methods throughout the whole as far as the arms of the enemy will admit.

“ The reply to the Nabob’s request concerning his creditors, which you give in the name and language of an advice to his Highness, can scarcely be thought included in any treaty to which those creditors are not made parties. We do not foresee how far they all will relish the loss of interest after the 25th November next, or how far the assignees of the original creditors will be reconciled to the loss of *25 per cent.* of the principal due to them; or how far the old creditors of the Nabob, whose case is thought by many to stand on stronger ground than the others, may consider themselves, or be considered by the Company, as injured by losing the preference in the discharge of their demands to which they esteem themselves entitled. But we hold it a matter of very serious deliberation to subject the Company to the payment of any large sums by the execution of bonds in its name, on account of the assignment of lands to the creditors, as it may not perhaps be thought entirely consistent with our duty to suffer the discharge of any private debts out of the revenues of the Carnatic, till those of the Company shall have first been liquidated; we feel ourselves indeed inclined to go every length which our duty will permit in the settlement of those demands, not only on account of the hardships suffered by individuals, but from our desire of removing the anxiety we are sensible the continuance of them has given to the just mind of his Highness. So ancient and so valuable a friend of the Company and the English nation, merits every effort that we can make for enabling him to pass the remainder of his life with happiness and honor. These are matters on which we should wish, if possible, to have special instructions from our honorable employers: perfectly satisfied and happy to receive them from your Board, as far as we are authorized to abide by them in these instances.

“ The attentive consideration which we have given to your replies has arisen not only from the respect with which we shall ever regard all your

proceedings; but also from our desire to find our duty and our inclination equally concur in the adoption of them: for we think it will redound to our particular credit, as well as to the benefit of the Company, that a perfect union of sentiments, as well as of conduct, should subsist between us. It shall never be broken by any instructions you will please to send us; if, in some instances we cannot consider them as commands, we shall be thankful for them as most respectable advice; and where we deviate from you in opinion, we shall hope to account for our own, in such a manner, as will either reconcile you to our determination, or induce you to point out to us our mistakes. We shall, in every part of our conduct, endeavor to remove whatever impression your immediate interposition in the business of this coast may have left upon the public, of your dissatisfaction or disunion with us. But we cannot answer for the consequences which may arise from the intervention of any other person exerting your authority, or interfering with our duty. We have already dwelt with pain on facts and observations which concur in throwing upon us exclusively the charge of immediately making with the Nabob of the Carnatic all treaties and arrangements, in the formation of which, in certain cases, we are entitled to apply for the benefit of your instructions how we shall proceed. The power of deputing ministers to foreign Princes is not expressly granted either by law or charter to any of the Presidencies: it is incident to the right of forming alliances with such Princes, and can subsist only where the other can be exercised. The Company has indeed always been particularly careful to admit of no intercourse between the Nabob and any of its servants but through the Governor of Madras, and has even requested his Highness to communicate his intention to the Court of Directors through no other channel. The presidency of Madras is the only minister from the Company to the Nabob who resides in the seat of our government; and what we have already quoted of the Director's letter of the 18th October 1780, seems to indicate that you, gentlemen, cannot have any other, for you are not empowered to be otherwise connected with the Nabob than by instructing us how to proceed toward him, when in our difficulties we

shall apply to you for that purpose. As they who cannot themselves negotiate cannot appoint a minister to negotiate ; so the representatives of power, as you are of that of the East India Company, in several instances, cannot delegate their representation, without a special clause of substitution, which is not to be discovered either in the act of parliament, or the commission or intructions of the Company. We must continue therefore to give you the trouble of addressing ourselves to you immediately for your consent and approbation, or for your instructions in the respective cases where we are authorized to apply to you for either of them. Though the credentials you have granted include the terms of representative and minister as distinct offices, we should have thought ourselves liable to the suspicion of searching for objections in considering them otherwise than as synonymous expressions, but that in the purposes you declare to have in view, you add, to that of maintaining your treaty with the Nabob, an interposition in your name and in the character of Representative of your Government, with the President and Council, or Select Committee of Fort St. George. A minister in a foreign state, though he represents his own sovereign, carries with him no power of interference, because his constituents would not, on the spot, be possessed of any. But a new representation of government within its own limits, destroys at once every previous deputation. The more completely you are vested by the British legislature with the authority of the East India Company over us, the more necessarily a transfer of that authority to, or representation of it by, a person residing on the spot (if the same could legally be done) would become a substitution of that person in the place all those who now are charged with the immediate administration of the Presidency. In fact, as your minister and representative is to secure you against any interruption of your plan of public arrangement that might be attempted from secondary private consideration, or the interference of individuals, and is empowered (distinctly from the business of representation to the Nabob and Presidency) to maintain the faith of your government in the agreement concluded with his Highness ; it carries the ap-

pearance of its being really meant, that he should, when occasion offered, exercise executive authority. Pretences at least could scarcely fail of presenting themselves to do so. At any rate the division and distraction of government by the existence of representatives of the Court of Directors, and the representatives of the Governor-general and Council, residing at once in the same Presidency, and independent of each other, are likely to be productive of evils which cannot with certainty be avoided otherwise than by a removal of one or other of those deputed powers.

“ As neither our President nor any other member of the present Select Committee of Madras, were in the temporary administration, which subsisted here on the 2d April last, when you thought it necessary to withdraw your confidence from that Board, we cannot feel ourselves hurt at the preference you gave, on that particular occasion, to an individual for maintaining the faith of your government; but we do not hesitate to expect your candid concurrence with our opinion, that the governing members of this Presidency appointed, after mature and solemn deliberation, by the Company, charged with their interests, and vested with their authority on the coasts of Coromandel and Orixá, have a claim for your exclusive confidence, in the endeavors to be pursued here for the Company's welfare.

“ Your late appointment being the first of the kind to Fort St. George, since the establishment of your superintending power, is to be considered only as an extraordinary deviation from your general conduct, and which, when made, you no doubt thought warranted by the necessity of the occasion. It would have been however particularly desirable that the effect had ceased with the cause that had produced it, because the object of your choice on this occasion, though in other respects a gentleman of much merit, might be thought to have incurred a breach of trust to the Company.

“ Mr. Richard Joseph Sullivan at the very time that he was confidential secretary to the Select Committee of this Presidency, and consequently possessed of all the views and secrets of the Company as far as relate to this government, privately entered into the service of the Nabob, with whom, by the orders of the Court of Directors, none of the Company's servants are allowed to have any communication without a permission from the President. He undertook his Highness's plan of independence so reprobated by the Company, as well as of those other projects contained in his requests, with which you have either positively refused, or have simply declined complying. If he acknowledged himself to your Board to have been secretary to this Committee, you must have either supposed that he had resigned that office before his acceptance of a charge from another master, or that he had the permission of his superiors for holding both. The fact is however otherwise; and your letter was the first intimation to the Committee of Mr. Sullivan's commission from the Nabob. The resignation of his office at the Board was subsequent to your nomination of him as your representative. The acceptance of an office on another establishment, without the approbation of the Board, in whose service he continued, was thought a sufficient ground by the members of it at that time, for coming to a resolution of calling upon him on his arrival here to justify his conduct. We however do not wish to treat him with harshness, and though our lenity may possibly be considered as injurious to the discipline of the service, yet, from respect to your partiality for him, from respect to the name he bears, and from a willingness to believe that he has erred rather through levity than ill intention, we yet forbear to punish him for his misconduct, and we trust that so signal an instance of our moderation will be a most convincing proof of our sincere desire to cultivate and maintain the most perfect harmony and good correspondence with you.

“ Our President indeed thought that even the appearance of any interruption of this disposition was an evil, if possible, to be avoided. He

therefore wished that the whole of this proceeding, new and intricate in its nature, and applying by the change, which has lately happened in this government, to circumstances different perhaps in your estimation from those which impelled you to the measure, should remain suspended, until he should learn through the Governor-general, in their private confidential communications, whether your Board would still think it necessary to pursue the whole of their plan; but it has been announced with such ceremonies of solemn and public notoriety, that the alternative of silence was no longer in our power: we have therefore, in our observations on the contents of your dispatches, ventured to discharge our minds freely to you, trusting to your candor and justice that the most liberal interpretation will be given to what we mean as a liberal communication of our sentiments. It arises from what we conceive to be the absolute duty of our station, and from our attachment to the service in which we are engaged. We have sedulously avoided all general reasoning upon the probable expediency or consequences of public measures; confining ourselves to those objects which called for our immediate determination. We mistrust our own opinions, aware that probabilities are but uncertainties, that all possible does not become actual evil, and so averse to all spirit of altercation or contention, that should your resolutions remain unchanged by our representations, we are perfectly inclined to subscribe to them. For we are sensible that public business can be carried on with success by the concurrence of such persons only, as are disposed to communicate fully and frankly their judgment of circumstances as they arise, but are equally ready to acquiesce in, and act according to the more enlightened decision of their superiors or colleagues.

“ We have the honor to be with high esteem and respect,

“ Honorable Sir and Sirs,

“ Your most obedient and most humble servants,

(Signed)

“ MACARTNEY.

“ ANTH. SADLER.

“ MR. WILLIAMS.”

No. XI.

Letter from WARREN HASTINGS Esq. to LORD MACARTNEY on the Subject of a Treaty with the Nabob, dated on the River Ganges near Bangulpoor, 23d July 1781.

“ MY LORD,

“ **I**N the letter, which I have already had the honor to address to your Lordship, I expressed my regret that I had not known of your appointment in time, to have furnished you with explanations on some particular points, of which I expect that an advantage will have been taken to prejudice your mind with injurious and dangerous opinions of the designs of this government with relation to yours. From the candor which your Lordship appears to possess, I have no doubt that I should have found it an easy point to satisfy you of the propriety and fairness of our acts, and even of their necessity. But as it has happened, you will have taken your line, and any thing which I can write upon past subjects may arrive too late to produce their effect. I feel the discouragement of this reflection, but shall not yield to it, trusting that you will have had the caution, under whatever impression, to avoid so decided a conduct as may disable you from yielding to the influence of better information, or (which I rather expect) that you will have at once resolved to adopt our principles, and heartily to support and carry the measures formed upon them into effect.

“ Let me premise that our government has a weight of business of its own already as great as it can sustain, and a responsibility sufficiently hazardous and delicate in itself to make it dread any addition to it; and my Lord, I fancy that you have found the affairs of the Carnatic in a state which could afford little temptation to us, were we ever so vacant of employment, to assume a participation in the conduct and events of

its administration. This may serve for a general proof, that it was not from choice that we have in any instance interfered in the concerns of that province, or of your presidency. I desire your Lordship to look back on the transactions of the last twelve months, and weigh by your own judgment the many things that we have done for the relief and preservation of Fort St. George. That which was undeniably good has been accepted as a rightful claim. The rest, as I am told, either treated with derision, or resented as injurious. I allude particularly to the treaty proposed with the Dutch, a measure extorted by the cries of despair, and judged in the elation of a sudden return of success; and to the agreement lately concluded with the Nabob Waulau Jah. To this I shall confine the sequel of this letter.

“The letters from the President and Select Committee of Fort St. George from the beginning of the war with Hyder, had invariably represented the resources of the Carnatic as lost beyond all hope to them, either from the Nabob’s inability to collect them, or his determination to withhold them. We expressed it as our firm opinion that every rupee of the Carnatic ought to be primarily and exclusively applied to its defence; that as our force alone maintained it, we had a right to demand assignments of the whole revenue, and even to take it, if refused. In the mean time they had made the demand, and the Nabob had refused it; but the demand and refusal were in one instance so mysterious that we could not comprehend the latent causes of either. The Circars of Ongale, &c. had been assigned to the Nabob’s private creditors, but as they had gained nothing by the assignment, they proposed to transfer it to the Company on the condition that credit should be given them in the Company’s name for the receipts, that these might be employed in the mean time for the expences of the war. The Committee demanded the assignment, but took no notice of the condition; and the Nabob naturally refused it, because he had already granted it to his creditors; and with this state of the case, both parties referred it to us, the creditors remonstrating against the mode in which the demand was made as subjecting

the Nabob to a rejection of it, by which all parties must be losers; and the Committee stating it as a confirmed Proof of the Nabob's disaffection.

“ At the same time the Nabob's Dewan Assam Cawn and Mr. Richard Sullivan arrived in Calcutta, charged with a special commission from the Nabob to conclude a treaty with this government, of which the first condition, and the first apparent object of their deputation, was, that we would accept an assignment of his revenues, and employ them on the public service: and this condition was not offered for our benefit, but solicited, as if his interest alone was likely to be promoted by our assent to it.

“ This was the foundation of the agreement; and as it promised a most seasonable relief to the Carnatic, which we could not easily afford, having already exhausted both our resources and credit in that and other emergent occasions of the Company's affairs; we readily and gladly accepted the offer, guarding it with such provisions as appeared to us necessary to prevent its being defeated, or perverted to other purposes. Your Lordship will not ask why we thought our intervention on this occasion necessary, and why we did not rather refer the accommodation to the Presidency of Fort St. George, which was the regular instrument of the Company's participation in the government of the Carnatic: but I will suppose the question. I might properly answer it by another. Why did the Company withdraw their confidence from the same ministry to bestow it on your Lordship? and after all what have we done? For others every thing; for ourselves nothing—unless it be supposed that we rescued the Nabob from the thraldom in which he was held by others, to exercise the same lucrative species of oppression on him ourselves; an imputation which I know will be suggested, and the world will be ready to give it credit; but which, I should abhor myself, if I thought that any man who knew me would admit, but with a moment's hesitation. Had I known that a man of your Lordship's character had been chosen to administer

the affairs of that government, I believe that I should have persuaded the Nabob to trust his interests in your hands, rather than make such a separation of them from their ancient and more natural connection; and from the moderation of Mr. Wheler's disposition I think he would have agreed with me in that preferable accommodation. But as it has been made an act of this government, and its faith pledged in the most sacred manner to the performance of it, it can neither be revoked nor qualified; and I most earnestly conjure your Lordship to give it your firm and hearty support.

“ The principal articles of this agreement are the 8th, 10th, 11th, and 12th: On these I shall offer a few remarks.

“ To render the mode of collection prescribed in the 8th and 10th articles effectual, I would recommend that the commissioners be allowed a commission or percentage, and a liberal one, upon the sums which they shall realize, and no fixed appointments. It is the principle which we have lately adopted, and have applied to every great department of our own government, and I will venture to answer for its complete success, if you will make the trial of it. If you trust to the integrity of those whom you charge with the unchecked receipts of lacks, and allow them such ostensible salaries as will afford them the bare means of subsistence, they will make up the deficiency by secret perquisites; to which no man ever yet set due bounds. The consequence is inevitable, especially in this remote quarter of the world, where men must look to a competency for their latter days. The commission will be an incitement to exertion, and will be a tie on the honor and fidelity of those who receive it; for I am persuaded that the generality of the Company's servants would be better contented with a moderate but sure provision by such allowed means, than to be let loose on an unbounded scene of plunder, which must be a source of perpetual reproach and apprehension for the consequences of detection. I beg your Lordship to receive this not as a light recommendation. It is a favorite doctrine, confirmed by many years reflection and

experience, although it is but lately that I have had it in my power to apply it. I believe that the same sentiments will appear recorded by myself on your consultations even at so distant a period as the year 1771.

“ I can say little upon the subject of Tanjore ; for I can hardly allow it the credit of a serious argument. The meanness of our first settlers dignified the Rajah with title of King, and by that misnomer, if I may call it so, he has acquired all the prerogatives of royalty, though the Nabob, his undoubted sovereign, has been, without scruple, treated as a dependant. If these ridiculous prejudices are allowed to operate against every principle of justice and policy, and, I must add, of common sense, it is a pity that they could not be confined to the season of peace and security. Surely this is not a time to encourage or yield to the delusion. The late President and Select Committee informed us, that the Rajah had refused to contribute a store of grain to the subsistence of the army ; for which the President had written to him a letter expressive of his displeasure. This is a language so remote from my conceptions of the actual and absolute rights of your government, while it is charged with the entire defence of the state, of which the Rajah of Tanjore is a member ; and of his dependance ; that I can scarce offer an opinion which shall not appear extravagant in the comparison.—In a word, I think it improper at such a time to leave the Rajah an option to withhold a grain of his store, or a rupee of his treasury, from the service of the general state ; and most heartily advise that, while that service, in the present desperate condition of it, lasts, the whole with the single reservation of his own personal subsistence be taken out of his hands, in better trust for the public use. These are my public not private sentiments, and your Lordship is welcome to avail yourself of them in any manner you please. Most heartily do I wish that they may be conformable to your own.

“ The Nabob's debt to individuals is become an object of too great magnitude and extent to be treated on the principles on which it might

have been proper to judge it, in its commencement, as it is grown into a kind of national property, and the fortunes of so many are concerned in it, that it will force itself upon the protection of the public, if some lenient expedient be not found to put the claims of the creditors on some footing on which they can rely for their recovery.

“ At the same time if they are allowed to grow with the yearly accumulation of the present interest, or even the principal to remain at its actual amount, the manifest impossibility of its being ever discharged, or even diminished, will be a discouragement to every attempt to effect either.

“ It was with an equal regard to these united considerations that we recommended the plan of adjustment and liquidation, which is described in the 11th article of the agreement. Mr. Richard Sullivan, who professed to know the sentiments of the creditors, assured me, that instead of repining at the retrenchments which we have proposed, they would be thankful for the provision which was left them, having had little ground to hope for any payment. I express my hopes upon this subject with the greater confidence of their meeting your judgment, from a communication which has been lately made me by Mr. Stephen Sullivan, of a letter written by his father to your Lordship, in which he recommends a plan for the liquidation of the Nabob's debts on exactly the same principles as that of ours; but differing in the application only by the difference which was rendered necessary by the alteration made in the state of affairs since his letter was written.

“ The reason of the 12th article is self-evident: it may also appear unnecessary, for surely the past experience of the insecurity of the Nabob's credit would be sufficient of itself to prevent any one hereafter from trusting to it. But this will be forgotten when the danger is past, and even the remedy will be a lure to new adventurers.

“ I shall not make excuses for the length of this letter. It will cost your Lordship less time to read it than I have spent in writing it, and you will receive it as a proof of the value which I set on your Lordship's concurrence in my line of thinking, by the pains which I have taken to gain it. You will have heard that I have subjected myself to reproach for the deficiencies of my private correspondence; and as much as I wish to avoid that imputation with your Lordship, I am affraid that occasions will happen to draw it upon me, and I thus early bespeak your indulgence if ever this shall prove the case. I am at this time happily furnished with unusual leisure, and have gratified my own inclinations, and performed, I hope, not an unacceptable service to your Lordship in this employment of it.

“ I beg leave to conclude this letter, and the general subject of it with a recommendation of Mr. Richard Sullivan to your protection and countenance. You will find him deeply and minutely informed in the Nabob's affairs of pleasing manners, and if you shall think it proper to make use of his services, possessed of honorable and faithful principles.

“ I left Calcutta on the 10th instant, and hope to reach Benares by the middle of next month. I shall proceed to Lucknow, and shall expect to return to Calcutta before the end of October, if no very urgent cause detains me, which I do not apprehend, beyond that period.

“ I shall continue to write to your Lordship upon other important subjects. In the mean time I beg that you will believe me to be with a real esteem,

“ My Lord,

“ Your most obedient and most faithful servant,

(Signed) “ WARREN HASTINGS.”

No. XII.

LORD MACARTNEY's *Reply to the foregoing Letter from WARREN HASTINGS Esq. dated Fort St. George, September 28th, 1781.*

" MY DEAR SIR,

" THE letter with which you have honored me of the 23d July, was two months in its passage to me; you are pleased to express in it a kind regret for not having been able to furnish me with earlier explanations on particular points, of which you apprehend that advantages might be taken to prejudice my mind with dangerous opinions of the designs of your government respecting mine. The desire I feel to acquire your confidence and esteem might lead me to claim some merit, for having preserved my mind as free from the adoption of such opinions as if it had been guarded against them by a previous communication of the particular motives which influenced your conduct towards this Presidency. But it is more candid to confess, that I came to this country under such strong impressions of your experienced wisdom and uprightness, that it required no effort to reject imputations against either. India indeed was never considered by me otherwise than in a collected view; nor have I had any other ambition than of contributing in it, as far as fell to my share, whatever that might be, towards the general welfare of my new employers, without any subdivision of local interests or attachments. Every objection therefore urged against public measures, on the ground of being encroachments by one English settlement, or by one set of the Company's servants over another, presented itself to my judgment, when contradistinguished from the general good, with such a degree of weakness as to reason, and of danger as to consequences, that I have taken uncommon pains to inculcate my opposite sentiments in this Presidency. To

the assertion of its rights invaded, I have opposed the impropriety of giving such a name to simple institutions established for the facility of the service, and which must be subservient to its benefit. And to persons hurt at the apprehension of contempt from the participation or subtraction of their authority, it was obvious to observe, that bodies of men, as well as individuals, become, in fact, contemptible, not by the acts of others, but by the weakness or inconsistency of their own proceedings: few stations being so low as not to be capable of attracting esteem, and even respect by a strict acquittal of the duties they prescribe. It was true beside, and not useless to add, that every Englishman will really derive a share of additional importance from the establishment of system in the conduct of the Company, which must depend on fixing some where the supreme representation of its power. As very soon after my arrival here, our friend Mr. Sullivan announced to me, that with my government of Madras I was to be honored with a share in that representation as a member of the Supreme Council, there was little likelihood I should yield to prejudices against it, and I should rather be upon my guard against the predilection which, from opinion and from inclination, I might contract in favor of it: for I cannot avoid acknowledging that I have taken a personal interest in the result, as well as propriety of its undertakings; and I have particularly rejoiced, that the treaty and the embassy, lately emanating from that source, did not arrive here in time to meet the derision with which, I believe, you were rightly told, they would have been treated, and the resentment that would have been felt by the predecessors of the present government. No doubt, the truest method of preserving the dignity and securing the efficacy of authority is to be cautious in extending the exercise of it to lengths that may throw the existence of it (so extended) into doubt; but necessity gives propriety and fairness to every interposition, provided it can be effectual: and it is not to the avowed irregularity of passing by the usual instruments of the Company's participation in the government of the Carnatic, that in times of critical exigency, those instruments being unfit, any solid objection will in the judgment of

wisdom and policy be allowed; but it is to the attempt of interposing where the interposition may be rejected, or when, if admitted, it may be prejudicial or ineffectual. The uneasiness of the Presidencies of both coasts at any extension of the authority of the Bengal government over them beyond the express provision of the act of parliament, has been declared in forcible terms in their respective consultations, in their protests, in their correspondence. Their complaints to the Court of Directors have not hitherto been discountenanced by any confirmation of your claims or condemnation of their resistance. The dread of suspension by your decree could have little effect on men inclined to dispute, in certain instances, the sentence as well as the crime; and on whom, being determined to quit the service, if executed, it would not be a punishment: neither could you be certain, by the dangerous experiment of a succession of suspensions, to arrive, at length, at fit subjects for obedience; nor could the purpose of immediate relief be answered by remote success. Yet the utter rejection of your act, and the consequent breach with your government, reflective as it would prove on the regulations of our policy, would still perhaps be less fatal to our affairs than the perversion of a treaty reluctantly admitted by persons, on whom ultimately the execution of it must be dependent. From these dangers at least the settlement was relieved by the change which the Company made in the administration of the Presidency. The whole transaction had now a fair and candid examination; and from the application given to it, and the opportunities of judging of it upon the spot, it is probable the view taken of it has been a just one. In considering the intentions of the Nabob in soliciting this arrangement, it may be necessary to recur to the observation of the difference which frequently is found between the ostensible motives avowed by politicians and the real objects of their pursuits. His Highness was aware that whatever assignment he might offer to make of his revenues to you, which he set forth as the first condition and intention of the deputation from him to Calcutta, such assignment must be transferred and entrusted to the Company's servants at Fort St. George, connected immediately

with his territories. The consideration of his finances was, in fact, subordinate to other purposes, for which he had already given particular powers to Sir Thomas Rumbold and others to treat for him with the King of Great Britain. That dependence, which his Highness transferred to the Company in the persons of their representatives here from the Soubah of the Decan and the throne of Delhi, to whom originally it belonged, was become as disgusting to him, if not as prejudicial, as the former. He had indulged the hope, that ambassadors to the crown of England would contribute not a little towards freeing him from it; a deputation to a government established as your's is by parliament, promised to add to the advantages, or to supply the deficiencies, of the European embassy. These views, which without blaming them, the Company's interest obliges its servants to counteract, are consistent with the tenor of his Highness's conduct and the spirit of his character. They are confirmed to me by information which I cannot doubt; and they are absolutely avowed, not in what you mention to have been the foremost proposition in the verbal conferences of his deputies, but in one of the first articles of his written proposals, where he requires, though he did not obtain from you, a precise acknowledgment of his perfect independence, as well as of his hereditary right. Several of the subsequent requests indicate his aim at an increase of possessions and of power, which the Company has not thought just or wise to suffer. The assignment of his revenues, to be collected by the conjunct management of his and the Company's servants, with the same control in favor of the latter, was actually made by his Highness to my predecessor as to part of his country; and to me, before he knew the contents of the treaty, he made the offer of the remainder. The effect then only of your government's intervention was, in this instance, which passed for counterbalancing all the Nabob's political demands, to obtain, by your means, what he had given or was ready to give before; but at the same time, as far as the treaty bound, to bind our hands from attempting to improve this plan of finances if deficient, or if it should fail, from substituting another

in its room. The participation which you mention of the Company in the government of the Carnatic, through its representatives at Fort St. George, is meant to be rather the effect of influence than the exertion of force. The Governor-general's immediate interference has destroyed or diminished that necessary influence. If it had been perverted to the purposes of corruption, it was full time to change the hands by which it was directed; but there is no alternative between taking away the management from this Presidency entirely, or leaving to it the means of managing with advantage and effect.

“ Very soon after my accession to this government, I had a strong instance of the disadvantage of the interposition of your authority, and the imbecility into which it cast this Presidency. In the midst of our distresses, without money or provisions, the army in arrears, and our garrison ready to mutiny, I applied to the Nabob in the most urgent manner for assistance. He never precisely denied his ability to give it. Many of his friends acknowledged he could have given it. The final answer which was sent me expressed, that his Highness had concluded a treaty with you, which provided for all the supplies which he should furnish.

“ Notwithstanding my experience of the ill-consequences of your government's immediate intervention, I was resolved, if you were empowered so to intervene, to abide strictly and scrupulously by every clause and article in your replies. Your exercise of the power was with me indeed a presumption of your right; but though the discussion has not led to that conclusion, I have, with a view to the great good which united efforts operate, and from the respect and, I may say, the partiality I feel towards your opinions, adopted my conduct to them, and shall place my satisfaction in such a faithful, zealous, and, I hope, judicious execution of your plans as to give them the best chance of success.

“ Your observations on the preference of a commission or percentage, rather than salaries to the persons concerned in the collection of the revenue, appear to me perfectly just; and shall, as far as will depend on me, be adopted here.

“ If I commit any mistakes in relation to Tanjore, they will not at least arise from the error originally committed in translating the Indian appellation of that Prince. You will perceive, by a plan of finance which I lately enclosed to you, that the settlement of that country comes within my contemplation as well as the remainder of the Carnatic.

“ The best inquiries I can make do not lead to confirm the assurance you received from Mr. Richard Sullivan, that any of the Nabob's creditors would be thankful for the provision left them after the abolition of interest and diminution of the capital, or that they would be even likely to yield to such an arrangement. But the diminution of interest and delay in the discharge of the principal, as proposed in the plan I sent you, will, I believe, if adopted, be considered as sufficiently balanced by the security and regularity of the payments.

“ The satisfaction I have received in the perusal of your letter makes me wish that you will have frequent leisure to communicate your sentiments fully to me.

“ You lay little constraint on my inclinations in recommending Mr. Richard Sullivan to my good offices. Beside the claim which his engaging manners give him upon his acquaintance, his interest is warmly espoused by his kinsman in London, to whom I feel myself very much obliged. Mr. Richard Sullivan is, I believe, convinced that had he arrived here before my accession to the government, he would have been suspended from the service. Though in a public consideration I cannot approve of the commission which he holds at present, I have not the least

private or personal objection to it. If the welfare of the Company's affairs would admit of a representative from the Court of Directors here, other than the Presidency, I should rejoice at such a witness of good, and such a guard against bad, conduct.

" I have the honor to be with great esteem and regard, Dear Sir,

" Your most obedient and most humble servant,

(Signed) " MACARTNEY."

No. XIII.

Copy of a Letter from Lord MACARTNEY to Mr. HASTINGS, dated Fort St. George, May 22, 1782.

" DEAR SIR,

" **E**VER since we received your public letter of the 11th March, I have had a strong inclination to trouble you with a private one upon the subject. I thought it a kind of duty to that friendship which I wished to cultivate with you, to communicate to you my sentiments, even although they should differ from yours, but I was restrained by the recollection that a former liberty of mine, on a similar occasion, seemed for some time at least to have made an impression on your mind very different from what I could possibly have intended or foreseen. I was also desirous to wait for the arrival of Mr. Staunton before I trespassed on you again; but I have this moment heard of his being at Ganjam, and that we are not to expect him here for some weeks. This delay of his, joined to an extraordinary occurrence which has come to my knowledge,

and which I think you should be acquainted with immediately, must plead my apology for troubling you with a letter at this moment.

“ You were advised in the Select Committee’s letter of the 11th of last month, that we meant implicit obedience to your recommendations, in favor of the extraordinary powers proposed to be given to Sir Eyre Coote, and we could not indeed consider the style of your recommendations in any other light than as a command founded on the late authority given to you by our constituents at home. And upon this principle, although we felt most sensibly the effect of a compliance, we chose to acquiesce without expressing to you a single murmur. Having stated this strong proof of our deference to the orders of the Company, and our firm resolution to co-operate with you in every plan which you may suggest for the public interest, you will allow me the freedom of a private and confidential communication of my ideas to you upon the subject of those powers, and more especially as the full exercise of them in the latitude in which they seem to be taken, may probably induce very important consequences.

“ I am totally at a loss to conceive upon what ground Sir Eyre Coote could reasonably have desired to be furnished with more ample powers than he possessed. I found him upon my arrival gratified in this respect to the fullest extent of his claims ; and though my opinion was, in general, against such extraordinary and uncontroled command, I took no step to reverse the resolution of the former Council by which his powers were conveyed to him. The only occasion, upon which the Select Committee assumed any direction, was that which put all the Dutch settlements on the coast, and the important harbor of Trincomalee into our hands. The expeditions, particularly to Negapatam and Trincomalee, were undertaken by us, not only without the assistance of a man from his army, but even against his opinion and remonstrances : yet the objects were so important and appeared so practicable at that period, that we did not hesitate to take the responsibility upon ourselves. The success which attended

our measures, and the events which have since happened, are sufficient proofs in justification of our conduct. Except in this single instance we never interfered either in the plan or execution of any military operations, and probably should of our own choice have continued to leave as much power in Sir Eyre Coote's hands, as any reasonable man, however highly he might rate himself or his services, could possibly have desired: but I now fear that, by the manner in which this matter has been understood and taken up, the barrier between the civil and military is almost entirely annihilated. I cannot bring myself to imagine that it could be your intention to depress the civil and raise the military above it; but it may be worth while to reflect a little on what a latitude the dispositions of some men might give to your letter of the 11th March, on the subject of Sir Eyre Coote's powers, and particularly that passage where you say, "In
" some points however, we think the principle we have recommended
" should be carried beyond our example; such, for instance, as the
" conciliation of the dependent chiefs of the Carnatic, the acceptance of
" terms offered by those of the enemy, and, in general, such other acts
" as do not fall within the express line of military command, but which
" may contribute to the success of its operations, either by adding
" strength to our arms, or weakening those which may be opposed to
" them—in all such cases, the officer who is charged with the conduct of
" the war, especially if he has shewn himself deserving of that confidence
" in an eminent degree, ought, we conceive, to be trusted with an implicit
" discretion."

" You allow that all governments possess of course an ultimate and overruling authority, and that the right of exercising such authority, which is inherent in us, must also be invariable and perpetual, notwithstanding any restrictions we may impose upon ourselves for particular purposes. This is certainly very just, but it appears to me that, having once parted with powers of such consequence as those which you have thought fit should be exercised by Sir Eyre Coote, an attempt to resume or overrule

them in any material point, under the present circumstances of the army, and of our situation in general, might be attended not only with serious difficulties, but perhaps with a total convulsion. One particular inconvenience which we feel, is in the want of sufficient control over the army disbursements. Not only every shilling that comes from Bengal, but all the rest of our revenues, except a very small part, are solely applied to the military. We are sensible they are not frugally administered, and yet we are without remedy. The paymaster, commissary, agent in camp, and grain-keeper attending the army, are considered as scarcely accountable to us, and, as far as we can observe, there is very little method or arrangement in any one of those departments. All the accounts are many months in arrear. Another inconvenience which we feel is that the public, seeing the powers of the State transferred to the military, have withdrawn from us all that confidence and respect, which this government used to enjoy, insomuch that, on a late occasion, when we were called upon by Sir Eyre Coote for a supply of money, we could not raise a pagoda on the public faith, and the whole that was procured I raised on my private credit alone; should a similar occasion occur again, I tremble to think on the consequences. The public resources are vanished, and as to private assistance, it can scarcely be expected that many will be found to advance money to an individual whose fortune is moderate, and whose disposition is not likely to increase it. The country powers or dependent chiefs will certainly not look up to a government, whose means of conciliating them, and authority to awe them, are lodged in the hands of others. But all my thoughts and apprehensions are now engaged by an event which has happened within a short time, and which has so far been conducted with such secrecy that it has only come to my knowledge through the channel of private information.

“ The Nabob being fully apprised of your determination to support us in the collection of the revenues, which he had assigned by a formal agreement to the Company, has tried his last manœuvre to defeat our

joint efforts, by addressing a letter, as a sort of Sunned to Sir Eyre Coote, which I am informed runs nearly in the following stile :

“ As the Supreme Council of Bengal has given to you the sole power
“ and authority to conduct the war, repel the enemy, and defend the
“ Carnatic, and as I consider the interests of the Company and mine
“ inseparable, and the same, I think it incumbent upon me, in the pre-
“ sent circumstances of things, in order to obtain the desired effect, to
“ invest you, Sir Eyre Coote, with the government of my country and
“ revenues for the public good ; and I propose to send *Nagiff Khan* to
“ carry my great seal to you, with powers to you to affix it to all orders
“ which you may think fit to give to Zemindars, Polygars, Phousdars,
“ Renters, Amuldars, Sheristadars, &c. &c. and I also send for your
“ publication a circular letter to all Zemindars, &c. as above, and all
“ other officers of the Circar, to obey your orders, under the pains and
“ penalties of high treason.”

“ If these be nearly the contents of the letter, as my information gives me reason to suspect, I leave you to judge of the consequences which may be produced if Sir Eyre Coote should not immediately, in the most explicit and decisive manner, reject them, and give us information thereof without delay. The concealment alone would in my opinion be highly improper, to use no harsher term ; but any act performed under such an authority must be considered as a total separation from the government, and a measure of the most dangerous kind. I shall make no comment on the conduct of the Nabob. Your own understanding will supply all that is necessary on the occasion.

“ Having thus unburthened my mind to you upon this point, I beg leave to add, and I declare, that my principles are invariably directed to promote union and co-operation throughout the whole of this trying scene in which we are engaged ; your judgment will discriminate which is most proper

to correct the inconveniences which I have represented, without interrupting the harmony so necessary to be maintained amongst us. I have personally no passions to gratify, and if the public interest can be served, my primary views are fully answered.

“ Having said thus much, I will now take the liberty of fully opening myself to you once for all, on some other points; the manner in which my most respectable friends Mr. Pechell, Mr. Sullivan, and some others expressed themselves to me upon your subject, is a strong motive; but the necessity of my being perfectly understood by you, in the present state of our affairs, is still a stronger.

“ I have lived too long in the world not to have seen all the games which the sharpers of it usually practise; I have warned my friends against them, but in a particular instance, where it was highly essential, I have been unsuccessful. I very early told Sir Eyre Coote that there were men whose interest made them wish that the General and the Governor should not be well together. I told him with regard to myself I should not be the dupe of such persons, and I repeatedly warned him against being so. You will perceive, from the enclosed papers, how solicitous I was to prevent any misunderstanding with him. If I was so averse to a rupture with Sir Eyre Coote, I leave you to judge how much more so I should be to the slightest difference with you. And yet from a kind of sharpness in the stile of one of your late letters to this government, some persons might imagine that ill offices may have been employed, and ill impressions conveyed, with regard to my conduct and intentions. If I have a right idea of your character, you are of all men the least likely to adopt hasty opinions. I have therefore as yet nothing to apprehend in that respect. And, I trust, that the fair and unreserved manner in which I express myself will be sufficient to obviate any future prejudice. It is not what may be written from Bengal to Madras, or from Madras to Bengal—it is not the messages or dispatches from the Durbar, or their

starting new projects, and making new promises, that can do real business at this critical time, or decide upon the great interests of our empire here. A man of your extensive views and superior knowledge in the policy of India will not receive any systematic ideas from the convulsive struggles of Oriental vanity and rage ; you will not listen to the deliberate falsehood, which rancor and disappointment may endeavor to convey—but, you will separate from the question all the rubbish and dross that involve it, and then determine the true value of the mine. Among many motives impelling this government to press the Nabob's assignment of his revenues to the Company, Sir Eyre Coote's letters upon the subject were not the least forcible. Extracts from those, in which the Nabob is mentioned, are now enclosed to be contrasted with such others as you may think fit to examine. The report from the Committee of assigned revenue, which is now preparing from their proceedings, will be transmitted to you in a few days. It will show you at one view, either how incapable or how dishonest the Nabob's ministers have been in managing his revenues, the absolute necessity of the Company's undertaking it, and the very able and upright manner in which the business has been conducted by Mr. Oakeley, and the other gentlemen of the Committee. I am happy in every opportunity of doing them justice, and so romantic is my disposition in that respect that if my country be benefitted, I resign without scruple any little reputation that might fall to my share. These are most serious times ; it imports but little what can befall an individual, but the fate of millions depends on your resolves. Perhaps at this moment the foundation of our Empire in India may be loosened to the bottom, or rivetted for ever by the motion of a finger of your government. You have long known Sir Eyre Coote, from personal intercourse : me you can only know from literary correspondence and general report, and I am far from presuming that any inference can be drawn from thence in my favor. The power is in your hands, our constituents have lodged it there, and I am sensible that it is a painful pre-eminence they have given you. But, I trust, that the wisdom which supports it will

render it equally useful to the state and honorable to yourselves. As a private individual nobody is less interested in the concerns of India than I am ; as a public man, nobody more so. Mr. Macpherson can inform you from what quarter an Indian appointment was first suggested to me. I accepted it upon the most honorable ground. I have invariably maintained it, and I can say to the whole world, which I now do to you upon the honor of a gentleman, that from my arrival in India to this hour I have never accepted for my own benefit a single pagoda, a diamond or even a shawl, but restricted myself most scrupulously to the receipt of my salary alone, and to the rigid observance of all my covenants.—So help me God !—I claim no more meritorious distinction from a conduct of this kind than from the discharge of any other common obligations of life, and I only mention it because I am informed that attempts have been made to insinuate the contrary. As my views point to a scene very distant from India I can interfere with no man in this part of the world, and my objects here, being very moderate, are easily attainable without encroachment upon others. Besides, I will confess that the contemplation of our affairs has taught me to look upon every private consideration, and every private feeling, as trifling sacrifices at this moment to the general good. I flatter myself I have given pretty strong proofs of this, and that you are fully convinced of it by the line of conduct which I have adopted. It is perhaps a different one from that which more hasty spirits may approve ; but I well weighed every circumstance in my own mind, and chose that part which seemed to be attended with the fewest probable inconveniences to the solid interests of our constituents. After the stations I have filled, it is not probable that I can feel within my breast any jealousy arising from Indian politics, nor could any employment here flatter my ambition, otherwise than as affording opportunities to me of serving my country. Such opportunities must now be rare ; and that being the case, I would fain hope that it is better they should occur to others. In all events you may rely on the most faithful discharge of whatever duty may fall to my share ; and

whether it be the pleasure of our superiors that this government should be a cypher, a subordinate, or a principal, to their pleasure an equal obedience shall be paid. At the same time I would not be understood as if this government, however lately abridged of power and responsibility, should wish, in any crisis or any arduous situation, to decline power or shrink from responsibility. But power on which responsibility is built, must be intire, perfect, and distinctly and unambiguously defined, otherwise it can only lead to anarchy and distraction. In the transaction of business I have ever been slow to decide; but when once decided, I own myself very difficult to change; for my little experience has taught me that nothing can contribute more to give the natives a contempt for us, than variable measures and instability of conduct. I doubt not that the firmness of my temper has been represented to my disadvantage; and that two strong instances of inflexibility have been urged to my reproach—I mean my declining overtures of friendship with the Nabob's second son Ameer-ul-Omrah, and Mr. Benfield. To this I answer; I never will put it in the power of any man who has deceived me once to deceive me a second time. But here it is not myself that I consider, but my constituents; for after all my knowledge of these two personages I should think it little less than treason to the Company to have any correspondence with either of them. This sentiment of mine will probably be remembered hereafter; and however strong it may appear, it arises from the most dispassionate reflection, and not from any prejudice or resentment. I hope I am above them; and that whatever other faults may be imputed to me, I believe you will scarcely find a man who ever saw me betrayed into a loss of temper upon any occasion.

“ I have now opened myself to you with all that frankness which I have ever practised since my first entrance into public life, and which both reason and experience convince me to be the wisest as well as the most honorable system. My wish was to convey to you a representation of our affairs, of my own mind, and of the impressions upon it; and yet I

do not dismiss this letter from my hand, without much hesitation, lest what I sincerely mean as a mark of unreserved confidence may not be taken in the sense it is intended ; and lest the egotism, unavoidable on an occasion of this kind, should weary and disgust you. If this letter happens to meet the reception which I wish it to do, I shall sincerely rejoice ; if not let me request that you will consign it to the flames and forget that it was ever received. It is I believe one of the longest I have ever written, and if I had not conceived ideas of you very different from the generality of men, I certainly should have adopted a very different stile, and have addressed you in a manner more suitable to the formalities of common intercourse, than to the attention of a great mind occupied only by essential objects, and superior to the intrusion of little ones.

“ I have the honor, &c.

(Signed) “ MACARTNEY.”

No. XIV.

Extract from the Minutes of the SELECT COMMITTEE, dated 31st July, 1784.

THE President lays before the Committee the following copy of a letter which he intends to address to the Governor-general and Council at this time, and desires it may be entered on the records.

Letter from Lord MACARTNEY to the GOVERNOR-GENERAL and COUNCIL of BENGAL, dated Fort St. George, July 31, 1784.

“ GENTLEMEN,

“ ALTHOUGH the Committee’s letter of this date, together with my minute upon which it is founded, has fully explained the reasons for deferring the execution of your Government’s orders of the 8th June, I must take the liberty of addressing to you a few lines on the occasion from myself, lest any misconception might arise in your breast with respect to others. My colleagues, I have every ground to believe, are disposed to pay all due obedience to your commands, although their opinions should not entirely coincide with yours: nor should I be less inclined to do so in the present instance, if I could by any means reconcile my mind in reason or in conscience, either to the propriety or necessity of the measure which you now direct to be adopted. After your Government had ratified the treaty with Tippoo Sultaun, and that ratification had been transmitted to him as the last solemn act by which the treaty was acknowledged and confirmed in all its stipulations, I cannot sufficiently express the surprise I felt at the contents of the letter of the 8th June, so inconsistent with that act, and so alarming in the tendency of the measures prescribed to us.

“ When the ratification was transmitted to us by the members of the Supreme Council then at Calcutta, they transmitted their observations upon the treaty, but still thought it expedient to ratify it without any exception or declaration whatever, as to the rights of the Nabob; so that however their sentiments might differ from ours, respecting the omission of the Nabob’s name in the treaty, nothing on the subject was communicated to Tippoo Sultaun, either in the ratification or in any declaration annexed to it. Tippoo was taught to consider the treaty as solemnly and

finally approved by the Government of Bengal in the form in which it then stood.

“ This ratification of the treaty, by the Council of Fort William, must have been considered by themselves, as it was, a valid act, or they would not have transmitted it to us and to Tippoo Sultaun as the act of their Government. Those gentlemen referred to a future correspondence with Tippoo, for any further stipulations, without weakening the validity of those already made by annexing a declaration as the implied condition of such ratification. If those gentlemen perceived any thing so defective in the treaty as to require a formal declaration to be annexed to it, why did they not annex it themselves at the time they ratified it ?

“ If the honor of the nation suffered discredit by the omission of the Nabob's name, so as to make it an obligation of public duty to retrieve it by a public declaration affixed to the treaty, the gentlemen at Fort William must have felt that obligation as strong at the time of ratifying the treaty as they do at the present time. Their ratification therefore, under these circumstances, implies that the discredit might be retrieved without annexing such declaration to such ratification.

“ The complaints of the Nabob were made very early, but could communicate no new information respecting his rights. They are apparently the production of the same English pens which, for a considerable time past, have written most of his Highness's correspondence, and it yet remains extremely doubtful whether the sentiments contained in them be the real sentiments of the Nabob, or those of his writers.

“ That the Nabob's name is not expressly mentioned as a party to the treaty is true. We could not make him personally a party without his consent, which he never gave us, and the declared hostility, with which he treated every measure of this Government, both during the war and the

negotiations for peace, afforded us no reason whatever to think that he either wished to be included by name or as a party; that if included, he would have acted cordially in the observance of a treaty, of which he speaks with such unreserved disapprobation.

“ The treaty, as far as the rights of the Carnatic are concerned, is precisely in the same form as the treaty made with Hyder Ali in 1769. The Carnatic Payen Ghaut is expressly mentioned, and the Nabob thereby included as far as it was necessary or proper to include him. The peace of the Carnatic is as amply provided for, as if he had been mentioned by name as a party, and this is all I conceive that could have been intended in the instructions to us from Bengal. Your Government did not think it necessary to consult with the Nabob in the terms of peace previous to its negociation. You gave your ideas on the subject only to us, and you empowered us to carry them into execution both for the Nabob's interests and those of the Company. This was not surely treating the Nabob as a principal in the negociation. But if we look to the true nature of the Company's connection with the Nabob, we shall find it utterly impossible to preserve their mutual interests, but by considering him as a Prince altogether under the protection of the Company, not at liberty to pursue separate or independent views, but subject, in every instance, to the general views of the power on whom he leans for his support. The Company cannot, at least I am sure they ought not, undertake the protection of any country Prince upon other terms. If they do they subject themselves to be perpetually misled from that character, and from those interests which are infinitely more sacred and valuable than the connection of any Prince whatever, who is at liberty to involve them by his crooked politics in the wiles of his own ambitious or unjust pursuits.

“ If the Nabob be made a contracting party to the treaty with Tippoo Sultaun, as your Government have lately desired, will not the Company be precisely in the situation above described? Can they answer for the

Nabob's faithful observance of a treaty which he has so strongly reprobated? and will it be in any respect prudent or adviseable for the Company to risk the peace of their own possessions, which are included in the treaty, upon so slight a security? It is a fact, I believe indisputable, that his Highness has no scruple where an interested or ambitious purpose is to be promoted. The former wars with the Nizam, with Hyder Ally Cawn, and the Rajah of Tanjore, sufficiently testify this disposition; and his open and avowed hatred to the late Hyder Ally Cawn and his family is by no means favorable to the views of any peace with that family, in which the Nabob is made a contracting party.

“ But the strongest objection that immediately presents itself to the orders of your Government is the certain effect, which any attempt to execute them must have on the mind of Tippoo Sultaun. After the treaty with him has been solemnly ratified and exchanged, what other construction can be put upon the proposed additional article, than that the Company's government is variable and inconsistent in its conduct and resolutions, and that no dependence can be placed upon a treaty which is thought so imperfect, as to require amendment after it has been approved, and ratified in the most formal manner. It is not the importance of the declaration proposed by the Governor-general and Council to be annexed to the treaty, but the principle of unsteadiness, which is so alarming in this proposition, and which cannot fail to impress Tippoo with the strongest doubts of our intention to maintain the peace we have concluded with him. Such an impression, added to the misunderstanding which has already arisen respecting the execution of some of the articles of the treaty, would in all probability bring on a renewal of the war, and throw the Company at once into a scene of such distress as no exertion of ability or resource within their power could possibly extricate them from; and when the object, for which all this proposed to be hazarded, is viewed in the light in which I have now placed it in this letter, and more fully in my minute of the 15th instant, I humbly think there is

no proportion between the advantage of the object and the risk in attempting to accomplish it. I must request your indulgence to excuse me for repeating in this paper some of the arguments which I have used in another, but my mind is too forcibly impressed not to give way to its feelings at such a moment. If, however, what I have now submitted to your consideration, should have no weight. If you still persevere in your opinion and reiterate your orders, while the present objections remain to their execution, you will permit me to decline having any share in executing them, but to leave that task to be performed by my successor. The measure seems to me big with mischief, and totally inconsistent with every principle of what I humbly conceive to be the only system capable of giving a chance for saving our Indian empire in the Carnatic from speedy ruin. This conviction is so strong in my mind, that I ought not to shrink from the risk of disobedience, although the state of my private fortune could ill afford the loss of my public situation. If it should seem that at any time my sentiments have been rather acquiesced in than approved by my colleagues, the principal responsibility ought to rest upon me, and I am neither unwilling to bear it on this present occasion, nor any other in which this present government has had the misfortune of differing from yours.

“ I have, &c.

M.

“ In Committee—Fort St. George, July 31, 1784.

“ MR. DAVIDSON desires to record the following minute and motion :

“ That the suspension of Lord Macartney, or his being obliged to quit the chair, at this important juncture, would most probably throw the Presidency of Fort St. George into anarchy and confusion.

“ His great abilities, integrity, and application in his station, during a most critical period of the Company's affairs ; and the great exertions he

has made to support and promote the prosperity of the Company, are well known to every member of this Board. Mr. Davidson therefore is of opinion, that the displacing of Lord Macartney from the chair of Madras at this important period, when the army and our garrison are six and twelve months in arrear, consequently dissatisfied; our bills on Bengal in payment of our civil and military servants, and others, at 40 *per cent.* discount; our resources nearly exhausted; such a change in government, at this time, would endanger the Carnatic, and tend to the ruin of the Company's affairs on this coast. If the Select Committee are of this opinion, Mr. Davidson moves, that the Secretary draw up a minute at large in the nature of a protest against the Supreme Council, should they proceed to extremities against the Right Hon. President now in charge of this government.

(Signed) "ALEX. DAVIDSON."

"Mr. Sadlier and Mr. Maunsell concurring in the sentiments of Mr. Davidson, expressed in the foregoing minute, the motion intended by Mr. Davidson in the event of such circumstance, is now put:

Mr. Maunsell for the motion.

Mr. Davidson for the motion.

Mr. Sadlier for the motion.

The Right Hon. the President desires to decline giving any vote upon the motion.

"The motion being agreed to *nemine contradicente*, the Committee advert to that part of the orders from Bengal of the 8th June, which seems to imply, that whatever circumstances might arise to render it the duty of this Government to resist, or even defer the execution of those orders, and whatever conviction the representatives of the Company charged with their interests here, might feel of their destructive tendency, they would "do it at their peril," and combining these orders and this menace

with the hostile disposition which, to the great detriment of the Company's affairs, the Governor-general and Council have manifested towards this Government, almost from the commencement of Lord Macartney's administration, in a variety of important instances too notorious to require being stated here; but particularly in the extrinsic and, it may be added, unnatural support given to the complaints fabricated by the advisers of the Nabob, notwithstanding the proofs adduced of their fallacy and injustice; the Committee, duly weighing all these circumstances, are of opinion, that they afford grounds to apprehend, that the Governor-general and Council have determined to compass the removal of the Right Hon. President from his station, an event of which the probable consequences are pointed out in Mr. Davidson's minute.

“ The abilities and indefatigable attention to the public service, by which this Government has been upheld for these three years past, through a series of difficulties unexampled, both in their nature and magnitude, are still necessary to the retrieval of the Company's affairs; notwithstanding the return of peace many and very serious difficulties still continue, and the heavy burdens, produced by a long and destructive war, must for some time press upon us. The temper and patience of the Right Honorable President, his known integrity, and the weight derived from his rank and character, have enabled his Lordship to conciliate and satisfy, where justice could not be immediately rendered, and to reconcile men to the delay which the public exigences require; but they still look towards the right honorable President, confiding in his knowledge of their claims, in his ability, and zealous efforts to retrieve the public affairs, and in the opinion they entertain of the stability of his administration.

“ From these considerations the Committee are of opinion, that in the present state of the Company's affairs here, there is the greatest reason to apprehend that the removal of the Right Honorable President from

his station would be followed by the most serious consequences within this settlement ; nor are such the only consequences to be expected from it : the cause of the removal would not remain a secret ; such a proposal known to be sent from Bengal might excite strong suspicions in the mind of Tippoo Sultaun of the sincerity of that Government with regard to the treaty, and make him imagine that an adherence to it had been the President's crime, and that the Governor-general and Council, desirous of finding a pretext for renewing the war against him, had removed Lord Macartney as the chief obstacle to their wishes.

“ The Committee therefore, as the only expedient left them to evince their regard to the interests of their employers, and to the public welfare, do, upon the presumption that it may be the intention of the Governor-general and Council to remove the Right Honorable President from his station, hereby, on behalf of the Honorable East India Company, solemnly protest against such act, and declare the Governor-general and Council to be solely responsible for all the consequences that may arise therefrom to the British interests in India.

“ Resolved, That a copy of foregoing minutes be transmitted to the Governor-general and Council.

“ A true extract,

“ T. HUDLESTONE, Sec ”

No. XV.

Translation of a Persian Letter from his Highness the Nabob WALLAW JAW, to LORD MACARTNEY dated 7th Ramasan 1196, or 17th August 1782.

“ Your Lordships letter of the 29th Shabawn 1196, or 10th August 1782, in answer to a few lines from me, in order to obtain fine rice for my people, I have received.

“ Your Lordship is pleased to say, that the distresses of the Carnatic, in which I am so nearly concerned, cannot be unknown to me. That your efforts have been invariably directed, since your arrival here, towards the alleviation of them; both in procuring means for repelling the invasion of our enemies, and in applying those means to the best purposes in your power to effectuate. That if I feel any other uneasiness than what the calamities of the war necessarily occasion, it must be entirely owing to the insinuations of factious and designing persons, whose sinister views are forwarded, and passions gratified, by instilling jealousies into my mind against the representatives of the Company, and in creating a variance between me and my best friends; that you hope my good sense will not much longer be imposed upon by such insidious advisers; and that I shall then be soon convinced how sincerely and steadily you have endeavored, notwithstanding the unjust charges I have suffered to be made against you in my name, to promote my real interest and welfare; the force and meaning of all this I understand.

“ I have long been an unshaken friend to the English, and, by the blessing of God, have governed the affairs of the Carnatic to the present time from an earlier period perhaps than that of your birth. I am

now, for the first time, told I am not able to distinguish good from evil, even in my own affairs. You wound me in every part of my body, and when I complain from my heart of what I feel, you tell me I can have no pain; that the feelings I complain of proceed from the insinuations of evil minded persons, that the wounds are for my good; and to prove the respect and regard that you bear towards me, you give me a mortal stab that lays me prostrate on the ground; and, in the last moments of my breath, you say, it is done to produce to me solid advantages, and to promote my real interest and welfare; and that I am to depend upon a nostrum you have in reserve, to restore me to life at your pleasure hereafter. Indeed, my Lord, it wants not the powers of human faculties to distinguish between good and injury. Even a bird of the air will fly from offers of violence, and as speedily approach the hand of kindness.

“ It would be happy for me could I and those that experience your coconduct, agree with your Lordship in what you are pleased to express so handsomely of yourself, concerning your efforts, both in procuring means for repelling our enemies, and in applying those means to the best purposes; but the whole of our correspondence will evince how widely our sentiments differ in this respect. Your Lordship however more boldly advances the circumstance: it is therefore incumbent upon me to adduce a few facts; that, I trust, must establish evidently to all the world, how much it was in your Lordship's power to have employed those efforts more productively, and more effectually, towards expelling the enemy, and alleviating the distresses of the Carnatic; and though the conduct of your Lordship has caused the utmost uneasiness to my mind, as well from my feelings for the interest of the English nation in India, as for what concerns myself, my family, my subjects, and my country; yet neither my feelings nor my communications with your Lordship have proceeded from the insinuation of others, but are the dictates of my own mind, founded on facts, and delivered to you in the result of my serious and deliberate considerations. I might strongly recriminate upon the advisers

your Lordship has brought and thought proper to introduce into these parts, but it would be unbecoming in me ; nor will I suffer myself to intrude upon your Lordship's right to consult and advise with whomsoever you please. I have always held it an indispensable duty I owe to my friends, the Company, to make these communications to their representatives here, as you will find I have pointedly done before the invasion of Hyder, when I warned them of the impending danger ; and had my representations at that time been properly regarded, it is well known that the calamities we are now suffering under might have been averted. In the present case, my representations are made with the same good motives to preserve and secure the connected and inseparable interests of the English and myself ; and had they been properly attended to by your Lordship, very essential assistance would have been obtained towards alleviating the distresses of the Carnatic, and in procuring means for repelling the invasion of our enemies : and though your Lordship would insinuate that my representations to you tend to create a variance with my good friends, the Company, yet you well know, my Lord, that my complaints to you are not against them, but against your Lordship personally. The servants of the Company, who of late have come in authority to this country, though their names and faces are different, yet their views and designs are the same ; but every one pursues his own plan of carrying them into execution. Thus, injuries of every kind are brought upon me, and my affairs ; but how can I attribute these acts either to the Government of the Company, or to the Company themselves ? I can only lament the inability to restrain them, and until the Company shall express their approbation of your conduct towards me, and in my affairs, I cannot complain of them for what you have done.

“ It is without a doubt that my son, Ameer ul Omrah Bahawder, contrary to the opinions of my whole family, of my eldest son, Omdut ul Omrah Bahawder, of my other sons, and all my servants, did advise me to place implicit confidence in your Lordship, and according to your

Lordship's earnest desire, to invest you with powers far exceeding what were stipulated in the Bengal treaty, over the revenue of my country during the war, in the hope that they would be duly exercised, and productive of good to the public service; of all which I verbally acquainted you at the time: and so certain was he of your Lordship's good intentions, that he even became a surety to me in my Durbar, under his own hand, for your good conduct in that trust, a copy of which I enclose to you; though, after obtaining those powers through my son's endeavors, your Lordship published by tongue and pen, both far and near, that they were obtained from me by your own great address and exertions: I in return for all those marks of good faith and confidence that my son had in your Lordship, and his strong desire to accede to your wishes, even to the extent of committing the future peace and welfare of myself and my family into your Lordship's hands, what is there in the world that your Lordship does not now say and write against him, as well as against myself? Is it worthy of your Lordship to do every injury to a person, from whom you have experienced every kindness, and who, on account of the advice that he gave me to accede to your wishes, has so much incurred the displeasure of myself and my family, that he is not able to hold up his head before us? But the goodness of his intentions plead for him with me in extenuation of his fault.

“ I will now, my Lord, presume on your candor, to ask your Lordship, if you did not, previous to your obtaining from me the powers over the revenues, make the most solemn promises that you would nominate responsible people as Renters of the districts, who would be able to give Soucar security for the revenues; but in violation of your promises, have you not appointed creatures without credit or reputation, or without any security for the revenues, such as have been actually guilty of embezzling the public revenues to an extensive degree; and have not complaints to this effect been made to your Lordship, in particular from the province of Nellour.

“ Did not your Lordship solemnly engage and promise, under your hand, that the provinces should not be let at an inferior rent to what they had produced in former years, under similar circumstances? And did I not furnish you with all the particulars of ten years collection for your guidance? But in violation of those promises, have not the countries, even those most distant from the seat of war, been let at rents far inferior to what they have yielded in former years; and that at a time of scarcity in the adjacent districts, whereby the produce of those countries you have so let, must be greatly increased in value? And has not your Lordship withheld from my distressed creditors their just right, and every sort of satisfaction for what has been received and supplied on this account?”

“ Did not your Lordship solemnly engage and promise under your hand, that the Renters and Amuldars to be appointed by you in my name, and under my seal, should be subject to my confirmation? And did not you propose to me in writing that over such Renters and Amuldars I should appoint Aumeens to prevent embezzlements, and superintend the collections, according to ancient custom, and as under me, in the fullest extent, to exercise the office of Aumeen, in clear distinction from the revenue department, for all the purposes and in all the powers of my Government; a Government that of early time has been solemnly secured to me, under the faith of his sacred Majesty of Great Britain, by every solemn pledge from the Company, and lately by the faith of a solemn treaty entered into between the superior Government of Bengal and myself? But in violation of all their pledges and assurance, has not your Lordship, of your own authority, in your own name, without my confirmation or seal, granted Sunneds to Amuldars, and Renters for my provinces? And has not your Lordship, of your own authority, dismissed all my people of every description in the towns and villages, without even giving them the pay due, as well those who, under the office of Aumeen, were superintending the collections, and were possessed of all the accounts of the countries from ancient times, as those under the same office, exer-

cising the functions of Government in the different branches of judicature and police, and were possessed of all the records of the provinces, whose charge had descended chiefly from their ancestors, and who had no power whatever over the revenues, leaving the cities, towns, and villages in a state of anarchy? By these violences, my Lord, has not my Government been totally subverted, my powers assumed by yourself, the collections of my revenues concealed from me without any account, but such as you chuse to give, exposed to all manner of dissipation and embezzlement, and your own conduct in the countries thereby abused? Was it necessary, my Lord, to have proceeded to those assumptions of power? Was it within our mutual engagements that I should confirm at an instant the first persons you sent to me as Renters and Aumildars, regardless of their civil and military fame, or insufficiency? Were not my books and registers open to your inspection for a knowledge of all those who had preserved characters, and were eligible for offices of revenue? Could their circumstances be otherwise known to your Lordship, and were not these the reasons for the article in the agreement between us, stipulating for my confirmation of the persons nominated to those superior offices of revenue? And as a proof that it was clearly so understood by both of us, I call to your mind your first act after being invested with power over the revenues, when you presented three people to me for the Aumildarship of Permacoil, and I immediately gave my confirmation of the one that was most proper, who was thereupon invested in that office by your Lordship in my name, and by my Sunned under the seal of my Government?

“ Did not your Lordship, after I had pointed out a great reduction in the current expences, promise and assure me of a continuance of the Tanjee or the orders for the pay of my body guard, a few hundred people, attendant on my person and family, and did you not promise and assure me of the continuance of the small collection from the jaghires, given under the faith of government to the woman of my family, to my

children, my relations, and faithful servants, which had never been considered or included in Government revenue; but when I complained of your measures, did I not thereby incur your Lordship's displeasure, and in consequence thereof, and in violation of all your promises, did you not stop the payment of the Tanjee, and seize the collections from those small Jaghires, leaving many reputable and honorable families in the utmost distress, want, and ruin? And did you not, in like manner, put a stop to the expences for the feeding of my elephants and horses, in different forts, whereby most of them have died, and the rest are rendered unserviceable? And further, did you not cause the small daily allowance to the poor, and the inconsiderable grants for the service and support of the mosques, churches, and places for religious worship, to be seized as revenue, to the disgrace and dishonor of my name and of all government? Did you not continually say to me, my Lord, that the treaty I had made with the superior Government of Bengal would ruin my affairs? And have you not repeatedly threatened me, my Lord, before many of the gentleman of the place that from my incurring your displeasure, you would take such measures as should deprive me and my family in succession of my Government? But is it with me alone that your Lordship has quarrelled; is it not the case with every gentleman of authority, command, or distinction amongst your own people, and the servants of the Company?

“ Did not your Lordship totally disregard my applications to you, that receipts might be given for the large quantities of stores and provisions, issued to your people in the different garrisons, so that my granaries are drained, and my storehouses exhausted to supply your wants, without receipts, or accounts, and when I asked, according to custom, for a small quantity of ammunition to be supplied to my body guard, the horsemen, and Sepoys, to the number of about three hundred, who the other day, almost at your gates, so gallantly defeated Careem Sahib, the second son to Hyder, with a body of above 6000 horse and Sepoys, with

guns, who came down to burn and destroy the vicinity of Madras, and distress the garrison? Did not your Lordship refuse to comply with my application, except in very small part, though it has been always customary to supply me, and though the general, whom you referred it to for the purpose of delay, gave his approbation for its being complied with? Though this circumstance is unworthy of my notice, it will mark the disposition of your Lordship towards me.

“ Did not your Lordship communicate at home and abroad that you had made a reduction of five lacks of pagodas in the expences incurred in the countries for one year? But what, and where is that reduction, when the whole revenue from all the provinces for the year, under your Lordship’s management, is less than half the sum that your Lordship talks of having reduced in the expences only? Have you sent me for my expences more than 33,000 pagodas, as the proportion of a sixth part of the whole revenues for the year, which proves the whole revenues collected for the present year, now nearly expired, to amount to 1,98,000 pagodas? If more has been received from the countries, your Lordship should tell me where it is deposited, and not deceive me in this point too, by withholding from me the proportion of one-sixth part of the revenues collected and promised under your hand to secure to me; the great distresses of myself and family for the want of money to supply the necessaries of life have been continually known to you; and as my treasury and the Company’s are now one and the same under your charge, and at your disposal, may I not here, my Lord, well call your attention to the supplies of money you have thought fit to furnish for the Prince of the Carnatic, and all his family and attendants, compared with the large drafts you have made on the treasury, with an unabating hand, for your own salary of 40,000 pagodas a year; and an arbitrary sum, nearly approaching the amount of your salary, under the denomination of secret services, notwithstanding the public distresses and wants; and that all the

other servants of the Company, and even the army, are without their pay. If your Lordship means by reduction of expences the entire dismissal of all my officers and servants of Government, and the necessary Aulmagaunce attendants, an inherent establishment never to be altered, so long as any Government is preserved; or if you mean on those groundless pretences to acquire reputation to yourself, such reductions, my Lord, are like those that would be made by the gentlemen of the Company, were they to strike off your salary, allowances, and contingencies, and all other salaries and charges of Government, delivering over the administration of their affairs to one or two of their youngest writers. These would be similar reductions, but after all these flattering representations, have not the Aumildars, under your authority, re-established the same charges in the countries?

“ Is it not known to your Lordship that by your conduct, myself, my family, and servants have been reduced to the most deplorable distresses? In this situation, and while I was suffering every dishonor, disgrace, and indignity, did you not treat me with personal derision before a principal and honorable officer of his Majesty's service? And have you not, my Lord, labored with avidity to dishonor me and my family by abetting the meanest and most unworthy calumniators in fabricating false and wicked insinuations and charges, calculated to defame me and my son? Have you not prevented enquiry and the examination of the person, who had been instigated to perjury on that occasion, and is he not still held for your purposes upon dishonorable and groundless pretences, under your guards of Sepoys.

“ In order to dishonor me and my Government, did not your Lordship cause the provinces to be put up to public auction, a measure the most disgraceful? And during the whole course of your Lordship's management, have not I had continual petitions and representations from the in-

habitants and vassals throughout all the provinces, setting forth the intolerable grievances and oppressions they have suffered under your authority; the unreasonable demands made upon their share of the crop; and the oppressions and cruelties exercised upon them, even to the cutting off their ears and noses upon the slightest pretences? After your Lordship had dismissed all my people, of whatever denomination, without their pay, was it not proclaimed throughout many of the districts by beat of tom tom, that all such as had belonged to me, and were not retained in the service under your authority, should depart from the countries, or be punished? Have not the distresses of the disbanded servants been beyond description, imprisoned and tortured by those under your authority; and have not their importunities for subsistence been returned with bloodshed? But at Trichinopoly, my Lord, were not the courts of justice removed from my Government-house, and affected to be held at the house of a private European gentleman?

“ Did not your Lordship violently seize and open all letters addressed to me and my officers, on the affairs of my Government? In the face of all the other Vakeels that attend upon your Lordship, was not my Vakeel ignominiously dismissed from your presence, and not afterwards suffered to approach the Government-house? When your Lordship found yourself unequal to the charge and management of the countries, and that the calculations, plans, and projects you had sent away to the Company and to Bengal, in order to raise your own fame, were evidently vain, ill-founded, and delusive: still to veil the deception and your insufficiency and designs did you not, my Lord, unjustly insinuate that I continued an interference in the revenue department, that interrupted the collections; though you well knew I did not interfere, and though the assertion is so contrary to all common sense, to every act of my life, and to the very act that came so voluntarily from myself, of making over to the Company by the Bengal treaty, and on the faith thereof, the whole revenues of my

country, for the exigencies and purposes of the war during its continuance ; and this I did in order to remove all doubts, jealousies, or difficulties, between me and the representatives of my friends, the Company, in those perilous times ?

“ Did I not repeatedly offer to your Lordship, upon seeing your insufficiency in the management of the countries, and the consequent evils, distresses, and public calamities, to ensure to your Lordship, under the security of good and responsible people, the whole amount of the revenues that could be collected or expected from the countries, grounded upon the medium of the collections for the preceding ten years ; whereby a large revenue of several lacks of pagodas would have been secured for the public exigencies of the war ? But did not your Lordship reject that offer, and disdain all communication with me upon the subject, suffering the revenues in a chief degree to be dissipated, embezzled, and lost ?

“ Did not your Lordship improperly assume the command of the southern army under Colonel Braithwaite, which thereby fell a sacrifice to the enemy, a dreadful calamity to the Carnatic ? Hath not your Lordship taken upon yourself to furnish all the supplies, contingencies, and provisions for Sir Eyre Coote’s army ; and notwithstanding the gallant conduct and repeated victories of Sir Eyre Coote, have not the public been deprived of all the advantages that would naturally have occurred from those victories, by the inability of Sir Eyre to pursue the enemy from the want of those supplies that depended on your Lordship to furnish, notwithstanding the resources of the Company’s countries and mine, from whence the supplies of bullocks should have been furnished, have been entirely under your Lordship’s authority and management ? Have not the operations of Sir Eyre been thereby defeated, and a victorious army rendered inactive and almost confined to the precincts of

Madras, from the time of your Lordship's arrival here; an army that would certainly have cleared the country of Hyder's forces long before the junction of the French, had rice and a proper number of bullocks to carry it been furnished by your Lordship, sufficient to have enabled Sir Eyre to have moved from Madras for any length of time? And does not your Lordship boast of having obtained, since the time of your arrival here, now fourteen months, a supply of 16,000 bullocks for the public service? Is such a supply, my Lord, equal to a fourth part even of the contingencies, or casualties, that must naturally accrue in such a service as the present war? But what sums, my Lord, have been expended in vain, through want of bullocks to convey provisions, and enable the army to act with effect; and what are the misfortunes that now threaten us from the want of those supplies that ought to have been furnished at an earlier period, thereby to have secured the Carnatic against all our enemies? Was it known to your Lordship the supplies and expenditures in the article of bullocks by the Company's people and mine in former wars? Certainly your Lordship would think very little indeed of what you have done in the present. You would blush, my Lord, to mention the small number obtained for the army through your means, though all the resources have been under your authority.

“ It is indeed endless, my Lord, for me to adduce the circumstances of my sufferings, and those of the Company and the public under your Lordship's conduct. I will therefore, for the present, only ask of your Lordship one truth farther, if you have not been tampering and intriguing with my family for the worst of purposes, and thereby seducing those nearest to me of blood from their duty, affections, and allegiance? Could your Lordship believe I was unacquainted with this conduct? But what am I not to suffer under your Lordship's administration?

“ Indeed, my Lord, all these are direful facts, dreadful to my feelings, and big with calamity; and those facts are the true cause of all my suf-

ferings. When in the course of your progress, I have represented and remonstrated to your Lordship, you have cloaked yourself under appeals to your writings, neither known nor communicated to me, but formed to veil your conduct, and to convey to my old friends, the Company, only such information as suits your own purposes; and under that cover framing pleas and excuses for your own conduct, and criminating me in many parts. Such writings you call records; partial representations, made by the offending party, I presume can neither justify your measures, or prejudice me; nor can such representations deserve the name of records until they have been communicated to, and replies made by, those whom they concern.

“ Such, my Lord, are the sufferings of the old, the faithful, and unshaken friend and ally of the English nation, the lawful Prince of the Carnatic; nor will I doubt but that the justice of the English will afford me ample retribution for the injuries done me, and restore my honor and dignity. What can I say more?

P. S. I send you a translation, made with care, by my secretary, of this letter, to prevent mistakes; because the translations in Persian of your letters to me differ from the originals.

No. XVI.

Minute of the PRESIDENT of Fort St. George, relative to a Letter in English, from the Nabob of ARCOT to Lord MACARTNEY, of the 17th August, dated 16th September, 1782.

“ THE President had the honor to lay before the committee, a letter which he lately received from his Highness the Nabob.

“ It is meant to convey the severest censure upon the whole of the President's conduct in this Government, and he acknowledges it is no pleasing performance of his duty to communicate, even to the witnesses of that conduct, charges which derive, at least apparently, their source from a person of so respectable a rank as the Nabob.

“ It is a subject of much mortification to the President to be disappointed in the desire he had formed of pleasing and satisfying his Highness, for whom he has the greatest respect. It is a severe misfortune to him, either to have really had the wickedness of being guilty of those several charges by a flagrant abuse of the trust reposed in him, or, by a faithful discharge of it, at this critical juncture, to have excited the efforts of the Nabob's ministers and advisers to remove him from it, by an accusation on the part of his Highness of heavy crimes.

“ He is aware of the impression that is expected to be made upon the public at a distance by the weight of such a name; he has observed on this occasion the successful union of European address and Oriental eloquence, in exciting the passions to a commiseration of his Highness's sufferings, and in imputing those sufferings to the President.

“ But his inclination would neither prompt, or his situation permit, even if his talents had enabled or his case required, him to have recourse to such arts in aid of his defence. He conceives that it ultimately must rest upon those plain and important matters of fact that have happened in his Government, and which cannot be altered or suppressed: to the deliberate and impartial consideration of them he commits his conduct and himself; perhaps it will be found, that his task has not been easy, or his situation pleasant.

“ The letter indeed, under the Nabob's seal, does not deal much in the proof or even the assertion of fact; but in directing the drift of interrogatory addressed to the President, in such a manner, and with such a tendency, as to insinuate, that the answers, to be true, should be given in the affirmative; which affirmative must stamp a guilt upon the answer.

“ If the truth be really on that side, and the President be guilty of all those crimes concerning which he thus is questioned, no denial of them will prevent the indignation, so justly, in that case, excited by the display of injuries committed and wounds inflicted by him; and if it should prove otherwise, more of that indignation than the President requires will recoil upon the aggressors.

“ If this attack had been restricted to any particular instances of deviation from the general line which has marked the present administration of the Presidency, or had been founded on a supposition of facts, compatible with those which have a known existence, the President might have been justly apprehensive of the consequences of a charge on the part of his Highness, or in his name; and should have to rely on the candor of his employers, in being forgiven for any error, into which he might inadvertently have fallen.

“ But when in the eagerness of accusation, and the vehemence or blindness of passion, every appearance of probability is overturned, and even the testimony of records is rejected, in order to heap upon the President the guilt of tyranny, usurpation, injustice, and other daring crimes, for which he could have no more an incentive than an apology, he trusts it will be sufficient for him to give a plain recital of the facts to which the charge alludes ; and those facts shall not be assertions loosely advanced, to serve the present purpose, but founded on authentic and indisputable documents.

“ Though the letter addressed to the President contains a list of grievances said to be suffered, and of questions supposed to be put by his Highness the Nabob, it is not expected by his ministers or advisers that the former should be acknowledged ; or is it wished that the latter should be answered by the President ; the real object of sending to him such a letter, being the hope of giving weight to those accusations elsewhere, by the boldness of asserting them upon the spot.

“ The President, therefore, runs no risk of giving any real dissatisfaction by not replying to the Nabob's letter, which he shall not do, otherwise than by the subsequent account of his transactions with his Highness.

“ If, as is asserted in this letter, the President had quarrelled with every gentleman of distinction among his own people and the servants of the Company, the repeated expression of their sentiments of his moderation, integrity, and assiduity would come in the President's favor with all the strength of the acknowledgment of enemies.

“ He does not indeed bias the judgment or win the testimony of men, by exciting sentiments in their minds of personal interest or gratitude : strictness to engagements with the Company, and economy in the expen-

diture of its funds, having, in the present administration, superseded every consideration of private advantage.

“ Whether he has had prudence or judgment in the conduct of public affairs, he has had at least the approbation of them by his successive colleagues in the administration implied in their concurrence in his, or his concurrence in their, proposals: no disagreements having happened amongst them; nor has experience thrown any doubt upon the propriety of those proceedings.

“ Of all the proceedings of this Government, none have been carried on with more caution, with so much personal delicacy, or with such reprehensible and indeed reprehended delay, on account of that delicacy, as those which respected his Highness the Nabob:’

“ Though, from the first moment of the invasion of the Carnatic, ‘ he
‘ ceased to pay a single pagoda into the Company’s treasury towards
‘ assisting to repel that invasion as if his own treasury had at once been
‘ annihilated by the event * :’

“ Though he made, but did not perform, even in the smallest degree,
‘ a solemn promise, on the representation of the late Government, and of
‘ Sir Eyre Coote, to pay one lack of pagodas on or before the 1st day of
‘ February 1781; nor did he pay any part of it afterwards † :’

“ Though that General, whose testimony his Highness will not at this time controvert, ‘ would not allow that his Highness’s delay in supplying
‘ money proceeded entirely from inability, as he thought he could not
‘ have exhausted the large sums which he had borrowed from individuals,

* Letter from Governor Smith to the Nabob, April 30, 1781.

† Sir Eyre Coote to the Committee, April 16, 1781.

‘ and the very considerable revenue which he not only collected but extracted from the country, insomuch as to reduce it to a deplorable state even before the enemy entered it * :’

“ Though failing to give money, and having, in lieu of it, assigned to the Company the revenues of the southern provinces of Trichinopoly and Tinnevely towards the support of the war, after having stated, ‘ that the net revenue of the former amounted, at least, to 50,000 pagodas, beside the amount of the assignment to individuals on that revenue; and that the net revenue of Tinnevely was, at least, 200,000 pagodas, beside the assignment to individuals amounting to several lacks †.’ He soon, after the assignment, transmitted a statement of those ‘ provinces by which the charges of Trichinopoly to be defrayed out of the revenues, and to be retained by his officers for that purpose, were made to exceed considerable the revenues of that province, and the revenue of Tinnevely to exceed its charges by little more than one lack of pagodas ‡;’ ‘ and his second son, and minister the Ameer ul Omrah, sent pressing orders to the Phousdar of the province, after such assignment to the Company, to remit to him bills of exchange for that lack of pagodas §:’

“ Though ‘ it was not doubted from the engagements, into which he entered since the invasion of his country, but that he was possessed of the means of furnishing supplies for its defence, and was told, that it was a fatal policy to withhold them in the idea that the Company had too much at stake not to find resources for carrying on the war || :’

“ Though the treasury of Fort St. George was actually exhausted, and that of Bengal much drained, and the civil servants of the Company de-

* Sir Eyre Coote to Committee, April 16, 1781.

† Letter from the Nabob to Governor Whitehill, October 25, 1780.

‡ Letter from the Nabob to Governor Smith, March 5, 1781.

§ Letter from Governor Smith to the Nabob, April 30, 1781. || Ibid.

prived even of their salaries for a long period, in order to apply the amount towards paying troops for the defence of the Carnatic :

“ Though the property of the Company had been sold to raise funds for the same purpose, and money had been taken upon Company’s bonds, while any could be procured upon them, and bills of exchange were drawn upon the Court of Directors, contrary to the instructions and interests of the Company, and though these funds were still so inadequate that the troops were still much in arrear and ready to mutiny :

“ Though his Highness was in possession of the Company’s Jaghire, and received some revenue from it daily, without paying the smallest part of the stipulated rent :

“ Though, ‘ when that assignment of Trichinopoly and Tinevelley was
‘ found to be of no avail by the last system of charges, into which his
‘ Highness would not consent to any enquiry or alteration ; but desired
‘ that the overplus of the revenue of one province should be applied to-
‘ wards defraying the overplus charges of the other, instancing at the
‘ same time such unproductive assignment as a proof of his regard for the
‘ interest of the Company * :’ ‘ and when pressed by the late Government
‘ to give effectual aid, and warned that, unless resources were furnished
‘ for carrying on the war, the most favorable issue of it would be to pur-
‘ chase a peace by ceding a part of the Carnatic to save the remainder †.’
His Highness, to avoid immediate importunity upon the spot, sent agents to the Governor-general and Council of Bengal, informing them, ‘ that
‘ of several talooks or provinces of the Carnatic still secure from the enemy,
‘ some were included in the accounts of the Company, some were
‘ assigned to his creditors, and of some he had received the peshcush or
‘ tribute in advance ; and signifying his consent that whatever should be
‘ collected from those mahals or districts, might be expended for the

* Letter from Governor Smith, April 30, 1781.

† Ibid.

‘ Company ;*’ thinking, at the same time, that the state of war in which the Company was engaged, and the distresses in which it was plunged, afforded no unfavorable occasion for his asserting and obtaining an acknowledgment, ‘ that he was the hereditary Prince of the Carnatic and Balaghaut, and Peanghaut, and was independent of every one ; that the political administration of those countries should be altogether dependent upon him ; and that his good friends, the Company, should not interfere in it †.’

‘ And that a treaty of peace should be made by the King of Great Britain with the King of France, including the rights of his Government without the connection of any one ; together with a power in him to appoint a successor in the Carnatic, to be settled in a solid manner ‡.’

‘ And that his friends, the Company, should be just and favorable to him by assisting to conquer, and by giving into his hands, after the defeat of the enemy, the talooks or provinces of Cuddapah and Zeerghaut, and several mahals or districts in Balaghaut belonging to Carnatic Peanghaut §.’

‘ And that the talook or province of Tanjore was his right, that, conformably to the rules or practice of Indostan, he had taken possession of it with the assistance of his friends, the Representatives of the Company, to whom he had returned his thanks ; but that it was afterwards taken from him by force at the instigation of self-interested people, and his right given up to a ryot or peasant of his ; that if his friends would act justly and give him back Tanjore, great advantage would be derived

* Requests of Nabob to Mr. Hastings communicated to the Presidency of Fort St. George, Aug. 22, 1781.

† Request 2d.

‡ Ibid. 6th.

§ Ibid. 9th.

‘ to the Company’s and his affairs, and the views of the enemy counter-acted ; but if otherwise, that the collections of Tanjore ought to be appropriated to the payment of the Carnatic army, of his, the Nabob’s public and private debts, and to the expulsion of the enemy * :’

“ Though the disposition which was manifested to favor those manifold and momentous requests, might be supposed to induce his Highness to be attentive to the advice he asked, and which followed it ; and though his Highness’s agents solemnly executed, in his name, a treaty of assignment, so advised, of the revenues of the Carnatic for the support of the war, with clauses to render the same really productive : ‘ And though, when entreated to assist in alleviating the distresses of the Presidency, even before the arrival of the treaty, he referred to it as having fixed the assistance he should give † ;’ ‘ and that he solemnly ratified it on its arrival, and promised to execute whatever depended upon him ‡ :’

‘ Though a Committee of assigned revenue was appointed for the more regular, impartial, and effectual execution of this treaty, which was chiefly composed of persons agreeable to the Nabob, and presided by Mr. Paul Benfield §,’ who had been, and is now again, supposed to be honored with much of his Highness’s confidence :

‘ Though the powers, which that Committee unanimously thought essential to be vested in the collectors of such revenues, and implied in the treaty ||,’ were absolutely refused to be granted by his Highness, and Mr. Benfield was said to have incurred for the time, as the proposer of

* Request 10th.

† Message from Ameer to Governor, July 6, 1781.

‡ Nabob’s letter, August 29, 1781.

§ Consultations of Fort St. George, October 6, 1781.

|| Minutes of the Committee of assigned revenue, October 20, 1781, and their letters to Select Committee, November 5, and November 15, 1781.

such powers, his Highness's severest displeasure; and the treaty was by such refusal rendered of as little avail as the former assignment of the southern provinces, which it was to succeed and remedy; and that there was thus some ground for the suspicion of a plan being settled, that the complaints of engagements broken or defeated were to be stifled by new engagements doomed to the same fate; and that the Commander in Chief of the forces declared that, in case of secret and improper correspondence carried on by the Nabob, 'it was better to give up the burdensome task, and spare the British arms from shame and disgrace, and the British interests from the total ruin, in which they might be involved by the hidden and double transactions in the Nabob's Government * :'

" Though the Governor-general and Council of Bengal had expressed their sentiments, 'that the present juncture justified this Presidency, in demanding from the Nabob the immediate transfer of his whole country in exclusive assignment for the expences of the war; and that his Highness's refusal ought to be construed, as it would virtually prove a declared separation of his interests from those of the Company, and would require the adoption of a new system, both for the present security of the latter, and a future indemnification for the expences and hazards entailed on the Company by their former connection with the Nabob † :'

" Though the General of the forces employed in resisting the invasion of the Carnatic, had early observed that 'there was some fundamental error in his Highness's Government of the country, as otherwise the inhabitants would not so speedily have forsaken his interests ‡ :'

'and urged that the experience of his Highness's total inactivity and neglect of his

* Letter from Sir Eyre Coote, September 19, 1781.

† Letter from Governor-general and Council of Bengal, February 26, 1781.

‡ Letter from Sir Eyre Coote, March 12, 1781.

‘ own affairs, and of his having rendered no one aid, and of his continuing
 ‘ inability or disinclination to give the least assistance towards the reco-
 ‘ very of the country then in the hands of the enemy, would justify the
 ‘ Select Committee to their King and country in taking for a time the
 ‘ entire management of the Carnatic * ;’ and the General afterwards im-
 ‘ formed the Committee that ‘ it was necessary to encourage the Polygars,
 ‘ or principal inhabitants, in the hope that they would experience, from
 ‘ the justice and equity of our Government, some relief from, and a de-
 ‘ gree of sincerity against, a repetition of those oppressions which they
 ‘ did not scruple to confess had a principal share in alienating their af-
 ‘ fections from the Nabob’s Government ;†’ and the General also ‘ re-
 ‘ minded the Committee of his having pointed out to them repeatedly
 ‘ the necessity of taking a lead in the executive management of the
 ‘ affairs of the Carnatic until the war should be brought to a conclusion ;
 ‘ and even warned them, in the most expressive terms, of the ruin
 ‘ which, in the midst of all their exertions, might be brought upon the
 ‘ national interests by the duplicity and iniquity of the Nabob’s Go-
 ‘ vernment ‡.’

“ And though the Committee acknowledged ‘ the necessity of a mate-
 ‘ rial change in the executive management of the affairs of the country
 ‘ until the war should be brought to a conclusion, and gave the general
 ‘ assurances that they were employed, by methods consonant to their
 ‘ powers and the Nabob’s engagements, to effectuate those salutary and
 ‘ indeed essential purposes §.’

‘ Yet, they observed, that the connection of the Company with his
 ‘ Highness required, and their instructions directed, that in the transac-

* Ibid. September 11, 1781.

† Letter from Sir Eyre Coote, November 4, 1781.

‡ Ibid. † Ibid. November 8.

§ Letter from the Select Committee, November 12, 1781.

‘ tion of all business with him, they should proceed with temper and even
‘ with delicacy, that they wished to interpose with effect but without
giving offence *. They were indeed determined to give the Nabob
no cause of offence ; and to avoid disagreement with him even after the
infringement of his own treaty, they once more consented to take into con-
sideration new proposals for a new assignment from him.

“ These proposals were another modification of the former assignment ;
better calculated in his opinion, as he said, to preserve the dignity of his
station in the eyes of the people ; and, on that account, absolutely refusing,
as is related by the witnesses to the transaction, to communicate to any of
the Company’s servants, under the rank of the President, any portion of
his authority ; and expressly stipulating, that Mr. Benfield, to whom he was
not yet reconciled, should be removed from every concern in the assigned
revenue. He conferred on the Governor, on behalf of the Company, the
power of renting and managing, in his Highness’s name, the revenues of
the country, which implied a power of regulating the public charges, for a
limited time.

‘ Those who knew the extreme reluctance with which his Highness
‘ had consented, even to the unavailing assignment of two of the southern
‘ provinces upon the irruption of Hyder †, and who reflected upon his
evasion of the assignment expressly stipulated by treaty, publicly declared
that he must have been impelled to the present assignment, which pro-
mised fairer to be efficient than any of the former, either by his know-
ledge of the sentiments of the Governor-general and Council of Bengal,
and his apprehensions of decisive instructions from them to this Presi-
dency, as well as by the effect of the strong and repeated remonstrances
of the Commander in Chief on various instances of his Highness’s mis-

* Letter from the Select Committee, November 12, 1781.

† Letter from Governor Smith, April 30, 1781.

conduct, or that he had unusual confidence in the present President, and found that no dissuasive arguments would operate upon his integrity, or that his Highness and his ministers still flattered themselves that they should be able to defeat the present as they had defeated the past assignments.

“ But the marked respect of the President towards the Nabob, and his prepossessions in his Highness’s favor, would not allow him to see in this transaction, at that time, the effects of any other causes than those of his Highness’s regard for the Company and the English nation, and his sense of the necessity of sacrificing every inferior consideration to the support of the common cause.

“ He was particularly solicitous too that his Highness should experience from this arrangement, the gratification which he had so much at heart, to recommend as the chief instrument of it his second son and minister the Ameer ul Omrah, who, beside the unfavorable character he bore in the private opinions of men, was frequently recorded in the general letters of the Presidency, to be artful, intriguing, and adverse to the interest of the Company; and in the very Government which had favored his father’s views upon the kingdom of Tanjore, ‘ this second son’s restless spirit of ambition was a ground of apprehension and representation *;’ and concerning whom, lest he should gain a dangerous confidence in the unsuspecting breast of a person lately arrived in the country, a very respectable person in high rank and trust, whom his Highness the Nabob calls his good friend, thought it necessary to write to the President, and, *though it might be displeasing, to caution him, from his regard for him as well as for the welfare of his country, against the intrigues of the Ameer.*

“ But whatever may have been the number or magnitude of his demerits on former occasions, the President was careful to proclaim his

* General Letter from Governor Wynch and Council, July 4, 1775.

merit in forwarding the present arrangement which promised to be essentially beneficial.

“ The President’s tongue and pen, which the Nabob’s letter supposes were employed in diffusing his own praises on this occasion, were employed on the more necessary occasion of praising the Ameer. ‘ He informed the Select Committee in the handsomest terms of the considerable pains which had been taken by his Excellency, in forwarding this important business * ;’ ‘ and on the President’s assurance of them, an account, to that purport, was transmitted by the Select Committee to the Court of Directors †.’

“ The part, which the President had borne in this transaction, did not require the assistance of his own tongue or pen to impress a favorable sense of it upon the public ; they were sufficiently inclined to give him credit for qualities which they thought must be exerted in order to derive from the very urgency of public affairs, what, on no former and similar urgency, had been produced : an arrangement capable, if supported and continued, of establishing that certainty of revenue and security of defence on the coast, which the Company had found to be precarious ; and which objects it had in vain attempted to attain ever since its arms had given the Nabobship to his Highness.

‘ The members of the Committee therefore thought it would be the greatest injustice to themselves as well as to the President, to be content with the mere expression of their approbation of such a measure : to attain an object of that magnitude, and which had so much opposition to encounter in the jealousy and prejudices of the Nabob, the greatest ability would alone have been ineffectual without that judicious and

* Consultations of Fort St. George, December 4, 1781.

† General letter to the Court of Directors, January 26, 1781.

‘temperate line of conduct which the President preserved throughout the
 ‘negociation, and the most perfect conviction in the mind of the Nabob
 ‘of his just and upright intentions *.’

“Not the tongues and pens alone of the immediate witnesses of the President’s conduct rendered it unnecessary for him to proclaim his own exertions or address; but the members of the superintending Council of Bengal, who, in investing this Government with every authority and confidence which could aid its operations, declared that they did so from their perfect reliance upon the impartial, clear, and discriminating judgment of the President, who was disconnected with any local or party views in the Carnatic, and, from his great experience in public affairs, would distinctly and justly decide, where the claims of the subject interfered with those of the Government, and where the rights of Princes in alliance were involved with both under all the evils of a general war †.’

“This declaration was accompanied by an express desire, ‘that in a crisis of such actual danger to the existence of the territorial rights of the Nabob of Arcot, and Rájah of Tanjore, no obstructions of their little contests, or any unseasonable interposition of their local authority, should be permitted to prevent this Government from taking care that the produce of the country be collected and applied to its immediate defence ‡;’ and the Governor-general and Council, on hearing of the voluntary cession of the revenues of the Carnatic for the support of the war, ‘express their entire satisfaction, and applaud the ability and address with which so considerable a point must have been gained from the Nabob §.’

* Minute in the Select Committee, December, 4, 1781.

† Letter from Supreme Council of Bengal, December, 26, 1781. ‡ Ibid.

§ Letter from Governor-general and Council of Bengal, March 11, 1782.

“ Whatever were the flattering hopes entertained by the President, or confidence placed by him in the cordiality and sincerity of his Highness and his ministers, the Committee had very soon occasion to observe to the Governor-general and Council of Bengal, ‘ that the power lately
‘ vested in the President was found liable to be counteracted by artifice
‘ prevailing on the habits of implicit obedience to the intimation of
‘ any wishes from the ministers of his Highness; and that though the
‘ authority immediately entrusted to the Governor was exercised by a
‘ Committee of gentlemen, selected for that purpose, from their know-
‘ ledge in and their application to public business, there was reason to
‘ apprehend that it was the perseverance only of that Committee in its
‘ efforts and the continuance of a decided support from their superin-
‘ tending Board that could enable them to succeed in that desirable but
‘ arduous undertaking *.’

“ To the Board of Assigned Revenue, as a fit object of their sole occupation, the whole detail of this important business has been, in fact, uninterruptedly entrusted.

“ Transactions carried on by a public Board, open to the inspection of his Highness, subject to the control of Government, and rendered effectual only by the signature of the Governor, were not likely to wear the impression of that rashness, violence, and oppression, into which sole and unlimited authority sometimes degenerates; or of that partiality and corruption, to which the darkness and secrecy of private offices might afford a temptation, as well as an opportunity to individuals.

“ Had his Highness the Nabob, and his Excellency the Ameer, been as sincere in their wishes and cordial in their co-operation, as they were strenuous in the expressions of their hope of benefit from

* Letter to Governor-general and Council of Bengal, February 1, 1782.

this arrangement, which was in fact, on all sides, allowed to be highly necessary, and capable of being as highly beneficial ; this arrangement, of which the execution was placed with so much caution into such proper hands, who were vested with the apparent absolute authority of the Nabob, could not fail of producing immediately its natural effect.

“ It requires therefore neither the assistance of real or fabricated testimony to prove, because the nature of thing demonstrates, that this assignment, which, as proving ineffectual, his Highness the Nabob soon required to be surrendered back to him, could not have even for a time become so ; or the fact take place which furnished the opportunity of making this demand, otherwise than by the operation of that assignment having been secretly counteracted and interrupted, by the only means that could affect it ; and which had been sufficient to overturn all the former public engagements of the Nabob ; and which seem to proceed from the adoption of that short-sighted policy so long observed to have influenced his Highness's conduct, and so frequently expressed in the accounts given to the Company, of his publicly consenting to what he privately prohibited ; and which constitute part of those fundamental errors, those hidden and double transactions, and that duplicity and iniquity in the Nabob's Government already mentioned to have been repeatedly represented to this Government.

“ It is really true, that for a considerable time after the execution of this assignment it was utterly unproductive.

“ The attention of the President towards the Nabob, and which operated upon the whole Committee, the determination of proceeding with delicacy and tenderness towards even the officers, who had been of his Highness's appointment, induced the President, who had an express

power to remove, to make a point of continuing the Nabob's own Aumildars and Renters in their respective offices.

‘ But it was found that those people, instead of obeying his orders respecting the revenues, were still influenced by the Nabob's ministers ; and that remittances were secretly made to the Ameer ul Omrah, notwithstanding all the vigilance exerted to oppose it, and which only was sufficient to detect it. Every information even, or account of the collections made in the different districts, was withheld by various evasions and delays *.

“ Of the Ameer's early intention to defeat, and his industry in defeating, this assignment, the testimony is not derived from native and devoted servants, or subjects terrified, or obscure, or partial individuals, from whom false attestations might be extorted ; but from facts which are stubborn, unequivocal, and involve the intention.

“ That the same was indeed universally observed, may be collected from the report summed up and transmitted among others by the Company's resident in the southern countries. Mr. John Sullivan, who is added here because he is known to be of a character too respectable to be doubted, as well as too solid to take notice of slight surmises to the prejudice of his Highness or his family.

“ Mr. Sullivan acknowledges ‘ that the suspicions relative to the Durbar were too well founded ; that every letter he received from the southward, mentioned some instances of counteraction ; that the people of the country were taught to look upon the interference of the Company as a temporary measure that must soon terminate ; and that vengeance was

* Letter from Select Committee to Governor-general and Council of Bengal, March 13, 1782.

‘ denounced against every man who should dare to oppose the mandates
‘ of the Durbar *.’

“ Had the President from partiality favored or from weakness suffered,
the speedy termination so announced of the assignment, he might have
escaped the invectives thrown upon him in the name of his Highness;
‘ and his Highness might perhaps still declare, that it was through his
‘ good fortune that the President had arrived here; and his hopes from
‘ the well known honor and abilities of the President would have been
‘ realized †.

“ It is possible too that the hopes of his Excellency the Ameer may
have been checked in a point which was personal to himself, and which
he is fond of tacking, being an object of some difficulty, to the assign-
ments granted by his father.

‘ The exalted and illustrious Emperor Shau Allum had been pleased
‘ out of his great favor and high esteem for the Nabob Wallaw Jaw,
‘ to give and grant by his Royal Phirmaund, bearing date the 26th Au-
‘ gust 1765, to him and to his eldest son Omdat ul Omrah, the Govern-
‘ ment of the Carnatic Paenghaut; and the Great Nabob Nizam Ali
‘ Soubah of the Decan was likewise pleased to consent that the Govern-
‘ ment of the Carnatic Paenghaut should be enjoyed as a free gift by the
‘ said Nabob Wallaw Jaw, and after him by his eldest son Omdat ul
‘ Omrah ‡.’

“ This Phirmaund or grant of the Mogul, which was obtained by Lord
Clive, and accompanied by titles which the Nabob still uses, ‘ was, in

* Letter from Mr. Sullivan to the Select Committee of Fort St. George, Feb. 14, 1782.

† Nabob's letter, August 29, 1781.

‡ Treaty between the East India Company, the Nabob Waulaw Jau, and the Great
Nabob Nizam Ali Soubah of the Decan. Article 7.

‘ 1766, proclaimed at his desire in the presence of the Governor and
 ‘ Council of this place, of the principal inhabitants, and of all his sirdars
 ‘ or leaders of troops. By such acceptance of the grant he acknow-
 ‘ ledged the authority of the Mogul to dispose of that Government, and
 ‘ which grant fixed the succession in his eldest son. By a treaty between
 ‘ the Nabob and the French, the same succession was agreed to. In the
 ‘ treaty just quoted by the Soubah of the Decan in 1768, to which the
 ‘ Nabob was a party, the same line of succession was confirmed. The
 ‘ Company were guarantees of the treaty; and the Nabob actually after-
 ‘ wards joined this his eldest son in and for the payment of all the bonds
 ‘ given to his Highness’s creditors as the heir and successor to the
 ‘ Carnatic *.’

“ However, so early as in November 1775, a general letter from the
 Court of Directors mentions the apprehensions, communicated to them, of
 the Nabob’s design to appoint his second son his successor in the Carnatic,
 which design ‘ they disapprove, and desire their representatives to pre-
 ‘ vent; and to secure the Government of the Carnatic in a just and lineal
 ‘ succession, according to the above phirmaund and treaty of 1768 †.’

“ His Highness the Nabob means however that the succession should not
 be thus secured; but in the treaty with the Government of Bengal for the
 assignment of the revenues in April, 1781, he desires, ‘ that his right to
 ‘ appoint a successor in the Carnatic may be settled in a solid manner by
 ‘ a treaty between European sovereigns ‡.’

“ The good will and word of his Highness the Nabob, and of his Ex-
 cellency the Ameer, ‘ must indeed be secured to the Governor-general of

* General letter to Court of Directors, July 4, 1775.

† Letter from Court of Directors, November 25, 1775.

‡ Request 6th to Governor-general.

‘ Bengal, by the implicit faith he appears to have placed in the information
‘ given to him by the Nabob’s dewan or agent, that the Nabob possessed
‘ letters from the Company and the King’s minister, and the King him-
‘ self, on the subject of his Highness’s will ; and by his reliance on co-
‘ pies, presented to him by such agent, of letters from the King, and
‘ from the Company, all expressing a clear acknowledgment of the
‘ Nabob’s right to appoint a successor to the Government of the
‘ Carnatic *.’

“ Had prudent and personal policy superseded sentiments of rectitude and adherence to instructions in the mind of the President, he would have avoided observing, after the examination to which his duty led him, that nothing was found, on the records of this Presidency, to confirm the information of the Nabob’s dewan ; and which only contain a letter from his Majesty, simply expressive, as to this subject, of his receipt of the Nabob’s will, and of his royal promise, that the same should be preserved as a sacred deposit until his Highness’s decease ; but no recognition, on the part of the King or of the Company, of his Highness’s right to dispose of the Carnatic, nor any other order or instruction, except that already quoted, which had the direct contrary tendency.

“ This want of confidence in the assertions of the Nabob’s agent, or in the copies of letters produced by him ; this reference to, and examination of, the records of the Presidency, and of the Company’s instructions, may have perhaps been considered by his Excellency the Ameer, as a virtual infringement of the last assignment in December 1781, in which he is acknowledged to have borne a considerable share, and for which he may have expected the return of a more valuable consideration than the commendations that were given of him.

* Governor general’s reply.

“ If at least the President had, on the occasion of this last assignment, fed the fanciful hopes of his Highness, and had promised to promote his views of being *independent of every one* and of gaining possession of *Cuddapah* and *Zeergbaut*, and other districts of *Balaghaut*, and of soon recovering *the talook or province of Tanjore*, then possessed by a *ryot or peasant* of his, and in the mean time of throwing *all his public and private debts upon the revenues of that province*, which conditions had accompanied his precedent assignment; and, as the present grant was still more beneficial, if, in return, the President had encouraged him ‘to revive his scheme of acquiring the Soubahship of the Decan, which he once seriously proposed *,’ and of which Mr. Due Pre and Mr. Hastings thought his ambition had never lost sight †:’ persuaded that his ‘earnest wishes were to possess all Indostan if he could ‡;’ It is not unlikely that the President might have been favorably represented by the Nabob, in his letters to Europe, and even entrusted, on the President’s return there, to assist in the promotion of his projects §.

“ But the President, adopting the principles often inculcated by the Company, and sometimes forgotten by its servants, took occasion, in order to calm the jealousies of the neighbouring powers, to declare with the Select Committee, and has since kept up to the declaration, ‘that the power and arms of the Company were solely to be directed to the maintainance of peace and harmony among its allies, to the establishment of justice, and the promotion of happiness; and that it was clearly best not to disturb the possessions of the several powers of Indostan, but that they and the Company should continue satisfied with what they then respectively possessed ||.’

* Letter from the Nabob to the Court of Directors, January 29, 1765.

† Letter from Court of Directors, December 24, 1765.

‡ Consultations of Fort St. George, May 6, 1771.

§ Letter to Court of Directors, Feb. 28, 1772.

|| Instructions to the Resident at the Court of the Soubah of the Decan, July 10, 1781.

“ A deference to instructions, and a consideration of a right, which were so opposite to the second son's unjust designs, and principles of equity and moderation equally opposite to the father's weak and inordinate ambition, rendered the present President more unpalatable to both, and rendered his removal from the Government much more an object of their eager desire, than the ostensible reasons alledged for their discontent.

“ It is true, that the former administration of this Presidency had observed, and observed it personally to his Highness, ‘ that not all the calamities which had already befallen him, nor the danger with which he was still threatened, seemed to carry to him any profitable instruction; but that he contended for privilege and punctilio to the sacrifice of his dearest interests, with as much earnestness as if in the plenitude of his power *.’

“ But his Highness must be sensible, in the present instance, that any infringements of his privileges or deficiency in punctilio could originate only in the Committee of assigned revenue, who first examine, deliberate, prepare, and recommend, all matters, without exception, that relate to the Nabob's assignment. The detail, and in the detail his Highness seeks for occasions of complaint, is entirely left to the direction of that Committee. The President fully trusting to that discretion, approves and signs, the Select Committee likewise approve, conscious however that they all are answerable for this their approbation.

“ But if a measure unjust, erroneous, or even merely unbecoming, happened, at any time, to be imposed upon their confidence, a representation to them, on the part of his Highness, would not have to combat any of the private motives that might have led to the suggestion of that

* Letter from Governor Smith to Nabob, April 30, 1781.

measure, nor even with the predilection of self-opinion ; but that redress which, when the grievance is suffered and not demanded, is not the redress that is really wanted.

“ It was therefore no particular hardship felt in the execution, or any abuse of the assignment, which might have been remedied upon the spot, but the entire and absolute surrender of that assignment, which was the real object with the Nabob and his ministers ; ‘ nor did they ‘ scruple actually to found an argument, for the propriety of that surrender, on the failure of the revenue from the Renters of the Nabob’s ‘ appointment, whom the President’s delicacy towards his Highness had ‘ continued in their offices. His Highness repeated his wish to take ‘ again the management of his country into his hands, and said he ‘ would give good and proper security for all the revenue *.’ This would have been a fourth new arrangement since the commencement of the war ; the proposals, the discussions, the agreements, the subsequent breaches of the former arrangements, had consumed near two years, during which nothing as to revenue was executed. The war was waged by the enemy, but not supported by the country. The period was fully arrived for carrying into effect some of the plans, which, as eligible, already were agreed to, rather than incur the further delays of other new proposals, however they also might be eligible. But this last proposal, with the certain loss of time, and an appearance that at least was suspicious, could not really be effected by the one party, and ought not to have been accepted by the other. As to security for revenue in this country, it is only obtained on giving to the sureties, for their indemnification, possession of the lands which are to yield such revenue, with an allowance of a considerable percentage to be deducted from the crops, and an opportunity of deducting a great deal more : all which must fall ultimately upon the public. It is no mark of disrespect to his Highness to assert,

* Nabob’s letter, March 7, 1782.

that it was not safe or warrantable to depend for the supply of the army's wants on the punctuality of the best and most proper security he could have to offer. Where deficiency in receipts was the very evil to be remedied and punctuality was become essential; actual possession was not to be exchanged for any security of the fund. Much of the benefit to be expected was to arise from economy in the charges, and diminution of the exactions, as well as accuracy and fidelity in the accounts. The sureties would produce new charges and new exactions, and might not be accurate or faithful. And as to the Nabob's own management to render them so, the words of the Select Committee at a former period may justly be repeated. It is obvious that if a successful collection of the revenues depended upon the exertion and authority of his Highness, and that he had been sincerely disposed to let the Company have them to defray the expenses of the war, those revenues might have been thrown into the Company's treasury immediately from his Highness's officers, without the intervention of the Company's officers. Whether the total failure which has happened in this respect, be owing to the want of inclination, power, or skilfulness on the part of his Highness, the fact equally proves the necessity of using other means than those which have hitherto proved ineffectual.

“ But of the delicacy which retarded the good effect of the plan already executed, the Governor-general and Council of Bengal did not give their approbation. They express ‘ their regret that any consideration, even of delicacy towards the Nabob, or attention for those feelings which it might be natural for him to retain, should have in this situation of necessity restrained the complete effect of the assignment; and they recommend the placing of persons in the management of the assigned countries who were likely to be more under the control and authority of the Select Committee *.’

* Letter from Governor-general and Council of Bengal, April 5, 1782.

“ This Presidency was obliged to apologize to that superintending Board, and to observe, ‘ that if, in their transactions with the Nabob, ‘ they seem to have been too much guided by the spirit of caution and ‘ forbearance, such caution really proceeded from an anxious desire of ‘ making the Nabob a principal and willing party to the measures to be ‘ taken for his own immediate security *.’

“ Those measures, described minutely in the proceedings of the Committee of Assigned Revenue, shewed all the means that were pursued to effectuate the purposes of the assignment, and the precise manner of carrying it into execution. They were transmitted to Bengal, where his Highness already had appealed ; and sent that minister to support his new complaint, who had managed his former treaty.

“ It requires no long experience of Oriental practises to be convinced, and information was indeed actually received, ‘ that every species of ‘ intrigue, artifice, and falshood were employed to give an odious coloring to those proceedings ; a plan was said to be regularly formed, and ‘ it appears by his Highness’s present letter, to be completely executed, ‘ of throwing out such a multitude of aspersions that it might be taken ‘ for granted there must be some ground for accusation. †’ Out of a vast number of false tales, fabricated letters, and distorted facts, a few it was hoped, would meet with credit ; and a few of such would answer the purpose of imposition. Each would produce the double effect of injuring the President and that Committee. They were the authors and advisers of all the measures respecting the Nabob, his revenues and countries. They possessed no power separately from the President—he exerted no power but in signing the orders they advised ; ‘ he claimed only the merit of ‘ adopting the measures suggested by that Committee ‡’—their cause was

* Letter to Governor-general and Council of Bengal, May 1, 1782.

† Letter from Select Committee to Bengal, June 29, 1782.

‡ Minute on Report of Assigned Revenue, May 30, 1782.

therefore common; and the judgment pronounced has been that, 'of satisfaction with their proceedings, and entire approbation of their conduct *.'

" Before this decision was thus pronounced, Assam Cawn, the Nabob's dewan, or revenue-minister, had already been a considerable time employed at the Presidency of Bengal, in endeavoring to prevent the approbation, and in endeavoring to procure a condemnation, of this conduct. His restoration to the management of the public revenues would have followed his success. The representative and minister of the Governor-general and Council to the Nabob, 'and who was appointed for the purpose of maintaining the faith of that Government with his Highness †,' and had previously been one of his Highness's agents at Calcutta, was also returned there; and those two ministers were abundantly able to detect any error in that conduct, or to solve any doubt, and supply any deficiency, which might have prevented that Government from forming a full and just opinion of the contest. The majority of its members had resided on this coast, and were not suspected by his Highness. The choice they made of one of the Nabob's agents sent publicly to them in that capacity, to be their representatives back to his Highness here at his desire, and totally independent of the Company's representatives in this Presidency, seems to establish a separate interest for the Nabob with the Presidency of Bengal. His Highness is said to have written to Mr. Hastings, that *he was his old friend, and that he depended on God Almighty, and then on him for justice and protection.*

" Yet this assignment, considered upon such evidence, and before such judges, and in the vicinage of its object, is neither overturned or transferred; but in hands accused of not knowing how to make a good,

* Letter from Governor-general and Council of Bengal, July 4, 1782.

† Ibid. April 2, 1782.

but of having made a bad use of it, 'is still found to be the first and 'natural means of maintaining the defence of the Carnatic; and continues to be approved *.'

"In the proceedings thus attacked by the Nabob, but thus approved by the judge, to whom he had appealed for justice and protection, will be found the answers to all the most important of his Highness's present interrogatories, calculated to obtain from Europe that success which the same complaints in another dress had failed to obtain in Bengal.

"He has chosen a mode of conveying his censure, which undoubtedly possesses the advantages he wanted. Queries leading to the answers, and addressed to the person on whom a guilt is intended to be fixed, convey an air of confidence in such a notoriety and consciousness of the facts, that he must make those answers against himself; and preclude, of course, the necessity of other evidence. If that evidence should, however, on his denial, be required, no reproach can attend the want of it, for a question strictly is not an assertion.

"Those questions find however their negative, with a full explanation of the subject to which they bear relation, in the abovesaid minutes of the Committee of Assigned Revenue. The motives for advising to chuse new Renters, the precautions in the recommendations of them, their names, qualities, and connexions; and the conditions, and comparative statements of the rents are inserted therein at length.

"If these motives had not, after the objections made to them at Calcutta by the Nabob's agents, been yet found good, and the precautions proper and sufficient, and the conditions reasonable, the Governor-

* Letter from Governor-general and Council, August 5, 1782.

general and Council of Bengal would not have felt the satisfaction, or given the approbation they expressed of the proceedings in these important as well as in all other respects.

“ It is not even pretended that the President, and it is known he has not, prescribed, in relation to the revenue, any condition, or made any appointment of his own ; but if he were to deny, the nature and occasion of the assignment would testify, and the trust in him would imply, that he was obliged to nominate the most responsible Renters, and upon the highest terms, and with the best security that could be found ; and a committee of five persons was accordingly appointed by him, and enquiries made, and advertisements published by them, in order to procure such.

“ This method of advertisement, which his Highness suffers himself to call a disgrace upon his Government, is the method which the Court of Directors positively order to be pursued in letting out their lands, and which reflects upon them no disgrace. It opens the markets to all bidders ; it prevents private preference ; and what may have given real pain, it precludes the opportunity of suspicion or of plausible censure.

“ It is however not impossible but that the choice may, in some instances, have fallen on men who will not always correspond to the confidence placed in them, and the hopes that were formed of them : essential favors are sometimes not requisite by fidelity and attachment.

“ *The speedy termination, to which the people were taught to look, of the Company's interference in the revenues and the vengeance denounced against those who, contrary to the mandate of the Durbar, should be connected with them, as reported by Mr. Sullivan, may, as much as the former exactions and oppressions of the Nabob in the revenue as reported by the Com-*

mander in Chief, have deterred some of the fittest men from offering to be concerned in it.

“ The timid disposition of the Hindoo natives of this country was not likely to be insensible to the specimen of that ‘ vengeance given by his
‘ Excellency the Ameer, who, upon the mere rumor that a Bramin of
‘ the name of Appagee Row had given proposals to the Company for the
‘ Rentership of Nellore, had the temerity to send for him, and to put him
‘ in confinement *.

“ A man, thus seized by the Nabob’s Sepoys, within the walls of Madras, gave a general alarm; and Government found it necessary to promise the protection of the Company, in order to calm the apprehensions of the people.

“ As yet, however, it is not known that the Renters or managers, employed by the Committee of assigned revenue, have been guilty of embezzling any revenue; but those with whom the situation of the enemy’s forces allows a communication with our troops, and a conveyance of safety with this Presidency, have, more than embezzlement would have, discontented his Excellency the Ameer, in surmounting some of those obstructions to the progress of the army, against which the Commander in Chief had strongly and repeatedly remonstrated in the Nabob’s Government, and in remitting sums for the support of the troops, of an amount considerable in proportion to the times, and unexampled since the war, in any the smallest degree, under his Highness’s Government, or the management of his Renters.

“ What promises were made, in addition to the amount of the rent, is not merely implied, but is expressly declared in the instrument of writ-

* Letter to Governor-general and Council of Bengal, March 12, 1782.

ing, executed by his Highness and by the President. The engagement of the latter appears to have been "that the rent should not be inferior to the net revenue of his Highness's Exchequer in similar circumstances*."

"This engagement was made in the name, and on the behalf of the Company. If the committee of Assigned Revenue were so inattentive to this engagement, and to their duty, and to their interest in gaining by their exertions the approbation of their employers, and to the public welfare depending on such resources, as to propose the acceptance of lesser rents than those they could obtain, 'and which appear to be very nearly equal to the average of the aggregate rents of the four last years preceding the war, even according to the Nabob's account †.' If the Select Committee to whom, from the other Committee, these proposals were submitted, could have been so weak, ignorant, or wicked, as to approve of the weakness, ignorance, or wickedness of others; and, lastly, if the President, who is alone made culpable for this transaction, could wantonly render himself so culpable by conforming to the folly or the guilt of those two Boards; the Company is undoubtedly liable to the Nabob for such a misconduct of their servants; and would be bound to make good to his Highness what he had suffered by this breach of their engagement.

"For the discussion on the existence of such a breach, and the degree of it, if it had existed, his Highness might, and indeed the 'Governor-general and Council have declared all controversial explanations with him ought to be referred to that period, at which he may require a restitution of the trust, and a faithful report of the manner in which it shall have been discharged ‡.'

* Agreement between his Highness the Nabob and Lord Macartney on behalf of the Company, December 2, 1781.

† Minutes of the Committee of Assigned Revenue, May 2, 1781.

‡ Letter from Governor-general and Council of Bengal, April 6, 1782.

“ But, in fact, the security of Renters under the Company’s protection, and immediately communicating with the Presidency, against interference and injustice of civil or military officers residing in their respective districts, as well as against the caprice and exactions of the Nabob’s ministers, was an inducement powerful enough even to counter-vail this disadvantage of the past, and the danger of the future, evils of the war.

‘ Those Rents, with the great reduction of unnecessary charges, have
‘ left an estimated balance, in case of an end being put to the present
‘ invasion, much greater than the members of the Government of Bengal
‘ confess they had any idea of*.’

“ In regard to the nomination of Renters, truth would have forced the President to answer affirmatively to his Highness’s interrogatory, if instead of asking whether his Lordship did not solemnly engage and promise that the Renters to be appointed by him should be subject to the Nabob’s confirmation, ‘ his Highness had asked whether he had not empowered the Governor to appoint all Aumildars or Renters, to be confirmed by his Highness †,’ which are, in fact, the precise words, as far as they go, of the first sentence relative to this point in the assignment ; and his Highness, who is possessed of a counterpart of it, would have stuck to the words exactly if he had been quite sure that they would have answered all his purposes ; but he suspected that the exact words might not convey the idea of that express stipulation for the absolute subjection of such Renters, and the indispensable condition of his confirmation : which the substituted words more strongly indicate.

“ The sentence as it is here quoted and really stands in the original, the Nabob’s advisers foresaw, would be considered as simply and strictly

* Letter to Select Committee, July 4, 1782.

† Assignment, December 2, 1781.

declarative of two acts on the part of his Highness : a present act in empowering the Governor to appoint Renters, and a future act in confirming such Renters ; it is a plain and simple confirmation promised by him absolutely, not conditionally ; if it had been meant to be conditionally, the appointment would have really been expressed, as his Highness felt it to be necessary to represent it as *subject* to his confirmation. The failure in this instance cannot be the breach of the President, who did not engage for the performance ; but of his Highness who did. Perhaps he considers it merely as a ceremony intended to gratify his own wishes of maintaining his dignity, his favorite precaution, in the eyes of the people ; and which therefore he might refuse without giving occasion for complaint ; but if, of consequence, as perhaps it was, to strengthen agreeably to the meaning of the word, the authority of the new Renters ; the absolute refusal of it might, in the degree of that consequence, be, instead of a ground of accusation on the part of his Highness, a juster ground against him, if it were not the determined purpose of this Committee to be silent except when the just defence of others calls them forth.

“ The intent of this assignment would not indeed have merited the praise it has acquired, if, according to that intent, its operations were left to the uncertain determinations of either of the parties ; but an agreement solemnly executed, expressing what each is to do, is on each obligatory to do. The idea of confirmation in implying choice in particular circumstances has arisen from the necessity of public affairs, which requires sometimes the temporary nomination to offices at a distance from the seat of Government ; when the purpose is answered, though the nomination should not afterwards be approved. There is no necessity, no obligation to continue it, the continuance of it is a voluntary confirmation, that might have been withheld because it was not promised though it might have been expected ; but a confirmation previously covenanted, implies, at the period of performance, no internal approbation or act of the mind, which is not always at a man's disposal,

but a mere external act, that is so; and in the present instance consists in nothing more than the signature to a paper called a suned or cowle; and lest by any misconstruction of words, or confusion of ideas, it should have been possible to mistake this absolute for a conditional engagement, it is repeated in the second sentence of the assignment, on the subject of the nomination of Renters; in which his Highness expressly covenants in so many precise words, *that he will give the usual cowle to the Aumildars who will be appointed by the Governor.* This engagement stands therefore no longer on construction, it leaves no room for doubt or cavil. The Governor is answerable for the appointment; the Nabob is bound to the confirmation.

“ If, unfortunately, the Aumildars could not have proceeded without this action on the part of his Highness, and that the assignment were therefore become a nullity, he alone by his express refusal of such confirmation would have been accountable for the failure of what is allowed to be, and declaredly approved as being the first and natural means of maintaining the defence of the Carnatic.

“ The appointment was found, however, to constitute the Renter, the deed of appointment, or *Torana Chit*, was the only deed and saned executed by the President; but, if more had been necessary to give effect to the assignment, he would or certainly ought to have done it readily; for it has been already shown that the produce of the country was not, previously to the assignment, collected, or applied to its defence. That collection, and that application were the objects of the assignment. If the local authority of the Nabob interposed to impede it, this Presidency was required, by the superintending Presidency of Bengal, ‘ whom it is bound to obey, not to permit such an unseasonable interposition to take effect *.’

* Letter from Supreme Council, December 26, 1781.

“ The management of revenue includes a power to reduce expenses ; and the assent to that reduction is in the Nabob’s letter formally acknowledged. In that indispensable reduction of expenses, in that forbearance from payment of useless officers and retainers, has consisted what his Highness in the same letter describes, as an unwarrantable dismissal of all his people ; ‘ though, as was observed to the Presidency of Bengal, ‘ his Excellency the Ameer ul Omrah mentioned the convenience of ‘ getting rid of a vast load of useless pensioners and retainers through the ‘ authority of the President, which their connexions, interests, or importunities at the Durbar would have rendered impracticable for his Highness ‘ alone to effectuate *.’

“ It is true that the forbearance from pay might have operated as an effectual dismissal from office, if before, for a considerable time, those officers had depended on, and had been in the receipt of any pay ; but the distinction, the power which office gave, and especially the exactions which it effected as well as screened, were sufficient incitements to continue in it without salary. The exactions indeed have been also checked by the Company’s Aumildars ; and his Highness’s officers may have really diminished in their number, as well as in their power of doing evil ; but the President issued no order for their removal ; the Select Committee, or Committee of Assigned Revenue, gave no order. The Company’s Government is exercised, and its authority conveyed, by formal and fixed channels. Its commands are not signified by nods, or obedience paid to the obscure or irregular intimation of its will. If the President, from the Presidency, assumed and exerted any authority in the Nabob’s country, except what is relative to revenue on the suggestion of the revenue Committee, as he was authorized to do, the evidence of that assumption and exertion, must exist in letters or orders from him, as his

* Letter from Select Committee, July 12, 1782.

revenue letters and orders do, but none other than the last described ever did exist.

“ Little indeed is the authority really necessary to exert over the peaceful and timid Hindoo natives of this country. Few disturbances arise among them. The common police is regulated by the natwars, or chiefs and heads of casts, residing on the spot. Disputes are settled by arbitration under the direction of the Aumildar, who is an officer of justice, as well as of revenue; and Christian and Mahometan interference are equally dreaded by them.

“ The Renters have not, which they would willingly have, given as a pretext for some allowance in their rents, any accounts of disorder or confusion in the towns or villages, except where the enemy's troops have introduced it. As the rest therefore are not in a state of anarchy, either the Nabob's officers continue in their employments, or it is not necessary they should do so. ‘ His Highness's latest communications on current business, not intended for working an effect in Europe, show indeed the continuance of his officers in their respective stations through the country *.’

“ The specific charge of the removal of the Courts of Justice from the Nabob's Government House to another House at Tritchinopoly implies, however, the continued existence of those courts; and the omission of any specific charge, in relation to the courts in any other of the Nabob's districts, seems to imply that in those others no alteration had been made. It is true that the courts at Tritchinopoly were removed; but without any authority from hence: and it is not less true that orders were ‘ immediately transmitted by the President, that they should return to the Nabob's Government House †.’

* Nabob's note to the Governor, September 4, 1782.

† President's letter to Mr. Norriss, March 9, 1782.—Tritchinopoly book in the Assigned Revenue office.

“ His Highness made, and has frequently repeated, a specific charge of bloodshed in consequence of the execution of a jemidar or lieutenant of cavalry for mutiny at Nellore.

“ The depositions at length were laid before his Highness. If he had made a requisition, as he has on former less serious occasions done, for a court martial on Captain Campbell commandant at Nellore, at the time, it would have been granted; but an acquittal might impede the aim, with which the charge is now renewed. If the times admitted of Captain Campbell's being relieved from his command, a requisition from the Nabob for a trial would have been unnecessary: but the act whether just and necessary, or unnecessary and unjust, is not the President's act; nor did he give any powers or any directions that might have led to it.

“ The loss of noses and of ears is for the first time mentioned in this letter from the Nabob: no names are mentioned of sufferers, or of the places where they suffered, or of the persons who, under the President's authority, committed those cruelties and oppressions. It is not pretended that the President directed the commission of those cruel acts; if the authority he had given has happened to be abused, he is no more accountable for it than is the Nabob for the flagrant abuse he complains the President has made of the power delegated to him by his Highness. The Aumildars, who are officers of justice, may have, in the proper discharge, or under the color of the discharge, of their duty, ordered such punishments as the laws or customs of the country may have in some particular cases authorised; but no accounts of such punishments have been laid before either of the Committees or the President; if the Nabob conceals the representation of such facts, in order to display them at a distance, it will not be a presumption that they were incontrovertible upon the spot. Perhaps it is meant to be no more than the ordinary surplusage and unsubstantial ornament of an Oriental crim-

natory charge, somewhat like the legal and technical but unmeaning slander of European processes, or like the empty sounds of those tom toms, or eastern village drums, by the beat of which his Highness is pleased seriously to ask if his officers, at the time, possessed of real power, weight, and influence, were not dismissed and driven from the country.

“ It does not appear that his Highness ever once proposed to appoint Aumeens or inspectors of accounts ; but the accounts are public, and open for such Aumeens or any other persons his Highness may be pleased to appoint for the inspection and examination of them. His Highness is in no doubt possessed of those accounts, or abstracts of them ; and he reasons on them.

“ But though his Highness may have been mistaken in relation to his country where he does not reside, but in the precincts of Fort St. George, or to his officers who may deceive him, he cannot be mistaken as to his personal situation. It might perhaps be thought that the violence of his animosity, the bitterness of his expressions, his accusation of the subversion of his Government, of the usurpation of his powers, and concealment of his revenues by the President, may have been the ebullitions of resentment arising from the poignancy of his own distress. On the invasion indeed of the Carnatic, he quitted his usual mansion which was suitable to his dignity, but ill suited to his safety. That removal preceded the accession of the President to this Government. His Highness has since dwelt in the same habitation, is protected by the same guards, is attended by the same officers, except some revenue clerks, receives the same honors, and appears to lead, in every respect, the same life which he is said to have done in the former Government, or previous to the assignment.

“ But the mode of his Highness's attack seems entirely founded on the observation, that accusations of injuries of this strong kind, painted in

moving and lively colors, are apt to catch the sympathising affections of the mind, and to leave an impression that the slow and cold hand of truth does not afterwards easily efface. Bold assertion, warm representation, private influence, supercede investigation among Oriental politicians, whose wit and eloquence are equal to their depth of intrigue, and freedom from scruple.

“ Indeed the members of the Select Committee, in a letter written in June last, mention ‘ having had occasion to observe such rapid changes
‘ in the sentiments, expressed by his Highness the Nabob, of the same
‘ persons, that they could scarcely consider his praises or his censures as
‘ prompted by affection or resentment; but that they were the weapons
‘ of which he successively tried the use for the attainment of his pur-
‘ poses. The members of the Committee had their turn of the strongest
‘ declarations of his esteem; and they would force him, if possible, to
‘ a repetition of them by a continuation of good offices *.’

“ Of the Nabob’s reproach upon the President for not allowing the pay of his body guard out of the current expenses of the country, and of not withholding from the public the collections of several Jaghires, or parcels of land, in favor of the women of his Highness’s family, his children, his relations, and faithful servants, it is necessary only to observe, that the expence of the Nabob’s body guard residing in Madras forms no part of the current charges of the country, to be deducted out of their gross revenues; and that his Highness, in his letter, reserving a sixth part of the revenues for himself, expressly says, ‘ it is for defraying, among other things,
‘ the charges of the protection of himself and family †;’ and to the latter object there is no exception in the assignment in favor of any lands or possessors of lands. All the revenue, except one-sixth, was to be applied

* Letter to Governor-general and Council of Bengal, June 29, 1782.

† Nabob’s letter to Governor, October 2, 1781.

to the support of the common cause. The President would be accountable in his private capacity for any such indulgence or deviation. He must have done it independently of the subordinate and principal committee; and he has done nothing in this business independently of them; but has acted solely on their suggestion.

“ On the subject of the Nabob’s queries, relative to his elephants, it is sufficient to observe, that the charges of their maintenance was retrenched with the consent of his Excellency the Ameer, and would have been done without it, because they were an expensive object of mere parade, and at a distance from his Highness’s residence, and in the present juncture a ridiculous one; and that the Sepoys at the same place were, at the
‘ time in want of maintenance; but proper allowances have been made
‘ for daily charity, and for the service and support of mosques, churches,
‘ and pagodas, with precautions for the real application of such allowances
‘ to those purposes *.’

‘ Receipts have been ordered to be regularly given for supplies furnished in the several districts; and no instance has been represented to
‘ the Committee of the refusal of a receipt for stores or provisions delivered by order of his Highness, or by any of his people†.”

“ Some ammunition was delivered to some troops of his Excellency the Ameer, through perhaps an imprudent complaisance; because ammunition is so scarce as not always to be given even to his Majesty’s fleet, to the full amount of its demands; ‘ and because the Ameer’s troops are

* Minutes of Assigned Revenue, May 27, 1782.

† Letter to Lieut. Place, Permacoil, Feb. 14, 1782.—Letter to Mr. Fallofield, Cuddalore, Feb. 20, 1782.—Letter to Mr. Ram, receiver at Trichinopoly, Feb. 21, 1782.—Letter to Mr. Proctor, receiver at Palamcottah, Feb. 21, 1782.—Letter to Mr. Turing at Nellore, March 13, 1782.

‘ are reported to have done no service ; but to have kept a mile in the rear *.’

“ The President did not communicate at home or abroad, that he made any reduction in the public expenses ; ‘ but the Committee of assigned revenue have laid a comparative statement of the gross amount of the rents, according to the Nabob’s accounts, at an average, for the four years immediately preceding the war, and of the annual expenses by the same accounts, with a gross amount of the present rents and present expenses, by which it appears that in six districts rented there will be, if not ravaged by the enemy, an actual increase in the annual net revenue of upwards of six lacks of pagodas†.’ If that reduction were really such as the Company might make in delivering over the administration of their affairs to two or three of their youngest writers, such reduction would not have continued until now ; or the Company would do right to follow the example.

“ The assignment did not begin to be productive till the new Aumildars entered on the exercise of their respective employments about May last. Of six districts rented, there is no safe or certain communication with three of them situated to the southward, from the interruption of enemies by sea and land ; and no remittance whatsoever has been received from thence. The three remainder have supplied in money, grain, and bullocks for our army, in four months about two lacks of pagodas ; though no remittance was made by the Nabob in the eighteen months preceding. His Highness has received indeed 40,000 pagodas, which is more than a sixth of that sum, because he wished to receive some money in advance ; and the President wished

* Letter from Colonel Kennedy, commandant of Madras, to the Town-major, May 7, 1782.

† Comparative statement in minutes of Committee of Assigned Revenue, May 27, 1782.

to gratify him; but if the northern had been as unproductive as the southern provinces, the Nabob must have suffered the loss of his sixth as the public must have done that of the other five-sixths; 'that proportion not a definite sum was his Highness's own choice *,' either that amount was equal to the like proportion of what he had received for a similar period, during his own management since the troubles, and of which he must have foreseen the sufficiency for the Nabob of the Carnatic, and his family and attendants confined by the calamities of war, and without the necessity of expensive splendor, to the town of Madras; or if he received more than the sextuple of what he now receives, he will have been equally an enemy to his own interest, and to that of the Company, in not supplying a single pagoda from it to the treasury of this Presidency, for the support of that war which was waged, in order to repel the invasion of his country.

" But to disculpate the Nabob from so heavy a charge, it is just to declare it probable, that such were the mismanagement and useless charges in the country, and such were the imposition and rapacity of the people about him, that he did not receive from those three provinces, as their entire net revenue much more than what he now draws after applying five-sixths of it to the discharge of his debts and the recovery of his territories. But comparison may lessen the estimated value of what was in itself abundantly valued. Forty thousand pagodas in four months, out of only three provinces, make for the year no more than just triple the whole income of the Company's principal representative on the coast of Coromandel. To this triple sum, until the other provinces become productive, has the Nabob stinted himself. He allows indeed a dependence on other resources within his reach, having declared that although his expenses are very great, yet, out of the growing revenues, 'he wishes only, in this time of trouble, to have what is necessary to defray his table, and supply the wants of a few people employed for his protection†.'

* Nabob's letter, October 2, 1781.

† Ibid.

“ One-third of what the Nabob reserves, in this time of trouble, out of a small part of his territories, merely to defray his table in Madras, and supply the wants of a few of his people, might not have been thought an extravagant allowance and compensation for all the trouble, as well as the expenses of a Governor of Madras, however free he may be from ostentation, and for all his family, and for all his attendants, even if that allowance had depended upon his own discretion to have established; but it is the act of his employers settled before his time; and they complain that his predecessors were not satisfied with it.

“ If the present Governor had chosen to have added to it other gains, which would be criminal; his satisfaction with his salary alone, and his receipt of it, would not have been alledged against him as a crime. A man who is accused for the exercise of his right, must have left no ground for being so, in doing wrong. He who rejects all other resources but the stipend allowed him, has the more occasion for the amount of that stipend; whether he makes his drafts with an unabating hand, or with various intervals, if they exceed not what is strictly due to him, he is equally justifiable.

“ If he were to receive a compensation for the unjust reproaches that are cast upon him, if his employers were to allow for the advantages he might have reaped, and the praises he might have gained, from his Highness the Nabob, by holding a conduct directly the reverse of what he has held, the salary which he now has, not cheaply earned, would form but a small proportion of his profits.

“ All the drafts for public and for secret services pass through his hands as Governor. The former, which are immense, and the latter, which, including the salaries and expenses of agents to Indian courts, &c. on the Continent, and the Island of Ceylon, have not exceeded in the fourteen months of the present administration, when the nature of the war calls for secret services, which to be performed, must be paid, the sum

of 14,000 pagodas, are all accompanied with such vouchers as the cases would admit, and submitted to the inspection of his employers, who will have no reason to doubt of his caution or economy.

“ That caution and that economy were wanted and exerted in supplying the disproportion between the resources, and the expenses and exigencies of the war. In the eleven months, during which the war was carried on previously to the arrival of the President on this coast, ‘ the army ‘ then consisting only of Carnatic troops, was subsisted entirely by remittances from Bengal. This administration has since furnished specie ‘ equal to the subsistence of those troops ; the treasure remitted from ‘ Bengal, though considerable, being not more than sufficient to defray ‘ the charges of the reinforcement sent from thence *.’

“ During the first eighteen months of the war, when the country, then less exhausted, was under the management of the Nabob, ‘ the army was supplied with fewer bullocks ; being ‘ than in the eight succeeding months, when the same country, necessarily more exhausted by the continuance of the war, was entrusted to the management of the President, ‘ who supplied above 13,000 bullocks and 100,000 bags of rice †,’ ‘ being ‘ more of each than was supplied, or there was occasion to supply, ‘ in any equal time in the former Carnatic war ‡.’

‘ If three thousand bullocks were suffered to be captured in one night ; ‘ for which the officer in charge was broken by court-martial §.’ ‘ If the country ‘ be so desolate as to supply no provisions for the troops, or ‘ grain or fodder for the cattle employed to carry provisions ||,’ and which

* See Statement by Accountant-general.

† See state of supplies by the Army-agent.

‡ State of supplies in the army under General Joseph Smith, from January 1769, to March, in the Agent's office.

§ Letter from Sir Eyre Coote, February 1782.

|| Ibid.

on that account perish faster than they can be replaced. If there be an absolute want of cavalry, the greatest part of those of the Nabob having, before the war, deserted for want of pay and gone over to the enemy, causes like these could not fail to have cramped the operations of the army, though it has effected more in the present administration than before, and has induced the superintending Board at Bengal, who are directed to take the lead in all military operations, to be of opinion, in which this Presidency entirely concurred, that the most certain method of putting an end to the invasion of the Carnatic, is by a powerful diversion into the territories of the invader on the other side of the peninsula.

“ Though the Carnatic army has not been decisively successful, notwithstanding its bravery, discipline, and perseverance, and the ardor and experience of the General, because the situation of the country, the resources, and precaution of the enemy, and the want of cavalry, were sufficient to render such decisive success impracticable; the troops in Tanjore, though a small body, have had the fortunate occasion of rendering essential services. They have, with the co-operation of his Majesty's squadron, taken the principal forts and settlements of the Dutch, a national enemy, on the coast of Coromandel, whose numbers under arms were greater than that of the besiegers. And a detachment from them, with the like co-operation from the squadron, took Trincomalay in the island of Ceylon.

“ For these concerted operations with the Admiral, the President was vested by the Committee with its authority to act, and they seemed satisfied with the spirit and perseverance, with which the objects of such trust were undertaken and accomplished.

“ It is this trust which his Highness is pleased to include in one of his interrogatories, under the name of the assumption of the command of the southern army under Colonel Brathwaite. It is not merely an error in

chronology; for Sir Hector Munro, not Colonel Brathwaite, commanded at the siege of Negapatam. Soon after the surrender of that place, the President wrote to Hector Munro, 'to communicate to Sir Eyre Coote, the commander in chief, an account of all his operations, and to desire all the commanding officers to the southward to write to him at the same time with regard to all military points; and as his plan of service might extend to very distant branches, they would probably receive military orders from him from time to time; to which he, the President, desires they will pay all due respect and obedience *.'

"Such orders were, in fact, given, and such obedience was paid. Sir Eyre Coote, in a letter of a date immediately subsequent, addressed to Sir Hector Munro, after entering circumstantially into the detail of several movements, which might be useful, he added, 'that those suggestions were not made with an intention that they should be considered as measures *absolutely* to be adopted; but as points which struck him as deserving of attention, provided the circumstances of Sir Hector Munro's situation might, at any time, render them eligible to be carried into execution; for at so great a distance the propriety of undertaking any particular services must be left to the judgment of the officer in command †.'

The orders of Sir Eyre Coote were transmitted, on Sir Hector Munro's departure from Tanjore, to Colonel Brathwaite, on whom the command again devolved, and whose letters shew that he obeyed them; nor was there ever a contrary or indeed any order issued by the President or Committee to Colonel Brathwaite after the siege of Negapatam.

"Colonel Brathwaite mentions that, in consequence of orders from the Commander in Chief communicated to him through Sir Hector

* Letter to Sir Hector Munro, December 23, 1781.

† Letter from Sir Eyre Coote to Sir Hector Munro, December 24, 1781.

Munro, he had, out of the few battalions with him, ‘ detached a battalion to Trichinopoly * ;’ and soon afterwards happened ‘ that defeat, or that sacrifice to the enemy †’, of which neither the Presidency nor the President were the cause, but of which they have, not without some success, endeavored to prevent the ill consequences.

“ The truth of the answers, in the negative, to some other less important of the Nabob’s questions, may not be easily within positive proof. Perhaps the President may not be slightly supposed to have so far departed from his former life and usual demeanor, as to deride his Highness before one of his Majesty’s principal officers ; to calumniate him in his absence ; to dismiss his vaqueel or agent from the Government House ; and to open all his letters ; such a procedure would be extraordinary, inexcusable, and unaccountable : it does not appear to be very compatible with European manners, or with any knowledge and practice of the world, to gratify even the keenest resentment, by modes so mean, so silly, and so short of their intended purpose. The President has, on all occasions, testified the highest respect for the Nabob ; still seeks opportunities to oblige him, and still expects he will see his present errors ; the Nabob’s jealousy, perhaps, led him only to suspect that the President had treated him unhandsomely. His Highness only asks, if he did not ? The question may be said to imply a doubt of the fact ; it seems at least to put the truth of the accusation upon the issue of the answer ; and that answer is a most solemn declaration in the negative. The President recollects being in the presence of his Highness, in company only with two principal officers of his Majesty ; Sir Eyre Coote, between whom and his Highness, the President had the good fortune to effect a reconciliation ; and General Medows, whom he accompanied in a visit of ceremony to his Highness. It would have been a singular perversion of such meetings to render them occasions of offence ; and the offence would be equally

* Letter from Colonel Brathwaite, Jan. 26, 1782.

† Ibid. Feb. 17, 1782.

to those respectable officers. To them both, one upon the spot, and one in England, the President appeals for his behaviour.

“ To the question of his calumniating his Highness's person ; opening his letters (except are meant two petitions in the Persian language, which the President does not understand, and of which a clerk mistook the meaning of the address) ; or of dismissing his vakeel—the answer can be only a simple negative.

“ But some negatives admit at least of presumptive proof. If the President had told the Nabob, that the treaty, which his Highness had made with the superior Government of Bengal, would ruin his affairs, such an answer would have been the very best reply which his Highness could have made, but did not make, and must have been an unanswerable argument to that President, when, in letters in October and November last, he urged the Nabob in the strongest terms to the execution of that treaty, informing him, that his duty would not suffer him to consent to any other alternative than his Highness's compliance with the immediate provisions of the treaty, or with the present assignment, which grew out of it.

“ The particular circumstances of the case, which his Highness calls an instigation to perjury, and restraint under guards of Sepoys, and in which he asks, if the President did not partake, are so perfectly known to the members of the Council at large, that the consideration of it is left to a meeting of that Board. His Highness may have been mistaken in that respect, as he has in the sentiments of his creditors, from whom he says, the President has withheld their just rights and every sort of satisfaction.

“ This accusation may serve as a test to form a probable judgment of those others, in which no testimony intervenes between the charges of the enquirer, and the denials of the answer.

“ If the President had withheld from his Highness’s distressed creditors their just rights and every sort of satisfaction, the indignation of so considerable a body, so large a proportion of the settlement, would not be felt in silence; and their complaints would have been a presumption in favor of the Nabob’s assertion. Those creditors have not been backward in the assertion of their rights on other occasions; they were loud in their complaints, and warm in their expostulation to this Presidency during the administrations of Governor Bouchier and of Governor Dupré; because they apprehended that justice was by those administrations denied or delayed to them.

“ The creditors have sometimes extended their suspicions even to his Highness, and have proceeded to expressions of disrespect, that the pressure of distress only could excuse: one of the most considerable among them, who is supposed to be in the intimacy of his Highness, and of his minister the Ameer, in a letter to the Court of Directors, declared, ‘ that the Nabob was destitute of the smallest inclination to discharge his debts, and employed his whole time and attention to avail himself of every possible subterfuge, by which he could elude payment; though it is by no means believed that he is destitute of resources, and even of considerable treasures; yet, certain it is, that he tenaciously conceals and withholds them *.’ The entire body of creditors residing at Madras, in a public letter since printed by their directions, complain, ‘ that his Highness the Nabob withheld his payments from them †;’ If the President had appeared to them to stand in the way of the satisfaction, as they conceived that Governor Bouchier and Governor Dupré had done; if they imagined that he withheld their just rights and refused to give them any sort of satisfaction, he would, like his Highness, and those Governors, be an object of their complaints. If they were

* Letter from Mr. Benfield to the Court of Directors, Dec. 14. 1780.—Printed in 4to.

† Letter from Nabob’s Creditors to Governor and Council, Fort St. George, March 11, 1779.

merely silent concerning him, notwithstanding their impatience increasing with their disappointments, it might be some presumption that the President was not guilty of the charge alledged on this occasion by the Nabob. It is, at least, a certainty of his failure in the positive evidence of such a charge so easy, if it were true, to be adduced. ‘It may be possible that these allegations are connected with such a design, as he was formerly accused of entertaining, to involve the Government in fresh disputes with his creditors, in which it was then thought probable he would succeed*.’ In the present instance such a design has not succeeded; nor have the creditors left the insinuation against the President, to be combated by negative presumption in his favor. They, in a memorial addressed by them to the Court of Directors, a very few days before this accusation of the President’s injustice and inattention to them, have declared, ‘after mention of the Nabob’s failure in his agreement made five years ago, and of their sufferings in consequence, that they drew an auspicious hope from the equitable attention of the Right Honorable the President of this settlement, who in a plan which he lately framed for the arrangement of the Nabob’s affairs was pleased to include the demands of all his creditors†;’ and in their letter to that President they repeat to him, ‘that from the equitable manner in which he had taken up their concerns, they had the greatest reliance upon his representations in their behalf‡.’

“If the Nabob’s advisers were not perfectly indifferent as to the truth of what they suggested to his Highness’s mind, if they preserved the least degree of regard to his reputation for veracity, if they did not prefer the success they expect from the first impressions of the Nabob’s heavy charges against the President; to the permanent credit which

* Letter to the Court of Directors from the Presidency of Fort St. George, dated April 6, 1770.—Consultations of Presidency of Fort St. George, October 6, 1770.

† Memorial to the Court of Directors, August 10, 1782.

‡ Letter to Lord Macartney, August 10, 1782.

facts on his Highness's assertion should be made to deserve, they would not have hazarded his signature to assertions, so capable of disproof, so effectually disproved.

“ The accumulation of those barefaced attacks defeats the purpose intended by them. It betrays the foundation on which they are laid, and precludes the necessity of guarding against their effect. It must therefore be acknowledged that much of the pains here taken has been unnecessary. The consultations shall not again be swelled, or the attention of the Court of Directors detained, on such an occasion.

“ But to judge of the future by the past conduct of the Nabob's ministers they will not be deterred, by the refutation of those charges, from a renewal of them, or from substituting others in their room. It is not however an unfair condition, that those they have already made, as the most obvious and pressing, shall be a scale to measure the truth, the probability, and the justice of those others they may have reserved for subsequent occasions.

“ The caution of those advisers of the Nabob is alarmed at their being brought forward by the President; they wish his Highness alone to run the risk and receive the blame, and suffer the consequences of yielding to their pernicious suggestions; they render him dissatisfied at being told he is advised; they, whose rank and views and stations are, or are thought, eminent, want him to recriminate on a few harmless and un-
aspiring individuals, who happened to accompany the President here, with licence from the Court of Directors, or actually in their service. The Nabob asserts that he is now told, for the first time, that he cannot distinguish good from evil in his own affairs; and that even the animals of the air can easily distinguish injury from kindness; but animals of the air and inhabitants of the earth may be sometimes caught in the snares of

apparent kindness, and may feel anguish in the most sincere and salutary assistance.

“ It has many times been told of the Nabob, and even by that Governor who was dismissed from the Company’s service for services rendered to his Highness ; ‘ that not being of a resolute or active mind, he has ‘ frequently been misled by those who have had the art to raise his jealousy ‘ of the Company, or who have flattered his vanity, or raised in his mind ‘ ideas of conquest or future greatness *.’

“ Not long even before this period when he disclaims advice, the Commander in Chief of the forces, who has had the best opportunity of knowing his Highness, would not, when he was considering a letter from him conveying censure, ‘ allow himself to believe that the diction, although ‘ patronized by his seal, could have been entirely his own, but the secret ‘ infusion of some vindictive, invidious, and disappointed adviser †.’

“ That such infusions were not confined to persons of the Nabob’s own family and country may be collected from the reason given by the translator of the Persian copy of his Highness’s present letter, for the delay in making the translation, ‘ that he could get little assistance from the native moonshies or writers, who said the idiom was in several places different from Persian letters in general, which difference he could not ‘ otherwise account for than by supposing it, as to those places, originally ‘ written in English ‡.’

“ In fact, the mildest and most friendly interpretation that could be given to a conduct, by him who disapproves of it, is to free it from the

* General Letter from Governor Wynch and Council to the Court of Directors, July 4, 1775.

† Letter from Sir Eyre Coote in Consultations of Fort St. George, October 29, 1781.

‡ Letter from Mr. C. N. White, deputy translator.

imputation of deliberate mischief, by attributing it to the influence and misinformation of others; it, no doubt, was more decent, and, it is hoped, it was juster, to lament the effect of insinuations of factious and designing persons, whose sinister views were forwarded and passions gratified by instilling jealousies into the Nabob's mind against the representatives of the Company, than 'by personally accusing his Highness of 'inflexible obstinacy, jealousy, and perverseness; and of his having 'given many proofs of his want of faith and honor, which was the language of Governor Bouchier, Mr. Dupré, the present Governor-general of Bengal, and General Joseph Smith *.'

"It is possible indeed, that, through error, his Highness may have been accused unjustly. The example of groundless attacks against the President is sufficient to warn him against yielding to the impression of violent accusation against others. The present is not indeed the only instance where the President has had to oppose his actions, with firmness and patience, to obloquy and opposition.

"His situation indeed particularly exposed him. Appointed to the Government at a particular crisis, and out of the usual course, by an example alarming to the prospects of the former servants of the Company; sent out with instructions of reformation, affecting private interest, and arriving to a place where calamity led to discontent, the unpopularity he had to encounter could yield only to a favorable opinion of his intentions. His subsequent efforts for the public good have secured to him, indeed, the impartial voice of general approbation; but the views that have been thwarted, the claims rejected, and attempts opposed, even in high departments, when interfering with the orders and welfare of the Company, have excited the operations of adverse passions, which were to be resisted,

* Letter to Court of Directors, November 21, 1769. — Remarks on Nabob's Letter of November 26, 1770, in country correspondence.

but could not be calmed, by any goodness of conduct or of example. The President, opposed by such passions, and struggling at the same time with the difficulties of the war, and partaking in the distresses of the people, has a claim on the generosity as well as justice of his colleagues to aid, and of his superiors to approve, his efforts; which he desires as long only as he shall be found to adhere to public and private faith and honor; and, consistently with these, to have no other end in view than the good of the Company and the State."

No. XVII.

*Letter from Lord MACARTNEY to the Earl of HILLSBOROUGH,
dated Fort St. George, September 3, 1782.*

"MY DEAR LORD,

"I Return you a thousand thanks for your obliging letter by Mr. Dunkin, who arrived here some weeks since, and gave me great pleasure by the accounts he brought of your Lordship's welfare. As I know how little leisure you have for private correspondence, I shall not venture to trespass upon you in that respect further than is absolutely necessary; but I should be wanting to myself if I did not say a few words upon the present occasion. By the packet, which carries this dispatch, I have reason to believe that the Nabob has sent letters to his Majesty and to the ministry full of complaints against me and my Government here. The misrepresentations and falsehoods, contained in those letters, will be fully detected by the perusal of our proceedings, which are now sent home, and which are, I believe, regularly laid before you. But such serious accusations as the Nabob, or rather his second son and minister

Ameer ul Omrah, assisted by some profligate Englishmen here, has set his name to, would naturally stagger any one unacquainted with this country or the character of the Durbar. There is however no gentleman conversant with either, but will be able at a glance to see the causes from whence the Nabob's resentment has arisen. The real truth is, that I have acted like an honest man and a good Englishman, and a Governor of Madras of that stamp is by no means such a one as they have been accustomed to, or ever wish to see again. If I had acted like many of my predecessors, and come into the Nabob's views, it would be no exaggeration to say, that I might have fully answered any views I could possibly have formed of my own. It has been objected to me by the Nabob, that I am a stranger, ignorant of Oriental customs, unwilling to understand, or come into the ways of black people; that I wo'nt accept of presents, that I am unconciliating, &c. &c. After the space of time that I have passed here, and the intercourse I have had with the Durbar and the gentry belonging to it, I must certainly be next to an idiot if I were ignorant of what is called the method of managing them. Nothing is more easy; sacrifice the interests of the Company and of the creditors, or promise to do so; engage for impossibilities, Tanjore, and the succession of the second son; and write lying paragraphs and encomiums upon the Nabob's disposition towards us, in the public letters to England; do this, and I'll venture to say, that a Governor of Madras, even in the present distress, would extract half a dozen lacks of pagodas for himself, when he could not obtain a rupee for the Company. This was the mode by which the Durbar was managed by some politicians; but my system has been different, and if my predecessors had practised it, our affairs here would not now be in their present deplorable state. By observing a different conduct from theirs, I have drawn upon myself not only the most rancorous enmity of the Durbar; but the ill-will and opposition of every man in this part of the world of a different character from my own. Against these my only arms are steadiness and diligence, upright intentions, and disinterested conduct, and I have no

doubt that they will at last carry me through with success. The only circumstance which affects me is the apprehension that the Nabob's letters might in the slightest degree make an impression upon my sovereign to my disadvantage. I must therefore request your Lordship will be so good as to lay me at the king's feet with every expression of my duty and attachment to his Majesty, and with the strongest assurances of the most scrupulous attention and respect on my part to all the country powers here, whose interest is the least connected with the British power in India. But I never will sacrifice, as has often been done here, the smallest particle of our real rights and our true policy for any private emolument or advantage whatsoever. I have ventured to say thus much, because well I know the artifices and engines which will be employed by disappointed avarice and blasted ambition to misrepresent and vilify my Government. But I trust to a good cause, and to that conduct which will never give my friends reason to be ashamed of supporting me.

“ The real state of the Nabob's case is this : When I arrived here, though we had been engaged for near a twelvemonth in a most expensive and bloody war with Hyder Ali, I found that the Nabob, though generally believed to be possessed of great treasures, had, under pretence of the failure of his revenues from the invasion of the enemy, scarcely contributed any thing to the common service. He had been often pressed upon the subject, but without effect ; at last he consented to assign to the Company the revenues of a few districts that were, or should be, recovered from the enemy, but he was far from being sincere in this measure ; and, in a short time it appeared that his secret influence and counteraction prevented our receiving any benefit from the assignment. We were therefore under the necessity of taking such steps, as we were authorized and directed to do by the Governor-general and Council of Bengal, to render it effectual, and of these steps the Nabob loudly complains. When I mention the Nabob, it is proper I should inform you that he is not the object to whom we should really impute this ungrateful conduct to the Company ; he, as is usual to Oriental sensualists at his time of life, is now

much impaired both in mind and body, and is totally under the direction of his second son the Ameer, who aims at the succession to the disherison of his elder brother Omdat, who would be a much better Nabob for our interests. It is therefore the Ameer who is, in fact, the great wheel of the Durbar machine, and who, by the assistance of some discontented Europeans, Mr. Paul Benfield in particular, has thrown his father's affairs into confusion, has quarrelled with the ancient friends of his family, and is the real author of all those extravagant letters and papers, to which the Nabob's name is affixed. At a time when the Durbar should be all patience and resignation, they are all turbulence and outrage: and yet, after all, what have they to complain of? At a time when the Company is spending its blood and treasure in defence of the province, why is there to be so much noise about the miserable remains of it? At the moment that it is in danger of being swallowed up, is it decent that the Nabob should be disputing about the channel in which the Company shall receive the revenues of a few districts, as if he were wrangling with a private creditor? Whilst I had opportunities of conversing with him, I candidly gave him my opinion upon his affairs. I explained to him the necessity of changing his measures, and of adopting the only line which could save him and his family from ruin. Had he followed my advice, he would have said to the Company, 'Gentlemen, the common danger makes it absolutely necessary, that you should take all my rights and authority into your own hands. Make what use you please of them to repel the enemy and extricate me and yourselves from the most critical embarrassment we were ever involved in. I throw myself on the protection and faith of the English, and am satisfied that at the proper season, you will replace me in the enjoyment of those rights which for so good a cause I have surrendered to you.' This I often told him was the part he should take in his circumstances. It would have been the wisest and the most honorable, and would have secured to him what it is possible from his own impediments may now be very distant, if not irrecoverable. But, poor man, he was not allowed to follow the line he would have chosen for himself, and they have much indeed to answer for

to him and to the Company, who have turned his mind from the liberal and generous plan of policy which formerly distinguished him in time of misfortune. But the misconduct of others shall make no alteration in my sentiments of respect and attention to him, and, I hope, that when the present troubles are over, we may be able to restore his mind to that state of tranquillity, which he has been deprived of by those who ought most to contribute to his ease and happiness. I think I am now worth about 10,000*l.* more than when I arrived here, and I do assure you that I might have been easily worth ten times the sum, if I pleased, without any reproaches, but those of my own conscience. What I have is the mere savings of the Company's allowance; for I never have accepted for my own benefit, a pagoda, a diamond, or even a shawl—So help me God! This solemn declaration which I make to you, from one gentleman to another, will, I trust, be some antidote against the poisons intended from hence for my destruction at home. I will now add one word to you as a statesman. Should we surmount the difficulties which press us in this part of the world, your possessions in India, if not ably and honestly administered, will assuredly slip from you in a short time. For God's sake therefore, if you wish to preserve them, send the ablest and the honestest men you can find to fill the first stations here. A Company constituted like the present is but ill-suited to the Government of your Indian empire. I have extended this letter to so great a length that I stand in need of all your indulgence to excuse me. I will not therefore trespass upon it longer than to express those sentiments of respect and esteem with which I am,

“ My dear Lord,

“ Your most obedient and most humble servant,

(Signed) “ MACARTNEY.”

“ P.S. Give me leave to observe that both in Council and Committee, there has constantly reigned the most perfect harmony, and that almost all our proceedings have been unanimous, as will appear upon the records.”

No. XVIII.

Plan of Arrangement for the NABOB's Affairs.

The nett annual revenue of the Nabob, if properly collected, may be fairly computed to produce in time of peace, star pagodas	3,000,000
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The following Annual Disbursements.

For the current expenses, troops, stores, &c. including all military charges whatsoever in the Nabob's dominions, to be paid annually to the Company	1,200,000
For the Nabob's expenses and Taguirs to all his sons, &c. &c.	400,000
	1,600,000

Nabob's Debts.

The balance due to the Company, and the expenses of the present war, computed at about	3,000,000
Debt owing by the Nabob to all other creditors	7,000,000
	10,000,000

Interest at 6 per cent. on the 7,000,000 pagodas due to the creditors	420,000
To pay the creditors 5 per cent. on account of the principal, annually	350,000
	770,000

Toward the liquidation of the Nabob's balance to the Company, and the expenses of the war, computed as above, at about	}	630,000	
3,000,000 - - - - -		<u>1,400,000</u>	3,000,000

N. B. The amount of the expenses of the present war as aforesaid about - Pagodas 3,000,000

From the Carnatic every year to be received in part - - - - - 630,000

The Peshcash payable to the Nabob, by the Rajah of Tanjore, P. N. pagodas 130,000
or star pagodas - - - - - 120,000

Star Pagodas 750,000

Thus the above debt of 3,000,000 will be discharged in four years, and then the same amount of 750,000 to be appropriated to the formation of a public treasure for the use of the Carnatic, which in five years will accumulate to 3,750,000 pagodas, and on the tenth year, the said sum of 750,000 pagodas to be applied towards the discharging the Nabob's debt to individuals. The yearly overplus of the 6 *per cent.* allowed for the interest of the debt due to individuals, to be added to the 5 *per cent.* allowed to discharge the principal of the said debt; by this mode on the ninth year two-thirds of the debt will be paid; and with the addition of the 750,000 as aforesaid on the tenth year, the whole of the debt and interest of 6 *per cent.* will be paid in the twelfth year. From the arrangement of the revenue of the Tanjore countries, the distribution of the annual peshcash has been accounted for as aforesaid; but the deposit money and the peshcash due, which both amount to - Pagodas 900,000

In the first year will be received	-	-	164,000	
In the second year	-	-	<u>464,000</u>	
			628,000	
In the third year the balance	-	-	<u>272,000</u>	- 900,000

This sum may be appropriated to pay the cavalry debt of 400,000 pagodas, due by the Nabob, and the arrears now due to his Sepoys, &c. in the country; which alone as above will amount to very near 500,000 pagodas. From the above statement, the Nabob at the end of the twelfth year, from the day the arrangement takes place, will owe nothing; there will be about 3,750,000 pagodas in the treasury, and on the thirteenth year, the whole revenue of 3,000,000 pagodas *per annum* will remain clear of any incumbrance.

Dr.

The Nabob to the Company.

Cr.

To the amount supposed for balance to the Company, and expenses of the war - - -	3,000,000	By the payment from the revenue the first year - - -	630,000
		By the peshcash of Tanjore - - -	120,000
		first year - - -	750,000
		second year - - -	750,000
		third year - - -	750,000
		fourth year - - -	750,000
Pagodas	3,000,000	Pagodas	3,000,000

Dr.

The Public Treasury for the use of the Carnatic.

Cr.

Remains in the treasury at the end of the ninth year of this arrangement - - -	3,750,000	By the revenue of the Carnatic and the peshcash of Tanjore as aforesaid, appropriated for this purpose every year 750,000, viz.	
		The fifth year - - -	750,000
		sixth year - - -	750,000
		seventh year - - -	750,000
		eighth year - - -	750,000
		ninth year - - -	750,000
Pagodas	3,750,000	Pagodas	3,750,000

Dr.

The Debt due to Individuals.

Cr.

To the total debt	-	-	7,000,000	By receipts of every year	-	-	350,000	
				On account of the principal for nine years	-	-		3,150,000
				By overplus of the interest, reckoning from the second year to the ninth year, viz.				
				The second year	-	21,000		
				third year	-	22,260		
				fourth year	-	23,595		
				fifth year	-	25,071		
				sixth year	-	26,575		
				seventh year	-	28,170		
				eighth year	-	29,860		
				ninth year	-	31,651		
								208,182
				By the receipts on the tenth year the sum at 5 per cent.	-	350,000		
				The overplus of interest in the tenth year	-	33,550		
				The 750,000 to be appropriated on the tenth year to the discharge of the debt	-	750,000		
								1,133,550
				The eleventh year the sum as aforesaid		1,133,550		
				The overplus of interest		68,025		
								1,201,575
				The twelfth year	-	-	-	1,273,881
			7,000,300					6,967,188

OBSERVATIONS.

“ A public treasure has by the experience of all ages been found to contribute to the permanency of a state, by enabling it to withstand the shock of sudden attacks. But it is not meant by the establishment of a

treasury, that large quantities of specie should, in the interval of public exigencies, be uselessly locked up; on the contrary, it is intended that the money should be circulated in such a manner as to encrease the stock of the Company with perfect security, and, at the same time, to promote the commerce and consequently the riches of the country.

“ For this purpose the treasury should be a kind of bank or lombard, one third of the stock to be always in specie untouched, and two thirds to be employed in discounting good bills, and to be lent on valuable pledges, at an interest never to exceed six *per cent. per annum*.

“ Thus Madras, instead of being a shop of pitiful usury, would become a city of honorable commerce, of opulence instead of misery, and of real resource, not of temporary expedient.

“ These ends are much promoted by the facility of throwing personal effects into circulation. Thus the bonds to be given by the Nabob and the Rajah should be subdivided into such sums as are daily transferable in the ordinary course of traffic, bearing interest, and perfectly secured by the present arrangements. They will be preferred, like India bonds in England, to the possession of unproductive specie. If the bonds were divided into several classes, according to the priority of the demands for which they were given, or in a fixed proportion to the amount of each creditor, and that periods were settled at which the bonds of each class should be received as money in the Company's treasury, it would, by approaching them to the nature of convertible specie, still add to the activity of their circulation. This is a point to be considered hereafter.

“ As the sum allotted for the Nabob's expenses may be considered as too small, I propose to encrease it by two lacks of pagodas. It seems but reasonable that the tributary Rajahs and Polygars of the Carnatic

should pay a proper proportion of their revenues to the state whose protection they enjoy.

“ I should therefore think that in addition to what they now pay, a new assessment of two lacks should take place, under the sanction and guarantee of the Company, which should remain the rate for ever hereafter beyond the Nabob's power to augment it. In order to obtain such a security, the Rajahs and Polygars would it is thought readily consent to the proposed assessment.

“ Thus then the Nabob would stand with regard to the Rajah as six to two in respect to the allowances, and as thirty to eleven with respect to revenue.

“ It may perhaps be asked, why the Rajah's creditors are to be paid in six years, and the Nabob's in twelve. The only reason *now* to be given is, the Nabob's debts are so much larger than the Rajah's that they must necessarily take a much longer time in paying.

“ N. B. In the general plan as above, if the revenues, which are estimated from the best information that could be obtained, should fall short, a proportional reduction of all the sums allotted to particular purposes must take place, except the sum appropriated to the payment of 6 *per cent.* interest, which ought to remain inviolate.

“ Thus, if the revenues produce one third less than they are computed at, the allotments to the Nabob and Rajah, the allotments for reducing the principal due to the creditors, and for discharging the sums due to the Company, must also be one third less respectively, than they are stated at in the above arrangement.”

No. XIX.

Account of a Duel between Lord MACARTNEY and Mr. SADLIER.

“ Friday, 24 September, 1784.

“ THE time of meeting, as settled the evening before by Mr. Sadlier and Mr. Davidson, was seven o'clock in the morning. However about thirty-five minutes past six all the parties were on the ground; Lord Macartney and Mr. Davidson were the first. It being agreed upon by Mr. Davidson and Major Grattan, who had retired to the particular spot intended, that the distance should be ten paces; Major Grattan loaded Mr. Sadlier's pistols, Mr. Davidson's being loaded before they arrived. It was then proposed by Mr. Davidson, for the consideration of Major Grattan, whether, after one pistol had been fired by each gentleman, the trial should not be made by the seconds, if there was any disposition on the part of Lord Macartney to make an apology to Mr. Sadlier, and thus to terminate the affair. To this Major Grattan acquiesced, adding that the effect of such an interposition would however depend entirely on the temper of the parties. It was further referred to Major Grattan by Mr. Davidson, whether the gentlemen themselves should be previously acquainted with this intention of the seconds, which latter proposition Major Grattan did not think expedient. Lord Macartney and Mr. Sadlier were then conducted to the spot, and took their proper distance as already marked out. The right of the first fire was determined by chance between the seconds, and fell to Mr. Sadlier, who accordingly fired; the ball struck Lord Macartney on the ribs of the left side, which however was not known to any of the other gentlemen till after his Lordship had given his own fire, which missed Mr. Sadlier. Mr. Davidson then advancing a little called out to Major Grattan on the opposite side, to know whether the trial before proposed should not then be made; Major Grattan advancing, Lord Macartney, who did not quit his ground,

called out, *go on* Mr. Sadlier, remaining also on his ground prepared to take his second fire. Mr. Davidson having come up to Lord Macartney, first perceived that his Lordship was wounded, and declared it to Major Grattan, who was at the time beginning to ask his Lordship's intentions as to the proposition before mentioned; to which his Lordship replied, I came here to give satisfaction to Mr. Sadlier, *and am ready to do so*. His Lordship's waistcoat being now unbuttoned, and the effects of his wound, as well as its dangerous position, becoming visible, Major Grattan, with the concurrence of Mr. Davidson, declared, that in his Lordship's present condition Mr. Sadlier should rest satisfied, and that under such circumstances the matter could not well be pursued further. This declaration being heard by Mr. Sadlier while remaining on his ground, was adopted by him, and he declaring that he was satisfied, then quitted his ground.

" At a meeting, held expressly for the purpose by Mr. Davidson and Major Grattan on the next morning, at which were present Colonels Fullarton and Dalrymple, the above state of facts was mutually admitted to be just and true, and was accordingly subscribed to by the undersigned.

(Signed) " ALEXANDER DAVIDSON.

" JOHN GRATTAN."

" 24 September, 1784.

" Concerning the proposition mentioned by Mr. Davidson to Major Grattan in the above narrative of an interference and reference to the principals after an exchange of pistols, Mr. Davidson declares, the proposal came from himself. Lord Macartney not having given Mr. Davidson any instructions whatever, relative to the meeting, Mr. Davidson made the proposal with a view of terminating the affair as soon as possible.

(Signed) " ALEXANDER DAVIDSON."

No. XX.

NOTES OF MY TRANSACTIONS WITH MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES
STUART, SINCE MY ARRIVAL IN ENGLAND IN 1786.

(Signed) M.

Note received from Major-general JAMES STUART, January 10, 1786.

“ Lower Grosvenor-Street, January 10, 1786.

“ Tuesday Afternoon.

“ MAJOR General Stuart takes this earliest opportunity to communi-
cate to Lord Macartney, an extract from the petition on his part, laid be-
fore his Majesty, and to acquaint L. M. that the whole of that petition
may be seen at Lord Sydney's office, and at the India House.

Extract of M. G. S.'s Petition to the King, dated July 26, 1785.

*The contradiction given by
Gen. Stuart, while at
Madras, to the charges
of the Select Committee.*

‘ He (the Petitioner) begs leave, however, in
‘ justice to himself, only to observe, in point of fact,
‘ that while in India, and when made acquainted
‘ with the contents of the minutes of the President
‘ of the Select Committee, which contained the charges against him,
‘ he never failed to take the very first opportunity of declaring to
‘ Lord Macartney, the President of that Committee, in the strongest
‘ and most unequivocal terms, both verbally and in writing, *the in-
‘ justice and falsehood* of the imputations thus aimed at the Petitioner's
‘ character and conduct; and the minutes on the Petitioner's part, in
‘ answer to those of the President, and addressed to him personally,
‘ not only express the indignation at such ill-founded and unexpected
‘ attacks, but likewise shew the grounds on which he considered him-
‘ self authorized to apply the terms of *injustice and falsehood*, to the
‘ charges which the President had made against him.’

“ A true extract in my own writing.

(Signed) “ JAMES STUART.”

B

Note sent by Lord MACARTNEY to Major-general STUART, Jan. 11, 1786.

“ Charles-Street, Berkeley-Square, Jan. 11, 1786.

“ LORD MACARTNEY has received the note which Major-general Stuart has thought proper to send to him, intimating his having laid a petition before his Majesty, and quoting a passage from it, adding, that the whole may be seen at Lord Sydney's office, or at the India House. As far as any such petition may convey the wishes of Major-general Stuart respecting himself, Lord Macartney has no concern, and takes no part in the event of it, and can have therefore no occasion to inspect it; and as to any censure it may insinuate or express of Lord Macartney's conduct in the administration of the Government that had been entrusted to his charge, those persons to whom he is accountable for his public conduct, if any such there be, who entertain a doubt of it, will ever find him ready to explain it to their satisfaction. But he is and long has been resigned to the consequences of having filled the duties of his station, and being exposed to the contradiction and opposition of those individuals, of whose misconduct he was, in his official capacity, obliged to take notice. He has however no apprehension that his character will be affected, or the justice and truth of minutes adopted by the Select Committee of Fort St. George, concerning Major-general Stuart, be less manifest, by the General's denial of the charges against him, which fact and the records justify, and require not to be supported by any other means. But if Major-general Stuart has any drift, not expressed in the mere conveyance of his contradiction to those minutes, he is desired to make it known, in direct terms, through any gentleman by whom he may chuse to convey it to Lord Macartney, who will take no notice of communications in any other manner from Major-general Stuart.

C

Note received from Major-general JAMES STUART, dated Jan. 12, 1786.

“ Lower Grosvenor-Street, Jan. 12, 1786.

“ MAJOR-General Stuart has received Lord Macartney's note of the 11th, the latter part of which needs only to be noticed at present. He must for once acknowledge himself under obligations to his Lordship, for having brought matters between them so precisely to a point, and for having understood so properly the tendency of the intimation he received from General Stuart's note.

“ That there may be no ambiguity however about *the drift* of that intimation, Major-general Stuart thinks it proper to declare, that *one object* of it was, to take the first opportunity of communicating to Lord Macartney, the petition which he (G. S.) had presented to his Majesty, and the terms in which he had expressed himself with regard to his Lordship in that petition, thinking it would have been unsuitable on his part to make use of any terms, with regard to Lord Macartney in his absence, which he was not equally ready to direct to him when present.

“ The *other object* was, that Lord Macartney, upon his arrival in England, might be ascertained, that General Stuart's sense of the atrocious injuries and injustice he had received from his Lordship, was by no means abated, by the distance of time or place, and that Lord Macartney might from thence perceive the inevitable consequences of what had happened.

“ General Stuart is happy to find that those consequences have occurred to his Lordship, and that he will be ready to meet them. This point therefore is completely settled, and General Stuart has only one additional favor to request of Lord Macartney, which is, *that in the interval this settled conclusion may remain inviolably secret!*

“ The course of proceedings which General Stuart had, for a considerable time past, settled in his own mind, as the most honorable and proper for him to pursue in this matter, was this : that as his character and military conduct had been traduced and attacked in the severest terms by Lord Macartney, it became a primary duty on General Stuart's part, to address a petition to his Majesty, as the supreme judge of military merits, requesting the appointment of a Court of Enquiry, or a Court-martial for investigating, in the strictest manner, the whole of his (G. S.'s) conduct, while in the command of the forces of his Majesty and of the East India Company in India, in order that such judgment might be passed upon that conduct as the circumstances of it should appear to merit.

“ This, General Stuart has uniformly considered as a duty, which he owed to himself and to his friends, as well as what every man in a public situation, entrusted with the command of an army at a very critical and interesting period, owed to his King and country !

“ The *first* object of his wishes has therefore been to obtain that public opportunity of vindicating his honor and character, and establishing upon the ruins of detraction and misinformation, his claim to positive merit, in the conduct of the army entrusted to his command in India. This opportunity, he flatters himself, will now be very speedily obtained, especially as those causes of delay, which might have been founded on the absence of Lord Macartney, the principal accuser, are now removed.

“ So soon as General Stuart shall have performed this duty to the public and to himself, or in the event of his being refused the opportunity of that public method of vindicating his honor and character (an event which he cannot permit himself to think possible), in either case, the mode suggested by Lord Macartney, in the latter part of his note, namely, that of General Stuart's conveying his sentiments by a gentleman em-

ployed for that purpose, shall be adopted most certainly, and without loss of time!

“ P. S. The friend, whom General Stuart intends to be the bearer of the future message to Lord Macartney, above alluded to, happens to be now at Bath, otherwise, even this present communication would have been conveyed to his Lordship in that channel.”

Note.—The secrecy requested by Major-general Stuart, in the above note, was strictly observed by Lord Macartney, who heard no more from the General, till late on Saturday night, the 27th of May last, when, on his return from the Opera, he found at his own house the following note from Colonel Gordon.

D

“ Received May 27, 1786, at night,
on return from the Opera.

“ Colonel Gordon presents his compliments to Lord Macartney, and wishes to see him when convenient.

“ Saturday, quarter past nine o'clock, P. M.
No. 20, Charing Cross, Corner of Craig's Court.”

E

Note of Transaction with Colonel ANDREW GORDON, May 28, 1786.

“ Sunday, May 28, 1786.

THE next day, Sunday, May 28, Lord Macartney waited on Colonel Andrew Gordon at twelve o'clock, and received from him a packet from General Stuart, inclosing his letter, dated yesterday, and a paper called *State of Facts*.

The Colonel also shewed me a note, in General Stuart's handwriting, relative to the mode of meeting, which the Colonel said he would send me a copy of.

I told him I should certainly meet the General with great alacrity; but wished to settle my affairs first, as I was just come to town, and expected a friend from Oxford, who was lately returned from Ireland with some papers of mine for the arrangement of a mortgage on my estate, which he was charged to settle the payment of. I therefore thought it would be ten or twelve days before I could be ready, and that he should hear from me in the latter end of next week.

At a quarter before four, received from Colonel Gordon, inclosed in a cover, No. 1. and 2."

F—No. 1.

Note from Major-general JAMES STUART, dated May 27, 1786, received from Colonel ANDREW GORDON, May 28, 1786, inclosing State of Facts.

" TO LORD MACARTNEY,

" I have used every possible effort since your arrival in England, to obtain an examination of my military conduct while in India, by the most competent judges, and in the most public manner, in order that the false representation of it, which had originated with your Lordship, might be detected and exposed to public view, but I have met with very unexpected delays.

" My original intention was, that such public enquiry should precede every personal or private consideration of my own; but having remained so long in a state of uncertainty, and without any notification of an intention to grant the trial or enquiry, so earnestly and repeatedly solicited on my part, I cannot, under these circumstances, think of delaying any longer the duty I owe to myself.

" I therefore now demand that satisfaction, which, as a gentleman, I have a right to insist upon, in consequence of complicated injuries sus-

tained, proceeding either directly from you, or occasioned by the various misrepresentations and falsehoods on your part respecting me and my conduct; falsehoods the more unjustifiable, because, in many instances, they were contrary to evidence consistent with your own knowledge at the time.

“ It is needless for me to bring to your recollection all the instances which authorize me to express myself in these terms; it may be sufficient, at present, to select one very remarkable instance, the particulars of which I have thought proper to insert in a *State of Facts*, annexed to this letter.

“ From thence it will appear, that the representation you gave of me, and of my conduct, in your letter to the India directors of 30th September 1783, wherein you took occasion also to add *insult* to *injury*, has been in the most convincing manner, and by evidence upon oath, taken at the trial of Sir John Burgoyne, proved to be totally false, and that you knew it to be so, at the time you wrote that letter.

“ From the annexed state, it appears likewise that the story you had thus invented, and in which, without the knowledge of Sir John Burgoyne, you had made use of his name, as deriving your authority from him, has been positively contradicted by that respectable officer himself, notwithstanding the compliments which in your letter to the directors, you affected to pay to him at my expense, and which he has honorably disdained to accept, knowing the injustice of the representation given of me in that letter.

“ I have now only to repeat my demand for immediate satisfaction,

“ And am, &c.

(Signed)

“ JAMES STUART.”

“ Lower Grosvenor-Street,

Saturday Evening, May 27, 1786.

“ P. S. The gentleman who has done me the honor to be the bearer of this letter knows my mind ; he has full power to settle what remains to be done, either with you or with your friend.

(Signed) “ JAMES STUART.”

G—No. 2.

STATE OF FACTS.

Extract of a Letter from Lord MACARTNEY, &c. to the Court of Directors, dated September 30, 1783.

“ Paragraph 117. From General Stuart, he (Sir John Burgoyne) came to the President. *He acknowledged he was desired to feign compliance with the wishes of Government, and to promise accepting the command ; but he disdained to follow so reprobate a precedent.* He honestly gave notice to the Committee, that Major-general Stuart was about issuing orders to be distributed that very night to the King's troops, and he avowed himself ready to obey them.

“ Paragraph 118. The illegal assumption of authority in itself justifies the supposition of illegal designs, and in the present instance they could be no other.

“ Paragraph 119. General Stuart had not, since his return from Cuddalore, been in the immediate command of the army. Sir John Burgoyne had, under him, that command. Major-general Stuart could have at that time no orders to issue in the common course of carrying on the service ; it must have been orders with a view to extraordinary purposes, fitted to the wild and desperate nature of his pretensions, and to the situation of his mind.

“ Paragraph 120. He had left the Fort, and had with him the confidential person, whom on particular occasions he preferred to the Adjutant-general, for distributing his orders. The King's troops were little distant, and through General Burgoyne were ready to obey him.

(Signed)

“ MACARTNEY.

“ ANTHONY SADLIER.

“ ALEXANDER DAVIDSON.

(Signed) “ JAMES STUART.”

“ In the Court-martial, which was assembled at Madras in the months of June and July 1785, for the trial of Sir John Burgoyne, one of the witnesses produced by the prisoner was Richard Johnson Esq. * who was called upon by Sir John Burgoyne, expressly for the purpose of ascertaining the conversations which had passed between Lord Macartney and Sir John at the meeting of the Select Committee alluded to in the said paragraph 117, and for disproving the remarkable assertion contained in the first part of that paragraph.

“ The account given by Mr. Johnston, upon oath, in answer to Sir John Burgoyne's questions, was as follows :

“ *Question* by Sir John Burgoyne.—Was you with me when I attended the Select Committee in the afternoon of the 17th of September 1783?

“ *Answer*, I was.

“ *Qu.* Did I tell you I took you with me on purpose to be present at any conversation that might pass between me and the Governor?

“ *Ans.* You did, and on some difficulty being made to my going into the room, you said the same thing, or words to that effect, to the Governor.

* The gentleman here mentioned is son to Lieutenant-general Johnston, Colonel of the second dragoons.

“ *Qu.* Did you minutely attend to what passed between his Lordship the Governor and myself?

“ *Ans.* I did, and took down notes.

“ *Qu.* Did you hear me during the time I was in the Committee room, or with Lord Macartney, tell his Lordship, or any of the members, *that General Stuart had desired me to feign compliance with accepting the command?*

“ *Ans.* I never heard you make use of words of that import to any person whatever.

Same day, 4th July 1785, ALEXANDER DAVIDSON, Esq. present President and Governor at Madras, sworn.

“ *Question by Sir John Burgoyne.*—Did you ever hear me tell Lord Macartney, *that General Stuart had desired me to feign compliance with accepting the command, but that I scorned such an act?*

“ *Answer,* I do not recollect.

“ *Qu.* Did Lord Macartney ever tell you so?

“ *Ans.* I do not recollect.

“ *Qu.* Have you not signed a letter to the Court of Directors, in which you say the Right Honorable President had informed you I did so?

“ *Ans.* I do not recollect.

“ *Qu.* Did you sign the letter to the Court of Directors of the 30th September 1783?

“ *Ans.* I beg to refer you to the records now before the court.

“ In addition to the evidence which arises from the result of these examinations of Mr. Johnston and Mr. Davidson, it must be sufficiently

clear, from the questions put by Sir John Burgoyne, and from his being the person who called upon these witnesses, that he, Sir John Burgoyne, was convinced of the falsehood of the intelligence which, in the letter of the 30th September 1783, had been sent to the East India Directors, in that essential part of it which had represented General Stuart as desiring him, Sir John Burgoyne, to feign compliance with the wishes of Government, &c. And it must be evident, that Sir John Burgoyne, by these examinations of Mr. Johnston and Mr. Davidson, meant to detect the falsehood of that intelligence, notwithstanding the mixture of compliment which it contained to him personally, at the expense of General Stuart.

“ But if any doubt could possibly remain as to Sir John Burgoyne’s positive contradiction of the intelligence which Lord Macartney pretended to have received from him, there is a letter of Sir John Burgoyne’s hand writing, signed by him on the 18th June 1785, and addressed by him to a person at Madras, which letter is now in General Stuart’s possession, and contains the following paragraph :

“ *I have to assure you that I never told Lord Macartney General Stuart had desired me to feign compliance with the wishes of Government, and to promise accepting the command.*”

“ Mr. Johnston, who was with me purposely, can inform you of all that past ; no other conversation ever took place on the subject with General Stuart and me, but what I have communicated to you.”

“ In consequence of the reference thus made to Mr. Johnston, in Sir John Burgoyne’s letter, the person to whom it was addressed wrote that same day, 18th June 1785, to Mr. Johnston, requesting that he would let him know, ‘ if he heard Sir John Burgoyne inform Lord Macartney, or any other member of Government, or any one else then or since that

‘ period, that he, Sir John, was desired by General Stuart to feign compliance with the wishes of Government, and to promise accepting the command, &c.’

“ To which inquiries Mr. Johnston gave the following answer by his letter of 18th of June 1785, now in General Stuart’s possession.

‘ SIR,

‘ I have received your letter of this date, and have only to say, that Sir John Burgoyne did carry me with him on the 30th * of September, purposely to be present at such conversation as might pass between him and Government; that he desired me to be particularly attentive, which I was, and well recollect every circumstance. *He did not inform Lord Macartney, or any other member of Government, that General Stuart had desired him to feign a compliance with the wishes of Government, and to promise accepting the command; nor did he, during the time I lived in his family, ever make use of words to that effect; and I do declare, the communication of this idea, given me by you, is the first I ever heard of it.*

‘ I have the honor to be, Sir,

‘ Your obedient humble servant,

(Signed) ‘ RICHARD JOHNSTON.’

“ In addition to all the preceding proofs, there are two affidavits by Captain Close and Captain Smart, both Aids-du-Camp to General Stuart, who, upon the 13th of October 1785, appeared before the Mayor of Madras, and there declared upon oath, ‘ that they were present at the whole of the conversation that passed between Major-general Stuart and Major-general Sir John Burgoyne on the 17th of September 1783, and

* The date is an evident mistake in the original. (Signed) J. S.

‘ that they never heard the said Major-general Stuart, *directly or indirectly,*
‘ *desire or suggest to the said Major-general Sir John Burgoyne, to feign*
‘ *compliance with the wishes of Government, and to promise accepting the*
‘ *command*; nor did they hear any words mentioned between them, the said
‘ Major-general James Stuart and Major-general Sir John Burgoyne, on
‘ any subject tending to that purport or effect.’—These affidavits are in
General Stuart’s possession.

“ IN the said Paragraph 117, of the letter from Lord Macartney, &c.
to the India Directors, it is said, ‘ but he (Sir John Burgoyne) *disdained*
‘ *to follow so reprobate a precedent.*’ This part of the paragraph is from
intention or accident expressed in such a manner, that it may be under-
stood either to be a repetition of words, used by Sir John Burgoyne in his
conversation with Lord Macartney; or to convey his Lordship’s own
commentary upon General Stuart’s conduct. If the first of these was in-
tended, the falsehood of it is proved in the most convincing manner. If
the second, it was a most unjustifiable expedient made use of by Lord
Macartney, first to assume for truth what he knew to be false, and then
to take occasion from that invented tale, to make a commentary upon
General Stuart by a paragraph, which, in a few words, conveyed as
much insulting and injurious abuse, as the force of language was capable
of affording.”

“ With regard to the *orders* which General Stuart was to issue to the
King’s troops, on the day on which he was arrested, it is said, ‘ that
‘ they must have been orders with a view to extraordinary purposes, fitted
‘ to the wild and desperate nature of his (General Stuart’s) pretensions,

‘and to the situation of his mind.’ It is to be observed, that on the 30th of September, when Lord Macartney, &c. were thus endeavoring to fill the minds of the Directors with apprehensions about the nature of desperate orders, *intended to have been issued* by General Stuart; Lord Macartney himself must have known precisely the nature of these orders; for it appears from Sir John Burgoyne’s defence upon his trial, that the very orders, thus alluded to, were sent to Sir John Burgoyne by General Stuart, on the evening of 17th September, when he was arrested, and that he (Sir John Burgoyne) next day issued these precise orders, as the orders of General Stuart to the King’s troops.

“ Orders thus publicly issued to his Majesty’s troops at the Presidency, copies whereof are in the orderly books of every Company in the King’s service there, could not fail to be universally known at Madras; and Lord Macartney must have had a copy of them: therefore, instead of mysteriously reasoning upon the nature of orders pretended to be unknown, it would have been more fair and candid to have stated the precise fact; and to have transmitted to the Directors a copy of these orders, that they might have been judged of from their contents, and not from Lord Macartney’s commentary.

“ The tendency of these orders was to acquaint the troops in his Majesty’s service, that the Select Committee had that day thought fit to dismiss him (General Stuart) from the service of the East India Company; but to declare, that he reckoned himself bound by the duty he owed to his Majesty, and to the troops, never to relinquish the command of his Majesty’s troops to any authority inferior to that of his Majesty, from whose authority he derived that command. And the orders concluded with declaring, that ‘ he hoped and trusted, that his example
‘ would be followed in every thing for forwarding the public service, at
‘ a crisis when unanimity in public exertion had become so essential to
‘ the national interest, and to the real good of the Hon. East India
‘ Company.’

“ When Sir John Burgoyne, in the course of his trial, was put upon his defence, he insisted that these orders of General Stuart’s, of the 17th September, should be publicly read to the judges upon the Court-martial, who would then judge whether he acted with propriety in telling the Right Hon. President (Lord Macartney), that he would obey them; and Sir John Burgoyne, in his defence, added, that he wished General Stuart’s orders to have their proper effect in the minds of the officers and soldiers.

“ The acquittal of Sir John Burgoyne by the Court-martial, shews what was their sense of his conduct upon this and other occasions.

THE Paragraph 120, of the letter to the Directors (30th September 1783) says, ‘ that General Stuart had left the Fort; and had with him the ‘ confidential person whom, on particular occasions, he preferred to the ‘ Adjutant-general, for distributing his orders, &c.’ This is stated as a circumstance for persuading the Directors, that General Stuart was at that time meditating some very extraordinary purpose. The Adjutant-general alluded to by Lord Macartney is Lieutenant-colonel Malcolm, who was Adjutant-general *to the Company’s troops only*; but the person employed by General Stuart upon this and other occasions, in his separate orders to the King’s troops, was Major (now Lieutenant-colonel) Grattan, *the Adjutant-general to his Majesty’s troops in the East Indies*, who had been employed in that capacity by Sir Eyre Coote, and of course by General Stuart. The very orders, issued by General Stuart, on the 17th of September 1783, were signed by Major Grattan, describing himself thus ‘ Adjutant-general to his Majesty’s forces in India.’ These particulars must have been known to Lord Macartney at the time when he signed the letter to the Directors of 30th September 1783.

“ I have signed every page of this State of Facts.

(Signed)

“ JAMES STUART.”

“ Lower Grosvenor-Street, May 27, 1786.

Received from Colonel ANDREW GORDON, inclosing No. 1. and 2. at four o'clock P. M. on the 28th May 1786.—No. 1.

“ The conversation which passed this day having been communicated to G. S. he replied, and put in writing, now in my possession as follows : I have read what is stated as a conversation between L. M. and C. G. and have no objections to L. M's precautions, and shall in other respects leave my concerns to C. G. the delay if necessary to L. M. is agreeable to me.

(Signed) “ J. S.”

“ May 28th, two o'clock P. M.

Message.—No. 2.

“ The place of rendezvous proposed by G. S., if equally agreeable to L. M., is at twenty minutes drive from the outside of Tyburn turnpike ; at which place, he and his friend, who is the bearer of this message, will be to-morrow morning at half past five in a carriage which will lead to the rendezvous.

“ The arms, for the occasion, carried by G. S. will be two brace of pistols, common size, ready loaded with single ball, and they will be wrapped up in a cloak or great coat.

“ It is much wished, that L. M. may provide himself equally well, and with the same precautions ; but in case he has not the means ready, then G. S. will give him a due proportion of his arms.

“ G. S. and his friend, will not move from the station outside of the Tyburn turnpike until the carriage with L. M. and his friend does come there, which he hopes will suit with L. M's convenience to be at the hour above-named.

(Signed) “ J. S.”

“ May 28, 1786.

H

Note for Colonel ANDREW GORDON, in consequence of the Letter inclosing State of Facts, from Major-general STUART, dated May 27, 1786, and delivered by Colonel GORDON to Lord MACARTNEY on the 28th May 1786.

“ Charles-Street, June 6, 1786.

“ IF any gentleman, feeling himself hurt by such a representation as, in a public capacity, I thought it my duty to make of him, requested in decent terms an explanation of the same from me, I should be very much disposed to give it to him; but when Major-general Stuart thought fit in January last (*the very day after my arrival in London from India*) to send a letter with inclosures to me, censuring, in unqualified expressions, my public conduct in relation to him, and contradicting my assertions, I held it sufficient to observe, that those persons to whom I was accountable for my public conduct, if any such there were, who entertained a doubt of it, would ever find me ready to explain it to their satisfaction; but that I was long resigned to the consequences of having fulfilled the duties of my station, and to be exposed to the contradiction and opposition of those individuals, of whose misconduct in my official capacity I had been obliged to take notice, concluding by saying, that if Major-general Stuart had any drift not directly expressed, (which it was sufficiently obvious he had), I desired he might make it known through any gentleman he might chuse to appoint, as I should take no notice of communications in any other manner from him. The General, by a second paper sent to me in the same month of January, seemed perfectly satisfied at my conceiving at once the object to which he aimed, and which being once decided upon, all further discussion of the subject which led to it is out of time, and a renewal of accusation and abuse loses its edge, as not being able to provoke to more than was already determined to be done. On every account therefore, Major-general Stuart has no right to expect that I should take notice of his late letter or inclosure, otherwise than by settling

with his friend as I have done the point of ultimate satisfaction, which the General has had in view. I wish, however, that his friend should know that I have no difficulty in repelling the accusations contained in the papers, communicated to him by Major-general Stuart; for I was authorized to declare, that Major-general Sir John Burgoyne *did acknowledge that he was desired to feign compliance with the wishes of Government, and to promise accepting the command, but he disdained to follow so reprobate a precedent*; because the fact certainly is, that General Sir John Burgoyne did relate such desire or advice to me on the 17th of September 1783, and as I know no motive that could induce him to make such assertion without ground, I believed him, and therefore used the expression of his having acknowledged such advice. What was the cause or motive of his subsequent denial of this assertion, whether he forgot that he had made it, among others in the course of a long and desultory conversation, when his mind was considerably agitated, or whether, from the shame of having betrayed what was, no doubt, meant to be a very private and confidential request, or advice, he chose to screen himself under a denial of the same precise words, notwithstanding a consciousness of having conveyed the same precise idea, I am not interested to enquire; or whether his brother-in-law, Mr. Johnston, did really hear every word spoken by Sir John Burgoyne, in the different parts of the Fort-house, sometimes in my apartments, sometimes in the Council-chamber, and sometimes in the viranda or gallery before the Fort-house, during the conferences which lasted altogether in those different places during several hours, on the 17th of September 1783, without all which, such negative testimony is deserving of no attention; but it is a positive truth and fact, that I did hear Major-general Burgoyne make that declaration, and I find that it is also in the clear perfect recollection of the only person now in England, who was present at those conferences, Sir George Staunton, and who drew up an account of them at that time. By the extract from the Court-martial, contained in Major-general Stuart's paper, it does not appear that Mr. Davidson had his recollection present when examined on that occasion. He could not indeed hear the whole of what passed at these conferences,

with Major-general Sir John Burgoyne, on the 17th September 1783, as he was there only during a part of them, for I did not summon in the afternoon of that day the Select Committee of the Council, of which he was a member, until after I had some considerable conversation with General Burgoyne. It is not probable that any one person heard the whole of what was said during that day; but it is probable that Mr. Hudleston, then Secretary to the Select Committee, and who was present from the beginning, heard Major-general Sir John Burgoyne mention the advice he had thus received, but as I was refused a sight of the proceedings of the Court-martial when in India, notwithstanding my solicitations for that purpose, it is not surprising that I should be ignorant, whether that gentleman's evidence was taken, or whether he was examined to this point. This fact is related in the Select Committee's letter historically, and not as any ground on which our determinations rested, or were to be justified, and therefore would have been an invention, neither likely to occur, nor useful to be made, nor necessary to our purpose.

“ The fact of Major-general Stuart's issuing orders to the troops after he was dismissed from the Company's service, as asserted by me, to have been asserted by Major-general Sir John Burgoyne, is indeed a fact much more essential in this business, and does not appear to have been denied. As to my reasoning upon that fact, it must bear itself out, and it has done so. My fundamental and decisive position was, that after Major-general Stuart had been dismissed from the Company's service, it was an illegal act in him to issue any orders to any troops *in India*. And that position is founded on the most deliberate and scrupulous examination there to be unquestionably right. My letter, on the 30th September 1783, accounted for the measure among others of ordering Major-general Stuart to be arrested on the afternoon of the 17th September 1783. The propriety of that measure was to depend on the facts I knew, or had a right to assume at that precise time. I knew that Major-general Stuart had then no right to issue any orders. I knew he was actually issuing orders, and if my

reasoning be just, as it is found to be, I had a right to assume that the purport of the orders was as illegal as the authority to issue them. No fact that could come only to my knowledge afterwards, could have been brought by me in justification of that measure, and I am sufficiently justified, if the facts then within my knowledge authorized the measure, even if others had come afterwards to light, which, if then known, ought to have prevented it. My letter thereon of the 30th September 1783, properly and clearly alluded to and reported my reasoning on the afternoon of the 17th day of the same month, previous and leading to the determination of arresting Major-general Stuart; nor did any fact come in that interval or since to light, capable of overturning or weakening the inferences I then drew; for I know no fact that has appeared to prove that the orders which Major-general Stuart was preparing to issue to the troops when he was at liberty, and without expecting to be arrested before he could issue them, were the identical orders, which, after he had been arrested, he thought, in his new position, proper to send to Major-general Sir John Burgoyne to issue to the troops; and if, as is likely, for it could not be avoided without inconsistency, those orders took notice of the new event that took place with regard to him, these orders must of course differ from those which were preparing before such event took place. Another event did happen after the arrest, which has added great probability to the inferences which had been drawn by me before it. Major-general Stuart was allowed, upon being arrested, to gather up the papers on which he was busy at his table with Major John Grattan, his Secretary, and Aid-du-Camp, and which papers probably were, or were in part, those orders so intended to be issued. Major-general Stuart took those papers with him into his palankeen, which conveyed him from the place of his arrest towards the Fort, and in his way thither he was observed to tear several papers. It is not unwarrantable to conjecture, that Major-general Stuart would not, on so critical an occasion, gather papers, about which he appeared to be anxious, for the purpose of tearing them as useless, and therefore that he was anxious about them, and in a hurry to destroy them, as being papers of an illegal purport, which would it seems confirm the

suspensions of his illegal designs. I was as justifiable in denying the legality of Major John Grattan's appointment in India by *Sir Eyre Coote* to be Adjutant-general of the King's forces, as I have been in denying the legality of Major-general Stuart's issuing orders to the troops, after his dismissal from the Company's service. His Majesty, by the Secretary at War's letter, has declared that the appointment could only be made by the King himself, and consequently Sir Eyre Coote had no authority to appoint Major Grattan. Major Grattan was not therefore, in September 1783, Adjutant-general of the King's troops, nor, as I did not then allow any such pretension on his part, could I officially describe him otherwise than as I justly described him, the confidential person whom, on particular occasions, he (Major-general Stuart) preferred to the Adjutant-general (Lieutenant-colonel Malcolm) for distributing his orders.

An Account of the Duel.

“ London, June 8, 1786.

“ This morning a duel was fought near Kensington between Lord Macartney and Major General Stuart, of which the following is an authentic account, as transmitted to us by the seconds, Colonel Fullarton and Colonel Gordon, the former accompanying Lord Macartney and the latter General Stuart; the place and time of meeting having been previously fixed, the parties arrived about half past four o'clock in the morning, and took their ground at the distance of twelve short paces, measured off by the seconds, who delivered to each one pistol, keeping possession of the remaining arms. General Stuart told Lord Macartney he doubted, as his Lordship was short sighted, he would not be able to see him; his Lordship replied, “ he did perfectly well.” When the seconds had retired a little on one side, and as the parties were about to level, General Stuart observed to Lord Macartney, that his pistol was not cocked; his Lordship thanked him and cocked; when they had levelled General Stuart said he was ready; his Lordship answered he was likewise ready, and they both fired within a few instants of each other; the seconds observing Lord Macartney

wounded, stepped up to him and declared the matter must rest here: General Stuart said "this is no satisfaction," and asked if his Lordship was not able to fire another pistol; his Lordship replied, "he would try with pleasure," and urged Colonel Fullarton to permit him to proceed; the seconds however declared it was impossible, and they would on no account allow it: General Stuart said "then I must defer it till another occasion:" on which his Lordship answered "if that is the case we had better proceed now, I am here in consequence of a message from General Stuart, who called upon me to give him satisfaction in my private capacity, for offence taken at my public conduct, and to evince that personal safety is no consideration with me, I have nothing personal, the General will proceed as he thinks fit." General Stuart said it was his Lordship's personal conduct to him, that he resented; the seconds then put a stop to all further conversation between the parties, neither of whom had quitted their ground: General Stuart in consequence of his situation, having been under the necessity, from the first, of putting his back to a tree.

"The surgeons, Mr. Hunter and Mr. Home, who were attending at a little distance, were brought up by Colonel Fullarton. Colonel Gordon, in the mean time, assisted his Lordship in taking off his coat, and requested him to sit down, apprehending he might be faint, through loss of blood. Colonel Gordon then left the ground in company with General Stuart, and an easy carriage was provided to convey his Lordship home.

"The seconds cannot help expressing, that no two persons ever met on a similar occasion, who showed more firmness and composure; and they are happy to add, that the ball is extracted, which was lodged in Lord Macartney's right shoulder, and that there is every reason to hope for his recovery.

(Signed)

" W. FULLARTON.

" A. GORDON."

Letter from Captain COLE, Slane Castle, to Lord MACARTNEY, Aug. 1786.

[Received in London, Oct. 1786.]

“ MY LORD,

“ I think it is most probable your Lordship has no recollection of me. Among the number of officers that did business with you in the East Indies I was one, as pay master and Captain in the 101st Regiment, and was a silent spectator of much uneasiness you must have suffered from a great deal of vexatious opposition. I confess I was much surprised, on reading last week the correspondence between you and General Stuart, to find that Sir John Burgoyne should have denied saying that General Stuart wished him to feign taking the command. The cause of my troubling you at present is my having a perfect recollection of Sir John's saying so at Mr. Balfours, where I dined the day he refused the command, and adding, it was what he could not think of doing. Your Lordship may make what use you chuse of my assertion, and if necessary, shall have my oath of it ; for it will make me happy, at all times, to do justice to a character that I am sure every honest man must approve of ; and to assist in support of your Lordship's veracity in this case, where it may be so difficult to procure people who *wish* to recollect the circumstance.

“ I am your Lordship's most obedient servant,

“ H. S. G. COLE.”

“ Castle of Slane, near Drogheda, Ireland.”

Lord MACARTNEY's Letter to Captain COLE, London, 26th October 1786.

“ DEAR SIR,

“ London, October 26, 1786.

“ THE letter you were so good as to write to me from Slane Castle, and which appears from the post mark to be of so old a date as the 31st of August, did not come to my hands till after my return to London a few

days ago, or you would have much sooner received my acknowledgment of it, as well as my best thanks for the satisfaction it has given me. Though I perfectly remember the pleasure of seeing you at Madras, and could expect every thing honorable from your character, yet as I did not know that Sir John Burgoyne had repeated in your presence, what he had asserted in mine, though he afterwards thought it necessary to deny it, it could not occur to me to apply to you for a corroboration of the fact from so respectable a testimony. A declaration therefore made on your part, from a love of justice, cannot but be particularly gratifying and useful to me; it is so much so, that I readily avail myself of your handsome offer, to make your declaration upon oath, which I request you will render as circumstantial as your memory will enable you. It is indeed the more unaccountable that any motive should have induced Sir John Burgoyne to retract this assertion, repeated by him verbally, as I have undoubted information of his having related the same fact by letter, to one or more persons in England; but in a matter where such artful pains have been taken to throw a doubt on my veracity, you will easily conceive how anxious I am to be possessed of indubitable proofs in its favor, and shall therefore be impatient to have your deposition, as soon as you can forward it to him who is with great esteem,

“ Dear Sir,

“ Your most obedient,

“ and most faithful servant.

(Signed)

“ MACARTNEY.”

“ HENRY ST. GEORGE COLE, Esq.
at Slane Castle, near Drogheda, Ireland.”

County of MEATH, }
to Wit. }

*The Affidavit of HENRY ST. GEORGE COLE, Esq.
taken before me this 9th day of March 1787, one
of his Majesty's Justices of the Peace for said
County of Meath.*

“ HENRY ST. GEORGE COLE, Esq. late Captain in his Majesty's 101st Regiment of foot, came this day before me, and made voluntary oath on the holy evangelists, that he was at Madras in September 1783, when General Stuart was made prisoner, and the command of the army offered (as this deponent understood) to General Sir John Burgoyne, that among other matters, this deponent recollects Sir John Burgoyne's relating that General Stuart had proposed it to him to feign accepting the command of the army, which he, said Sir John Burgoyne, said he declined, not thinking it consistent with the character he was to support; that this deponent having accidentally met a pamphlet published by directions of General Stuart, as he supposes, in which the above circumstance is denied, and Lord Macartney charged with making such assertion without foundation, that thereupon this deponent thought himself bound in honor, truth, and justice, to communicate to Lord Macartney what he had heard General Sir John Burgoyne relate upon the occasion, as is above mentioned, and to offer to corroborate the same upon oath, which he hath hereby done accordingly.

“ H. S. G. COLE,
“ late Captain, 101st Regiment.

“ Sworn before me this 9th March 1787.

“ BRABY MORRIS.”

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

Strahan and Preston,
New-Street Square, London.

Macartney, George Macartney, 1737-1806

Some account of the public life, and a selection from the unpublished writings, of the Earl of Macartney the latter consisting of extracts from an account of the Russian Empire: a sketch of the political history of Ireland: and a journal of an embassy from the King of Great Britain to the
Bd.: 1

London 1807

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